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1 Summary 
The aim of the present work was to advance research on social intelligence and to 
establish it as a viable new ability construct within the nomological network of existing 
human ability constructs. The present work adhered to the requirements on a new intelligence 
construct as established in the research literature on intelligence (Matthews, Zeidner, & 
Roberts, 2005; O’Sullivan, 1983; Schaie, 2001; Süß, 2001; Weber & Westmeyer, 2001). In 
accordance with these requirements, the focus of the present work firstly, was on the 
theoretical and methodological substantiation of the construct, and secondly on the 
development of a test battery of social intelligence (i.e., the Social Intelligence Test 
Magdeburg, SIM. The most central research questions concerned the investigation of the 
psychometric properties of the newly developed tasks and the construct validity of social 
intelligence as assessed by the SIM. 
Theoretical Foundations 
Social intelligence, in the present study, is based on the performance model of Weis 
and Süß (2005; see also Weis, Seidel, & Süß, 2006) and only contains cognitive ability 
requirements. The model originally represented a structural model distinguishing between 
social understanding, social memory, social perception, and social creativity as the cognitive 
ability domains. The model is modified in the present work by adding a hierarchical 
assumption in terms of a higher-order social intelligence factor. In extension to this 
differentiation of operative requirements, further taxonomic considerations are applied which 
identify additional relevant classificatory principles in definitions of social intelligence: (a) 
contents or cues (e.g., the tone of voice in spoken language or gestures displayed in pictures 
or videos), (b) the queried modalities (i.e., the requested output of a task such as the judgment 
of emotions or personality traits), (c) the settings (i.e., the surrounding contexts), and (d) the 
targets (i.e., as the objects of the cognitive operation such as the self or others, familiar 
persons or strangers). These taxonomic considerations do not claim to be exhaustive, rather 
they serve as classificatory principles of existing measurement approaches and as foundations 
for the subsequent test development. 
In the context of the theoretical foundation, related constructs such as emotional 
intelligence are also addressed where the most central theoretical models are described and 
discussed. Substantial theoretical shortcomings are identified, related to the current state of 
conceptualization of the emotional intelligence construct (i.e., the Four-Branch-Model of 
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Emotional Intelligence; Mayer & Salovey, 1997). These concern the differentiation of 
emotional processes and contents, and cognitive processes and contents, and the postulated 
performance requirements of the Four Branches. It is mainly criticized that the interplay of 
emotional and cognitive processes is not clarified by the Four-Branch-Model and that some 
Branches contain behavioral and knowledge requirements. For the lack of comprehensive 
empirical evidence, the present work elaborates the construct overlap of social and emotional 
intelligence relying on theoretical accounts. Furthermore, domain-specific overlap is 
identified. 
Methodological Foundations 
Prior to the description of the test development, existing measurement approaches and 
the surrounding methodological problems are described with a strong focus on cognitive 
ability tests. In this context, the problems of item origin, the relevance of context information, 
different response formats, and scoring procedures are discussed. Against this background 
and referring to the preceding taxonomic considerations, existing measurement approaches to 
assess social intelligence as a cognitive performance construct are sampled and discussed in 
light of the methodological shortcomings and the resulting validity evidence. The conclusions 
from these considerations identify problems surrounding the use of artificial and 
decontextualized item material, the use of only written language contents, the adequate 
scoring procedure, and a mismatch between the purported measurement construct and the 
actual task requirements. As a consequence, many existing measurement approaches lack 
evidence for the convergent and divergent construct validity. 
Test Development and Research Questions 
The test development in the present work was based on the performance model of 
Weis and Süß (2005) and the associated taxonomic considerations. The test design cross-
classified three operative ability domains (i.e., social understanding, social memory, and 
social perception) and four material related content domains (i.e., written and spoken 
language, pictures, and videos). This classification resulted in a 3 x 4 multitrait-multimethod 
design and was foremost intended to balance method-related variance. Additionally, all tasks 
systematically varied the type of setting (i.e., private vs. public) and the number of persons 
involved in the situations (i.e., one person, a dyad, and small groups). All tasks relied on 
genuine task material that was sampled in natural settings involving real persons. 
The test principles of the three operational ability domains will be summarized briefly 
in the upcoming sections. (a) The social understanding tasks relied on a scenario approach 
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applying the so-called postdiction paradigm. The tasks consisted of eight scenarios, each 
related to one target person. One scenario consisted of a specific number of scenes which 
were related to the four material related content domains. Based on each of the scenes, 
subjects were required to judge the emotions and the cognitions of the target persons, and the 
relationship of the target to the other persons displayed in the scene. At the end of each 
scenario, subjects had to rate the personality traits of the target persons and answer control 
questions about the perceived sympathy, the assumed similarity, and the self-assessed 
empathic compassion and the perspective taking skills for the respective target person. The 
response format in the final task version was a 7-point rating scale. Answers were scored in 
terms of the weighted difference to the target answer (i.e., target scoring). (b) The tasks of 
social memory required subjects to watch, read or listen to extracts from social situations. 
They had to answer multiple-choice or open-ended questions about socially relevant details. 
Presentation and answering times were limited, and answers were scored in terms of the 
proportion of correct answers. (c) The test principle of the social perception tasks required the 
quick identification of previously presented targets within social situations (i.e., within a 
written or spoken sentence, within a picture or a video). Targets were, for example, the 
utterance of an emotion, a disagreement, a specific name, a person wearing different types of 
clothes or more interactive social facts such as touch or eye contact. Subjects had to strike a 
key as soon as they detected the target. The answering format was the response latency 
between the stimulus presentation and the key stroke. 
The pivotal research questions concerned the investigation of the psychometric 
properties of the social intelligence tasks and the examination of the construct validity of 
social intelligence as assessed by the SIM. The hypotheses of the construct validity 
established testable models of (a) the internal structure of social intelligence as postulated in 
the design of the test battery and (b) the relationship between the broad ability factors of 
social and academic intelligence (divergent construct validity). Additionally, it was expected 
that social intelligence would show divergent construct validity with personality traits. 
Amongst others, some further research questions concerned the convergent construct validity 
with a measure of nonverbal sensitivity (i.e., a construct related to social and emotional 
abilities), the exploration of gender differences, the exploration of different scoring methods 
for the social understanding tasks, and the investigation of the faceted structure of social 
understanding. 
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Method: Studies and Materials 
The present work was based on two main studies. One hundred twenty six German 
university students participated in Study 1. The mean age was 21.35 (sd = 3.06), and 53.5 % 
were females. In Study 2, an unselected sample of adults was applied. Participants were 
between 23 and 40 years old (mage = 28.69; sd = 5.57) and 58.8 % of the subjects were female. 
The sample consisted of heterogeneous subjects in terms of age, education, and occupation. 
Both studies applied the test battery of social intelligence and the Berlin Intelligence 
Structure Test (BIS-Test; Jäger, Süß, & Beauducel, 1997) as a measure of academic 
intelligence. Additionally, several trait inventories of personality were applied. In both 
studies, additional measures were utilized that were not directly related to the research 
questions, thus they are not mentioned at this point. 
Empirical Results and Discussion 
In addition to the pivotal research questions, Study 1 was particularly directed at the 
investigation of adequate item and response formats and of the presentation and answering 
times of the social intelligence tasks. However, the present summary addresses both studies 
without detailing the concrete steps of test development in between. The focus is rather on the 
answers to the research questions. 
Referring to the psychometric properties, most of the newly developed tasks showed 
sufficient reliability coefficients. In Study 2, Cronbach’s alpha of the social understanding 
tasks ranged between .75 and .85. The reliability coefficients of the social memory tasks 
showed a large range (between .19 and .84) with rather low coefficients for one auditory and 
two pictorial tasks. The reliabilities of the social perception tasks were the largest and ranged 
between .71 and .98. After some necessary steps of data cleaning (i.e., dealing with missing 
values, correction of outliers, and trimming of the reaction time scores), the final scales were 
found to be normally distributed. 
With respect to the internal structure of social intelligence, confirmatory factor 
analysis supported a two-factor structural model with two correlated factors of social 
understanding and memory. The factor intercorrelations were r = .35 in Study 1 and r = .20 in 
Study 2. No higher-order general social intelligence factor was supported in Study 2. Results 
also showed good data fit of a faceted model of social intelligence with two correlated 
operative (i.e., social understanding and memory) and two correlated content related factors 
(i.e., language-based and language-free contents). The factor intercorrelations were r = .25 
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and .26, respectively for the operative and the content factors. However, the loadings on both 
content related factors were rather heterogeneous, rendering the factors difficult to interpret. 
Regarding the construct validity, confirmatory factor analysis supported discriminable 
social and academic intelligence factors with low correlations between social understanding 
and the BIS-Reasoning factor (r = .00 in Study 1 and r = .14 in Study 2). The social memory 
factor and BIS-Memory were substantially correlated with r = .42 in Study 1 and r = .67 in 
Study 2. However, the social intelligence structural model proved structure independency 
from academic intelligence: when BIS-Test variance was partialled out of the single tasks, 
confirmatory factor analysis replicated the structural model of social intelligence based on the 
residuals. Furthermore, correlational analysis supported the divergent construct validity of the 
social intelligence tasks with personality traits. The correlational analysis in Study 2 did not 
support the convergent construct validity with a measure of nonverbal sensitive. 
The exploration of gender effects showed only a few significant gender differences in 
the tasks of both studies, most of them in favor of women. Surprisingly, males tended to 
perform better on the social understanding tasks in Study 2 while females performed better on 
the tasks in Study 1. However, both effects were not significant. An exploration of alternative 
scoring methods for the social understanding tasks revealed substantial weaknesses of group 
consensus and correlations-based scoring methods. Target and group consensus scoring of the 
respective content related scales were highly intercorrelated with a smaller correlation 
between the written language scales (r = .314 - .783). However, Study 2 showed that 
correlations between group consensus and target scoring were difficult to interpret. The 
correlation size depended on the item difficulty. Moreover, it was demonstrated that the 
bivariate distributions between target and group consensus scoring revealed a curvilinear 
relationship under certain conditions. With respect to correlations-based scoring methods, 
Study 2 showed very low reliabilities and comparably low intercorrelations between the 
respective content related scales (r = .271 - .430). 
Regarding the faceted structure of the social understanding tasks, these were based on 
a 4 x 3 x 2 design cross-classifying four content domains (i.e., written and spoken language, 
pictures, and videos), three modality domains (i.e., emotions, cognition, and relationships), 
and two setting domains (i.e., private and public). Confirmatory factor analysis supported the 
modality facet with one factor related to the judgment of emotions and cognitions, and one 
factor related to the judgment of relationships. Analysis further supported the differentiation 
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into a language-based and a language-free factor. However, the loadings were heterogeneous 
on the content factors, making the factors difficult to interpret. 
Besides the discussion of the aforementioned research results and their consequences 
for the social intelligence construct, the test approach and the underlying taxonomic 
considerations are discussed. Several decisions during the course of test development and the 
resultant tasks are subject to critical discussion such as the application of genuine task 
material, the target scoring procedure, the process of item construction and selection, and the 
cognitive processes underlying the social understanding tasks. Finally, some considerations 
about test modifications and extensions are addressed. Complementary interesting research 
questions that add to the current results are also discussed. 
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2 Introduction 
Research on human abilities is more than 100 years old (Spearman, 1904). Research 
on social intelligence started only a few years after Spearman (1904) introduced academic 
intelligence (Thorndike, 1920). Thus, social intelligence was one of the first candidates for a 
new intelligence construct to complement traditional human ability concepts. In a series of 
several researchers, Landy (2005, 2006) was the last to outline the history of social 
intelligence, while Walker and Foley (1973), Orlik (1978), Matthews, Zeidner, and Roberts 
(2002), and Weis and Süß (2005; see also Weis et al., 2006) have all reviewed the literature in 
terms of theoretical and empirical accounts. In recognition of its long although disputed 
history, Landy (2006) referred to research on SI as a long, frustrating, and fruitless search, 
presently ending up in its “replacement with the more modern term emotional intelligence” 
(p. 81). 
Today, emotional intelligence represents a younger candidate for a new ability 
construct. It was introduced by Salovey and Mayer in 1990. Subsequent attempts to establish 
emotional intelligence as a new intelligence construct were faced with still ongoing 
controversial discussions and its utility is still questioned today (Weber & Westmeyer, 2001; 
Zeidner, Matthews, & Roberts, 2001; Landy, 2006; Ashkanasy & Daus, 2005; Mayer, 
Salovey, & Caruso, 2000; see also a discussion forum in the German journal ‘Zeitschrift für 
Personalpsychologie’ in 2002, volume 3 with contributions from Asendorpf, Heller, 
Neubauer & Freudenthaler, Schmidt-Atzert, and Schuler). Thus, why did Landy speak of the 
replacement of social by emotional intelligence? Why can nearly every single one of the 
aforementioned reviews on social intelligence be found in the context of publications on 
emotional intelligence? And why did Goleman entitle social intelligence as “The new science 
of human relationships” in his recently published book (2006). An answer to these questions 
would surely require a longer examination than there is space in this introduction. Hopefully, 
some answers will be provided throughout the present work. 
At present, this controversially discussed development of social and emotional ability 
constructs should be illustrated in more detail. It is, for example, also reflected in the number 
of publications in scientific search engines (see Fig. 2.1 for the number of publications in 
PsychInfo). Publications before 1960 are not displayed. Before 1960, emotional intelligence 
(or the term emotional competence) was not apparent. The number of publications ranged 
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from two to 37 (with a peak around the early 1930s) for social intelligence and from zero to 
28 for social competence. 
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Figure 2.1 
Number of Publications of Social and Emotional Intelligence, Social and Emotional 
Competence 
Note. SI = social intelligence, EI = emotional intelligence, SC = social competence, 
EC = emotional competence. 
 
From its introduction in 1990, the number of publications on emotional intelligence 
has exploded from 6 between 1990 and 1994 up to 1055 between 2000 and 2006. Social 
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intelligence could not exhibit an approximately comparable career. Moreover, 16 % of the 
publications on social intelligence appeared in the context of publications on emotional 
intelligence since the introduction of the latter in 1990. 
The diverse careers of intelligence constructs, including academic, social, and 
emotional intelligence as human ability constructs can be attributed to several reasons. Some 
of them will be shortly mentioned hereafter and discussed in detail throughout this thesis. 
Academic intelligence represents the prototype of an intelligence construct. Consequently, 
every newly emerging candidate for an intelligence construct has to compete with the 
standard set by academic intelligence. Social intelligence was originally defined as “the 
ability to understand and manage men and women, boys and girls, and to act wisely in human 
relations” and was distinguished from abstract and mechanical intelligence (Thorndike, 1920, 
p. 228). Thorndike (1920) conceived social and mechanical intelligence as logical 
complements to academic intelligence. He required “a genuine situation with real persons” for 
the measurement of social intelligence (p. 231). In his conception, social intelligence 
consisted of cognitive and behavioral requirements. However, from the outset, there were 
some major problems encountered during the establishment as an ability construct, which 
exists even today. One of the most striking problems represents the lack of genuineness of 
task material and task requirements. Assessment approaches were equivalent to those of 
academic intelligence tests; it was rare that the behavior of genuine persons served as stimuli. 
Instead, task material consisted of verbal descriptions of social situations or black and white 
paintings. Social intelligence was not separated conceptually and empirically from academic 
intelligence so that the general value of social intelligence as a viable intelligence construct 
was questioned. 
Emotional intelligence demonstrated an exponential gain of scientific attention (see 
Figure 2.1). However, the research has been criticized for committing some substantial errors, 
some of which are comparable to those found in social intelligence research. Some authors 
criticize emotional intelligence for applying a labeling approach which renames already 
existing constructs (e.g., alexithymia, emotional regulation, appraisal of emotions, or even 
social intelligence) into emotional intelligence (Hedlund & Sternberg, 2000). Others strongly 
question the value and justification of emotional intelligence as an intelligence construct 
(Asendorpf, 2002; O’Sullivan, 2007; Weber & Westmeyer, 2001). Thus, how could emotional 
intelligence attract such large numbers of researchers to publish 1.055 peer-reviewed articles, 
book chapters, books, or dissertations between 2000 and 2006? To some extent, this can be 
attributed to the attention emotional intelligence received after the publication of Goleman’s 
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book “Emotional Intelligence – Why it can matter more than IQ” (1995). After emotional 
intelligence was introduced by Salovey and Mayer (1990), only six publications emerged 
until 1994. After Goleman’s book in 1995, the number of publications rose up to 68 within 
the next five years which meant an 11.3 times multiplication factor. The practical significance 
of constructs such as social or emotional intelligence remains unquestioned at the latest since 
then. Contemporary society is searching for alternative ability concepts that can explain 
success in academic, work, and private life. The present day zeitgeist no longer opposes 
cognitive reasoning to emotional or social skills, but rather values the contributions of both to 
a broad understanding of human resources (Matthews et al., 2002). Laypersons’ conceptions 
of human intelligence include other than traditional intelligence concepts, among them social 
competence (Sternberg, Conway, Ketron, & Bernstein, 1981; see also Kosmitzki & John, 
1993). Most strikingly, personnel selection in all types of professions has already included the 
so-called soft skills into their selection strategies, at the same time hardly relying on 
established selection instruments to measure these skills. 
The objective of the present work was to put social intelligence on a sound fundament 
in terms of a systematic integration of concepts, definitions, and theories. Moreover, the 
underlying methodological accounts and measurement approaches should be elaborated and 
applied to develop a test battery of social intelligence as a multidimensional cognitive 
performance construct. In the first Chapters (3-4), the central theories and concepts of 
intelligence research including academic and social intelligence as well as the related 
concepts of emotional and practical intelligence will be introduced. Chapter 5 will focus on 
the assessment of social intelligence including a systematic overview and description of past 
measurement approaches and a discussion of the pertinent failures and actual problems in the 
assessment of social and emotional abilities. Derived from these considerations, in Chapter 6, 
the aims of the present work, the test construction principles and procedures, and the research 
questions and hypotheses are formulated. Chapters 7 and 8 deal with the two main studies 
underlying the present work. These chapters include information about the samples, the 
material applied, and the results of the studies. Finally, Chapter 9 will discuss the utility of the 
test battery, and the scope, utility, and the validity of the social intelligence construct. In 
Chapter 10, some considerations about necessary research questions that add to the current 
results will point towards future perspectives. 
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3 Basic Theoretical Concepts, Terms and Definitions 
In the encyclopedia, the term “intelligence” is defined as the abilities of the human 
intellect in the sense of an individual’s potential and the consecutive dynamic meanings 
(Dorsch “Psychologisches Wörterbuch” Häcker & Stapf, 1994). Carroll (1993) defined 
intelligence as a generic term for cognitive ability constructs that are generally valid for the 
accomplishment of heterogeneous tasks, problems, and situations. Common to all broad 
theoretical models and definitions is the basic idea that academic intelligence is a cognitive 
performance construct. Construct definitions only include cognitive operations, and task 
requirements are independent from contextual or situational influences. An overview of 
definitions was given by Sternberg and Berg (1986) who presented the results of two 
symposia on intelligence which had taken place 65 years apart from each other in the years 
1921 and 1986. In these symposia, the main protagonists of intelligence research were asked 
to define their notion of intelligence. Answers were manifold and ranged from intelligence is 
“what is valued by culture” to “speed of mental processing” with a maximum agreement of 
57 % in 1986 (50 % in 1921) for the definition of “higher level components (abstract 
reasoning, representation, problem solving, decision making)” (p. 158). Common to most of 
the definitions was the idea of intelligence as a cognitive performance construct. 
These symposia (Sternberg & Berg, 1986) already revealed interests in the extension 
of existing intelligence concepts. In 1921, 50 % and still in 1986, 25 % of the voters 
mentioned the “investigation of abilities other than cognitive” (p. 161) as one of the crucial 
next steps in intelligence research. Another 36 % in 1921 (21 % in 1986) asked for the 
investigation of intelligence in specific domains (music, arts, chess). Furthermore, the real-
life manifestations of intelligence were of interest for 14 % of the voters in 1921 and for 21 % 
in 1986. Furthermore, the extension of intelligence has been the topic of large amounts of 
diversely oriented efforts, among them the convention of reputable experts in intelligence 
research for a symposium on The Enhancement of Intelligence in the year 2001 (3rd 
International Spearman Seminar, Sydney, Australia; Kyllonen, Roberts, & Stankov, 2007). 
The contributions at this symposium reflected the diversity of extensions to intelligence 
concepts ranging from reductionist approaches to a “trend of diversification” (Süß, 2001, 
p. 109). A prototypical example of a reductionist approach is the mental speed paradigm 
(Neubauer, 1995; Vernon, 1993), which assumes that performance in intellectual tasks can be 
explained by and reduced to the general speed of information processing. At the other end of 
3   Basic Theoretical Concepts, Terms and Definitions  
 12 
the spectrum, the introduction of a new ability construct represents an attempt to diversify the 
field of human intelligence. 
In 1920, social intelligence was intended to extend traditional intelligence concepts. 
However, under the label of social intelligence, research was not as programmatic as, and was 
much more diverse than, academic intelligence research. Social skills were assessed as social 
intelligence by the use of self-report inventories (Marlowe, 1986; Riggio, 1986). Social 
behavior was judged by trained observers and should also operationalize social intelligence 
(Ford & Tisak, 1983, Frederiksen, Carlson, & Ward, 1984). Thus, compared to academic 
intelligence, the operationalizations also contained additional or distinct criteria than just 
cognitive requirements. The diversity of approaches resulted in limited progress of 
establishing social intelligence as a meaningful and unitary factor of human abilities. 
Moreover, the unsystematic use of definitions and measurement concepts resulted in 
legitimate skepticism of some authors (Ford, 1994) about whether to specify social 
intelligence as a performance or ability construct. 
Intelligence, Competence, and “Performanz” 
According to Weber and Westmeyer (2001), psychometric intelligence is considered a 
psychologically defined concept based on Wiggins’ (1973) distinction between 
psychologically and socially defined concepts. The former are defined by psychological 
research and prototypically applied as predictors in the context of psychological assessment 
(e.g., academic intelligence). Underlying the idea of socially defined concepts is a social-
constructivist perspective. In this respect, lay-psychologists in applied settings are responsible 
for defining and specifying a concept. Prototypical examples are external criteria in applied 
settings such as success in a job which is rated by a supervisor. Weber and Westmeyer 
criticized that these former external criteria are now introduced as new ability constructs; 
emotional (Salovey & Mayer, 1990), practical (Wagner & Sternberg, 1985), or successful 
intelligence (Sternberg, 1997) are, according to the authors, the ideal examples. 
The expressions intelligence and competence were often applied as synonyms in social 
intelligence research. Süß, Weis, and Seidel (2005b) identified important distinctions between 
the two concepts. According to the authors, competence is specific to different situations and 
contexts (i.e., in certain applied settings) and more subject to modification and learning than 
intelligence. Intelligence is comparatively stable over time and seen as hereditary to a 
substantial extent (Grigorenko, 2000). Thus, following Weber and Westmeyer (2001), social 
competence can be classified as a socially constructed concept, as it comprises all person-
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related preconditions to show successful behavior in varying types of applied settings. 
Definitions of social competence vary substantially according to the spectrum of covered 
human attributes from just one (e.g., management of conflict, communication skills) to a 
complex interaction of various variables (Süß et al., 2005b). Intelligence often is one 
necessary part of competence concepts. 
“Performanz”, an expression especially known from German research literature, 
indicates the finally expressed behavior (= the result) in contrast to the person-related 
preconditions that “only” enable behavior (= the potential). Whether a person is capable of 
showing successful or effective behavior is not a direct function of this person’s potential 
(i.e., competence and intelligence) and additionally, it is dependent from certain personality 
traits (e.g., shyness, altruism, etc.), from moods and current psychological states (e.g., fear, 
exhaustion), and from context variables (e.g., group values) (Süß et al., 2005b). The 
distinction between competence and “Performanz” is not only theoretical, it is also apparent 
when distinguishing between potential- and results-oriented approaches used to assess social 
competence. Contrary to the potential-oriented approaches, results-oriented approaches 
conceive social competence as effective behavior (= the outcome) where effectiveness is 
determined through the specific properties of the situation. 
Abilities and Skills 
Intelligence constructs usually consist of several distinguishable ability factors, for 
example, reasoning or verbal abilities. Competence constructs also contain cognitive and 
behavioral skills. According to Süß et al. (2005b, see also Scherer, 2007), skills are concrete 
actions or applications of cognitive operations on concretely defined problems (e.g., driving 
with a stick shift or applying an algorithm on some new data). Skills are acquired in a process 
of several steps and are finally characterized by an automated series of action (Ackerman, 
1987). Contrarily, abilities represent more general, dispositional capacities. They are “either 
genetically endowed or acquired over a long period of socialization” (Scherer, 2007; p. 103). 
Criteria to Judge Performance 
Literature in the context of academic intelligence provides numerous accounts on the 
scoring of performance (Guttman & Levy, 1991; Nevo, 1993). Answers are scored according 
to well defined and reproducible rules so that the verity of a defined correct answer is not 
questioned (Roberts, Zeidner, & Matthews, 2001). A detailed description of general scoring 
principles and the problem of objectivity in the assessment of new ability constructs are 
provided in Chapter 5.2.4. However, things are not so clear when scoring other types of tests, 
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such as those that are behavioral in nature. Scoring these types of tests are often more 
complicated since various criteria can or must be applied. These criteria can be classified into 
those that rely on the effectiveness of the achievement of a given goal, and those that judge 
behavior according to the compliance with valid social norms (Süß et al., 2005b). With 
respect to the latter, behavior is judged as socially competent when both the applied means 
and the achieved outcome are accepted by the respective social group. This implies context 
dependency of the scoring criterion. Consequently, assessing social competence according to 
the acceptance criterion requires highly specialized measures since every specific social 
group, setting, or situation, has its own standards. 
Integrating the Concepts: A Model of Socially Competent Behavior (Süß et al., 2005b) 
In summary, social competence can be classified into potential-oriented and results-
oriented concepts. Table 3.1 contrasts the three concepts with the help of prototypical 
examples of German and Anglo-American research literature (extracted from Süß et 
al., 2005b). 
Table 3.1 
Models of Social Competence (Extracted from Süß et al., 2005b) 
 Greif (1987) Kanning (2002) Schneider, Ackerman, and Kanfer (1996) 
Definition 
Effective realization 
of plans and aims in 
social interaction. 
Universe of a person’s knowledge, 
abilities, and skills that promote 
socially competent behavior. The 
latter is defined as effective 
behavior specific to the context in 
accordance with the social group. 
Effective social behavior 
and its cognitive, 
affective, and behavior-
related preconditions. 
Attributes / 
Dimensions 
Social perception 
Interpretation of 
social cues 
Social perception 
Behavioral control 
Assertiveness 
Social orientation 
Communication skills 
Social intelligence 
Social skills 
Interpersonal personality 
traits 
Social self-regulation 
Potential vs. 
Result Result-oriented Mixed model Potential-oriented 
Context 
included Yes Yes No 
Performance 
criterion Efficiency Efficiency and social acceptance Efficiency 
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In a pure results-oriented approach, Greif (1987) applied the idea of a control loop on 
socially competent behavior. In this feedback loop, a person acts to reach a certain aim and 
compares the outcome with the desired state until the aim is achieved. In contrast, Kanning 
(2002) incorporated both a results-oriented approach relying on a control loop, and a 
potential-oriented approach with person-related attributes that contribute to socially 
competent behavior (e.g., social perception, assertiveness, etc.). Schneider et al. (1996) 
focused solely on person-related attributes in a potential-oriented approach including both, 
ability and personality variables. 
In order to complete the conceptual framework for the present work, the integrative 
model of socially competent behavior by Süß et al. (2005b) will be described (see Figure 3.1). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1 
Integrative Model of Socially Competent Behavior (Adapted from Süß et al., 2005b) 
The cognitive ability constructs of social, emotional, and practical intelligence belong 
to the person-related preconditions. Social competence additionally consists of social and 
emotional skills that are not depicted in the diagram. Furthermore, variables such as 
interpersonally relevant personality traits or interests (e.g., agreeableness, altruism, etc.) are 
 15
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supposed to moderate the “Performanz” of socially competent behavior. Altogether, Süß et al. 
(2005b) speak of the person-related attributes, or potential, of a person. 
This framework integrates the preceding considerations in one diagram (see 
Figure 3.1). At the same time, it invalidates Ford’s (1994) critique that social intelligence 
cannot be specified as a pure ability construct (see also Asendorpf, 2002). According to Ford 
(1994) and Asendorpf (2002), individual differences in socially or emotionally intelligent 
performances cannot be specified without considering situational demands, social values, and 
personal aims. The present model of Süß (2005b) and colleagues clarifies the necessity to 
differentiate between the fundamental cognitive ability structure (the potential) as the 
preconditions that allow or influence the final social behavior, and the behavior itself (result). 
The moderating variables are expected to influence behavior directly and indirectly via an 
interaction with context-specific variables. For example, a certain context could reinforce the 
effect of a person’s interest and thus, may increase the probability of a concrete action. 
Cognitive ability constructs are, according to Carroll (1993), generally valid for the 
accomplishment of heterogeneous tasks, problems, and situations and thus, per definition, not 
context-dependent. Therefore, cognitive ability constructs should incorporate the ability to 
accomplish heterogeneous situational demands. In contrast, social behavior is influenced 
directly by the context and is supposedly always directed towards a social goal. Whether 
social behavior is judged as competent depends on whether or to what extent the goal is 
achieved and if the behavior and the goal comply with social norms. 
The focus of the present work is the cognitive ability constructs with the implications 
that it is conceived as generally valid across situations, not related to specific situative 
demands, and without behavioral components in theoretical or behavior definitions. 
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4 Human Abilities – Traditional and New Intelligence Constructs 
The following chapters deal with the theories and definitions of traditional and new 
intelligence constructs. First, some of the most influential theories of academic intelligence 
are presented with a focus on the type of the theoretical model, their relationship to each 
other, and the relevance for the social intelligence construct. Against this background, a 
systematic list of requirements for an intelligence construct will be assembled. Afterwards, 
definitions and theories of social intelligence are presented. A special focus is placed on the 
cognitive components of social ability concepts, resulting in a cognitive performance model 
of social intelligence. Lastly, new ability constructs such as emotional and practical 
intelligence will be presented, which are purportedly related to social intelligence. The type of 
overlap will be elaborated based on the presented theoretical foundations. 
4.1 Theories of Academic Intelligence 
In 1904, Spearman detected covariations between different types of sensory-
discrimination tasks. Consecutively, he claimed to have identified a common general 
intelligence factor, the g-factor, which was supposed to be responsible for positive 
correlations among different kinds of mental tasks (Spearman, 1927). According to Spearman, 
the variance of a task can be explained, on the one hand, by the variance of the g-factor and, 
on the other hand, by the task-specific variance. This task-specific variance is not shared with 
any other task and hence cannot contribute to the covariance between two tasks. 
Consequently, the larger the relative proportion of g-related variance in two tasks, the larger 
the correlations should be among the tasks (i.e., the positive manifold). This finding was the 
origin for the so-called g-theory of which Jensen (1997) is the most prominent representative. 
Its basic assumption views a broad general intelligence factor as the only systematic source of 
common variance between mental tasks.  
According to the g-theorists, these postulations have an important implication for new 
ability constructs. Unless a new construct shows substantially positive correlations with other 
measures of g, there is no justification to conceive it as a new intelligence construct (Austin & 
Saklofske, 2005; Gottfredson, 2003; Neubauer & Freudenthaler, 2005). Jensen’s (1997) 
theory is subject to meaningful criticism from the intelligence literature (Bowman, Markham, 
& Roberts, 2002; Hedlund & Sternberg, 2000). Some critical points include that: (a) Many 
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variables yield positive correlations with intelligence tests (e.g., openness for experiences, 
conscientiousness, etc.) and do not imply g as the source of common variance. (b) The g-
factor represents the first principal component extracted in factor analysis, regardless of what 
intelligence test variables are entered into the analysis. Thus, the underlying functional 
commonalities of every g-factor depend on the selection of tests. (c) The amount of explained 
variance by the first principal component is often not higher than 50 % (Carroll, 1992). The 
extraction of a multiple-factor solution often results in larger variance explanation. (d) g was 
intended to represent the systematic variance common to all types of mental tasks. In practice, 
g is often measured by only one single variable (e.g., Raven’s Progressive Matrices Test) 
(Bowman et al., 2002). In summary, g in the absence of further lower-order ability factors 
could also be interpreted as a mathematical artifact; any conclusions based on the primacy of 
g should be derived with care. 
In contradiction to g as one single source of common variance, Thurstone (1931) 
detected seven primary mental abilities that could explain correlations between mental tasks. 
In a factor analytic approach, he identified verbal comprehension, word fluency, number 
facility, spatial visualization, associative memory, perceptual speed, and reasoning as separate 
ability factors. These factors only emerged in the absence of a common general factor. 
Accordingly, Thurstone formulated the first structural model of human intelligence that 
differentiated between several more or less broad ability domains. Albeit apparently 
contradictory, combining the two approaches unveils a hierarchical theory of human 
intelligence which postulated a higher-order general factor and lower-order primary ability 
factors (Brody, 2000). To establish a hierarchical model, the respective lower-order abilities 
(in this case Thurstone’s primary abilities) need to be intercorrelated in order to allow a 
superordinate factor structure on the next higher level in the hierarchy. The assignment of the 
respective lower-order abilities to higher-order factors is supposed to be derived from theory-
based assumptions about the task requirements. In subsequent research, several structural and 
hierarchical models of human intelligence were introduced. All of them were concerned with 
decomposing variance in mental tasks into various sources, that is, g-related variance or 
variance related to some broad or more specific ability factors. Thurstone (1931) and Guilford 
(1967) formulated structural models of intelligence whereas Cattell (1963, 1971), Carroll 
(1993), and Jäger (1982) have established hierarchical models. 
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Guilford’s Structure of Intellect Model (SOI; 1967) 
Guilford (1967) postulated a structural theory of intelligence. His Structure of Intellect 
Model (SOI) represents a faceted model of intelligence that cross-classifies the three facets of 
operations, products, and contents (for another faceted model of intelligence, see the last 
section in the present Chapter). The facet operations describes the cognitive requirements 
people need to accomplish a task and it contains five elements: cognition, memory, divergent 
production, convergent production, and evaluation. The content facet includes four elements 
and refers to the properties of the task material: figural, symbolic, semantic, and behavioral. 
Finally, the product facet comprises six elements, each describing a type of outcome 
associated with a mental task: units, classes, relations, systems, transformations, and 
implications. Consequently, the cross-classification of the facets resulted in 120 postulated 
ability factors that, according to Guilford (1967), described distinct human intellectual 
abilities. In a first adaptation, Guilford (1977) divided the figural contents into auditory and 
visual contents which resulted in additional 30 factors (see Figure 4.1 for the complete SOI). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 
Structure of Intellect Model (Guilford, 1967, 1981) 
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Guilford later modified the basic assumption of orthogonal factors (Guilford, 1981) 
and allowed intercorrelations between the ability factors. Thus, the modified SOI represents a 
hierarchical model with 150 first-order factors, 85 second-order factors, and 16 third-order 
factors. However, empirical data could never fully confirm the postulated factor structure 
(Brody, 2000). 
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Notably relevant for the social intelligence construct, the SOI also included a subset of 
abilities that were identified as representing social intellectual abilities, namely, all 30 cross-
classifications with the behavioral contents. Behavioral contents were defined as “essentially 
nonverbal information, involved in human interactions, where awareness of attention, 
perceptions, thoughts, desires, feelings, moods, emotions, intentions, and actions of other 
persons and of ourselves is important” (Guilford, 1967, p. 77). Guilford described behavioral 
information as mostly conveyed via visual or auditory cues. For testing purposes, he relied 
mainly on pictorial material. This seemed to cause a conceptual overlap with the figural and 
also the later auditory content domain. He acknowledged a possible role of the figural ability 
factors for the accomplishment of tasks based on the behavioral content presented in pictures. 
But at the same time, he stressed that the content (“the substance”; p. 221) of the behavioral 
information is essential and not the form of stimulus presentation. Thus, Guilford’s (1967; 
1981) model established social intelligence as independent from any content-related 
differentiations. Some of the 30 ability factors of social intelligence were operationalized by 
sets of specifically developed tasks (Hendricks, Guilford, & Hoepfner, 1969; O’Sullivan & 
Guilford, 1966, 1976) and investigated by rather extensive empirical analysis (O’Sullivan, 
Guilford, & DeMille, 1965; Hendricks et al., 1969). The test batteries and the most important 
associated empirical results will be presented in a later section. 
Cattell’s Theory of Fluid and Crystallized Intelligence (1963, 1971) 
Cattell (1987) conceived the identification of the structure of intelligence as the first 
goal of ability research. He acknowledged the general value of Guilford’s approach in 
classifying intellectual abilities. However, he conceived the idea of unrelated ability factors as 
postulated in Guilford’s early model as “entirely wrong” (p. 37). Cattell proposed a 
hierarchical theory of intelligence with two correlated general factors at the apex of the 
hierarchy, namely, fluid and crystallized intelligence (gf and gc respectively) (Cattell, 1963, 
1971). Fluid intelligence reflects the ability to deal with abstract information in tasks like 
series, classifications, analogies, etc. Importantly, fluid abilities explicitly exclude knowledge 
requirements (i.e., task material must be equally accessible for any tested group so that the 
opportunity of knowledge acquisition is the same for everyone). Fluid abilities are supposed 
to be hereditary and to decline over the lifespan. Crystallized intelligence shows loadings of, 
for example, verbal and numerical skills, and reflects knowledge acquired over the lifespan 
with no age-related decline. Cattell (1987) reported correlations between gf and gc of .40 to 
.50. He reasoned in accordance with his Investment Theory that the acquisition of crystallized 
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abilities depends on the investment of fluid abilities. Cattell (1987) later extended the theory 
by adding three broad factors besides gf and gc: retrieval capacity (gr), visualization (gv), and 
cognitive speed (gs). On a lower level in the hierarchy, over 40 first-order factors were 
postulated. Contrary to other theories of human intelligence, Cattell’s theory offered 
considerations and testable hypotheses about the intellectual development across the lifespan. 
Empirical studies supported the hypothesized developmental trajectories of the different 
abilities (Schaie, 1996). In German literature, the Intelligence Structure Test (IST-2000 R; 
Amthauer, Brocke, Liepmann, & Beauducel, 2001) is based on the gf-gc-theory. 
Comprehensive empirical support for the entire theory cannot be found in the literature. 
Carroll’s Three-Stratum-Theory (1993) 
Carroll’s Three-Stratum-Theory (1993) conceptually relies on Cattell’s (1987) gf-gc-
theory and also represents a hierarchical theory. The theory is based on an exhaustive 
reanalysis of correlative datasets from psychometric intelligence research. The theory shows 
three levels of generality (called strata): Stratum III represents the highest level of the 
hierarchy and consists of a general intelligence factor. On Stratum II, eight different ability 
factors are located that differ in terms of their loadings on the general intelligence factor. In 
the order of high to low loadings on the g-factor, the ability factors are: fluid intelligence, 
crystallized intelligence, general memory and learning, broad visual perception, broad 
auditory perception, broad retrieval ability, broad cognitive speediness, and processing 
speed. Comparable to the gf-gc-theory, Stratum I includes numerous specific abilities (see 
Figure 4.3 for a display of the three strata). In an integrative approach, the gf-gc-theory 
(Cattell, 1973, 1971) and the Three-Stratum-Theory were just recently combined in the 
Cattell-Horn-Carroll-Theory (CHC) (McGrew & Evans, 2004). The Woodcock-Johnson 
Psychoeducational Battery (WJ-III; Woodcock, McGrew, & Mather, 2000) was constructed 
to follow the propositions of the gf-gc-theory combined with some Stratum-II-factors of 
Carroll’s theory. 
Berlin Intelligence Structure Model (Jäger 1982, 1984) 
The Berlin Intelligence Structure Model (BIS-Model; Jäger 1982, 1984) also 
represents an integrative hierarchical model that differs from the aforementioned hierarchical 
approaches in some pivotal aspects. The BIS-Model was derived from several large empirical 
studies that applied a nearly exhaustive collection of existing intelligence tasks. Tasks that 
were excluded were those that were redundant to tasks already included in terms of their 
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cognitive determinants. Furthermore, marker variables for competing intelligence factors were 
kept in the analysis (Süß & Beauducel, 2005). Contrary to Cattell’s (1963, 1971) and 
Carroll’s (1993) theory, the idea of a faceted model of intelligence is applied in this model. 
The resulting model proposes a general factor at the top level of the hierarchy and seven 
second-order factors. These belong to two facets: an operational facet that consists of four 
cognitive operations (i.e., reasoning, creativity, memory, and speed) and a content-facet 
consisting of three content-related ability factors (i.e., numerical, figural, and verbal 
abilities). The cross-classification of the two facets results in 12 cells that represent a third, 
more specific level in the hierarchy. Figure 4.2 displays the BIS-Model showing all three 
levels of generality. Contrary to Guilford’s (1967) faceted model of intelligence, the cells do 
not represent separate ability factors but serve as a classification system for tasks (Süß & 
Beauducel, 2005). 
Content Facet Operational Facet 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 
Berlin Intelligence Structure Model (Jäger, 1982, 1984) 
According to Jäger’s conceptualization, knowledge requirements (i.e., as specified in 
gc) are represented in the content-facet. Basic knowledge about, for example, vocabulary or 
mathematical rules is necessary to accomplish verbal or numerical tasks. This distinguishes 
the faceted BIS-Model from any non-facetted model such as Cattell’s theory. In the BIS-
Model, a content-related ability facet balances any additional requirements related to the task 
material and any associated basic knowledge demands. 
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The seven second-order ability factors are defined as follows: 
On the operational facet: 
? Speed (BIS-S): the ability to accomplish simple tasks quickly and accurately 
? Memory (BIS-M): the ability to recall lists and configurations of items 
? Creativity (BIS-C): the ability to fluently produce many different ideas 
? Reasoning (BIS-R): the ability to elaborate complex information including inductive 
and deductive reasoning, construction, and planning 
On the content facet: 
? Verbal (BIS-V): the ability to deal with verbal material using the four different 
cognitive functions 
? Figural-Spatial (BIS-F): the ability to deal with figural-spatial material using the four 
different cognitive functions 
? Numeric (BIS-N): the ability to deal with numeric material using the four different 
cognitive functions 
Thus, the benefit of a faceted model in comparison with a structural model concerns 
the possibility to decompose task variance into the operational and content-related abilities of 
the two facets. This allows an unbiased analysis of the covariance structures between tasks. 
By aggregating tasks across an ability domain of one facet, variance due to abilities of the 
other facet is controlled for. If this is not accomplished, for example, fluid abilities, reading 
comprehension, and spatial scanning in the Three-Stratum-Model as First-Stratum factors are 
assigned to different Second-Stratum factors although it can be assumed that fluid abilities 
rely on reading comprehension when verbal material must be dealt with and on spatial 
scanning when figural spatial material must be dealt with. 
The BIS-Model represents the theoretical foundation for the Berlin Intelligence 
Structure Test (BIS-Test; Jäger et al., 1997). The internal structure of the BIS-Model was 
replicated in various studies (Beauducel & Kersting, 2002; Brunner & Süß, 2005; Süß, 
Oberauer, Wittmann, Wilhelm, & Schulze, 2002). Figure 4.3 illustrates a classification of the 
BIS-ability domains into the Three-Stratum-Model. Except for Broad Auditory Perception, 
for every Stratum II ability factor, there is an equivalent ability factor in the BIS-Model. This 
classification, however, suffers from a mismatch between the faceted BIS-Model and the non-
faceted Carroll model. Stratum I primary abilities classified to operative broad ability factors 
and Stratum II comprise unbalanced verbal, numerical, or figural material-related components 
4.1   Theories of Academic Intelligence   
S S C R 
g 
(e.g., word fluency as a primary ability subsumed under broad retrieval ability, numerical 
facility subsumed under broad cognitive speediness). Moreover, the BIS-Model lacks a 
content-factor related to auditory abilities which is represented in the Three-Stratum-Model. 
Auditory abilities are seen as a relevant complement to content-related abilities (Stankov, 
1994; Stankov & Horn, 1980). Seidel (2007) applied a first attempt to integrate an auditory 
ability factor into the BIS-Model and developed several new performance tests based on the 
battery of Stankov and Horn (1980). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 
Three-Stratum-Model and the Ability Factors of the BIS-Model (Carroll, 1993, p. 626; 
Süß, Seidel, & Weis, 2005a) 
Note. R = Reasoning, V = Verbal abilities, M = Memory, F = Figural, C = Creativity, 
S = Speed 
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4.2 Requirements for a New Cognitive Ability Construct 
Social and also emotional intelligence represent new candidates as meaningful 
intelligence constructs. However, the conceptual and methodological problems surrounding 
the introduction of a new intelligence construct are manifold (Landy, 2006; Matthews et al., 
2005; Schaie, 2001; Weber & Westmeyer, 2001). Many prominent intelligence researchers 
established requirements for the introduction and foundation of a new intelligence construct. 
The following section will be concerned with integrating these various positions. 
a) Theory formation 
These requirements refer to the nature and the development of underlying theoretical 
foundations. Matthews et al. (2005) required a-priori theoretical considerations about the 
“localization of the intended construct within the sphere of individual differences” (p. 80) 
and, in this respect, coherence in theory (i.e., theory has to provide postulations about the 
nature of the coherence between the construct and its manifestation in behavior). O’Sullivan 
(1983) called for a clear and nonredundant terminology for construct specification. Süß 
(2001) demanded a construct definition based on empirical results. In summary, research on a 
new intelligence construct needs to clarify the concepts, labels, and scope to establish the 
conceptual fundament. 
b) Construct specification: 
The respective construct needs to be specified in terms of the underlying operational 
performance determinants. This also implies the definition and classification of possible 
subconstructs in the context of hierarchical theories and hypotheses about the pattern of 
relations among them. Carroll (1993) claimed that intelligence must consist of cognitive 
determinants only. Süß (2001, 2006) required that the construct consists of highly general 
abilities that are relatively stable over time. Consequently, construct definitions should cover 
a broad and heterogeneous range of ability and content domains. Moreover, Süß (2001, 2006) 
demanded a minimum amount of knowledge requirements as a necessary prerequisite for a 
generally valid intelligence construct. 
c) Operationalizations 
Requirements concerned with the assessment of the new construct refer to both the 
formal characteristics of the measurement approach (i.e., type of data and scoring), and the 
psychometric qualities of the respective diagnostic instruments. With respect to the 
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psychometric qualities, Matthews et al. (2005) and Weber and Westmeyer (2001) stressed the 
necessity of psychometrically sound operationalizations (i.e., item properties and reliability). 
With respect to the former point, O’Sullivan (1983) addressed the necessity of congruence 
between the construct specification and the tasks chosen to measure it. Süß (2001, 2006) and 
Weber and Westmeyer (2001) demand the application of true performance tests in the sense 
of T-data according to Cattell (1965). Furthermore, objective scoring rules have to be 
available in order to judge the performance in tasks.  
d) Validation 
For proving the validity of the new intelligence construct, the validation strategy must 
be selected carefully. Both convergent and discriminant construct validity has to be proven by 
data (O’Sullivan, 1983; Weber & Westmeyer, 2001). Schaie (2001) requested the selection of 
adequate measurement procedures for the assessment of the validation instruments (Weis & 
Süß, 2005). For example, academic intelligence should be measured by the assessment of a 
multidimensional test battery in order to investigate the differential pattern of correlation with 
fluid or crystallized intelligence, speed, memory, verbal, figural-spatial, or numeric abilities. 
With respect to the criterion validity, studies have to provide evidence for the incremental 
predictive validity for heterogeneous external criteria over and above traditional predictor 
variables to prove the relevance and the practical meaning (i.e., academic intelligence, 
personality traits) (Süß, 2001, 2006). 
e) Other requirements 
Austin and Saklofske (2005) additionally required evidence for the genetic 
determination of an individual’s performance (i.e., evidence for the heritability of the new 
intelligence construct) and evidence for biological manifestations specified by basic 
neurological measures (e.g., speed of information processing). Whether the genetical 
determination must be proven empirically, is not specified. However, given the 
aforementioned criteria, genetical determination can be assumed to some extent. Schaie 
(2001) specifically addressed research on emotional intelligence and demanded positive 
correlations with age (i.e., experience) that could be inferred from construct definitions. 
One point is especially controversially discussed. Conforming with Jensen’s (1997) 
idea of the primacy of a general intelligence factor and the proclaimed positive manifold, 
Austin and Saklofske (2005), Gottfredson (2003), Guttman and Levy (1991), Mayer et al., 
(2000), and Neubauer and Freudenthaler (2005) all consider positive correlations between 
traditional and new intelligence tasks as essential for the establishment of a new intelligence 
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construct. According to Henry, Sternberg, and Grigorenko (2005), multiple types of 
intelligence do not have to fit under one single general factor. Also Bowman et al. (2002) 
identified meaningful criticisms of this requirement. The present work does not see evidence 
for the positive manifold as a necessary condition for the introduction of a new intelligence 
construct. First of all, the covariance pattern highly depends on the presumed level in the 
hierarchy in both constructs. Moreover, it is considered more important that the 
aforementioned commonly accepted criteria are accomplished. 
4.3 Theories and Definitions of Social Intelligence 
4.3.1 Definitions of Social Intelligence 
The only comprehensive theory based account of social intelligence is Guilford’s 
(1967) Structure of Intellect Model. In the SOI, the behavioral content domain reflects social 
intelligence. It is located aside figural, symbolic, and semantic task contents, which implies 
that social and general intelligence, according to Guilford, only differ in the contents of the 
tasks but share the same cross-classifications with operations and products. Thus, social 
intelligence includes cognition, convergent and divergent production, memory, and evaluation 
of behavioral contents. These contents mostly consist of nonverbal information about social 
interactions that allow conclusions about thoughts, desires, feelings, moods, emotions, 
intentions, and actions of other persons and of ourselves. Guilford and his colleagues 
(Hendricks et al., 1969; O’Sullivan et al., 1965) focused on the operational domains of 
cognition and divergent production to develop tests of social intelligence. O’Sullivan and 
Guilford’s efforts resulted in two test publications, the Six Factor Test (O’Sullivan & 
Guilford, 1966) and the Four Factor Test (O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1976) of Social 
Intelligence. Other definitions of social intelligence reflect Thorndike’s (1920) early 
distinction between cognitive and behavioral requirements (i.e., “understanding people” vs. 
“act wisely in human relations”) ( p. 228). Table 4.1 lists definitions extracted from the 
literature. The list contains both definitions from theoretical accounts and operationalizations. 
They are classified into cognitive and behavioral components. Additionally, the cognitive 
components are subdivided into different operational requirements (i.e., reasoning, memory, 
perception, creativity, and knowledge requirements). 
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Table 4.1 
Definitions of Social Intelligence Extracted from the Literature 
Cognitive 
Requirements Cognitive Components 
Behavioral 
Components 
Reasoning 
Insight into the moods or personality traits of strangers (Vernon, 
1933) 
Judge correctly the feelings, moods, and motivation of individuals 
(Wedeck, 1947) 
Ability to judge people with respect to feelings, motives, thoughts, 
intentions, attitudes, etc. (O’Sullivan et al., 1965) 
Understand the feelings, thoughts, and behaviors of persons, 
including oneself (Marlowe, 1986) 
Judgment in social situations (Moss et al., 1955) 
Recognition of the mental states behind words and from facial 
expressions (Moss et al., 1955) 
Role-taking ability (Feffer, 1959) 
The ability to interpret social cues (O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1966) 
The ability to predict what will happen (O’Sullivan & Guilford, 
1966) 
The ability to identify the internal mental states (O’Sullivan & 
Guilford, 1966) 
Decoding of social cues (Barnes & Sternberg, 1989; Buck, 1976; 
Sundberg, 1966) 
Ability to comprehend observed behaviors in the social context in 
which they occur (Wong, Day, Maxwell, & Meara, 1995) 
Memory Memory for names and faces (Moss et al., 1955; Sternberg et al., 1981) 
Perception 
Sensitivity for other people’s behavior (Orlik, 1978) 
The ability to perceive the present mood of other people (Orlik, 
1978) 
Creativity 
(Fluency) 
The ability to create recognizable categories of behavioral acts 
(Hendricks et al., 1969) 
The ability to imagine many possible outcomes of a setting 
(Hendricks et al., 1969) 
Knowledge 
Knowledge of social matters (Vernon, 1933) 
The capacity to know oneself and to know others (Gardner, 1983) 
Individuals fund of knowledge about the social world (Cantor & 
Kihlstrom, 1987) 
Social problem solving (Cantor & Harlowe, 1994) 
Knowledge of rules of social interaction (Orlik, 1978) 
Knowing the rules of etiquette (Wong et al., 1995) 
Get along with others 
and ease in society 
(Vernon, 1933) 
Ability to get along 
with others (Moss & 
Hunt, 1927) 
The ability to deal with 
people and the 
applications of means 
to manipulate the 
responses of others 
(Orlik, 1978) 
Act appropriately upon 
an understanding of 
the feelings, thoughts, 
and behaviors of 
persons, including 
oneself (Marlowe, 
1986) 
The ability to 
manipulate the 
responses of others 
(Weinstein, 1969) 
Attainment of relevant 
social goals (Ford, 
1982) 
Ability to speak 
effectively, to be 
appropriately 
responsive to the 
interviewers questions, 
to display appropriate 
nonverbal behaviors 
(Ford & Tisak, 1983) 
Effectiveness in 
heterosexual 
interaction (Wong et 
al., 1995) 
Social problem solving 
(Cantor & Harlowe, 
1994 
 
Reasoning requirements obviously represent the broadest domain, and are labeled 
social understanding from now on. Within this domain, the cognitive operations of 
understanding, interpreting, judging, having insight, predicting, and comprehending all 
address comparable or identical cognitive operations. In contrast, recognizing, decoding, and 
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identifying seem to address different cognitive operations that require less information 
processing but rather equal initial (perceptual) functions. The definitions of person perception 
in social psychological research equal the definitions for social understanding in the present 
work, and are applied synonymously. In social psychological research, the concepts of person 
perception or judgmental accuracy received substantial attention and now belong to the most 
established concepts in social (cognitive) psychology. Research on social or interpersonal 
perception (Bronfenbrenner, Harding, & Gallwey, 1958; Cline, 1964), social cognition, or 
interpersonal processes (Weinstein, 1969) offers important and fruitful definitions, concepts, 
and measurement principles for the study of social intelligence (see Chapters 4.3.3.1 and 
4.3.3.3 for a more detailed look on some interesting results from experimental studies). 
Memory, perception, creativity, and knowledge requirements do not cover such 
heterogeneous functions. All five cognitive operations will be addressed in more detail in the 
forthcoming passages. In contrast, the definition of social intelligence as social problem 
solving to attain social goals (Cantor & Harlowe, 1994; Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987) will be 
excluded. Social problem solving represents a special category with, on the one hand, less 
explicit cognitive requirements, and on the other hand, additional behavioral or knowledge 
components. According to Cantor and Harlowe (1994), problem solving strategies, schemas, 
and procedural rules for processing social information together represent the social 
intelligence repertoire reflected in knowledge structures. Schemas include concepts of 
oneself, others, and social situations. Because of this mixture of operative functions, social 
problem solving will be excluded from the performance model of social intelligence. 
Furthermore, operational definitions from approaches that rely on self-report measures of 
social intelligence are omitted. Some of these definitions are the same as those already 
derived from performance-based definitions (e.g., social and emotional sensitivity, Riggio, 
1986; decoding ability, Zuckerman & Larrance, 1979). At the same time, other definitions 
reflect personality-like construct definitions such as empathy, social assertiveness, or self-
efficacy (Marlowe, 1986). 
4.3.2 A Cognitive Performance Model of Social Intelligence 
Weis and Süß (2005; see also, Weis et al., 2006) proposed a performance model of 
social intelligence that incorporated the aforementioned structure of cognitive abilities. 
Besides the classification of cognitive operations, further taxonomic considerations of, for 
example, task contents will be addressed subsequently. The performance model was presented 
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in both, an English and a German language book chapter (Weis & Süß, 2005; Weis et al., 
2006, respectively). For reasons of simplicity, only the English language chapter will be 
referred to, whereby always the German language chapter would as well be valid. 
Social Understanding 
The core ability domain of social intelligence is social understanding. It includes 
cognitive operations subsumed under reasoning requirements (Weis & Süß, 2005). According 
to the authors, social understanding requires individuals to understand or interpret social 
stimuli against the background of the given social situation (e.g., understand correctly what a 
person wants to express via verbal or nonverbal means of communication). The stimuli can 
vary according to their complexity (e.g., from a simple facial expression to a sequence of 
interactions between persons) and should allow conclusions about a person’s emotions, 
thoughts, intentions, motivations, or personality traits. The present definition excludes the 
more initial cognitive functions of recognizing or, in other words, perceiving social stimuli 
These are classified as social perceptual abilities. 
Social Memory 
So far, social memory was defined and operationalized as memory for names and 
faces (Kosmitzki & John, 1993; Moss et al., 1955). Guilford (1967) specified memory of 
behavioral contents as social memory. Weis and Süß (2005) defined social memory as the 
storing and recall of objectively given social information that can vary in complexity. For 
example, memory for names and faces is a narrow subset of social information (Probst, 1982), 
whereas the memory for a sequence of interactions represents a rather complex entity. The 
required social information has to be objectively present in the situation (i.e., in the task 
material respectively). However, presence itself does not insure that individuals direct their 
attention towards the relevant cues and thus, also perceive the cues. This problem carries two 
implications. First, the instructions for a task have to direct an individual’s attention towards 
the relevant cues. Second, the type of information is supposed to influence the possibility for 
test takers to perceive the relevant cues. In this context, information included in static types of 
stimuli like written language and pictures suggest that all relevant cues can be perceived if the 
presentation time is long enough. Fluent information, for example, included in spoken 
language and videos only occur at one point in time and thus, are much harder to direct 
attention to. These last considerations reveal the importance of perceptual abilities discussed 
in the next section. 
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Social Perception 
From a theoretical perspective, there is little doubt that social perception represents a 
relevant ability domain. Both social understanding and social memory require the prior 
perception of relevant stimuli (e.g., a person’s smile needs to be perceived in order to make a 
conclusion about the person’s mental state). In real life, this perception usually happens 
within a very short period of time or with restricted access to the relevant cues. Accordingly, 
Weis and Süß (2005) defined social perception as the ability to (quickly) perceive socially 
relevant information in more or less complex situations. Wong et al. (1995) operationalized 
social perception but could not separate this ability from social understanding abilities. In 
order to separate social perception from social understanding, two presuppositions should be 
achieved. First, the target stimuli have to be present in the situation. Thus, only overt behavior 
(or a predefined target stimuli) can be perceived (e.g., eye contact or a touch between two 
persons). Second, for the construction of adequate measures, Weis and Süß (2005) 
recommended the application of speed measures analogous to the concept of general 
perceptual (or mental) speed in theories of academic intelligence. By measuring social 
perception with reaction time scores, a higher-level information processing and a further 
elaboration of information is supposed to be eliminated or reduced from the score. 
Social Creativity 
Guilford (1967) introduced the divergent production of behavioral contents as one 
ability domain of social intelligence. Hendricks et al. (1969) constructed an unpublished test 
battery of this domain, where they defined social creativity as the ability to imagine possible 
outcomes of a setting or to create recognizable categories of behavioral acts. Recent empirical 
work (Jones & Day, 1997; Lee, Day, Meara, & Maxwell, 2002) operationalized social 
cognitive flexibility as the fluent production of possible interpretations of a social situation. 
The score represented the number and the diversity of given answers. In academic intelligence 
models, creativity is represented as retrieval abilities (e.g., broad retrieval abilities in Carroll’s 
Three Stratum Model, or retrieval capacity gr in Cattell’s gf-gc-theory). In summary, Weis and 
Süß (2005) defined social creativity similarly like Lee et al. (2002) as the production of as 
many and as diverse solutions or explanations as possible for a social situation or problem. 
Social Knowledge 
In models of academic intelligence, knowledge plays diverse roles. Some models 
explicitly include knowledge as one ability domain of academic intelligence (Carroll, 1993; 
Cattell, 1971). Others do not account for a separate knowledge factor (Guilford, 1967; Jäger, 
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1982). At best, knowledge requirements should be eliminated as far as possible from ability 
domains that are different from knowledge itself (Cattell, 1987; Süß, 2001). Cattell (1987) 
acknowledged that performance in knowledge tasks always depends on an individual’s 
learning experiences. However, in academic intelligence research, task contents are typically 
taught in standardized settings so that individuals’ knowledge fundament presumably overlaps 
to a substantial extent. What is highly standardized in the academic knowledge domain, the 
learning environments for social knowledge vary substantially in terms of knowledge 
contents. Learning environments are the family, the peer group, school- or work-related 
groups, etc. The resultant knowledge contents depend on the cultural environment (Weber 
&Westmeyer, 2001). Every social entity (e.g., from a family consisting of father, mother, and 
child, to a culture or nation) has its own social standards so that possibly diverse social 
contents are taught as the “correct” knowledge. Thus, what is correct can only be judged with 
respect to the present social contexts and the social group. This implies that the construction 
of a social knowledge test requires a thorough definition of the social entity of which 
knowledge should be specified, a comprehensive classification of possible social situations 
within this entity, and subsequently, a rule according to which knowledge contents can be 
judged as right or wrong. 
In the literature, social knowledge is defined as knowledge about the social world (i.e., 
social rules, social matters, etc.) (Cantor & Kihlstrom, 1987; Vernon, 1933). Also, 
operationalizations reflect knowledge as good etiquette in very specific settings (e.g., dinner-
related knowledge; Lee, Wong, Day, Maxwell, & Thorpe, 2000; Wong et al., 1995). 
Altogether, social knowledge cannot be seen as a pure cognitive ability and does not fulfill the 
typical requirement of a general ability construct that is valid in heterogeneous situations. 
Furthermore, it seems impossible to develop and validate an adequate measurement 
instrument without applying a homogeneous sample with comparable experience in the 
queried knowledge domain. For these seasons, social knowledge is treated differently from 
the remaining cognitive ability domains in the upcoming considerations. 
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Integrating the operative ability domains 
The present work distinguishes between the four cognitive ability domains of social 
intelligence as specified in the performance model of Weis and Süß (2005) (i.e., social 
understanding, memory, perception, and creativity) and acknowledges the relevance of social 
knowledge for social behavior within a framework of social competences. However, a 
crystallized social intelligence factor, as specified in academic intelligence models, is not 
subsumed under the cognitive performance construct in a narrow sense. 
The performance model of Weis and Süß (2005) did not make a statement about the 
internal structure of social intelligence. They did, however, not exclude the possibility of 
correlated abilities and thus, of a higher-order general social intelligence factor. Furthermore, 
they assumed that all cognitive ability domains predict social behavior to a certain extent (see 
Figure 4.4). The present work extends and modifies the model of Weis and Süß and postulates 
positively related cognitive ability factors so that, on a higher-order level, a general social 
intelligence factor is postulated. Figure 4.4 and 4.5 display the two alternative performance 
models of social intelligence with (a) a structural model of social intelligence (Fig. 4.4; Weis 
& Süß, 2005) and (b) a hierarchical model of social intelligence (Fig. 4.5). 
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Performance Model of Weis and Süß (2005) Representing a Structural Model of Social 
Intelligence 
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In both models, the ability domains of social understanding, social memory, social 
perception, and social creativity constitute social (cognitive) intelligence in the narrow sense. 
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The structural model of Weis and Süß (2005) also classified social knowledge to the cognitive 
abilities subsumed under social intelligence. In the present hierarchical model, social 
knowledge is assigned a special role and it is assumed to be positively related to a putative 
general social intelligence factor. Both models claim to predict social behavior. For example, 
social behavior may be predicted by a general social intelligence factor (e.g., in typical private 
settings). At the same time, social behavior in a specific job setting could as well be 
specifically predicted only by social understanding (e.g., success in a counseling job). The 
model of prediction must be determined according to the principles of symmetry between 
predictor and criterion in order to optimize prediction (Wittmann, 1988; Wittmann & Süß, 
1999). In this respect, symmetry refers to analogous hierarchical levels of analysis in terms of 
underlying hierarchical models of predictor and criterion variables. 
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Modified Performance Model of Weis and Süß (2005) Representing a Hierarchical Model of 
Social Intelligence 
The original performance model (Figure 4.4) was supported by empirical data in a 
multitrait-multimethod study of Weis and Süß (2007). Confirmatory factor analysis yielded 
the correlated factors of social understanding, social memory, and social knowledge and also 
supported a general social intelligence factor (see Chapter 5.4). 
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4.3.3 Taxonomic Foundations of Social Intelligence 
For the establishment of an intelligence construct, Cattell (1987) demanded 
classificatory principles in the form of taxonomies. A taxonomy includes classificatory 
principles comparable to facets in the context of academic intelligence models. Consequently, 
empirical discoveries about the structure of human abilities are easier to interpret. Academic 
intelligence research has already proven the theoretical and empirical significance of faceted 
models. For example, content-related ability factors are contained in Guilford’s SOI and in 
Jäger’s BIS-Model (Guilford, 1967; Jäger, 1982, 1984; see Chapter 4.1 for the benefits of 
faceted models of intelligence). According to Cattell (1987), “concrete discoveries will take 
on their due richness and meaning only when they are sifted and placed in perspective of 
classification” (p. 61). Taxonomic foundations can serve several purposes. From a theoretical 
perspective, they help to differentiate structure and extend existing theoretical models, 
especially of supposedly heterogeneous constructs, and may provide the basis for a faceted 
model of intelligence. From a methodological viewpoint, the taxonomy can be used for the 
construction of new and for the allocation of already existing tests. For existing tests and 
subtests, initially unstructured and confounded variance sources will be disentangled so that 
the pattern of covariance can be interpreted more profoundly. Thus, method-related variance 
related to the different elements of the taxonomic elements can possibly be balanced. When 
applied during test development, the representativeness of task material and thus, the content 
validity of the test can be enhanced. 
Besides the classificatory principles described in the context of the faceted models of 
Guilford (1967) and Jäger (1982, 1984), two further taxonomic approaches are apparent in 
literature, one in the context of academic intelligence models, one in the context of 
interpersonal perception. 
a) Cattell (1987) introduced a theoretical schema of ability dimensions that differentiated 
between ability actions (e.g., involvement of input information in perceptual abilities, 
involvement of storage and processing components in memory abilities, etc.), ability 
contents (i.e., contents provided by cultural dimensions and contents classified 
according to the usage of different physiological channels), and ability processes (e.g., 
demands on the ability in terms of the complexity, amount of retentive and retrieval 
activities, amount of speed activities, etc.). Contents provided by the cultural 
dimensions are, for example, “verbal (semantic), numerical, spatial, and mechanical 
contents, social contents, arts, music, and science” (p. 72). Contents that enter 
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processing via different physiological channels were subdivided, for example, into 
visual, auditory, kinesthetic, tactile, and motor contents. Comparable to 
Guilford (1967), Cattell’s (1987) classification sees a social content domain as 
independent from contents that are related to the type of cue representation. 
b) Cline (1964) classified existing measurement approaches to interpersonal perception 
(i.e., social understanding) according to the stimulus information (e.g., photographs, 
motion pictures, live behavior, tape recordings, test scores, written material, etc.), the 
types of instruments (e.g., trait-rating procedures, postdiction of real life behavior or 
test or item scores, etc.), the sources of the criterion information (e.g., self-provided 
information, group responses, associates, or experts), and the scoring procedures (e.g., 
number of correct predictions, difference scores, correlation statistic, quantified 
evaluations of open responses, etc.). Some of these differentiations are relevant rather 
for a classification of measurement approaches, but some will be included in the 
subsequent considerations. 
So far, the performance model of social intelligence differentiated only between the 
cognitive operations (i.e., understanding, memory, perception, creativity, and knowledge). 
Existing definitions of social intelligence (see Table 4.1) already provide an approximation 
for some important further distinctions. Some taxonomic principles will be derived from 
models of academic intelligence. Moreover, taxonomies and empirical results from social 
psychological research will be introduced in the upcoming chapters. The taxonomic principles 
addressed are: process variables, outputs, contents and cues, contexts, and targets. 
4.3.3.1 Process Variables 
The present passage is concerned with a more a profound look into the cognitive 
operations that constitute social intelligence. 
Support for the Performance Model from Social Cognitive Research 
Bless, Fiedler, and Strack (2004) presented a comprehensive overview elaborating the 
present state-of-the-art research on social cognition. Included within this review was a section 
detailing their concern over the differentiation of social cognitive functions. They identified 
perception and attention, encoding, interpretation, and storage and retrieval as separate 
functions. Comparably, Bernieri (2001) mentioned (a) the opportunity to experience (i.e., 
open communication channels and opportunity to perceive), (b) attention, and (c) the 
available capacity devoted to perception and inference processes as necessary conditions for 
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correct social judgments. According to Bless et al. (2004), the perceptive functions mainly 
consist of the pure physiological perception process that lets stimuli enter any further 
cognitive processing. In the perceptive process, attention plays a crucial role. In real life, the 
devoting of attention to a stimulus is influenced by the salience of the stimulus provided by 
the situation or by self-raised thoughts or interests. In transferring this idea into social 
intelligence research, the instructions for tasks take a central position. Thus, the instructions 
should produce salience of the stimuli that have to be perceived. Particularly, for social 
understanding the instructions have to direct attention to the relevant situative and personal 
cues. If this is not accomplished, performance in social understanding can as well depend on 
whether or not participants have perceived the relevant cues. Bless et al. (2004) suggested that 
a later memory test can provide evidence of whether the cues were perceived or not (i.e., if 
yes, they should be remembered). 
The encoding functions in the model of Bless et al. (2004) reflect the process of 
assigning a mental representation to a perceived stimuli (e.g., assign “smile” to a perceived 
movement of a person’s mouth, or “man” to a perceived person). In general, available social 
categories are used to encode stimuli into mental representations. Within the social 
intelligence framework, this cognitive process can also be subsumed under the social 
perception abilities since Bless et al. still exclude any interpretative demands. In contrast, 
interpretation reflects any further information processing that goes beyond the given 
information. Analogous to the model of social intelligence, storage and retrieval functions 
represent social memory and social creativity, respectively. Bless and colleagues reported 
studies that varied the instruction to a memory task about behavior descriptions of people. 
One study directly instructed participants to memorize and recall the provided information, 
while the other instructed them to form an impression of the described person. Participants of 
the latter condition showed better performance. According to the conclusions of the authors, 
storage of information thus depends on the depth of information processing. 
Interestingly, personal knowledge is supposed to influence all other social cognitive 
functions. For example, attention is devoted to a person stimulus when it diverges from what 
the perceivers know about the person. Since social knowledge is organized into categories, it 
also influences the encoding of information. Moreover, stimuli can more easily be stored 
when they can be integrated into a knowledge network. Finally, the interpretation of a 
stimulus depends on the personal knowledge about the person or the situation. In summary, 
this classification of social cognitive functions support the relevance of the operative ability 
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domains of social intelligence as established in the modified performance model of Weis and 
Süß (2005), acknowledging also the special role played by social knowledge. 
Social Understanding – One or Multiple Processes? 
The upcoming passages will only focus on the cognitive processes and functions 
underlying the ability of social understanding. In particular, social psychological research was 
concerned with dissecting the process into various dimensions so that it is frequently doubted 
whether the ability to judge others is a unitary ability (Bronfenbrenner et al., 1958; Cline, 
1964; Gage & Cronbach, 1955). One differentiation opposed automatic and controlled 
information processing (Bless et al., 2004), which is similar to Probst’s (1982) distinction of a 
so-called “Diskursivmodell” versus “Intuitivmodell” (i.e., inference by analysis vs. inference 
by intuition). Automatic processes are unintentional, require only few resources, and occur in 
familiar situations. On the contrary, controlled processes require many resources and are 
applied in unfamiliar situations. Controlled processes demand the deliberate sampling and 
analyzing of available social cues, whereas automatic processes typically make use of mental 
shortcuts such as (a) the empathic transposing into the role of another person, (b) putting the 
situation, the target’s behavior, or the sequence of events in relation to what the judge has 
already experienced, or (c) an imitation of the other person’s movements in order to create the 
same inner sensory information (Bless et al., 2004; Tagiuri, 1969). With respect to the last 
point, an individual’s own mental state can guide further information processing (e.g., “How 
do I feel about it?”) and lead to a conclusion about the mental state of the target. 
Bless et al. (2004) applied the distinction of bottom-up versus top-down processing. 
This reflects the relative impact of new stimuli and prior knowledge on the inference process. 
Comparably, Buck (1983) disentangled the cognitive process of social understanding into 
perception and knowing. In both models, direct perception (or, bottom-up processing, data-
driven) represents the exclusive use of the available stimuli in order to make an accurate 
judgment (i.e., perception of the relevant cues as a necessary and sufficient condition). Top-
down processing (concept-driven) still relies on the stimuli but includes further information 
processing based on knowledge. The selection of an adequate processing model in a specific 
situation depends on the processing capacity and processing motivation of an individual 
(Bless et al., 2004). Bottom-up processing is highly resource-consuming so that a restriction 
of resources should instead evoke top-down processing. Furthermore, the processing 
motivation (i.e., strive for accuracy) is supposed to be enhanced when the individual is 
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involved in the situation. This can hardly be accomplished in group testing situations, 
therefore, the instruction should enforce this strive for accuracy. 
In a different approach, Bronfenbrenner et al. (1958) distinguished between the 
sensitivity to the generalized other and the sensitivity to the individual. According to 
Bronfenbrenner and colleagues, it addresses independent ability domains that are combined 
additively in social judgments. Moreover, the distinction also reflects a classification of 
targets of judgments. The sensitivity to the generalized other represents the ability to identify 
characteristics of what people have in common and requires knowledge of the social norm or 
the typical (average) response of the respective group (stereotype accuracy). The sensitivity to 
the individual represents the ability to recognize when and how much individuals diverge 
from a group average (i.e., the individual’s emotions, motives, thoughts, etc.). Bronfenbrenner 
and colleagues did not state whether individuals explicitly distinguish between both 
processes. However, it can be assumed that they are seldom applied explicitly. 
In summary, the paramount concern refers to the dimensionality of the ability domain 
social understanding. At present, social intelligence research did not systematically account 
for the questions of the underlying processes when different social understanding tasks are 
accomplished. Some more concrete considerations that imply the aforementioned models are 
presented in Chapter 5.2.4 where the scoring of social understanding tasks is addressed. More 
detailed considerations are provided in Chapter 10 that point towards interesting future 
research questions on the aforementioned concerns. 
4.3.3.2 Queried Information or Product of Tasks 
The queried information represents the output (product) which is derived from the 
cognitive operations. The SOI already includes a product facet distinguishing between six 
elements (i.e., units, relations, systems, classes, transformations, and implications). For 
example, units represent discrete social cues such as facial expressions, relations stand for the 
social-emotional relationship between two people, and systems represent conclusions about 
the relationship of three or more people (O’Sullivan, 1983, 2007). However, the taxonomic 
principles of the SOI were criticized for being an arbitrary classification that does not 
represent the present developments of the social intelligence construct (Cattell, 1987; Probst, 
1973). Definitions of social understanding (see Table 4.1) also include statements about the 
queried information: feelings (e.g., moods, emotions), cognitive components (e.g., thoughts, 
intentions, attitudes), and more general concepts such as personality traits, future behavior, 
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and relationships to one or more people. Analogously, Bernieri (2001) differentiated between 
emotions, thoughts, intentions, relationships, and personality traits. Obviously, queried 
information can be classified into modality categories. These modalities refer to the 
psychological qualities inside (i.e., a person’s emotions, cognitions, and personality traits) and 
outside the person (i.e., the person’s relationships with other people). 
The single categories of the modalities represent broad fields of psychological 
concepts and are each represented in separate psychological disciplines (i.e., psychology of 
emotion; cognitive psychology; social psychology; etc.). Here lies a meaningful interface 
between differential and general psychological approaches. A detailed description of the 
single disciplines and their results reaches beyond the scope of the present work and is also 
not relevant. The benefit, however, of using general psychological research results lies in two 
aspects. (a) They can provide further differentiations of the category of cues. These 
differentiations need to be sufficiently distinct and broad in order to provide a reasonable 
classification. (b) For specific types of (sub)constructs, they can serve as an expert-based 
database for determining correct answers to items when no objective information is available. 
An approach which is applied to the latter principle is described in MacCann (2006) and will 
be addressed in a later section when the measurement instruments are described. At this point, 
only the first aspects are addressed.  
Emotions 
With respect to the modality of emotions, a lot of research was directed at the 
identification of interculturally and universally valid emotions in terms of the patterns of 
appraisal and expressions (Ekman, 1999; see Scherer, Schorr, & Johnston, 2001 for a 
comprehensive presentation). Basic emotions can be identified by a common activity pattern 
of the autonomic or central nervous system (Ekman, 1999). For example, Ekman (1999) 
identified 15 distinguishable emotions: amusement, anger, contempt, contentment, disgust, 
embarrassment, excitement, fear, guilt, pride in achievement, relief, sadness / distress, 
satisfaction, sensory, pleasure, and shame. These universally valid emotions should be 
detectable in other persons when applied as queried information in a performance test. 
Whether other emotional experiences must be treated differently when they enter performance 
testing is not clarified. Another question concerns whether emotional judgments of more than 
one emotion could be dependent on each other when occurring at the same time with 
reference to the same situation. The dependency, if it does exist, would be reflected in the 
personal knowledge about the emotional system. Present tests of emotion recognition in the 
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context of emotional intelligence treat the dimensions as independent (Mayer, Salovey, 
Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2002). 
Cognitions 
The modality of cognition even seems more complex than that of emotions. 
Definitions of social intelligence speak of thoughts, intentions, attitudes, motives, etc. Ford 
(1992) conceived intentions or goals as the anchors that organize the activities within a 
behavioral episode. This represents an organized pattern of cognitive, emotional, biological, 
and perceptual-motor activity. Therefore, the goals are of special interest for finding thematic 
classifications of the contents of the cognitive elements that guide behavior. 
Ford (1992) distinguished between directive cognitions (i.e., personal goals such as a 
desired outcome of a situation), regulatory cognitions (i.e., evaluative functions that 
determine whether a goal or an activity is of a certain value), and control cognitions (i.e., 
planning and problem-solving thoughts). Within the personal goals, Ford applied the Ford and 
Nichols Taxonomy of Human Goals (Ford & Nichols, 1987 as cited in Ford, 1992) as a 
comprehensive taxonomy of goal contents for a better understanding of the direction and 
organization of human behavior. In the taxonomy, affective goals, cognitive goals, subjective 
organization goals, self-assertive social relationship goals, integrative social relationship 
goals, and task goals are differentiated and elaborated upon. The Ford and Nichols Taxonomy 
further distinguishes between several elements within one goal domain which will not be 
addressed here. 
There are surely other taxonomies of cognitions and goals available in the literature 
(see Ford, 1992; see also Bless et al., 2004 for an overview from social cognitive research) 
that will not be addressed any further. 
Relationships 
Relationships can also be described in terms of various dimensions. For example, 
Tagiuri (1969) introduced the dimensions of friendship, love, power, and influence as 
descriptive qualities for interpersonal relationships. A more theory-guided classification is 
provided by the interpersonal circumplex model (Wiggins, 1979). The interpersonal 
circumplex is a nomological system that serves different purposes. It classifies interpersonal 
personality traits in terms of their conceptual similarity and serves as a validating framework 
for the construct validity of interpersonally relevant traits. It includes four bipolar dimensions 
arranged in a circle which are given different labels throughout different approaches. The two 
4.3   Theories and Definitions of Social Intelligence  
 42 
core dimensions are labeled love (distance vs. closeness) and power (dominance vs. 
submission); these two dimensions are orthogonal (Wiggins, 1979). In between, two further 
dimensions are located that are again orthogonal. The dimension of competition includes the 
poles competitive vs. cooperative, with the competition pole located in between dominance 
and distance. The dimension agency with the pole of extraversion / activity (vs. introversion / 
passiveness) is located in between dominance and closeness. The single dimensions can also 
be applied to describe the character of interpersonal relationships in general or with respect to 
one person (e.g., How dominant is someone in his or her social relationships in general? How 
dominant is someone in his or her relationship to his or her partner?). 
Personality traits 
Personality psychology provides numerous classificatory systems of personality traits: 
the Big Five (Angleitner, Ostendorf, & John, 1990; Costa & McCrae, 1992; Goldberg, 1990), 
Eysenck’s three factor model (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1969), and Cattell’s 16 Personality 
Factors (Cattell, 1950). They shall not be addressed any further. Suffice to say that all the 
established models and the respective questionnaire inventories can serve as a basis for 
determining the personality traits of targets and to let judges answer questions about these 
respective traits. 
4.3.3.3 Cues and Contents 
Cues: Person and Situation 
This section refers to the cues used to perform any social cognitive task. The cues 
represent the data basis for any information processing, be it in social, emotional, or academic 
intelligence. Cues determine the output of a cognitive process to a substantial extent besides 
the knowledge structure of a judge that exists independently from the cues. Cues can be 
provided by a person (i.e., the target) and by a situation (Tagiuri, 1969). Situative cues can 
reduce the number of possible explanations for a set of person-related stimuli. Tagiuri 
concluded that both the person and the situation separately from one another allow 
“nonrandom, but indeterminate, judgments” (p. 421). Highly determinate judgments should 
be reached when both sources provide information. 
From the perspective of a judge, cues can also stem from inside the person (e.g., 
somatosensory information, feelings, emotions, etc.). Especially for the construct of 
emotional intelligence, cues from inside oneself make up a meaningful conceptual domain 
that will be discussed in Chapter 4.3. Cues vary in terms of the unambiguousness for the 
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respective task. Univocal cues require less further information processing to solve a task. 
Univocity can only be determined with respect to an underlying task, the context, and last but 
not least, the features of a stimulus. Empirical studies generally support the importance of the 
context for the perception and interpretation of person-related cues (e.g., Gestalt theorists) 
(Archer & Akert, 1980; Bless et al., 2004). Thus, the quantitative and qualitative properties of 
the situation and the stimuli must not be ignored.  
Archer and Akert (1980) addressed the question of the type and amount of information 
(i.e., cues) necessary to accomplish a social understanding task. They had previously 
discovered that a high level of accuracy was reached although only limited information was 
provided. Archer and Akert established three theories of social interaction that provide 
different explanations for the relationship between the availability of information and the 
accuracy of judgment. The Additive Theory states that accuracy accumulates as a linear 
function along with a growing amount of information or different information channels. The 
Significant Clue Theory postulates that indispensable information is highly localized in terms 
of place and time during the stream of information. Stimuli in measurement instruments or in 
real-life frequently contain controversial or misleading information which should not be taken 
into account. Thus, it is necessary to differentiate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ information. The 
Diffusion Theory claims that any individual piece of information provides sufficient 
information for accurate performance. In several investigations, Archer and Akert 
systematically manipulated the available information. They varied the length of the stimuli 
and the breadth of communication channels and assessed the accuracy of social 
understanding. Results showed that, in any event, the availability of the full information (in 
length and breadth) yielded the best performances across all types of scenes and material. 
However, in some cases, the performance reached a comparable level when only one part of a 
scene or just one piece of information was provided and nearly every condition reached an 
above-chance level of performance. But accuracy varied substantially across and within the 
scenes (i.e., material-dependent) so that the interpretation of the results was equivocal. The 
authors carefully interpreted their findings in favor of the Significant Clue Theory in 
combination with the Diffusion Theory. 
Cues may also vary according to their relevance for a task and for the underlying 
ability construct. Mehrabian & Ferris (1967) investigated the relevance of different 
communication channels. They found that more than half of communication relies on body 
language (55 %; e.g., postures and gestures) while 38 % are based on cues from spoken 
language (e.g., the tone of voice), and only about 7 % of the communication relies on the 
4.3   Theories and Definitions of Social Intelligence  
 44 
content of the language. Ekman, Friesen, O’Sullivan, and Scherer (1980) investigated the 
effect of different cues (i.e., face, body, speech, and a combination of all) on the judgments of 
personality characteristics. However, judgmental accuracy was not assessed. Instead, just the 
correlations between the judgments based only on the specific cues and the judgments based 
on a combination of all of the cues was assessed. Results showed that the relevance of the 
specific cues varied according to the judged attributes (i.e., the two judgments converged to 
different extents for different types of cues). In contrast to Mehrabian and Ferris (1967), 
Ekman et al. (1980) conclude that no communication channel is more or less important than 
any other, but that it is rather the interaction of the cues, judged attribute, and situation that is 
significant. 
How Can Social Cues Be Presented? 
The presentation of social cues or information and the applied task material (i.e., task 
contents) are directly associated with each other. Some models of academic intelligence 
already include a differentiation of different content domains, for example, symbolic, 
semantic, figural (i.e., visual and auditory), and behavioral contents in the SOI (Guilford, 
1967) and verbal, numeric, and figural-spatial contents in the BIS-Model (Jäger, 1982). The 
SOI is not an appropriate guideline for classifying content domains of social intelligence (see 
also Probst, 1973) since it abandons important components from the behavioral contents 
because auditory contents (e.g., the tone of voice or the way of speaking) are seen as a 
separate content domain. Cattell (1987) also criticized the arbitrary selection of content 
domains in the SOI. 
Definitions of social intelligence include words and facial expressions as possible 
social cues besides the aforementioned cues contained in spoken language. O’Sullivan et al. 
(1965) distinguished between facial expressions, vocal inflections, postures, and gestures as 
cues from which mental states are inferred. Consequently, relevant social cues can be 
contained in written language (e.g., the way people use the language in order to express an 
emotion, etc.), in audio recordings of spoken language (e.g., tone of voice, way of speaking, 
language contents), and in presentations of the person’s face and body (e.g., facial 
expressions, body language, etc.). Typically, situative contents can be presented in the same 
type of material. 
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4.3.3.4 Settings 
The differentiation according to the setting refers to the situative characteristics that 
may influence information processing. For example, settings may be located in private 
contexts (e.g., family and friends) or public contexts (including professional settings or 
encounters with official organizations). It is possible to assume that people who score high on 
social intelligence in public contexts may show low social intelligence in private settings. 
Another classification accounts for the varying numbers of people involved in the situation 
(i.e., a person is alone, in a dyadic interaction, or member of a group of people). People may 
feel more comfortable with less people involved, which results in them thinking and acting 
differently. Other aspects concern the psychological qualities of the situation (e.g., is the 
general atmosphere a pleasant one). Possible taxonomic principles to classify these 
psychological qualities are again found in the interpersonal circumplex dimensions 
(Wiggins, 1979). In this respect, the core bipolar dimensions of the interpersonal circumplex 
(i.e., love and power) can be applied to classify to underlying theme of a situation (e.g., when 
two people are having a fight about a major job-related decision, this situation would be 
classified to the power dimension of the interpersonal circumplex). 
4.3.3.5 Targets of Judgment 
Definitions of social intelligence distinguish between oneself and others as the targets 
of social cognitive operations. This refers to the question of who shall be judged in terms of 
his or her mental states (e.g., the interpretation of a stranger’s behavior for judging his or her 
intentions; remembering another person’s physical appearance so that he or she is recognized 
at a later point in time). The relevance of applying socially intelligent operations to oneself is 
not further discussed in the social intelligence literature. However, the ability to understand 
one’s own emotions and cognitions, to remember relevant autobiographic elements or past 
experiences, or to perceive one’s own behavior is definitely relevant for showing socially 
intelligent behavior. Emotional intelligence models address this question in more detail (see 
Chapter 4.4.1). 
The category others can be further subdivided. Bronfenbrenner et al. (1958) 
distinguished between first-, second-, and third-person sensitivity. First-person sensitivity 
refers to the question of what the judge thinks about how others think and feel about him or 
herself. Second-person sensitivity asks the judge to make a statement about how the target 
thinks and feels about the target him or herself. Third-person sensitivity addresses the 
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judgment of what the target thinks and feels about someone or something else. Definitions of 
social understanding introduce strangers as a special case of the category others. This refers 
to the relationship of the judge to the targets of judgment in terms of familiarity. This 
dimension can be assumed as a continuum with the extremes of completely unfamiliar (i.e., 
strangers) versus very familiar. Familiarity can be expressed in terms of qualitative and 
quantitative criteria. Literature shows that performance in social cognitive tasks varies with 
familiarity in a positive direction (Herzmann, Danthiir, Wilhelm, Sommer, & Schacht, 2007; 
see Buck, 1983 for an overview of results). Herzmann et al. (2007) reported empirical studies 
showing an increase in accuracy and a decrease in response latencies in a task of emotion 
recognition when familiar faces were applied as stimuli. Growing familiarity can also result in 
qualitative differences of the ability demands because the amount of previous knowledge 
about the target is richer and information processing may increasingly be based on this 
knowledge. In this respect, Sabatelli, Buck, and Dreyer (1980, 1982) could, in fact, not find a 
relationship of the general level of accuracy to interpret the nonverbal cues of partners with 
the general marital satisfaction across all cues. However, the accuracy was positively related 
to marital satisfaction when only those cues were accounted for, which could not be 
accurately interpreted by unfamiliar people. Buck concluded that these finding seem to limit 
the possibility to construct general measures of nonverbal understanding when the measures 
are based on unknown persons expressing cues that are highly idiosyncratic and specific to 
the sender. 
Another issue dealing with the judge-target-relationship is the interaction of common 
and uncommon characteristics in both (i.e., the familiarity of judge and target). Cronbach 
(1955) distinguished between an assumed and real similarity. He postulated better 
performance when assumed and real similarity are either both high or both low (see also 
Chapter 5.2.4). Bruner and Tagiuri (1954) reported positive correlations of the assumed 
similarity between a judge and target and the accuracy of those judgments. Bronfenbrenner et 
al. (1958) found that male judges’ accuracy in judging other males correlated positively with 
their accuracy in judging women. Contrary, females’ accuracy in judging other females 
correlated negatively with their accuracy to judge other males. The effect of assumed and real 
similarity on the accuracy of judgments is especially problematic when only one target has to 
be judged, which results in the influence being unbalanced across tasks. 
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4.3.4 Social and Academic Intelligence – The Same “g”s, Domain-Specific Overlap, or 
Independent Intelligences? 
Only Guilford’s (1967) Structure of Intellect Model included a statement about the 
construct overlap of academic and social intelligence. In the SOI, he represented coequal 
ability domains. The taxonomic weaknesses of the SOI have already been discussed (Cattell, 
1987). Accepting Guilford’s model would mean that social intelligence shares everything 
with academic intelligence (i.e., cognitive operations and task products) except for the task 
contents. It would also mean that auditory, figural, or semantic task contents are not relevant 
for social intelligence. Neither other theoretical accounts nor empirical studies suggested a 
coherent model of overlap between social and academic intelligence (see Chapter 5.4 for the 
results of validity studies of social intelligence). In the end, this question is an empirical one, 
however, construct definitions suggest that there are more than one hypothetical models of 
overlap. 
Conceptually, the largest overlap of the modified performance model of social 
intelligence can be identified in the faceted BIS-Model. Overlap can be determined from 
different perspectives related to the facets. Theory suggests that social and academic 
intelligence share common operative and content-related components. The operative domains 
reasoning, memory, perception (speed), creativity, and knowledge are all included in models 
of both constructs. At the same time, verbal and nonverbal (figural-spatial in the BIS and 
picture-, and video-based in the social intelligence model) content components are included in 
both models. Auditory task contents are, so far, only included in the model of social 
intelligence. Consequently, in order to fully validate social intelligence against the BIS-
Model, this must be complemented by an auditory ability domain. The doctoral thesis of 
Kristin Seidel (2007) extended the BIS-Model by newly developed auditory ability tasks. 
Results showed that a differentiation into operative domains (i.e. auditory reasoning, memory, 
etc.) was not possible. Tasks showed the highest correlations with the reasoning domain. With 
respect to the task contents, a differentiation into language-based and nonverbal (i.e., based on 
tones) tasks was supported by data. These findings at first contradict the idea of a separate 
auditory content factor since the identified factor is confounded with common reasoning 
requirements. However, Seidel pointed out that further research is needed. Thus far, the 
present work will apply the BIS as a model of reference without an additional content ability 
domain. 
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The overlap between social and academic intelligence for the example in the BIS -
Model, could be described as displayed in Figure 4.6 (a). The faceted structure of the BIS-
Model is complemented either by an additional social-operative or social-content domain. 
This is an example of integrating social and academic intelligence in one theoretical model. 
Both classifications are possible in the terminology of the performance model of social 
intelligence by Weis & Süß (2005). A necessary condition for both types of classification is 
the identification of and empirical support for a structural model of the respective operative or 
content-related ability domains of social intelligence. If social intelligence can be partitioned 
into meaningful content-related ability factors (e.g., written or spoken language, picture- or 
video-based) subsuming under the content factors in the BIS-Model, social intelligence may 
represent an additional operative domain. However, this classification is somehow difficult. 
The differentiation of contents is not fully equivalent, numeric contents are missing in social 
intelligence, and no auditory contents are, thus far, incorporated in the BIS-Model. In 
contrast, conforming to the previously described performance model of social intelligence, 
social abilities may more suitably represent an additional content domain if splitting into the 
operative ability factors (analogous to the SOI). No matter what overlap emerges from this 
faceted perspective, the possibility is maintained that social and academic intelligence 
subsume under one general factor. Another type of visualization for these hypotheses is 
displayed in Chapter 6.3 (Figure 6.4) as a hypothetical model for conducting confirmatory 
factor analysis (CFA) to examine construct validity. 
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Figure 4.6 
Overlap of Social and Academic Intelligence (a) On a Structural Level Based on Common 
Facets, (b) On Different Levels of Generality 
Note. R = Reasoning, M = Memory, F = Figural, C = Creativity, S = Speed, V = Verbal 
abilities, F = Figural abilities, N = Numerical abilities 
 r1 = relationship of social to academic intelligence on a general level, r2 = relationship 
of social to academic intelligence on the level of broad ability factors, r3 = relationship 
of social to academic intelligence on the lowest level in the hierarchy 
 
Figure 4.6 (b) displays a different model of construct overlap that turns relevant when 
both constructs are specified as a hierarchical model. Consequently, overlap cannot be 
restricted to just one ability facet (operations or contents). In contrast, it can occur on 
different levels of generality when a hierarchical model is assumed on both sides (i.e., 
positive correlations r1 between two g-factors, between corresponding broad ability domains 
r2, or between single cells r3; see Figure 4.6 (b)). In any case, whether social intelligence is 
distinct from academic intelligence can only be determined empirically. 
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4.4 Ability Constructs Related to Social Intelligence 
At the beginning of the present work, emotional intelligence was introduced as a 
competitor to social intelligence as a valuable new intelligence constructs that is sought to 
complement the traditional academic intelligence construct. Besides emotional intelligence, 
practical intelligence was introduced also not long ago to compete with academic intelligence. 
The concept of wisdom is not a typical human ability construct but originates from research 
on life-span development. All three constructs show substantial conceptual overlap with 
social intelligence. Sternberg’s (1997) concept of successful intelligence or Gardner’s (1983) 
conception of multiple intelligences were also mentioned in the context of new ability 
constructs and show some commonalities with social intelligence. However, they will not be 
accounted for in the present description. One reason for this decision is the lack of empirical 
support for these concepts and their overinclusiveness in terms of their applied construct 
definitions (Matthews et al. 2005). Furthermore, emotional or practical intelligence already 
cover some of the subconcepts of a successful intelligence in Gardner’s multiple intelligences. 
4.4.1 Emotional Intelligence 
Salovey and Mayer (1990) introduced emotional intelligence in psychological 
literature. They defined emotional intelligence as a subset of social intelligence that involved 
“the ability to monitor one’s own and other’s feelings and emotions, to discriminate among 
them, and to use this information to guide one’s thinking and actions” (p. 189). With their 
conceptualization, they attempted to overcome the sometimes promoted dualism of the 
emotional and the cognitive system by putting emotional intelligence at the intersection 
between emotion and cognition (Forgas, 2000; Matthews et al., 2005; Mayer & Salovey, 
1997). Traditional positions assumed that affect reduced individuals’ ability to think 
rationally. More recent research conceives “affective states as a meaningful source for the 
regulation of cognitive processes” (Bless et al., 2004, p. 179). 
In the year 1995, Goleman published his notorious book “EQ – Why it can matter 
more than IQ” and initiated a surge of research which accounted for a simultaneously growing 
market for the assessment and training of so-called soft skills and for emotional intelligence 
as a prototypical representative. Throughout subsequent research, the fathers of the construct 
Mayer et al. (2000) distanced themselves from those strands of research that presented 
emotional intelligence as an overinclusive new ability construct or which conceptualized 
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emotional intelligence rather as a personality trait. Particularly, these approaches were 
criticized for being overinclusive by incorporating personality traits, behavioral skills, as well 
as emotional competencies or, in other words, everything else but IQ (Hedlund & 
Sternberg, 2000). Mayer et al. (2000) labeled these approaches mixed models or trait 
emotional intelligence (see also Petrides & Furnham, 2001) in contrast to ability models 
representing a mental ability. This distinction was adopted by subsequent research. 
Figure 2.1 in the introduction chapter displays the development of publications 
throughout the last 47 years. The number exploded for emotional intelligence and has now 
nearly reached the level of social competence as a highly general and established construct 
both, above all, in the field of applied psychology. It has outperformed research on social 
intelligence within less than 10 years. Approaches to conceptualize and assess emotional 
intelligence are as numerous as manifold and it is not possible to present an exhaustive 
description in the present work. Instead, the prototypical approaches will be presented. 
4.4.1.1 Ability Models of Emotional Intelligence 
Four-Branch-Model of Emotional Intelligence (Mayer & Salovey, 1997) 
The current state-of-the-art in terms of theoretical models, is represented by the Four-
Branch-Model of Emotional Intelligence (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). The Branches contain 
emotion-related abilities that are classified according to the complexity of the cognitive 
requirements and rely upon each other (Mayer et al., 2000). Figure 4.7 shows the Four 
Branches arranged from bottom to top. 
Branch I (Perception, Appraisal, and Expression of Emotion) involves the most basic 
requirements of perceiving, recognizing, identifying, or expressing emotional information in 
one’s physical states, feelings, thoughts, in other people and in artwork. Branch II (Emotional 
Facilitation of Thoughts) represents the ability to assimilate emotions in order to enhance 
intellectual functioning, for example in order to support judgment and memory. Branch III 
(Emotional Understanding) includes the ability to reason about emotions and to understand 
transitions from one emotion to another. Finally, Branch IV (Regulation of Emotion) refers to 
the ability to manage emotions in oneself and in others in order to promote emotional and 
intellectual growth. 
 
 
4.4   Ability Constructs Related to Social Intelligence  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 
Four-Branch-Model of Emotional Intelligence (Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Adapted from 
Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999, p. 269)
Mayer and Salovey (1997) postulated positive relations between the Branches and, 
thus, a hierarchical model. They sought to conceptualize emotional intelligence as a mental 
ability and expected positive relations to other mental abilities as required by Austin and 
Saklofske (2005; see also Schaie, 2001). Furthermore, Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, and 
Sitarenios (2001) postulated a positive relation between performance and age and experience. 
Particularly, they claimed that the processing of emotional information as specified in Branch 
III (Emotional Understanding) is based on acquired emotional knowledge that typically 
covaries with age (e.g., emotional knowledge may contain the claim that anger typically goes 
together with the experience of injustice). The Mayer-Salovey-Caruso-Emotional-
Intelligence-Test (MSCEIT; Mayer et al., 2002) was developed to operationalize the Four-
Branch-Model. This test will be presented in a subsequent chapter. The Four-Branch-Model is 
surrounded by controversy; some of the critical points are discussed hereafter. 
a) Theoretical Validation 
The only empirical support for the entire model is based on the MSCEIT. If the model 
was valid, different measures that match the requirements of the Four Branches should also 
support the postulated structure of emotional intelligence. At the moment, empirical research 
is only concerned with finding adequate measurement procedures. Hardly any attempts are 
being undertaken to advance the theory. However, this would be a necessary step in the light 
of the subsequently presented criticisms. 
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b) Emotions vs. cognitions 
The model fails to explicate the interplay of the emotional and the cognitive system 
that were sometimes conceived as opponents (Mayer et al., 2001). At first sight, it seems to be 
a contradiction to speak of emotions within a construct that is supposed to be a cognitive 
intelligence construct (Carroll, 1993; Süß, 2001). In order to clarify the concepts, one 
distinction is indispensable: cognitions and emotions can be seen as a process (e.g., the 
process of thinking, the process of emotion appraisal); they can also be seen as contents that 
the human mind deals with (e.g., thinking about how it must be to feel depressed, an emotion 
is elicited by a sudden thought that comes to one’s mind). Such an explicit distinction is not 
realized in the Four-Branch-Model which is equivocal about the question of whether the 
emotional system also exhibits more or less intelligent processes. Relying on the classical 
definition of intelligence, only cognitive processes or operations are allowed. Consequently, 
emotional intelligence could be defined as the ability to apply cognitive operations to 
emotional contents. Emotional contents can be provided by external cues (i.e., someone 
speaks about his feelings, or shows body language that reveals information about the 
emotional life) or raised by emotional processes of one’s own emotional system (i.e., 
appraisal of emotion in oneself as reaction to external cues). However, some Branch 
definitions do not explicitly clarify the role of emotional processes and contents and suggest 
an undefined interplay of emotional and cognitive processes. Thus, the Four-Branch-Model 
obviously lacks taxonomic principles that clarify the operative and content domains of 
emotional intelligence. 
Table 4.2 attempts to disentangle the processes and contents of emotional intelligence 
as specified in the Four-Branch-Model. It opposes emotionally and socially intelligent 
operations and contents. Note that not every subcomponent of the Four Branches can be 
univocally classified to the present taxonomy: Perception of emotions in the self can be an 
automatic process with emotions raised by emotional processes or by a more conscious 
cognitive process which only includes emotions as contents. Moreover, typical emotion-
related traits may influence the perception and the regulation of emotions in the self (Gohm, 
2003; e.g., people high in impulsivity or low in emotional stability do not encounter the same 
performance conditions as people with a disparate trait profile). 
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Table 4.2 
Cross-Classification of Processes and Contents of Emotional Intelligence 
  Process 
  Cognition Emotion 
 
Cognition  
Branch II: Emotional Facilitation of Thought 
Branch IV: Regulation of Emotions 
C
on
te
nt
s 
Emotion 
Social 
Intelligence 
(Under-
standing, 
Memory, 
Perception, 
Creativity) 
Branch I: Emotion 
Perception in others 
(limitedly in the self) Branch III: Emotional 
Understanding 
Branch I: Appraisal of 
Emotions in the self 
 
Besides an unclear structure of performance when oneself is involved as the target of 
perception or regulation, appraisal and regulation of emotions in others contain behavioral 
requirements that do not match the present taxonomy. Table 4.2 shows that not only cognitive 
processes are involved in the current conceptualization of the Four-Branch-Model (i.e., above 
all in Branch II and IV). Consequently, models of emotional intelligence need to clarify the 
role of emotional processes. On the one hand, they reflect the contents of cognitive operations 
(e.g., apply cognitive operations that influence the emotional reactions; think about something 
that alters the present mood). If this is true, the aforementioned incompatibility of the 
emotional and the cognitive system would be irrelevant since the emotional system would not 
be involved. On the other hand, could the emotional system possibly be the active system that 
is responsible for the regulation and management of emotional experiences? Or, is it the 
interaction of the cognitive and emotional processes that represent emotional intelligence? At 
the moment, emotional intelligence research and especially the Four-Branch-Model are not 
capable to answer these questions. 
c) Performance requirements 
Branch IV and parts of Branch I include behavioral requirements. The ability to 
regulate emotions in others (Branch IV) as well as the ability to express emotions or appraise 
emotions in others (Branch I) demand overt behavior. According to Mayer et al. (2001), 
Branch IV even represents an interface between the cognitive system and personality traits. 
This conceptualization substantially questions the maturity of the theoretical concepts 
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underlying the Four-Branch-Model. Neither personality traits nor behavioral components 
should be included in an intelligence construct. 
Mayer et al. (2001) claimed that emotional knowledge is a necessary requirement for 
the accomplishment of tasks of perception and appraisal of emotions and emotional 
understanding. They leave it unclear to what extent perception, understanding, or knowledge 
contribute to performance in these Branches. However, the separate contribution can vary to a 
substantial amount. Even more so, Scherer (2007) demanded the exclusion of emotional 
knowledge from models of emotional intelligence. Exemplary for a prototypical task, 
emotional knowledge would assume anger or frustration to be the emotional reaction in the 
experience of injustice. However, it is possible that individuals differ in how they react during 
this experience. In this case, emotional knowledge of a prototypical reaction could result in a 
wrong answer. Instead, perception or understanding could provide the correct answer when 
the relevant cues are available. The present conceptualization does not allow for an explicit 
separation of crystallized and fluid components of emotional intelligence. Some researchers 
speculated that emotional intelligence could represent an additional factor amongst the 
crystallized abilities in Cattell’s theory suggesting that it could be acquired knowledge in 
specific domains (Davies, Stankov, & Roberts, 1998; Neubauer & Freudenthaler, 2005; 
Zeidner et al., 2001). 
Scherer’s Model of Emotional Competence (Scherer, 2007) 
Another theory-driven approach was just recently established by Scherer (2007). In 
criticizing existing ability and mixed models and particularly the use of the term 
“intelligence”, he suggested a model of emotional competence based on his Componential 
Emotion Theory (Scherer, 2001). He applied the differentiation of emotional mechanisms 
(i.e., processes) and emotional contents. Nevertheless, he identified the lack of agreement on 
the nature of the emotional mechanisms as the reason for the disagreement about emotional 
intelligence or competence. 
Scherer (2007) conceives high emotional competence as an optimal functioning of the 
emotional mechanisms with respect to the domains of emotion production and emotion 
perception. Therefore, he clearly focuses on emotions as process whereby emotion perception 
implicitly contains emotional contents as well. Scherer defines production competence as the 
“production of the most appropriate emotional reaction to different types of events based on 
adequate appraisal of internal goal states, coping potential, and the probable consequences of 
events, [... as the ...] adaptive regulation of one’s emotional states, both with respect to 
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internal set points and according to the sociocultural and situational context [... and as the ...] 
efficient emotional communication in social interaction through appropriate expression of 
one’s own state.” (p. 107). Thus, production competence includes appraisal, regulation, and 
communication competences, and is strictly restricted to emotions in oneself. Perception 
competence requires accurate signal perception and recognition (i.e., receiving ability) and is 
directed at the perception and interpretations of emotions in others. Table 4.3 displays the 
emotional competence model including the two postulated domains and their different 
subcomponents. Furthermore, the construct overlap with the Four-Branch-Model is presented. 
Table 4.3 
Scherer’s Model of Emotional Competence (2007) Opposed to the Four-Branch-Model 
Competence 
domain 
Subcomponents 
(Scherer, 2007) 
Four-Branch-Model 
(Mayer & Salovey, 1997) 
Appraisal Competence: 
appropriate emotion elicitation and differentiation 
Branch I (Appraisal in the 
self) 
Regulation Competence: 
correct inappropriate emotional responses produced by 
unrealistic appraisals 
Branch IV (Regulation in the 
self) Production 
Competence 
Communication Competence: 
- produce emotional expressions optimally suited to a purpose
- accurate signal perception and receiving ability (see 
Perception Competence) 
Branch I (Expression in the 
self and perception in others)
Accurate signal perception Branch I (Perception in others) Perception 
Competence 
Accurate recognition and interpretation Branch I (Perception in others) 
 
Scherer (2007) additionally introduced different performance criteria for the different 
competence domains. The so-called Aristotelian model is relevant for the regulation 
competence, whereas the so-called Galtonian model applies to the appraisal and 
communication competence including the domain of perception competence. The Aristotelian 
model is concerned with the appropriateness of an emotional response (i.e., typically in the 
middle of a range of opportunities). The Galtonian model refers to perfect accuracy as the 
desired performance criterion. Obviously, Scherer’s model is more restricted in terms of 
ability domains and range of targets and contents, and, at the same time, substantially more 
explicit and clear about the necessary performance requirements and the underlying 
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conceptual differentiation. The use of the term competence instead of intelligence allows a 
less strict selection of performance requirements. Scherer clearly differentiates between the 
self and others and minimizes knowledge requirements as specified in Branch III in the Four-
Branch-Model. It also excludes those domains in which it could not be clarified whether 
emotional or cognitive processes contributed to high performance (i.e., particularly Branch 
II). However, the model requires empirical substantiation foremost, and then, may well serve 
as a viable alternative to the Four-Branch -Model. 
Concurrent / Competing Approaches to Define Emotional Intelligence 
Several strands of research have now emerged which provide complementary or 
competing definitions of more specific ability domains of emotional intelligence (Austin 
2004; Freudenthaler & Neubauer, 2005). Austin (2004) focused on a biological perspective 
and postulated that emotion processing speed is a part of emotional intelligence. 
Freudenthaler and Neubauer (2005, 2007) focused on the ability domain of managing 
emotions as specified in Branch IV in the Four-Branch-Model. They criticized that existing 
operationalizations do not cover the effectiveness of subjects’ behavior in managing 
emotions, but rather include emotional knowledge about the effectiveness of behavior 
(assessed by a maximum-performance criterion). Alternatively, they suggested a 
conceptualization of emotional management skills that includes typically exhibited behaviors 
in everyday life. However, this approach is faced with several conceptual problems relating to 
the overlap with trait emotional intelligence when the typical performance conditions are 
applied (see Chapter 5.3). MacCann (2006) relied on the definitions of Understanding 
Emotions and Emotion Management of Branch III and IV of the Four-Branch-Model. She 
developed a different measurement approach that will be presented in Chapter 5.3 together 
with the approaches of Mayer et al. (2002), Freudenthaler and Neubauer (2005), and Austin 
(2004). 
4.4.1.2 Mixed Models of or Trait Emotional Intelligence 
Ability and mixed models of emotional intelligence differ both on the construct and on 
the measurement level. Mixed models literally contain a mixture of ability constructs, 
personality traits, motivational components and behavioral skills. They are assessed by the 
use of self-report inventories (Petrides & Furnham, 2001; Saklofske, Austin, & Minski, 2003; 
Schutte, Malouff, Hall, Haggerty, Cooper, Golden, & Dornheim, 1998). Some authors in this 
field still claim to assess an intelligence construct. However, intelligence theories and 
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empirical data clearly demonstrated that the use of self-report data for assessing a cognitive 
ability construct is highly problematic (Paulhus, Lysy, & Yik, 1998; see also Asendorpf, 
2002; Neubauer & Freudenthaler, 2005; Scherer, 2007). Goleman (1995) formulated a model 
of emotional “intelligence” consisting of five major domains (i.e., knowing one’s emotions, 
managing emotions, motivating oneself, recognizing emotions in others, and handling 
relationships). Bar-On (1997) defined emotional “intelligence” as an array of noncognitive 
capabilities, competencies, and skills that influence one’s ability to succeed in coping with 
environmental demands and pressures. His conceptualization contained five domains: 
intrapersonal skills, interpersonal skills, adaptability skills, stress-management skills, and 
general mood. Bar-On’s model of emotional “intelligence” is operationalized by the Bar-On 
Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-I; Bar-On, 1997). 
Goleman’s and Bar-On’s models were criticized for being overinclusive (Hedlund & 
Sternberg, 2000; Matthews et al., 2005). However, Petrides and Furnham (2001) introduced a 
model of trait emotional intelligence (synonymous for mixed models) that includes 15 
dimensions: adaptability, assertiveness, emotional appraisal (self and others), emotion 
expression, emotion management (others), emotion regulation, impulsiveness, relationship 
skills, self-esteem, self-motivation, social competence, stress management, trait empathy, trait 
happiness, and trait optimism. 
In general, and inclusive to all of the inventories, results from validational studies 
showed large overlap with measures of personality traits (e.g., alexithymia or emotional 
stability). Pérez, Petrides, and Furnham (2005) reported moderate to high correlations 
between personality inventories and 15 selected self-report inventories of trait emotional 
intelligence. Consequently, the value of mixed models of emotional intelligence is highly 
disputable in terms of the advancement of theories and the applied methodology. Hereafter, 
only ability models of emotional intelligence will be taken into account. 
4.4.1.3 Overlap of Social and Emotional Intelligence 
Several researchers agreed that social and emotional intelligence show conceptual 
overlap (Davies et al., 1998; Kang, Day, & Meara, 2005; Mayer et al., 2000; Salovey & 
Mayer, 1990; Weis & Süß, 2005; Weis et al., 2006). Only three empirical studies can be 
found in the literature that investigated the relation of social and emotional intelligence 
relying on performance tests (Barchard, 2003; Davies et al., 1998; Weis & Süß, 2007). 
Davies et al. (1998) found a nonsignificant negative correlation between two performance 
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tests of social and emotional intelligence. Barchard (2003) operationalized social intelligence 
as a subdomain of emotional intelligence but did not report construct intercorrelations. Weis 
and Süß (2007) showed that an emotional perception task loaded on a social understanding 
factor but not on a general social intelligence factor, suggesting domain-specific overlap 
between the two constructs. However, the empirical evidence is sparse and restricted to single 
operationalizations. More importantly, common theoretical considerations were not 
undertaken which would allow large-scale conclusions about the construct overlap (or 
distinctiveness). Weis et al. (2006; see also Süß et al., 2005) assembled the cognitive 
operations derived from a requirements’ analysis of both social and emotional intelligence 
tasks. With respect to this analysis and the aforementioned considerations, Table 4.4 contrasts 
social and emotional intelligence on different taxonomic levels based on the Four-Branch- 
Model and the performance model of social intelligence. 
The operations of understanding and perception appear in both constructs, being 
applied to different contents or queried modalities (i.e., emotions for emotional intelligence; 
emotions, cognitions, behavior, etc. for social intelligence). Thus, social intelligence seems to 
be the broader construct in terms of the covered modalities. With respect to Branch II and IV, 
emotional intelligence seems to reach beyond the scope of social intelligence. Emotional 
Facilitation of Thought and Emotion Regulation may make people more apt to think and 
behave intelligently in a specific situation by ruling out possibly unfavorable moods or by 
self-motivational mechanisms (i.e., meta-cognitions). The contents or cues that social and 
emotional intelligence are dealing with are totally identical. Social intelligence is only 
directed at others as targets, whereas emotional intelligence focuses both, on the self and on 
others. Conclusively, measure are needed that vary systematically the aforementioned aspects 
in order to determine the construct overlap. 
4.4   Ability Constructs Related to Social Intelligence  
Table 4.4 
Overlap of Social and Emotional Intelligence 
Domain of 
overlap Social Intelligence  Emotional Intelligence Type of Overlap 
Social Understanding ⊂ Emotional Understanding (Branch III) EI: Reasoning requirements applied to emotions 
Social Memory ≠   
Social Perception ⊂ Emotion Perception (Branch I) EI: Perceptual requirements applied to emotions 
Social Creativity ≠   
 < Emotional Facilitation of Thought (Branch II) 
Operations 
 < Emotion Regulation (Branch IV) 
EI: Meta-Ability: Influence on all 
cognitive processes 
Emotions = Emotions Identical 
Cognitions ≈ (Meta-cognition) EI: indirect effect on cognitions (Branch II/IV; see Table 4.2) 
Behavior ≠   
Queried 
Modality 
Relationships ≠   
Written language = Written language Identical 
Spoken language = Spoken language Identical Contents 
Body language = Body language Identical 
 ≠ Self  
Targets 
Other = Others Identical 
Note. = identical, ≠ not equal to, ≈ some unspecified overlap, ⊂ a proper superset of, 
< Influence on, EI = emotional intelligence 
4.4.2 Practical Intelligence 
Practical intelligence was frequently conceived as interchangeable with social 
intelligence (Cantor & Harlowe, 1994; Ford, 1986). Mercer, Gomez-Palacio, and Padilla 
(1986) equated practical intelligence with social competence and defined the latter as the 
ability to meet the normative expectations of others in six different types of social roles (i.e., 
family roles, peer roles, community roles, earner-consumer roles, self-maintenance roles, and 
non-academic school roles). Thus, the normative expectations are supposed to vary across 
social roles, cultures, or social groups. Sternberg (1985, 1987, see also Hedlund & Sternberg, 
2000) extended the scope of practical intelligence beyond problems of only a social nature 
 60 
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onto all types of problems encountered in everyday life. These problems are typically not 
clearly defined and solutions not readily available. Common to both approaches is the 
specificity for the respective context or content domain. Thus, practical intelligence is a 
context-specific capacity defined as the ability to find a more optimal fit between the 
individual and the demands of the individual’s environment by applying information-
processing components for the purposes of adaptation to, shaping, and selection of the 
environment (Sternberg, 1985, 1987). According to Wagner & Sternberg (1985), practical 
intelligence seeks to fill the gap left by academic intelligence tests in predicting relevant real-
life criteria in other than academic settings. For example, Wagner (2000) reported higher 
predictive validity coefficients of academic intelligence when school-like criterion measures 
were applied, implicating lower validity coefficients for non-school-like settings. 
Central to practical intelligence is the concept of tacit knowledge; it cannot be taught 
explicitly or sometimes can not be verbalized. According to Henry et al. (2005), tacit 
knowledge is what one needs to know to work effectively in an environment and involves 
knowledge about managing oneself, managing others, and managing tasks. Tacit knowledge 
about managing oneself includes knowledge about self-motivation and self-organization. 
Tacit knowledge about managing others refers to knowledge about how to manage one’s 
interpersonal relationships or to function effectively in social interactions. Tacit knowledge 
about managing tasks includes knowledge about how to carry out specific tasks in terms of 
planning, monitoring, and evaluating one’s activities. 
In most research approaches, practical intelligence is reduced to the concept of tacit 
knowledge. However, knowledge, whether implicit or explicit, requires a context-specific 
conceptualization and operationalization (see Chapter 4.3.2). An adequate measure needs to 
account for this context-specificity by constructing different tests for different types of 
occupations, roles, or settings. The problem of context-specificity carries substantial 
criticisms for the construct (Gottfredson, 2003). Performance depends on personal experience 
and the opportunity to have acquired the specific knowledge of the respective domain. 
Gottfredson argues that it is just the strength of academic intelligence to avoid this specificity 
and, thus, the dependency on culture and experience (see also Süß, 2001; Weber & 
Westmeyer, 2001). Further criticism concerns the restricted scope of practical intelligence 
equaling only tacit knowledge. Gottfredson (2003) argued that tacit knowledge has become 
the new “g”, valid in diverse domains and broader than academic intelligence in terms of 
practical relevance and conceptual scope (see also the next chapter for Sternberg’s concept of 
wisdom as tacit knowledge). Austin and Saklofske (2005) remarked that no “general-purpose 
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practical intelligence test is currently available” (p. 121). Consequently, it is highly 
questionable whether the conceptualization of practical intelligence as tacit knowledge can at 
all serve as a new intelligence construct since some of the central requirements for an 
intelligence construct are violated. Practical intelligence is not generally valid across 
heterogeneous situations and not only based on cognitive requirements. However, without 
such a widespread entitlement, tacit knowledge represents an interesting approach to assess 
domain-specific knowledge. It may be very useful for researchers to attempt to specify social 
knowledge in specific real-life contexts by the use of the tacit knowledge test paradigm (see 
Appendix A for an example tacit knowledge test). 
4.4.3 Wisdom 
“To act wisely in human relations” was one part of Thorndike’s definition of social 
intelligence (1920, p. 218). The concept of wisdom, however, has a long philosophical 
tradition and was originally located in research on life-span development in the psychological 
literature. Wisdom was introduced not long ago as an individual differences construct based 
on a psychometric foundation (Baltes & Smith, 1990; Sternberg, 1998). 
The Berlin Wisdom Paradigm 
Baltes and colleagues were interested in defining wisdom in terms of the underlying 
central elements and integrating wisdom in existing individual differences constructs such as 
academic, social, or practical intelligence and creativity (Kunzmann & Baltes, 2005). Baltes 
and his colleagues introduced the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm (Baltes & Smith, 1990; 
Kunzmann & Baltes, 2005) which was derived from philosophical accounts and from implicit 
theories of laypersons about the concept of wisdom (Holliday & Chandler, 1986; Sternberg, 
1985). The Paradigm was intended to offer operational definitions to develop a measure of 
wisdom-related knowledge. Wisdom was defined as “highly valued and outstanding expertise 
in dealing with fundamental (i.e., existential) problems related to the meaning and conduct of 
life” (Kunzmann & Baltes, 2005, p. 117). The range of applications excludes less severe life 
problems which can be handled by more specific abilities such as social, emotional, or 
practical intelligence. Moreover, Kunzmann and Baltes (2005) pointed to the integrative 
character of wisdom which combines cognitive, motivational, emotional, and social 
components. Five operational criteria for wisdom-related knowledge were formulated that 
combine intellectual capacities and character (i.e., virtue). 
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Basic Criteria (inherent to all types of expertise) 
1. Rich factual knowledge (about human nature and life course) 
2. Rich procedural knowledge (about ways of dealing with life problems) 
Meta Criteria (unique to wisdom) 
3. Lifespan contextualism (i.e., the awareness and understanding of the many contexts of 
life, how they relate to each other and change over lifespan) 
4. Value relativism / tolerance (i.e., acknowledgement of individual, social, and cultural 
differences in values and life priorities) 
5. Awareness / Management of Uncertainty (including the limits of one’s own 
knowledge) 
Staudinger, Smith, and Baltes (1994) developed a measure of wisdom-related 
knowledge that required individuals to give verbal responses to prototypical fundamental 
problems of life (see Chapter 5.3 for a detailed description of the instrument). Several studies 
were conducted which supported some of the basic assumptions of the Berlin Wisdom 
Paradigm. People nominated as wise and clinical psychologists showed better performance 
than age-equivalent groups. More than age, general experiences, professional training and 
practice, and motivational preferences (Kunzmann & Baltes, 2005) seem to determine 
performance. 
The Balance Theory of Wisdom 
As a competing theory, Sternberg (1998) formulated the balance theory of wisdom. 
Again and analogous to his definition of practical intelligence, Sternberg conceived tacit 
knowledge as the core component of wisdom. He defined wisdom as a part of practical 
intelligence which applies tacit knowledge to maximize a balance of others’ interests, the 
context’s demands and one’s own interests (i.e., the maximization of a common good). In 
other words, it represents the moral part of practical intelligence (Sternberg, 1998). 
Furthermore, wisdom is not being taught explicitly and it is “at least partially domain-
specific” (p. 356) because of its equalization with tacit knowledge. The value of tacit 
knowledge as an ability concept central to a new intelligence construct was already discussed 
in the last section and does not need to be repeated at this point. Hedlund and Sternberg 
(2000) postulated that research on social, emotional, and practical intelligence and on wisdom 
can be integrated in the framework of tacit knowledge. Knowledge about managing oneself 
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represents emotional intelligence, and knowledge about managing others is equivalent to 
social intelligence. Repeating the aforementioned criticisms, it is not adequate to reduce 
intelligence concepts to the domain of (tacit) knowledge. Therewith, large parts of 
conceptually and empirically supported differentiations are ignored. 
Social Intelligence and Wisdom – Construct Overlap 
The construct overlap of social intelligence with wisdom can be addressed in terms of 
the spectrum of subsumed abilities and in terms of the range of contents and situations in 
which the construct is applied. With respect to the content domain, Kunzmann and Baltes 
(2005) conceived social intelligence as more specific than wisdom since it is relevant in more 
delimited everyday problems. Moreover, the introduction of the dimensions of time and space 
in the criteria of life contextualism and tolerance represent unique requirements excluded in 
more specific intelligence constructs. For example, social intelligence is supposed to be 
relevant in a defined conflict with another person whereas wisdom is responsible for 
coordinating behavior for solutions that account for a broader viewpoint. However, the 
opposite position is also justifiable. Wisdom can be seen as the more specific ability because 
it is restricted to fundamental, serious life problems which rarely occur compared to everyday 
problems in work and private life and require social intellectual functions. With respect to the 
spectrum of abilities, wisdom seems to be the broader construct incorporating knowledge, 
abilities, and meta-cognitive components. Particularly, according to Kunzmann and Baltes 
(2003, 2005), wisdom-related performance is determined by the interplay and integration of a 
single intellectual, emotional, or social capacity to deal with a given life problem. 
Kunzmann and Baltes (2003, 2005) also elaborated upon the role of emotions for 
wisdom-related thoughts and judgments and, thus, implicitly addressed the overlap with 
emotional intelligence. On the one hand, they see emotional reactivity as a meaningful 
opponent of wisdom-related cognition. Most outstanding life problems also evoke strong 
emotions that could hinder logical reasoning. On the other hand, they claim that “the ability to 
work with emotions, to understand emotions, modify them, and use the information they 
provide to deal with the environment should enhance wisdom-related knowledge in its 
acquisition and performance” (Kunzmann & Baltes, 2003, p. 337). This idea is similar to the 
definitions of Branch II (i.e., Facilitation of Thought to enhance intellectual functioning) and 
IV (i.e., Regulation of Emotion to promote personal growth) of the Four-Branch-Model of 
Emotional Intelligence. Therewith, the role of Branch II and IV as a type of meta-cognitive 
ability is stressed (see Table 4.4). 
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5 Assessing Social Intelligence and Related Constructs 
Thorndike’s requirement for the assessment of social intelligence was “a genuine 
situation with real persons” (1920; p. 231). Ironically, ensuing research has tried various 
approaches to assess social intelligence. Among them, approaches that included genuine 
situations with real persons were least represented. Social intelligence was assessed by 
cognitive ability tests predominantly based on verbal material, by the use of self-report 
inventories of social (cognitive) skills, by implicit theories of laypersons, and sometimes by 
behavior-based ratings. Throughout its long history, researchers could not agree on a golden 
rule concerning how best to assess social intelligence, which is reflected within the academic 
intelligence research. The application of different methods resulted in contradicting validity 
evidence. This confusion may be responsible for the waxing and waning of research that 
occurred until today (Matthews et al., 2002). 
The present chapter will first present an overview of measurement approaches and the 
related validity results. First, self-report inventories, implicit-theory approaches, and 
behavior-based approaches will be presented. Afterwards, the emphasis is put on cognitive 
ability tests in terms of methodological challenges and problems. The last part of the chapter 
will present a database of cognitive ability tests of social intelligence and related constructs. 
The database is extended in the appendix which includes scale descriptions and examples. 
Some general conclusions about the implications of the various methodological approaches 
on the validity of the tests will be discussed. 
5.1 Overview of Measurement Approaches and Validity Evidence 
The following measurement approaches all occurred under the label of social 
intelligence. However, they were not intended or not capable to assess a cognitive ability 
construct. Instead, the measurement constructs were social (cognitive) skills and effective 
social behavior. For completing the picture of social intelligence, they will be reviewed 
hereafter with a narrow focus on the validity results. 
5.1.1 Implicit Theory Approach 
The implicit theory approach examines laypersons’ conceptions about a psychological 
construct. The common procedure asks people to identify and describe the behavior of 
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persons who are, according to their implicit theory, high scorers in the respective construct 
(e.g., highly intelligent). Sternberg et al. (1981) factor-analyzed the descriptions of intelligent 
people and found three factors labeled practical problem solving abilities, verbal abilities, 
and social competence. Behaviors classified to the social competence factor included, accepts 
others for what they are, admits mistakes, is on time for appointments, thinks before speaking 
and doing, is sensitive for other people’s needs and desires, etc. Kosmitzki and John (1993) 
applied the implicit theory approach only to the concept of social intelligence. They extracted 
three factors labeled social intelligence, social influence, and social memory. Social 
intelligence consists of the following components: understanding people, social insight, 
perspective taking ability, knowing social rules and norms, good at dealing with people, being 
warm and caring, open to new experiences and ideas, social adaptability, and being 
compromising and fair. Social influence includes motivation and leadership, influence on 
others, dominance and activity, manipulating others. Social memory consists of memory for 
names and faces. Amelang, Schwarz, and Wegemund (1989) used the implicit theory 
approach to develop a self-report inventory on socially intelligent behavior. They extended 
the aforementioned approach by having a second sample rate the original behaviors on the 
dimension of prototypicality for socially intelligent behavior. The result of their studies was a 
questionnaire of social behavior applicable to self- and peer-report. In a validation study, self- 
and peer-rated behavior correlated with a general factor of social intelligence which also 
consisted of self- and peer-ratings. 
The benefit of applying this approach on a new intelligence construct can be seen in 
the investigation of taxonomic foundations when no theory-based accounts are available for 
this domain. Moreover, the relevance of the construct can be supported by empirical data. 
5.1.2 Self-Report Inventories 
The trait – ability distinction is most fully developed for emotional intelligence 
(Austin & Saklsofske, 2005). Social intelligence was repeatedly operationalized by the use of 
self-report data without such explicit differentiation between ability and mixed models 
(Barnes & Sternberg, 1989; Brown & Anthony, 1990; Ford & Tisak, 1983; Frederiksen, 
Carlson, & Ward, 1984; Marlowe, 1986; Riggio, 1986; Riggio, Messamer, & Throckmorton, 
1991). 
Riggio (1986) constructed the Social Skills Inventory (SSI; Riggio, 1989) which 
contained six subfacets that resulted from a cross-classification of contents (i.e., social and 
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emotional contents) and skills (i.e., sensitivity, expressivity, and control). The SSI subfacets 
correlated substantially with personality traits (e.g., social expressivity: outgoing, happy-go-
lucky, venturesome, group dependent; social sensitivity: affected by feelings, shy, astute, 
apprehensive, conservative, tense, undisciplined). High scorers reported more socially 
effective behavior and richer social contacts. In the study of Riggio et al. (1991), the subscales 
of the SSI did not show convergent validity with a performance test of social intelligence. 
Other studies using self-reported social skills aside from social intelligence performance tests 
succeeded better in showing convergent validity evidence (Barnes & Sternberg, 1989; Ford & 
Tisak, 1983). Marlowe (1986) identified five dimensions of social intelligence (i.e., prosocial 
attitudes, social skills, empathy skills, emotionality, and social anxiety) by applying several 
self-report inventories. These five dimensions did not correlate with academic intelligence 
assessed by performance data. In a multitrait-multimethod study, Brown and Anthony (1990) 
found a clear factor structure determined by the applied measurement procedure (i.e., self- 
and peer ratings) across constructs (i.e., social skills, personality traits, and academic 
intelligence). 
The aforementioned results clearly demonstrate why the use of self-report data is 
disputable. Empirical evidence has shown that self-report data are not capable to assess a 
cognitive ability (Paulhus et al., 1998; Riggio et al., 1991). It seems also questionable whether 
they can serve as a validating instrument without controlling for method-related variance. 
Nearly no study could convincingly provide evidence for the convergent construct validity of 
performance measures with self-report inventories. Those that could applied behavior based 
measures of social abilities. 
5.1.3 Behavioral Observations 
Behavior-based assessment meets Thorndike’s original requirement of genuineness 
more than any other measurement approach. Behavior-based assessment conventionally asks 
individuals to behave according to a certain goal in a given setting. Typically, the construct of 
interest (e.g., social intelligence, social competence, leading competencies, etc.) is 
operationalized by a-priori constructed rating dimensions. These describe behavioral acts that 
conform to the supposed manifestations of the construct. Finally, in a test situation, behavior 
is rated by trained observers according to these behavioral acts. 
Ford and Tisak (1983) assessed social behavior in an interview setting as an indicator 
of social intelligence. Behavior was rated on the following dimensions: the ability to speak 
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effectively, to be appropriately responsive to the interviewer’s questions, and to display 
appropriate nonverbal behaviors. They could prove convergent and divergent construct 
validity (i.e., with self- and peer-reported social intelligence, and with academic intelligence, 
respectively). In a study of Frederikson et al. (1984), participants had to take the role of a 
doctor interviewing his patient. Social intelligence was operationalized by the following 
dimensions: introduction (i.e., greets client, attempts to put client at ease, etc.), seeking 
information (i.e., asks about major problems, emotional problems, etc.), giving information 
and advice (i.e., invites client to ask questions, explains reasons for management decisions, 
etc.), and affect and support (i.e., expresses understanding, assures client, etc.). Social 
intelligence as operationalized by the rated behavior correlated only marginally with academic 
intelligence, proving divergent construct validity. 
Stricker and Rock (1990) developed the Interpersonal Competence Inventory (ICI). 
The ICI is based on a video presentation of an interview between a subordinate and his 
superior. Participants have to respond orally in place of the superior (i.e., Replies Section). 
Answers are judged in terms of effectiveness and originality. Also, participants have to write 
down their description of the situation (i.e., Judgment section). Here, the performance 
criterion is accuracy. The Judgment Section cannot be conceived as a behavioral indicator 
whereas the Replies Section operationalizes socially intelligent behavior. Results from 
correlational and multidimensional scaling analyses showed no coherent evidence of 
convergent and divergent construct validity.  
In social intelligence research, the behavior based approach was rarely applied. Test 
development and assessment procedures are highly time and resource consuming. Moreover, 
this approach suits the assessment of social competence and, therefore, of relevant external 
criteria that validate social intelligence tests. Problematically, every class of situation needs 
separate rating dimensions for the intended constructs, raters need sophisticated training to 
detect and rate the desired dimensions, and group testing is not possible. The aforementioned 
approaches were restricted to interview settings so that the results cannot be generalized. All 
situations were artificial and the question remains whether people would behave similarly in a 
genuine situation. Broader approaches to assess social behavior in artificially produced 
situations represent exercises in the context of assessment center procedures(e.g. role playing, 
group discussions, etc.). A description of these approaches goes beyond the scope of the 
present work. For a detailed overview of the typical assessment center structure, exercises, 
and its validity, see Fisseni and Preusser (2007) and Kleinmann (1997). 
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5.2 The Cognitive Ability Test – A Methodological Challenge 
When the first cognitive ability tests of social intelligence were developed, tests of 
academic intelligence had recently been introduced. With his claim of genuineness of persons 
and situations in assessment procedures, Thorndike (1920) stressed the diverse nature of the 
new construct. The first tests of social intelligence could not match this requirement and 
strongly compared to those constructed to assess academic intelligence (i.e., Thorndike & 
Stein, 1937; Moss et al., 1955; O’Sullivan et al., 1965). Item material mainly consisted of 
artificially produced, decontextualized, mostly verbal descriptions of situations. Obviously, 
genuineness or social significance requires realistic material that conforms with socially 
relevant situations (see also Probst, 1973). For example, social interactions or 
communications are mainly based on the use of spoken and body language as already 
described in Chapter 4.3.3.3 (see the studies of Mehrabian & Ferris, 1967). The relevance of 
different communication channels in social situations was not reflected in early ability tests 
although already Thorndike and Stein (1937) doubted “whether any test which is 
predominantly verbal can measure social ability” (p. 284). O’Sullivan (1983) focused on the 
methodological implications of the use of only written language material and expected an 
unwanted amount of verbal ability variance in tests. Consequently, tests showed substantial 
correlations especially with verbal tests of academic intelligence. Thus, the autonomy of 
social intelligence was doubted without acknowledging the possible method-related effect. 
With today’s knowledge about past experiences, with more profound methodological 
foundations and new technologies, a more deliberate approach to develop assessment 
procedures of social intelligence is possible which also can account for the genuineness of 
item material. 
Compared to the typical item construction of academic intelligence tests, no 
comparable body of rules is present or easily constructible for items of social intelligence 
tests. Neither the item universe is well documented, nor is item material directly available 
(e.g., compared to number series or word analogies). Social intelligence is usually not 
explicitly taught in institutional settings. Therefore, a-priori considerations to item 
construction are helpful and necessary for the selection of item contents, for sampling item 
material, and for the decision about the formal attributes of items such as item and response 
format and scoring. The following considerations serve two purposes. First, existing tests of 
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social intelligence shall be described in terms of the aforementioned properties. Second, they 
shall serve as foundations for the test development of the present work. 
5.2.1 Item Origin 
The item origin addresses the question of how items (i.e., item material) are sampled 
or constructed. Tagiuri (1969) distinguished between items produced or sampled in natural or 
in laboratory settings. More specifically, item material can be distinguished according to the 
source of the material. It can be provided by real persons, posed by an actor or produced 
artificially. In a large number of tests of social intelligence, items were produced artificially 
and only some stemmed from actors and even less from real persons. Artificially produced 
item material of emotion expressions may typically be a verbal description of a situation, a 
painted face or a computer-animated face or body presentation. Artificial and posed item 
material is restricted to be sampled from laboratory settings. Item material from genuine 
persons can be extracted from natural settings. Tagiuri does not explicate whether natural 
settings are restricted to direct face-to-face contact between the judge and the target (Tagiuri, 
1969) which would make group testing impossible. The present work refers to natural settings 
as the situation of item material sampling and not of data assessment. With today’s technical 
developments, it is possible to display an earlier recorded close-to-natural setting in the final 
testing situation. 
The use of actors or real persons both bears some advantages and disadvantages. 
When actors are used, the process of item material sampling can be better controlled in terms 
of costs and efforts, as well as the match with taxonomic demands. Real material has to be 
edited in order to make it suitable as an item. Sampling genuine material may not necessarily 
include the desired taxonomic demands and requires more efforts to create an adequate item 
from the original recording. However, the crucial question refers to the relevance of the item 
material for the intended measurement construct and its validity. An example for the ability to 
understand emotions will be provided hereafter to illustrate the concern. Decoding an 
artificially produced or posed emotion expression would rarely occur and definitely not at all 
be relevant in real-life settings. Obviously, it is more relevant to understand the emotion of a 
real person within the person’s natural environment. Emotion expressions by actors or real 
persons do not only differ in their relevance, they may also evoke different underlying 
abilities for the accomplishment of tasks. Actors work with conventional emotion expressions 
which may never be as realistic and manifold or diverse as an emotion expression recorded in 
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a natural setting with a natural background (even by applying a sophisticated script of the 
situation). By providing information about the real person in their natural living space, 
genuine material clearly enhances the ecological validity of the test material. Moreover, 
making use of real persons as targets provides the opportunity to sample target information 
about the person’s mental state in the respective situation. 
5.2.2 Item Contents and Contexts 
The previously mentioned taxonomic foundations help in guiding the selection and the 
sampling of item material in terms of content and context information. Tests or items can be 
classified or constructed according to the queried modality (the task product; e.g., emotions, 
cognitions, personality, etc.), the contents (e.g., written or spoken language, etc.), the setting 
(e.g., private or public contexts), and the targets (e.g., real persons vs. actors). The possible 
taxonomic principles will not be repeated at this point. Nevertheless, two aspects need to be 
accounted for in more detail because of their methodological implications. 
Item Contents 
Different item contents are conventionally related to the applied task material (i.e., 
written and spoken language, pictures, and videos). The present work adheres to the 
distinction of different task material for the purpose of balancing method-related variance. 
Existing multitrait-multimethod approaches differentiate between verbal and nonverbal 
material. Probst (1973, 1982) distinguished between test approaches that rely on verbal 
material, pictures, and videos. A different perspective on the impact of item material is the 
acknowledgement of separable ability factors related to different item contents. For example, 
some researchers addressed the auditory abilities as meaningful contents in academic and 
social intelligence research (Carroll, 1993; Guilford, 1981; Stankov, 1994; Stankov & Horn, 
1980; see, for example, the Test of Implied Meanings by Sundberg, 1966). The doctoral thesis 
of Seidel (2007) presents a comprehensive approach to develop auditory ability tasks and to 
integrate an auditory factor into existing models of academic and social intelligence. 
Item Contexts 
Archer and Akert (1980) show that enough context information is needed in order to 
give social stimuli their meaning and to allow high performance in social understanding tasks. 
For example, the statement “Now, it’s someone else’s turn to organize the family meeting this 
year! They can eventually also do some work.” can only be understood in all its relevance and 
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throughout the last few years and just recently had a heart attack so that he had to refuse from 
organizing. Thus far, social intelligence testing is criticized for decontextualizing the person 
(Cantor & Harlowe, 1994; Ford, 1994). It was claimed impossible to be able to validly assess 
social intelligence without accounting for the task context (see also Ford, 1994). To illustrate 
the effect of different amounts of context information, Figure 5.1 displays a simple cross-
classification of stimuli properties (univocal vs. equivocal) and context availability (none vs. 
some unspecified amount of context information). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Item 
difficulty 
Univocal Equivocal Stimuli
Context 
included 
No context 
Figure 5.1 
Relationship of Stimuli Unambiguousness and Context Information on Item Difficulty 
Univocal stimuli allow for the accomplishment of a task without any need to ascertain 
more information. In this case, item difficulties are low for tasks with or without any context 
information (e.g., the statement “I am happy” allows for conclusions about the person’s 
emotional life; a facial expression that can be decoded according to the Facial Action Coding 
System of Ekman, Friesen, & Hager (2002)may also count to this category). However, most 
of the relevant social stimuli are equivocal and do not yield an interpretation without 
additional information (Probst, 1982). For example, a smile may be interpreted as happiness 
when it is known that the person just passed an exam or a smile can as well be interpreted as 
irony when knowing that a person is not satisfied with circumstances which he or she cannot 
change. This represents a simplified illustration of the relationship of context and item 
unambiguousness to item difficulty. 
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Context information may not only be a necessary complement for the simple stimulus 
material. Cantor and Harlowe (1994) claimed that intelligence testing “will miss the within-
person, domain-sensitive flexibility and attunement observed in behavioral-observation 
studies” (p. 160). At the same time, they acknowledged that intelligence can be described as 
an average capacity  which conforms to Carroll’s claim of general validity across situations. 
To solve this contradiction, balancing the contexts of different items and tasks along 
taxonomic considerations leads to a control of context-specific variance. This should result in 
an enhancement of the generalizability of the tasks and thus enhanced general validity. 
Furthermore, it allows an investigation into whether people differ in their ability to deal with 
different contexts (e.g., high social intelligence in private contexts versus low social 
intelligence in work-related contexts). Unfortunately, existing tests of social intelligence vary 
substantially in how much context information they include and how much they balance 
different contexts across items or tasks. Some tasks are only located in one context domain, 
some include very heterogeneous contexts across single tasks without a deliberate balance, 
while some tasks do not include any context information at all. Thus, in the subsequent 
presentation of tests, four classificatory elements will be used that concern (a) tests without 
context information, (b) tests with only one type of context, (c) tests relying on heterogeneous 
contexts without taxonomic foundations, and (d) tests based on heterogeneous contexts and 
taxonomic foundations. 
5.2.3 Item and Response Formats 
Researchers were concerned with the overlap of the item properties of social and 
academic intelligence tasks in terms of their content related and formal characteristics 
(Neisser, 1976; Schneider et al., 1996; Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). These characteristics are, 
for example: the encounter with inconsistent or novel social stimuli, stimuli unrelated to 
everyday experience, a highly structured task presentation, existence of only one correct 
answer, and a predefined way to achieve the correct answer. The content-related aspects have 
already been discussed in preceding Chapters. The following passages will be concerned with 
response formats in social intelligence testing. Possible formats are forced-choice formats 
(e.g., multiple choice items or Likert-based rating scales) and free response formats (e.g., 
open-ended format or response latencies). Table 5.1 provides example items for all of these 
response formats and specifies the most central methodological problems that will be 
addressed subsequently. Within each type of format, various methodological problems appear 
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(see Table 5.1 last column). The problems concerning multiple-choice, open formats, and 
response latencies, are key issues in every test construction handbook and will not be 
addressed at this point. The problems related to Likert-based rating scales, however, are of 
special interest. Ratings-based scales play a prominent role in the context of emotional 
intelligence testing (e.g., MSCEIT) but are also applied in prototypical social understanding 
tasks (e.g., the presence of a certain mental state has to be rated on a 1-5-point scale). 
Table 5.1 
Example Items of Different Response Formats for Tests of Social Intelligence or Related 
Constructs 
Response 
format Example item Typical problems 
Multiple 
choice 
Interpersonal Perception Task – 15 (Costanzo & Archer, 1993): The test 
taker watches a video scene of two adults having a conversation with a 
two children and has to indicate who the child of the two adults is. 
Guessing rate 
Construction of 
good distracters 
Likert-
based rating 
scale 
MSCEIT (Mayer et al., 2002): Test takers see a picture of a facial 
expression of a person. He has to indicate on a 1-5-point scale how much 
a certain emotion is expressed in the face (from not at all present to 
extremely present). 
Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Managers (TKIM; Wagner & Sternberg, 
1991): Test takers have to rate the quality of different strategies for 
handling a problem in the day-to-day work of a business manager on 1-7-
point scale (from extremely good o extremely bad). 
Scoring 
Response biases 
Group differences 
Item dependency 
(when based on the 
same stimulus) 
Open-
ended 
responses 
Level of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS; Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, 
Walker, & Zeitlin, 1990): 
Test taker read a situation description (e.g., “You and your friend are in 
the same line of work. There is a prize given annually [...] the winner is 
announced: your friend. How would you feel? How would your friend 
feel?”). Test takers have to answer the two questions. Answers are rated 
according to the conformity with different levels of emotional awareness. 
Construction of a 
scoring key 
Objectivity / 
interrater reliability 
Response 
latency 
Emotional Inspection Time Tasks (Austin, 2004): Test takers have to 
decide about the emotion displayed in facial expressions as quickly as 
possible (e.g., Does the face display a neutral mood or happiness?) (i.e., 
choice reaction time task).  
Distributions of 
reaction time 
scores 
 
However, the most severe and complex problem in using Likert-based rating scales is 
that of the scoring procedure (see next Chapter for a detailed account on scoring). 
Particularly, challenges arise concerning the response biases of individuals and possibly 
related group differences. For example, Legree, Psotka, Tremble, and Bourne (2005; see also 
Legree, 1995) considered the effect on the performance of participants who use only part of 
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the rating scale. Legree (1995) suggested procedures that compensate for this effect (e.g., the 
building of z-scores for each of the items and for the expert ratings and the subtraction of the 
two). 
Particularly, ratings-based scales are associated with the Situational Judgment Test 
paradigm (e.g., the TKIM in Table 5.1). Situational Judgment Tests (SJTs) are conceived as a 
class of measurement approaches (Kyllonen & Lee, 2005; McDaniel & Nguyen, 2001). They 
are applied for the assessment of various constructs and concepts (e.g., practical, emotional, 
and social intelligence; work-related skills and competences, etc. ). They put a focus on the 
application of contextualized and heterogeneous stimuli. In accordance with Funke and 
Schuler (1998), McDaniel and Nguyen (2001) assume that the application of contextualized 
and heterogeneous stimuli enhances the fidelity of item material according to situations 
occurring in real life. The requirements covered by these tests are not agreed upon by the 
main protagonists. While the typical conceptualizations claim to measure effective behavior, 
Situational Judgment Tests are supposed to measure practical know-how (McDaniel & 
Nguyen). According to Schmidt and Hunter (1993), Situational Judgment Tests simply 
measure job knowledge; in contrast, Legree (1995) states that they measure everyday problem 
solving. 
The development of Situational Judgment Tests and a respective scoring key is 
conventionally based on expert statements about critical situations and adequate behaviors in 
the situations. When experts can agree upon a right solution to a problem, multiple-choice 
formats can also be applied. When Likert-based rating scales are utilized, answers are judged 
in terms of the degree of correctness compared with a mean expert statement (i.e., a distance 
score). One problem of Situational Judgment Tests concerns the fakability when instructions 
direct the test takers to indicate the most typical or the most likely response (i.e., typical 
performance). McDaniel and Nguyen (2001) manipulated the instructions in a between-
subjects design. Some subjects had to indicate the most likely behavior in a situation (i.e., 
typical performance), some were asked to indicate the best behavior in the situation (i.e., 
maximum performance), and some should fake good (i.e., subjects were asked to provide test 
answers which provoked a test results that presents themselves as favorably as possible). The 
faking group and the maximum performance group showed performance about half a standard 
deviation better than the typical performance group. Freudenthaler and Neubauer (2005, 
2007) investigated the effect of different instructions on the validity of a Situational Judgment 
Test. They found that the typical performance condition showed higher correlations with 
personality traits and self-report inventories whereas the maximum performance condition 
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showed higher correlations with academic intelligence (see Table 5.3 and Appendix A for a 
more detailed presentation of their test approach). Another problem occurs when more than 
one item per stimuli is applied. In this case, items are dependent on each other (a) as a 
function of the same stimulus and (b) if the instruction promotes a comparison of the single 
items (e.g., indicate the best and the worst alternative). When separate ratings of effectiveness 
for each item are applied, the latter problem is eliminated (McDaniel & Nguyen, 2001). The 
former problem is addressed by the use of specific scoring techniques (e.g., profile scoring; 
e.g., Snodgrass, 2001), or by defining the rating categories by the use of concrete (behavioral) 
anchors. 
To recur to the question of response format, MacCann (2006) investigated the effect of 
different response formats on the between-constructs’ correlations of emotional and academic 
intelligence. Tests to assess these constructs utilized multiple-choice and ratings-based 
formats. Results showed larger construct overlap when the same response format was applied. 
Funke and Schuler (1998) investigated the effect of the response format on the criterion 
validity of a situational judgment test of social competence. Results generally supported an 
open response format. The authors attributed this to the higher fidelity of the responses in 
terms of the behavioral requirements of both the construct and the assessed criterion. In 
general, the applied items and response format influence the construct’s convergent and 
divergent validity. Consequently, early tests of social intelligence which applied traditional 
response formats (typically multiple-choice) were likely to show an unwantedly large overlap 
with tests of academic intelligence due to them using the same type of response format. 
5.2.4 Scoring 
According to Carroll (1993), a cognitive ability task demands the correct information 
processing as a critical condition for successful performance. The scoring key has to provide 
an objective rule for judging the response to a test item as correct or as more or less correct 
(i.e., degree of correctness on a continuum; Nevo, 1993; Wilhelm, 2005). Guttmann and Levy 
(1991) listed three types of rules that allow for the deduction of a correct answer to an 
intelligence test item: logical rules (i.e., typically mathematical problems), scientific rules 
(i.e., typically extracted from experimental results, or in other words, physical reality), and 
semantic rules (i.e., extracted from the dictionary). Relying on the results of an implicit theory 
approach, Nevo (1993) added the agreement with an authority (i.e., common knowledge or 
consensus) as another scoring rule to the three rules of Guttman and Levy (1991). 
Assessing Social Intelligence and Related Constructs Chapter 5 
 77
To identify the correct answers to a social intelligence test item, no logical or semantic 
rule can provide enough information. In contrast to academic intelligence testing, what has to 
be inferred about can rarely be perceived directly (e.g., physical vs. psychological attributes). 
Consequently, scientific rules or authority agreements must be applied. It is possible to apply 
a scientific rule when science has proven the truthfulness of the rule and when it can be 
applied one-to-one on the respective stimuli. For example, science has established certain 
rules about the appraisal and the expression of emotions which may be applied on narrowly 
defined social stimuli (e.g., the Facial Action Coding System, Ekman et al., 2002). A 
scientific rule is also applied when a correct answer is based on observable facts (e.g., a 
person who was present in the stimuli is remembered correctly). However, scientific rules are 
no longer valid when a certain range of interpretation is possible or, when not all of the 
necessary information is available (e.g., anger follows frustration only under certain 
conditions related to the involved persons and the situation) (see also Mayer et al., 2001). 
Initially, the agreement with a person of authority is a vaguely composed rule that 
depends on the conception of the authority figure. In this context, Nevo (1993) generally 
speaks of consensus or common knowledge as criteria. Cline (1964) applied a more fine-
grained distinction between three sources (i.e., authorities) of criterion information to identify 
the correct answer to a test item: experts, associates (i.e., peers, subordinates, spouse, 
teachers, bosses, acquaintances, etc.), and the self. Comparably, Kenny (1994) differentiated 
between several sources for the criterion information: self-report, group consensus, experts, 
behavioral observations, and operational criteria. He referred to operational criteria as 
objective social facts such as “the two persons are siblings” (i.e., standards-based scoring or 
scientific rules). Apart from the target scoring and standards-based scoring procedures, most 
common approaches are anchored in emotional intelligence research, and distinguish between 
group and expert consensus scoring (MacCann, Roberts, Matthews, & Zeidner, 2004; Mayer 
et al., 2002; Tagiuri, 1969). It is assumed that the general consensus between (large) groups of 
participants or experts is founded on a common knowledge base in the population that reveals 
the correct answer (Legree, 1995; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003). 
The construct definitions of social memory and social perception require the objective 
presence of the queried stimuli. According to these definitions, the scientific rule can be 
applied by relying on the objectively present information (e.g., a response to a memory test 
item is right when the stimulus showed exactly the response that was asked for). Perception 
tasks are frequently scored in terms of response latency (e.g., a test taker indicates by a 
keystroke that he or she has detected a target of perception, the keystroke is then scored by the 
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reaction time between the target presentation and reaction). The definition of social creativity 
requires that scoring accounts for the number and diversity of responses. Thus, correctness 
does not play a role in this ability domain. The construct definition of social understanding is 
not as directive. This scoring is far more intricate and it depends upon the nature and 
complexity of the queried information (see Chapter 4.3.3.2 for an overview). This can be a 
feeling or a thought of an individual. It can also be a more general concept such as a 
personality trait, future behavior, a relationship between two or more people, or a solution or 
explanation to a complex problem. Existing approaches in the literature refer to the wide 
spectrum of possible social information and consequently claim that with the rising 
complexity of the stimulus, the identification of a correct answer gets harder (Matthews et al., 
2002). Schulze, Wilhelm, and Kyllonen (2007) even claim that “the unavailability of 
indisputable rules can be considered as the most important problem in emotional intelligence 
research” (p. 212). 
Table 5.2 presents examples of different queried modalities and scoring options of 
prototypical social understanding tasks. Obviously, scientific rules are not applicable for most 
of the examples and depend on the availability of objective information. Neither standards-
based nor target scoring can be used when the queried information represents solutions or 
explanations to social problems. The problem becomes obvious when imagining that the 
typical answer to the example item of the Chapin Social Insight Tests is “It depends ....” (see 
also Bless et al., 2004). Consequently, only group and expert consensus scoring is possible. 
The passages that follow will focus more specifically on the three most prominent and 
discussed scoring procedures in social intelligence testing: target scoring and group and 
expert consensus scoring. 
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Table 5.2 
Queried Modality, Examples, and Related Scoring Options of Social Understanding Tasks 
Queried 
modality Example item 
Scoring 
options 
Emotions MSCEIT (Mayer et al., 2002): Test takers see a picture of a facial expression 
and have to indicate how much a certain emotion is expressed in the face. 
SBS (limited 
item contents), 
TS, GCS, ECS 
Thoughts Fictitious: Test takers listen to a phone call (only one side of the conversation 
done by the target). Several thoughts have to be rated in terms of how much the 
target would agree with to have had during the phone call (e.g., “The person 
I’m talking to just has no interest in trying to understand me.”). 
TS, GCS, ECS 
Relation-
ships 
between 
others 
A. Interpersonal Perception Task – 15 (IPT-15; Costanzo & Archer, 1993): 
Test takers watch a video scene of two adults having a conversation with a two 
children and has to indicate which one is the child of the two adults is. 
B. fictitious: Test takers listen to a conversation between a pair of people and 
has to judge the relationship between the two with regard to sympathy, 
familiarity, etc. from the perspective of one of the two 
SBS (only 
Example A., 
when social 
facts are 
available), TS 
GCS. ECS 
Personality 
traits 
Fictitious: A test taker has to rate the personality traits of strangers on the Big-
Five-dimensions. 
TS, GCS, ECS 
Future 
behavior 
Fictitious: A test taker has to identify the most likely future behavior of a target 
out of several alternatives. 
SBS, TS, GCS, 
ECS 
Problem 
explana-
tions or 
solutions 
Chapin Social Insight Test (Chapin, 1967; Gough, 1968; see Appendix A): 
The test taker reads a situation description: “A man bought an expensive 
automobile [... ] he gave several reasons [for the purchase], but the one reason 
he did not give was [...] 
Test takers then have to choose out of four alternatives the one that represents 
the most logical explanation to the problem. 
GCS, ECS 
Note. SBS: standards-based scoring relying on scientific rules 
 TS: target scoring 
 GCS: group consensus scoring 
 ECS: expert consensus scoring 
5.2.4.1 Target Scoring 
The classical test approach to social understanding (i.e., interpersonal perception) 
relies on the accuracy score (Bronfenbrenner et al., 1958; Cronbach, 1955; Tagiuri, 1969). 
The accuracy score represents the typical target scoring procedure. Target scoring allocates 
the difference between a target’s and a judge’s answer to the score. Conventionally, the 
squared difference or a reverse difference score is used in order to give a high performance a 
nominally higher score. This scoring is based on the idea that the target has more information 
about its own mental states than any outside observer (Mayer & Geher, 1996). Target scoring 
is restricted to item contents that are concerned with the mental states of the target. Targets 
can report about their emotions, thoughts, motivations, or intentions. The most crucial 
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criticism of target scoring concerns the bias of the target in judging its own mental state. A 
feeling may be too complex to be communicated, the target may miss an adequate label for 
the feeling or thought, or the target may intentionally report a more socially desirable feeling 
or intention, etc. (MacCann et al., 2004; Mayer & Geher, 1996). O’Sullivan (2007) reported a 
study by Spain, Eaton, and Funder (2000, as cited in O’Sullivan, 2007) which had participants 
(in this case equaling the targets) and peers or acquaintances rate (a) the participant’s daily 
emotional experiences and (b) behavioral indicators related to personality traits. Targets were 
more accurate than acquaintances in judging their emotional experiences but acquaintances 
were more accurate in rating the target’s behavioral indicators related to the personality traits. 
O’Sullivan concluded that “self-reports are clearly better for the prediction of emotional 
experience, while for (overt) behavior the picture is mixed” (p. 264). 
Other criticism relates to the dimensionality of the target score. Bronfenbrenner et al. 
(1958), Buck (1983), Cline (1964), and Gage and Cronbach (1955) doubted that a person’s 
accuracy in judging others can be described in terms of a single dimension or a single 
component score. Figure 5.2 displays the possible variance sources that contribute to the 
deviation between the target’s and the judges’ answers for a prototypical Likert-based rating 
scale. The target answer in Figure 5.2 is “5” on a 7-point scale. Three possible judges’ 
responses are marked (x=2; y=3; z=6). 
As the most evident alternative, the variance of target scores can be explained first and 
foremost completely by the difference in ability between the different judges providing 
ratings. The ability of a judge can be determined regardless of item difficulties, stimuli or 
target properties since a maximum strive for accuracy in typical performance testing should 
compensate for any of these influences. 
Against this, Buck (1983) distinguished between perception and knowing as processes 
that contribute to the accuracy of a judgment (also bottom-up vs. top-down processing, 
respectively; Bless et al., 2004). Comparatively, Bronfenbrenner et al. (1958) and Cline 
(1964) distinguished between the sensitivity to the individual (differential accuracy) and the 
sensitivity to the generalized other (stereotype accuracy). Both differentiations claim that 
judges may either rely on the perception of the available stimuli (i.e., what is specific about 
the target and different compared to what one knows), or on what they know about the target, 
the target’s social group, or the situation. The two ability domains are supposed to be 
independent. Cline (1964) investigated the relationship of the stimulus information to 
stereotype accuracy and differential accuracy and reported an increase in differential accuracy 
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with an increase in information. Conversely, stereotype accuracy decreased while the amount 
of information increased. Thus, to what extent both ability domains explain variance in the 
target score depends on the availability of relevant information (i.e., few information leads to 
top-down / knowledge controlled information processing) and the amount of prior knowledge 
about the target and the situation. 
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Figure 5.2 
Example Rating Scale Indicating the Variance Sources of the Target Score 
Gage and Cronbach (1955) were concerned with the degree of extrapolation or 
inference from the input information to the requested output of social judgments. Items can 
put demands either on the input process (perceiving without acquaintance with the target) or 
on the interpretation process (extrapolation from stimuli to the requested output). Contrary to 
Bronfenbrennner et al. (1958) and Buck (1983), Gage and Cronbach’s ability domains are not 
independent variance sources and knowledge (i.e., as a form of stereotype accuracy or 
sensitivity to the generalized others ) does not play a role in the accuracy of a judgment. As 
long as the input directly reflects the requested output, no extrapolation is necessary. 
Extrapolation from input to output becomes indispensable when not enough information is 
included in the stimuli. Comparably, Buck (1983) introduced the concepts of direct and 
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mediated perception which also reflect the proportion of input to requested output (see 
Chapter 4.3.3.1). Gage and Cronbach were further concerned with the influence of the 
similarity between the judge and the target. They assume high performance when judges 
assume high similarity (i.e., the responses then reflect the judges’ own way of thinking and 
feeling) while also the real similarity is equally high. Consequently, high performance also 
results from a combination of low assumed and low real similarity. 
Cronbach (1955) was the first to establish a componential analysis system to 
decompose the target score into different variance sources in order to account for the real and 
the assumed similarity in the use of rating scales. The system incorporated four elements that 
add to the calculated judge-target difference. They shall be described briefly without focusing 
on the mathematical issues: (a) Elevation measures the difference between the mean of a 
judge’s responses for all targets on all items and the mean of the targets’ answers on these 
items. (b) Differential Elevation measures the extent to which a judge predicts the deviation 
of the mean of all target answers over all items from the mean of one individual target. (c) 
Stereotype Accuracy measures the degree to which a judge predicts the mean answer of a 
group of targets. (d) Differential Accuracy measures the extent to which the individual target 
answer deviates from all other targets on one item. A necessary requirement for such an 
analysis is the application of the same items for every target (e.g., every target is judged on 
the same personality dimensions). It was acknowledged by researchers that this analysis and 
thus, the final Differential Accuracy score is difficult or impossible to interpret (Cline, 1964; 
Colvin & Bundick, 2001). Cline (1964) demanded a more theory-driven perspective on the 
process of judgments that accounts for the interaction of the judged trait, possible constant 
tendencies of the judge in judging this trait, and the effect of the target being judged on this 
trait. Cline listed even more variables that may bias any judgment: social desirability, 
similarity, the tendency to agree with a statement (“Yes”-tendency), the use of stereotypes, 
personal reactions such as sympathy, use of implicit personality theories (e.g., the assumption 
of a relationship among separate traits or items judged), and the tendency to make extreme or 
central ratings. Colvin and Bundick (2001) sampled some design and statistical techniques to 
deal with the Cronbach components. For example, they recommended the use of forced-
choice rating techniques such as the Q-sort technique to constrain the ratings of all judges to 
the same mean and variance to remove the elevation factors. Alternatively, the standardization 
of ratings is supposed to have the same effect (i.e., or correlations-based scores; e.g., 
Snodgrass, 2001).  
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Kenny, West, Malloy, & Albright (2006; see also Kenny & Winquist, 2001) 
summarized the problems and advantages of both componential and noncomponential 
approaches. They acknowledged that science has a strong interest in the overall degree of 
accuracy (noncomponential analyses) which is a direct function of the judge’s performance. 
They saw the application of componential analysis as restricted to specific research designs 
(i.e., several judges judge several targets on the same items). Moreover, the estimation of the 
different components results in the addition of error und thus, in a less reliable measurement. 
In agreement with Cline (1964), Kenny et al. (2006) state that componential analysis may be 
too complex and not possible to conduct by accounting for every possible component. 
However, Kenny et al. conclude that whenever appropriate and possible, componentional 
analysis should be conducted (see also Bernieri, 2001). In contrast, Funder (2001) strongly 
claimed to prefer design controls instead of possibly biasing statistical controls. According to 
Funder, statistical controls should not be conducted blindly or inconsiderately and the 
possible negative consequences should be accounted for (see Chapter 9.2.2 for the discussion 
of the debatable issues). 
Besides the componential analysis as suggested by Cronbach (1955), Cline (1964) or 
Kenny et al. (2006), Snodgrass (2001) proposed correlations-based scoring as an alternative 
procedure to deal with ratings-based scales. The correlations-based scoring method is 
conventionally applied in interaction research and is a subtype of target scoring 
(Bronfenbrenner et al., 1958; Funder, 2001; Ickes, Stinson, Bissonnette, & Garcia, 1990; 
Kenny & Winquist, 2001; Snodgrass, 2001). Correlations-based scoring assigns each subject 
(i.e., the judge) a score based on the correlation between the subject’s and the target’s answers 
on a set of items. Therewith, the information from the single item is lost. Interaction 
paradigms typically involve the same persons as both, targets and judges, being put into an 
encounter. The scoring method is sought to account for an interaction effect of the accurate 
sending and perceiving of cues (Ickes et al., 1990; Snodgrass, 2001). Snodgrass (2001) further 
claims that correlations-based scoring compensates for different rating tendencies of judge 
and target by relying on z-standardized scores. For example, if a target person tended towards 
extreme answers and a judge towards the middle of the scale, this would be equaled with 
inaccuracy in the traditional target scoring procedure. The predominant disadvantage of this 
scoring method, however, represents the loss of information by single items and thus, the lack 
of reliability information. 
In conclusion, the differential use of ratings-based scales of a judge and a target, the 
effect of similarity between judge and target, and the question of the validity of the target’s 
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answers, need to be considered when target scoring is applied. Research can be designed so 
that the aforementioned problems may possibly be controlled for: (a) The targets should 
represent no prototypical representatives of a social group. (b) Enough background 
information about the situation and about the person should be provided. (c) Stimulus material 
should provide enough information so that the relevant cues can be perceived by every judge. 
This should minimize the variance in the target score explained by perceptual abilities and 
restrict performance to interpretation requirements without top-down controlled components. 
More design issues will be addressed in the last Chapter (9 and 10) also concerning some 
research designs and questions relevant for the present problems. 
5.2.4.2 Group Consensus Scoring 
There are several algorithms to calculate consensus-based scores. MacCann et al. 
(2004) analyzed the effect of different algorithms on the psychometric quality and validity of 
emotional intelligence scales. Results suggested an advantage of the so-called proportion or 
mode scoring procedures. Proportion scoring is typically used in emotional intelligence 
testing (MSCEIT; Mayer et al., 2002) and allocates a score to a response according to the 
proportion of people in the sample endorsing that response. Mode scoring assigns correctness 
to the modal response in a sample while all other responses receive a score of zero. 
Emotional intelligence research is confronted with several severe criticisms about 
group consensus scoring. For example, an analysis of item difficulties is not possible (Legree 
et al., 2005; Schulze, Wilhelm, & Kyllonen, 2007). When this scoring is applied on a difficult 
item, a low score would result for a highly able person (Matthews et al., 2005; Schulze et al., 
2007). If a more able person accomplishes a hard item while the person with lower ability 
does not, the less able person receives a higher score (.80 vs. .20) because a hard item is 
conventionally solved correctly by a minority of persons. Thus, scoring depends on the mean 
level of ability in the sample. Legree et al. (2005) demonstrated different distributions of 
Likert-based and multiple-choice items scored consensually with respect to different levels of 
expertise. They could show that the distribution parameters of central tendencies (typically 
higher for a higher level of expertise) and variance (typically lower for a higher level of 
expertise) vary with expertise differences in samples. Thus, one of many problems arises if 
the level of expertise is unknown and not equally distributed in an applied sample. Tagiuri 
(1969) concluded that group consensus scoring favors the judge who agrees with the average 
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response of the comparison group but, perhaps agrees with the most common biases found 
among a sample (i.e., stereotypes or judgment biases). 
Finally, Kyllonen and Lee (2005) claimed that group consensus scoring should only be 
applied when unusual judgments are required for which no expert statements or standards-
based rules are available (e.g., judging the emotions in pieces of arts or in music). The 
aforementioned critical points dominate the discussion about emotional intelligence and raise 
doubts that this type of scoring is capable to objectively assess an intelligence (see also 
Matthews et al., 2002; Roberts et al., 2001). 
5.2.4.3 Expert Consensus Scoring 
An expert is supposed to be a specialist who understands the internal states of an 
individual better than the individual him- or herself and better than any outside observer. 
Expert consensus scoring is sometimes applied in social intelligence research (e.g., the Four 
Factor Test of Social Intelligence, O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1976) and is now prominent in 
existing approaches to assess emotional intelligence (e.g., MSCEIT, Mayer et al., 2002; 
Situational Judgment Tests). Typically, experts are nominated by test developers. They 
respond to the items with their assumed privileged knowledge base. This response becomes 
the criterion against which the participants’ answers are scored as correct (in terms of an 
absolute value or in terms of the deviation from the experts’ opinion). 
The role of expert consensus scoring is also subject to critical debate. For instance, 
Schaie (2001) and Legree (1995) require the application of a large panel of experts and a 
satisfactory degree of agreement between the experts (conventionally 75%). For example, the 
size of expert samples two (for the Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale, MEIS) and 21 
(for the MSCEIT). The resulting correlation between expert and group consensus scoring 
varies from moderate correlations for only two experts and a close-to-perfect correlation for 
21 experts (r = .26 and .96, respectively) (Roberts et al., 2001). Possibly, this result is just a 
function of the size of the expert sample and suggests that expert ratings converge with the 
group consensus when enough experts are tested. However, in some circumstances, an expert 
also may provide just a more reliable indicator of a group consensus (Legree, 1995; Mayer et 
al., 2001). Mayer & Geher (1996) also considered circumstances in which an expert would 
provide a more accurate judgment than the group because of a richer knowledge base. 
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Integration of Scoring Procedures 
In summary, every scoring procedure bears advantages and disadvantages. The scoring 
key for group consensus scoring is quite easily and economically achieved compared to 
expert consensus and target scoring. Group and expert consensus scoring allow for the 
application of a broader range of item material or contents beyond the judgment of a target’s 
mental state (see Table 5.2). But, economy of efforts cannot be the crucial point to decide 
about the adequacy of a scoring procedure. With respect to the standards of intelligence 
testing, target scoring seems to provide the most objective scoring procedure when standards-
based scoring is not possible. Expert consensus scoring also seems promising when item 
contents are applied that cannot be judged by the use of target scoring (e.g., complex social 
situations when no targets are available). Moreover, expert ratings can be used as a validation 
criterion for the target responses. Colvin and Bundick (2001) even demanded the application 
of multiple criteria for judging accuracy. 
However, of particular interest, is the concern that the validity of a construct is 
dependent upon on which scoring method is utilized. What makes a person score high or low 
depending on the selected scoring method? Mayer and Geher (1996) summarized research 
results suggesting a nonsignificant correlation between target and group consensus scoring. 
They reported empirical evidence against a target-group consensus convergence based on 
simple emotional judgments (mean r = .30). The authors even expect a drop in correlation 
size for more complex social cues. Davies et al. (1998) applied several tests of emotion 
perception based on different item material and applied target and group consensus scoring. 
They reported lower reliability coefficients for group consensus scoring. The two scoring 
procedures correlated substantially with r = .99 for a test of emotion perception based on 
pictures and r = .48 for a test based on auditory voice presentation. Interestingly, other 
emotion perception tests that did not allow target scoring (e.g., emotions expressed in colors 
or musical excerpts) showed unacceptable reliability coefficients (r = .28 and .37, 
respectively) of group consensus scoring suggesting that there was no commonly agreed-upon 
criterion (i.e., no common knowledge base) in the applied sample. No investigations are 
available in the literature that report about the agreement between target and expert consensus 
scoring. 
The upcoming passages are intended to elaborate the relationship between target and 
group consensus scoring depending on item difficulty for a virtual sample of 20 subjects. The 
same type of analysis should be repeated later on based on data from the empirical studies. At 
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present, it should be exemplified by four items (all belonging to one scale) how the 
relationship of group consensus scores to scales scored according to any external standard 
(such as a target or experts’ answers) appears for items of different difficulty. Therefore, 
Figures 5.3 and 5.4 present the effect of item difficulties on the bivariate distributions of 
scales scored by target and group consensus scoring. The response format is a 7-point rating 
scale. Target scores were calculated by the negative difference between the target’s and the 
judge’s answer, and consensus scores by proportion scoring. Figure 5.3 displays four different 
items, the target responses were “6”, “5”, “5”, and “1”, for Items 1, 2, 3, and 4, respectively. 
Items 1 and 2 are items of low difficulty (m = -.600), the mode response of the sample (which 
receives the highest score in consensus scoring) converges with the target score (receiving the 
highest score in target scoring). In Item 3 and 4, the difficulties are larger (m = -2.000 / -
1.500, respectively). The mode response of the sample does not converge with the target 
answer. Figure 5.3 also presents the means, standard deviations, and item-total correlations 
for all items. In the graphs on the left side of Figure 5.3, for each item, the frequencies of the 
raw responses for each rating category are displayed. The proportion per bar (i.e., the relative 
frequency of this category in the sample) equals the group consensus score in the graphs on 
the right side. There, the bivariate scatterplot of each item based on target (x-axis) and group 
consensus scoring (y-axis) is presented. 
A linear relationship between target and consensus scores on the item level only 
emerges when the mode response converges with the target response (Item 1 and 2). In Item 
1, a target score of “-1” (i.e., for one point difference from the target answer) is assigned to 
the responses “7” and “5”. However, scoring Item 1 with group consensus scoring results in 
different consensus scores (i.e., “0.05” for a response of 7; “0.2” for a response of 5) although 
the same target score is assigned. This happens because the categories are represented by a 
different relative proportion of responses in the sample. When the mode response does not 
converge with the target answer (Item 3 and 4), a curvilinear relationship in the form of a 
reversed “U” between target and consensus scores is discovered, both for normal and for 
skewed distributions of the raw scores. 
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Item 1 
target scoring 
m = -.600 
sd = .883 
rit = .830 
group consensus scoring 
m = .415 
sd = .236 
rit = .581 
Item 2 
target scoring 
m = -.600 
sd = .681 
rit = .907 
group consensus scoring 
m = .335 
sd = .175 
rit = .536 
Item 3 
target scoring 
m = -2.000 
sd = -1.124 
rit = .897 
group consensus scoring 
m = .260 
sd = .123 
rit = .443 
Item 4 
target scoring 
m = -1.500 
sd = .889 
rit = .891 
group consensus scoring 
m = .325 
sd = .133 
rit = -.002 
Figure 5.3 
Distributions and Bivariate Scatterplot of Four Exemplary Items (Based on Target and Group 
Consensus Scoring) 
Note. Target responses were “6”, “5”, “5”, and “1” respectively for Item 1 - 4 
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Aggregating Items 1 to 4 results in the bivariate scatter plot displayed in Figure 5.4. 
The reliabilities of these scales is Cronbach’s alpha = .940 (target scoring) / .579 (group 
consensus scoring). The correlation between the target and the group consensus scores is r = 
.785. However, this number does not seem to be a good indicator of the true relationship 
looking at the curvilinear relationship. 
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Figure 5.4 
Bivariate Scatter Plot of the Relationship of Target and Group Consensus Scoring of One 
Scale 
Importantly, the final group consensus score is a function of the underlying 
distribution of the raw score in the sample. Thus, high scores in group consensus scoring are 
not necessarily associated with a high score in scales scored by an external standard. This 
illustration could show that, in this virtual sample, the bivariate distribution of target and 
group consensus scores depends on the item difficulty which, in turn, depends on the sample. 
In correspondence with the literature, this demonstrates a lack of objectivity for the group 
consensus scoring procedure. Please also note the corresponding analysis presented in 
Chapter 8.4.4.3 based on the empirical sample of Study 2. 
5.3 A Database of Cognitive Ability Tests 
The present chapter presents existing test approaches that assess social intelligence 
and related constructs. The tests are presented in Table 5.3 in chronological order. For 
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economic reasons, tests were excluded that represent predecessors of current instruments 
(e.g., the MEIS as a predecessor to the MSCEIT is not included). Table 5.3 summarizes the 
intended measurement constructs, the taxonomic classifications of the test, and the basic 
psychometric properties of the scales. The taxonomic classifications are derived from the 
performance model of social intelligence including operative and content-related components 
and a simple classification regarding context. The database does not lay claim on 
completeness because not all the literature was available or the literature did not provide the 
relevant information. Thus, either some entire approaches or single information to one 
approach are surely missing. Areas where there is missing information connotes that the 
reviewed literature does not provide any information. In some instances, this means that a 
classification could not be done. The reliability and validity coefficients are derived from the 
manuals if they were available or from empirical studies. For some tests, there may surely be 
more validity studies available in the literature so that the reader who knows the literature 
may sometimes miss one or the other result. However, it was attempted to make a 
representative selection of research results in order to provide an adequate overview. 
Table 5.3 is complemented by a database of tests in Appendix A that includes scale 
descriptions and example items. Two tests are referred to within the subsequent text because 
they represent comprehensive test batteries that are worth a more thorough look: the MSCEIT 
(Mayer et al., 2002) and the Four Factor Test of Social Intelligence (O’Sullivan & Guilford, 
1976). Please note that not all the information in the Table and the database is interpreted or 
referred to subsequently. Many of the information was sampled in order to provide a 
collection of test approaches that allows to be consulted any time after the present work. 
 
 Table 5.3 
Overview of Tests of Social Intelligence and Related Constructs Including Taxonomic Classifications and Psychometric Properties 
Taxonomic classifications Validityg
Test and subscale Intended construct Opera-
tiona
Con-
tentb Context
c
Sco-
ringd
Item 
format/
No. of 
Itemse
Item 
originf Reliability Convergent Divergent 
Dymond Rating Test of Empathy (Dymond, 
1949; O’Sullivan, 1983, Orlik, 1978; Walker 
& Foley, 1973) 
Person 
perception / 
Role taking 
U V HE TS R / - G rsplit half =.82 - - 
George Washington Social Intelligence Test 
(GWSIT; Moss et al., 1955; Thorndike & 
Stein, 1937) 
Judgment in Social Situations 
Recognition of Mental State Behind 
Words 
Observation of Human Behavior 
Memory for Names and Faces 
Sense of Humor 
Social 
Intelligence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U 
U 
 
K 
M 
U / K 
 
 
 
V 
V 
 
V 
P 
V 
 
 
 
- 
- 
 
- 
NO 
- 
- 
 
 
 
M / - 
M / - 
 
M / - 
M / - 
M / - 
- 
rretest=.89 
rodd/even=.88
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
mean r = .34 within scales 
(Judgment and 
Recogn.) 21 Study 2 
Judgment: 
r = .20 / .04 / .12with 
ST/EG/CP21 Study 1 
Recognition: 
r = .06 with EG (4-Factor-
Test) 21 Study 1
Overall: r = .69 
w. overall AI 
 
mean r = .34 
with AI scales 
(highest with 
verbal subscales 
of AI)21 Study 2
Role Taking Test (Feffer, 1959; Orlik, 1978 
and Walker & Foley, 1973) Role taking U / C B NO 
Open 
res-
ponse 
ratings 
O / - AR Interrater: .89 - - 
Test of Implied Meanings (Sundberg, 1966, 
see also Stricker & Rock, 1990) 
Decoding 
nonverbal 
communi-
cation 
U A - - - / - - rsplit half =.62 r = .08 with SR SI19
r = .00 / .39 with 
numeric / verbal 
AI19
Chapin Social Insight Test (SIT; Chapin, 
1967; Gough, 1968; Keating, 1978; Weis & 
Süß, 2007) 
Social insight U V HE GCS M / 25 G 
Weis and 
Süß, 2007 
Keating 
(1978): 
α = .42/.84 
r = .22 with ST (4-Factor-
Test) 
r = .15 with IPT-15 
r = .06 with Faces Test 
(MSCEIT) 20
r = .09  -  .29 with SR SI 
r = .07  -  .40 
with AI scales 
(lower for 
figural tests)20
zero correlations 
with personality 
Communication of Affect Receiving Ability 
(CARAT; Buck, 1976, 1983; Stricker & 
Rock, 1990) 
Nonverbal 
receiving 
ability 
U F NO SBS / TS 
R / M 
/ 32 G 
α = .56 
rretest = .79 
rodd/even=.19 
Buck, 1983: 
r = .04 with PONS 
r = .24 with Video PONS 
r = .12 with SR SI 
r = .03 / .10 with 
numeric / verbal 
AI19
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Four Factor Test of Social Intelligence 
(O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1976; O’Sullivan et 
al., 1965; see also Barchard, 2003) 
Expression Grouping (EG; CBC4) 
Missing Cartoons (MC; CBS1) 
Social Translation (ST; CBT4) 
Cartoon Prediction (CP; CBI3) 
Behavioral 
cognition of... 
 
Classes 
Systems 
Transformat. 
Implications 
U 
 
 
 
P 
P 
V 
P 
 
 
 
NO 
HE 
NO 
HE 
 
 
 
ECS 
ECS 
ECS 
ECS 
 
 
 
M/26 
M/28 
M/24 
M/29 
AR 
Barchard / 
O’Sullivan 
et al.: 
α=.20 / .62 
α=.57 / .77 
α=.71 / .86 
α=.46 / .79 
Riggio et al. (1991) 16: 
r = .28  -  .44 within tasks 
r = .09  -  .19 with SR SI 
 
Wong et al. (1995) 21 Study 1
EG: r = .06 with GWSIT 
subscale) 
ST: r = .28 with EG 
CP: r = .30/.25 w. ST/EG) 
Riggio et al. 
(1991) 16: 
correlations with 
verbal / figural 
AI: 
EG: .19-.29 / .19 
MC: .21-.45 /.39 
ST: .43-.52 / .30 
CP: .23-.33 / .23 
Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS; 
Rosenthal, Hall, DiMatteo, Rogers, & 
Archer, 1979; Buck, 1983; Hall, 2001) 
 full length 
Video PONS 
Audio PONS 
 
Nonverbal 
sensitivity U 
 
 
 
A 
F 
NO SBS M / 220 AC 
 
 
 
α = .86 
α < .40 
α < .30 
r = .50 with MERT, 
JACBART2 
 
Buck (1983) / Hall (2001): 
r = .04 / .16 with CARAT 
r = .24 with CARAT 
r =      / .20 with IPT-15 
Rosenthal et al. 
(1979): r = .14 
with AI 
r = .22 with 
personality 
(median r of 
various samples) 
Couples Test (Barnes & Sternberg, 1989)3
Nonverbal 
decoding 
skills 
U P NO SBS M / 24 G α = .34 
r = .14 with supervisor 
task (same test principle) 
r = .21  -  .41 with SR 
social competence 
r = .34  -  .37 
with personality 
scales 
r = .08  -  .14 
with AI tasks 
Level of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS; 
Lane, Quinlan, Schwartz, Walker, & Zeitlin, 
1990; Lane, Sechrest, Riedel, Weldon, 
Kaszniak, & Schwartz, 1996; Ciarochi, Scott, 
Deane, & Heaven, 2003)               total score 
self 
others 
 
 
 
Emotional 
awareness 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
U / P 
U / K 
V HO 
Open 
res-
ponse 
ratings 
O / 20 AR 
interrater 
(self/other):
.84 / .92 
 
α = .88 
α = .84 
α = .83 
r = -.11  -  .07 with SR AI 
and AI , and TAS4
r = .43 with an emotion 
perception task10
- 
Empathic accuracy test (Ickes et al., 1990; 
Ickes, 2001) 
content accuracy 
valence accuracy 
Empathic 
accuracy U (V) HE TS 
O / M 
/ - G 
interrater: 
.94 (content 
accuracy) 
- 
r = -.14  -  .06 
with personality 
traits9
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Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Managers 
(TKIM; Wagner & Sternberg, 1991; Weis & 
Süß, 2007) 
Tacit 
knowledge K / U V HE ECS 
R / 
91 
(9*10
+1) 
G 
α=.74-.80 
rretest=.78 
(3 weeks) 
r = -.06  -  .58 with TK-
Tests (Gottfredson, 2003) 
r = .21 with IPT-1520
r = .09 with Faces 
(MSCEIT) 20
r = .36 with ST (4-Factor-
Test) 20
r = .07 with SIT20
r = .00  -  .25 
with AI scales 
(Gottfredson, 
(2003) 
Interpersonal Perception Task – 15 (IPT-15; 
Costanzo & Archer, 1993; see also Weis & 
Süß, 2007) 
Social 
perception U F HS SBS M / 15 G 
KR-20=.38 
rretest=.73 
r = -.09 w. facial emotion 
perception5
r = .21 with TKIM20
r = .13 with Faces 
(MSCEIT) 20
r = .09 with ST (4-Factor-
Test) 20
r = .15 with SIT20
r = -.02 with 
figural AI test20
r = -.19 with 
verbal AI test20
Wisdom-related knowledge test (Staudinger, 
Smith, & Baltes, 1994) 
Wisdom-
related 
knowledge 
K V HE SBS O / - AR - - - 
Situational Judgment Test of Social 
Intelligence (Legree, 1995; N = 193) 
Dinner-related knowledge 
Knowledge of indicators of alcohol 
abuse 
Social insight 
/ Tacit 
knowledge 
K / U V HE ECS 
R / 
20 
each 
AR 
 
 
α = .50 
α = .75 
 
r =.34 / .25 with the U.S. 
Army SJT (dinner and 
alcohol abuse scale, 
respectively) 
r = -.20  -  .65 
with AI scales 
Emotion Accuracy Research Scale (Mayer & 
Geher, 1996; Geher, Warner, & Brown, 
2001) 
Emotion 
identification U V HE 
TS; 
GCS 
R /  
96 
(8*12) 
G αT = .24 αG = .53 
between scoring methods: 
r =.1413 / .028
T / G-scoring : 
r = .13  -  .16 / 
.24  -  .13 w. 
trait empathy13
r = -.06/.26 with 
AI13
Japanese and Caucasian Brief Affect 
Recognition Test (JACBART; Matsumoto, 
LeRoux, Wilson-Cohn, Raroque, Kooken, 
Ekman, et al., 2000) 
Emotion 
recognition P P NO 
GCS / 
SBS 
RT / 
56 AC 
only forced 
choice: 
α=.82-.92 
rretest=.78 
(3-4 weeks) 
r = .50 with MERT, 
PONS2
only forced 
choice: 
r = .31  -  .38 
with openness12
r = .15  -  .35 w. 
conscient. 12
r = -.45 with 
neuroticism12
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Diagnostic Analysis of Nonverbal Accuracy 
Scale (DANVA2; Nowicki & Duke, 1994, 
2001) 
adult facial expressions (AF) 
adult paralanguage (AP) 
 
Nonverbal 
receptivity / 
emotional 
sensitivity 
P / U 
 
 
 
A 
P 
 
NO ECS 
 
 
 
M / 24 
M / 24 
 
AC 
 
 
 
α = .71-.78 
α = .71-.78 / 
rretest=.88 
AF: 
r =.54  -  .58 with 
DANVA1-AF15 
AP: 
r =.39  -  .43 with SR 
social competence 
- 
Vocal Emotion Recognition Test (Vocal-I; 
Scherer, Banse, & Wallbott, 2001) 
Emotion 
recognition P A NO SBS M / 30 AC  
Roberts, Schulze, 
O’Brian, MacCann, Reid, 
& Maul (2006)17: 
r =-.10  -  .24 with 
MSCEIT subscales (Faces 
- Blends) 
r =-.10 with JACBART 
r = .18 with gf17
r =.20 - .25 / .00 
with verbal / 
figural AI17
Facially Expressed Emotion Labeling (FEEL; 
Kessler, Bayerl, Deighton, & Traue, 2002) 
Emotion 
perception P P NO SBS M / 42 AC 
α = .76 
rsplit half =.73 
- - 
Verbal Social-Cognitive Flexibility (SCF-V; 
Lee et al., 2002; N = 239) 
Divergent 
thinking in 
social 
situations 
C V HE 
Open 
ans-
wer 
ratings 
O / - AR α = .88 
r =.41 with SCF-P 
r =.21 / .15 with social 
verbal / pictorial 
knowledge test 
r =.35 / .31 with 
the 
verbal / pictorial 
AI creativity test 
Pictorial Social-Cognitive Flexibility (SCF-P; 
Lee et al., 2002; N = 239) 
Divergent 
thinking in 
social 
situations 
C P HE 
Open 
ans-
wer 
ratings 
O / - AC α = .89 
r =.41 with SCF-V 
r =.23 / .23 with social 
verbal / pictorial 
knowledge test 
r =.27 / .24 with 
the 
verbal / figural 
AI creativity test 
MSCEIT (Mayer et al., 2002) 
overall 
area: experiential (Branch I and II) 
area: strategic (Branch III and IV) 
 
Branch I: Perception:      Faces 
                                        Pictures 
Branch II: Facilitation     Facilitation 
                                         Sensations 
Branch III: Understanding  Changes 
                                            Blends 
Branch IV: Regulation   Em. Management 
                                       Em. i. Relationships 
 
 
 
 
 
I: Emotion 
perception 
II: Using 
emotions 
III: Emotional 
understanding 
IV: Emotion 
regulation 
 
 
 
 
 
P 
- 
K 
- 
U 
U 
K 
K 
 
 
 
 
 
P 
P 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
V 
 
 
 
 
 
NO 
NO 
HE 
HE 
NO 
NO 
HE 
HE 
GCS / 
ECS 
 
141 
 
 
 
R / 20 
R / 30 
R / 15 
R / 15 
M / 20 
M / 12 
R / 20 
R / 9 
 
 
 
 
 
AC 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
AR 
 
α = .90 
α = .89 
α = .84 
 
α = .82 
α = .85 
α = .67 
α = .62 
α = .65 
α = .52 
α = .78 
α = .64 
r =.17-.53 among single 
MSCEIT-tests14
overall EI: r =.17  -  .52 
with SR EI and Empathy14
 
r =-.11  -  .48 among 
single MSCEIT-tests17
r =-.02  -  .20 of tasks with 
JACBART17
r =-.10  -  .24 of tasks with 
VOCAL-I17
overall EI 
r = .05 with 
figural 
reasoning 
(Raven) 14
r = .36-.38 with 
verbal AI (Army 
Alpha) 14
 
r = -.19  -  .31 
with personality 
scales14
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Test of Emotional Intelligence (TEMINT; 
Schmidt-Atzert & Bühner, 2002; Amelang & 
Steinmayr, 2006) 
Perception 
and 
understanding 
of emotions 
U V HE TS R / 12 G 
Schmidt-
Atzert & 
Bühner 
(2002) / 
Amelang & 
Steinmayr, 
2006) 
α=.76 / .77 
- 
r = .20 / .24 / .11 
with reasoning / 
figural / verbal 
AI18
r = .22 with 
openness18
r =.11  -  -.03 
(with other Big 
Five) 18
Facial Emotion Inspection Time Task 
(Austin, 2004) 
Happy IT 
Sad IT 
Speed of 
emotional 
information 
processing 
P P NO RT 
RT / 
112 
each 
AC / 
AR - 
r =.42 between scoring 
procedures1
r =.40/.33 with Ekman-60 
(Happy/Sad IT) 1
r =-.14  -  .25 with SR EI1
r = .48 with 
symbol 
inspection time 
task1
r = -.09/.07 with 
verbal AI 
(Happy/SadIT) 1
Test for the Assessment of Empathy 
(Kunzmann & Richter, 2004) 
Empathic 
accuracy U F HS 
TS / 
ECS R / 8 G - - - 
Multimodal Emotion Recognition Test 
(MERT; Bänziger, 2005) 
Emotion 
recognition P A / F NO SBS 
M / 
120 AC  
r = .50 with JACBART, 
PONS2  
Test of Emotional Abilities (Freudenthaler & 
Neubauer, 2005; N = 277) 7
self (intrapersonal emotional abilities) 
others (interpersonal emotional 
abilities) 
Emotion 
regulation in 
the self and 
others (typical 
performance) 
K / U V HE ECS 
 
 
M / 18 
M / 18 
 
AR 
 
 
α = .72 
α = .70 
 
rself/others=.29 
r=.08  -  .18 (self with SR 
EI)7
r=-.03  -  .08 (others with 
SR EI) 
r = -.02  -  .11 
with AI (both 
scales) 
r = .11  -  .51 
(self with 
personality) 
r = -.08  -  .35 
(others with 
personality) 
Situational Test of Emotional Understanding 
(STEU; MacCann, 2006; N = 207) 11
Emotional 
understanding U V HS 
SBS / 
ECS / 
GCS 
M / R  
42 AR 
S-scoring: 
α = .71 
r = .42 with STEM 
r = .32 with Stories 
(MEISh) 
r = .49 with 
verbal AI 
r = -.06  -  .16 
with personality 
scales 
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 Table 5.3 continued 
Situational Test of Emotion Management 
(STEM; MacCann, 2006; only ratings-based 
formats; N = 207)11
Emotional 
management K / U V HS 
ECS / 
GCS 
M / R  
44 G 
GCS 
α = .86 
r = .42 with STEU 
r = .44 with Stories 
(MEIS) 
r = .26 with 
verbal AI 
r = -.09  -  .31 
with personality 
scales 
Note. - no information available 
 a U = Understanding, M = Memory, P = Perception, C = Creativity, K = Knowledge 
 b V = based on written language, A = based on spoken language, P = based on pictures, F = based on video film 
c HO = Homogeneous (restricted) context information, HE = Heterogeneous context information (not systematically varied), HS = 
Heterogeneous context information (systematically varied), NO = no context information provided 
d SBS = standards-based scoring (one correct answer), RT = reaction times, TS = target scoring, GCS = group consensus scoring, 
ECS = expert consensus scoring 
 e MC = multiple choice, O = open response format, R = ratings-based scale, RT = reaction time 
f G = genuine situations / persons, AC = actors, AR = artificially constructed 
 g SR = self-report data, AI = academic intelligence, EI = emotional intelligence, TK = tacit knowledge 
 h MEIS: Multifactor Emotional Intelligence Scale (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999) 
 
1Austin (2004): N = 72-92, 2Bänziger (2005): N = 70, 3Barnes and Sternberg (1990): N = 40, 4Ciarrochi et al. (2003) : N = 331 , 
5Davies et al. (1998): N = 131, 6Dymond (1949): N = 80, 7Freudenthaler and Neubauer (2005): N = 277, 8Geher et al. (2001) : N = 124 , 
9Ickes et al. (1990): N = 76, 10Lane et al. (1996): N = 380, 11MacCann (2006): N = 207, 12Matsumoto et al. (2000): N = 89, 
13Mayer and Geher (1996): N = 321, 14Mayer et al. (2002): N = 1297 – 1673, 15Novicki and Duke (2001): N = 166, 16Riggio et al. (1991): 
N = 112 – 171, 17Roberts et al. (2006): N = 138, 18Schmidt-Atzert and Bühner (2002): N = 117 (TEMINT with AI), N = 94 
(TEMINT with personality traits), 19Stricker and Rock (1990): N = 108 - 122, 20Weis and Süß (2007): N = 118 (correlations within SI 
domain), N = 101 (correlations between AI and SI), 21Wong et al. (1995): Study 1 N = 134, Study 2 N = 227 
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Overview of Test Classes 
The tests sampled in the database are very heterogeneous in terms of formal and 
content-related attributes and in terms of the intended measurement constructs. With respect 
to the formal characteristics, several classes of tests can be identified within the database. 
a) Cognitive ability tests in a narrow sense 
Prototypical cognitive ability tests are, for example, the George Washington Social 
Intelligence Test (Moss et al., 1955), the Four Factor Test of Social Intelligence (O’Sullivan 
& Guilford, 1976), most of the scales of the MSCEIT (Mayer et al., 2002) or singular test 
approaches such as the IPT – 15 (Costanzo & Archer, 1993), the Couples Test (Barnes & 
Sternberg, 1989), the PONS (Rosenthal et al., 1979) and many more. The typical problem 
related to this test approach represents the identification of the correct answer when no 
standards-based scoring can be applied (e.g., the IPT-15 applies standards-based scores). 
b) Situational Judgment Tests 
Several Situational Judgments Tests are also represented: the TKIM (Wagner & 
Sternberg, 1991), the Test of Social Intelligence (Legree, 1995), the MSCEIT subtests 
Emotional Management and Emotions in Relationships (Mayer et al., 2002), the Test of 
Emotional Abilities (Neubauer & Freudenthaler, 2005), and the Situational Tests of 
Emotional Understanding and Management (MacCann, 2006). A specific variation of the 
Situational Judgment Test paradigm was introduced by Feudenthaler and Neubauer (2005) 
who instructed participants to indicate their typical response or behavior instead of the 
maximum performance (see Appendix A). However, it is questionable whether this type of 
assessment still measures cognitive performance because of the partly large correlations with 
personality traits. A more general problem associated with the Situational Judgment Tests is 
the lack of clarity about what is measured by this type of test (i.e., knowledge or inference). 
This should partly depend on the test takers knowledge in the queried content domain of one 
test. 
c) Tests based on information processing paradigm 
A separate class of tests represent those that are based either on the speed of 
information processing or, at least, on very basic processing demands such as unspeeded basic 
emotion perception. These are, for example, the JACBART (Matsumoto et al., 2000), the 
Vocal-I (Scherer et al., 2001), the FEEL (Kessler et al., 2002), and the Facial Emotion 
Inspection Time Tasks (Austin, 2004). 
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d) Test based on postdiction paradigm 
The last broad category represents the so-called postdiction paradigm 
(O’Sullivan, 1983) that typically requires the identification of a mental state or personality 
trait of a target person. Tests classified into this category are, for example, the Dymond 
Rating Test (Dymond, 1949), the Empathic Accuracy Test (Ickes et al., 1990), the EARS 
(Mayer & Geher, 1996) or the TEMINT (Schmidt-Atzert & Bühner, 2002). The most striking 
problem of this test approach represents the question of the truthfulness or validity of the 
target’s answer as the criterion for judging performance. 
The empathic accuracy test by Ickes and colleagues (1990, see also Ickes, 2001) 
represents a tests that cannot be classified to the aforementioned approaches and is based on 
the interaction paradigm. This approach is based on genuine persons being put into an 
artificial encounter with other people. Every participant is judge and target at the same time. 
Therefore, they diverge from all other tests by enclosing the ego-involvement of the judge 
which is supposed to result in different forms of task requirements. 
In summary, the intended measurement constructs as postulated by the test authors 
cover a broad range of social and emotional ability domains. The classifications of the tests 
into the performance model of Weis & Süß (2005) are done with care and sometimes were not 
possible. Particularly, knowledge and understanding requirements cannot be disentangled for 
the class of Situational Judgment Tests. Some of them explicitly claim to measure knowledge 
(e.g., TKIM), and some apply other labels (e.g., emotional management). Looking at the task 
requirements, it is hardly possible to completely exclude reasoning requirements from this 
type of test. The extent to which they influence performance should depend on the test taker’s 
acquired knowledge (i.e., expertise) in this domain and the amount of available background 
information (Wagner & Sternberg, 1985). Finally, this represents an empirical question not 
addressed any further at this point. 
Two Examples of Broad Test Batteries 
Before integrating results concerning the validity of social intelligence tests, two 
prominent broad test batteries will be presented in more detail: the Four Factor Test of Social 
Intelligence (O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1976) as the only published broad test battery in the 
domain of social intelligence, and the MSCEIT as the most discussed measurement 
instrument in the literature on new ability constructs. Table 5.4 presents the scale descriptions 
and example items of the Four Factor Test which consists of four subtests, three based on 
paintings and cartoons, and one based on written language. The correct solutions are indicated 
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by a cross in Table 5.4. Before this test was published, O’Sullivan et al. (1965) developed a 
large number of tasks intended to operationalize all 30 cells of the behavioral domain of the 
SOI. The stimuli of these tasks were photographs, drawings, cartoons, and tape-recorded 
words and sounds. Tasks were constructed analogously to the tasks of the other content facets 
of the SOI. To compose the final test battery, tasks were selected based on the best 
reliabilities and the highest factor saturations. Guilford and colleagues found support for this 
test approach from their first empirical validity studies. The authors reported no substantial 
correlations with general intellectual abilities (O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1966). 
However, later studies showed more equivocal evidence. Probst (1975, 1982) also 
found empirical support for an independent ability construct of social intelligence. But factor 
analysis did not yield a common social intelligence factor comprising tests of different 
measurement approaches (e.g., self-report) or cognitive operations (e.g., understanding and 
memory). Results from Riggio et al. (1991) could neither support convergent nor divergent 
construct validity (i.e., with self-reported social intelligence and academic intelligence, 
respectively). In an exploratory factor analysis, the subscales of the Four Factor Test loaded 
on one factor with the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised Edition (WAIS-R, 
Vocabulary Subscale; Wechsler, 1981), showing near to zero correlations with the Social 
Skills Inventory (SSI; Riggio, 1989). 
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Table 5.4 
The Four Factor Test of Social Intelligence: Test Descriptions and Examples 
Four Factor Test of Social Intelligence (O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1976) 
Test description 
The test is intended to assess the behavioral cognition facet of the Structure of Intellect Model (Guilford, 1967) 
focusing on four factors of the product facet (i.e., respective product domain indicated in parentheses). 
? Expression Grouping (Classes): Participants have to find one facial expression, out of four alternatives, 
which best fit a group of three other expressions. 
? Missing Cartoons (System): Participants are required to fill-in a blank, in a sequence of cartoons, by 
selecting the correct cartoon out of four choice alternatives. 
? Social Translations (Transformations): This test was the only written language measure of social 
intelligence in this battery. Participants are given a statement made between a pair of people, in a defined 
social relation. They have to choose one pair out of three alternatives that pair of people between whom the 
given statement has a different meaning. 
? Cartoon Prediction (Implications): Participants are required to select one cartoon, out of three alternatives, 
that most appropriately adds to a given cartoon. 
Examples 
Expression Grouping (Classes): 
 
 
 
Missing Cartoons (System): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Translations (Transformations): Parent to a child: “I don’t think so.” Alternatives:  
a. teacher to student, b. student to teacher, c. student to student. 
Cartoon Prediction (Implications): 
 
 
 
 100 
 
×
? 
×
× 
× 
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The analytical approach for the test construction was criticized by Probst (1973, 1982) 
who, conforming with Thorndike’s original idea, questioned the content validity of these 
artificially produced tasks. Instead, Probst called for the operationalization of relevant social 
elements. Furthermore, he attributed the lack of validity to the concept underlying the scoring 
of the tasks. The scoring key was developed by a group of experts by inducing a consensus 
about the logical true and false solutions. Probst claimed that this expert consensus could only 
reflect a certain probability or plausibility value of different response alternatives. It cannot 
reflect “true or false answers in a logical sense” because these “stimuli are not interpretable 
without the situational context” (Probst, 1982, p. 221). Context and background information 
eventually provide meaning to certain social cues and a lack of this causes equivocity, which 
was not accomplished by the Four Factor Test. Apart from Probst’s critique, other more 
specific methodological concerns refer to the imbalance of the applied task material (i.e., one 
is verbal, three are nonverbal). Moreover, the stimuli clearly lack face validity and more 
importantly, the present day opportunities of digital stimulus presentation to enhance real-life 
fidelity must not be neglected today. 
The MSCEIT represents a more contemporary approach to develop a cognitive ability 
test for the domain of social and emotional abilities. The MSCEIT is based on the Four-
Branch-Model of Emotional Intelligence (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). Table 5.5 presents the 
scale descriptions and examples for most of the subscales. The manual reported results from 
exploratory factor analyses that supported the postulated one-, two-, and four-factor solutions 
of the Four-Branch-Model (i.e., general emotional intelligence, experiential vs. strategic 
emotional intelligence, and the Four Branches). Later, confirmatory factor analysis supported 
the four-factor solution with, assumably, uncorrelated factors (Mayer et al., 2003). The 
authors did not explicitly speak of uncorrelated factors but also did not report any factor 
intercorrelations. Roberts et al. (2006) conducted a confirmatory factor analysis with the 
MSCEIT, the JACBART (Matsumoto et al., 2000), the Vocal-I (Scherer et al., 2001), and 
measures of fluid and crystallized intelligence. They identified a three-factor solution with 
Factor 1 equaling experiential emotional intelligence (i.e., Branch I and II), Factor 2 strategic 
emotional intelligence (i.e., Branch II and IV), and Factor 3 showing loadings of the 
intelligence and the emotion measures of the JACBART and Vocal-I. The factor 
intercorrelations ranged from .28 to .34. 
Although never particularly highlighted by the test authors, across studies the 
MSCEIT subscales showed substantial correlations with verbal academic intelligence that 
sometimes exceeded those between the MSCEIT subscales (see Table 5.3).  
5.3   A Database of Cognitive Ability Tests   
 102 
Table 5.5 
The MSCEIT (Mayer et al., 2002): Test Descriptions and Examples 
Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT) 
(Mayer et al., 2002) 
Test description 
The MSCEIT was developed to operationalize the Four Branch Model of Mayer & Salovey (1997). For each 
Branch, two tasks were constructed. The MSCEIT allows the score building for a general emotional intelligence 
factor, the Four Branches, and additionally, for two area scores: experiential emotional intelligence (Branch I 
and II) and strategic emotional intelligence (Branch III and IV). 
Branch I: Emotion Perception 
Faces (Section A): Test takers are presented the pictures of four faces of persons that display ambiguous emotion 
expressions. They have to rate how much a feeling is expressed in the face on a 5-point scale (from no feeling to 
extreme feeling expressed). 
Pictures (Section E): Test takers are presented six pictures of landscapes and pieces of art. They have to rate how 
much a feeling is expressed in the pictures a 5-point scale. 
Branch II: Emotion Facilitation of Thought 
Facilitation (Section B): Test takers are presented 5 short written situation descriptions and have rate the 
usefulness of three different emotions for dealing with that situation on a 5-point scale (from not useful to 
useful). 
Sensation (Section F): Test takers read five descriptions of the emotional / sensational life of a fictitious person. 
They have to indicate for each of three alternative sensations / emotions how much the aforementioned emotion 
or sensation is alike to the respective sensations or emotions on a 5-point scale (from not alike to very much 
alike). 
Branch III: Emotion Understanding 
Changes (Section C): Test takers read 20 brief written descriptions of the emotional life of a person in a specific 
situation. They have to complete the last sentence by selecting one of five alternative emotions which best 
complements the description. 
Blends (Section G): For twelve items, test takers have to select out of five alternatives the best combination of 
emotions for a given feeling. 
Branch IV: Emotion Regulation 
Emotion Management (Section D): Test takers read five descriptions of situations ended up by a goal. For each 
situation, four alternative actions have to be rated according to the effectiveness to accomplish the goal on a 5-
point scale (from very ineffective to very effective). 
Emotions in Relationships (Section H): Test takers are presented three situation descriptions that include special 
interpersonal problems. Three alternative actions have to be rated on a 5-point scale in terms of their 
effectiveness in solving the problem. 
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Table 5.5 continued 
Examples (fictitious) 
Branch II: Emotion Facilitation of Thought 
Facilitation (Section B): What mood might be helpful to feel when preparing for an exam? Emotions rated: joy, 
tension, frustration 
Sensations (Section F): Imagine you feel guilty for having forgotten your mother’s birthday. How much is the 
feeling like each of the following? (a. salty, b. blue, c. cold) 
Branch III: Emotion Understanding 
Changes (Section C): Johnny felt full of frustration and discontent. He then thought about what he could do in 
the future and began to feel ... (a. excited, b. satisfied, c. angry, d. depressed, e. surprised). 
Blends (Section G): A feeling of being bothered often combines the emotions of ... (a. love, surprise, 
embarrassment, b. anger, fear, amazement, ...) 
Branch IV: Emotion Regulation 
Emotion Management (Section D): Maria went to bed and thought about her day. She could not stop thinking 
about some bad things that have happened. How effective is each of the following actions in helping her fall 
asleep? 
Action 1: Maria started to think about what beautiful things she could do the next day. 
Emotions in Relationships (Section H): Carol was very engaged in work-related problems and couldn’t afford 
losing time. Then, her best friend asked her to help her with renovating her apartment. Last time, her friend had 
asked for help, she already had to resign because of her work. How effective are the following actions in 
maintaining a good relationship to Carol? 
Action 1: Carol tried to find a way to delay some important tasks at work so that she could spare time to help her 
friend. 
 
With regard to the incremental predictive validity for relevant external criteria, the 
results are equivocal. Burns, Bastian, and Nettelbeck (2007) criticized criterion validity 
studies for not controlling for either academic intelligence or personality as established 
predictors or both. When demographic variables, personality, and intelligence were controlled 
for, the incremental validity was weak (Burns et al., 2007; Brackett & Mayer, 2003). Brody 
(2004) also reviewed criterion validity studies and came to the same conclusions. Moreover, 
he criticized that sometimes, the general emotional intelligence factor was applied for 
prediction, sometimes, scores representing one of the Four Branches. Brody required a 
Schmid-Leiman solution of the factor-structure of the MSCEIT that allows the modeling of 
general and more specific factors at one time. 
Besides the lack of empirical support for the factor structure and high correlations with 
verbal academic intelligence, the pivotal criticisms address the scoring and the cognitive 
requirements of the single tasks and their match with the Four-Branch-Model. Above all, the 
scoring by group consensus suggests no objective testing and was already discussed in 
Chapter 5.2.4. This put aside, tasks for Branch I (i.e., ability to perceive emotions) are 
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restricted to emotion expressions in faces, landscapes, and artificial pictures. Further 
components of Branch I such as the perception of emotions in oneself and appraisal of 
emotions in oneself and others are not included in the MSCEIT. Tasks of Branch III 
(Understanding Emotions) are also restricted to emotions in others. Branch II and IV are 
represented by more complex tasks including situation-related information in the stimuli. The 
necessary requirements to accomplish these tasks are basically knowledge (Mayer et al., 
2003; see also Brody, 2004) while the Branch definitions demand behavioral requirements. 
The effect of method-related variance on the covariance structure within the MSCEIT and 
between the MSCEIT tasks and other measures of academic intelligence and emotions is not 
discussed by the test authors. MacCann (2006) shows that correlations are lower for tasks that 
use different response formats. The use of rating-based scales in the MSCEIT (except for 
Blends, Section G) may still affect the size of correlation within the MSCEIT and with 
academic intelligence tests that are typically not based on rating-scales. 
The two test batteries show substantial weaknesses. From today’s perspective, if they 
cannot serve as instruments to assess social or emotional intelligence, they may not as well 
serve as instruments to validate any new measure in this research domain. 
5.4 Integrating Findings about the Validity of Social Intelligence 
5.4.1 Empirical findings 
Referring to the test database in Table 5.3, a predominant number of tests turn out to 
be based on written task material (i.e., 23 out of 47 tests or subtests). Another 12 tests are 
based on pictures. Obviously, the most genuine and relevant task material (i.e., auditory and 
video-based) are totally underrepresented. Remarkably, just four tests systematically vary 
situative or contextual information. However, the underlying taxonomy is sometimes very 
simple and restricted to one or two varied dimensions with a small number of elements (e.g., 
positive vs. negative reported emotional experiences in the Test for the Assessment of 
Empathy, Kunzmann & Richter, 2004). 
The reliability coefficients are generally satisfactory, however, for some tests, the 
reported range of reliability is large (e.g., the Four Factor Tests, MSCEIT subscales). For only 
five tests, the convergent construct validity coefficients exceeded those for divergent 
construct validity. These are, on the one hand, two Situational Judgment Tests (the TKIM and 
the Situational Test of Emotional Understanding), and, on the other hand, three tests based on 
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pictorial or video material (the CARAT, the Couples Test, and the Facial Emotion Inspection 
Time Task). In general, evidence for the convergent construct validity is weak (Ambady, 
LaPlante, & Johnson, 2001; Buck, 1983; Hall, 2001). Ambady and colleagues attributed this 
to the differences in the queried modality (e.g., emotions, cognitions, personality, etc.) and the 
diverse types of stimuli (i.e., posed vs. genuine vs. artificial; presented in language, voice, 
face or body). Comparably, variations in the divergent construct validity can be attributed to 
the differences in the applied measurement approaches in terms of the formal characteristics 
(e.g., item formats and scoring), the applied task material (i.e., above all written language-
based tests), and the applied validation instruments (i.e., verbal vs. figural-spatial academic 
intelligence tests). 
However, all the present results are based on univariate analyses. Only a few studies 
applied multivariate designs or, at least, multiple measures of social intelligence, to assess the 
construct validity (Barchard, 2003; Buck, 1983; Davies et al., 1998; Hall, 2001; 
Keating, 1978; Lee et al. 2000; Lee et al., 2002; Roberts et al., 2006; Weis & Süß, 2007; 
Wong et al., 1995). Keating (1978) applied three written language indicators of social 
intelligence (e.g., Chapin Social Insight Test, Chapin 1967, Gough, 1968) besides three 
measures of academic intelligence (both verbal and nonverbal material). Neither correlational 
nor factor analytic results supported construct validity. Within-domain correlations did not 
exceed across-domain correlations, and no coherent factor structure could be identified. In a 
comprehensive study, Barchard (2003) applied the MSCEIT and the Four Factor Test of 
Social Intelligence both as indicators for emotional intelligence. Surprisingly, she did not 
report within-domain correlations or factor analytic results about convergent validity evidence 
but aggregated the tests to one scale of emotional intelligence. 
During the last decade, multitrait-multimethod (MTMM; Campbell & Fiske, 1959) 
designs and analysis techniques were applied to investigating the construct validity of social 
intelligence (Lee et al. 2000; Lee et al., 2002; Weis & Süß, 2007; Wong et al., 1995). Except 
for Weis and Süß (2007), all these investigations applied written language and pictorial 
performance tests besides self-report inventories for the assessment of the respective ability 
factors. Weis & Süß included video-based performance tests. The use of confirmatory factor 
analysis in all studies allowed the separation of ability- and method-related variance. Wong et 
al. (1995, Study 1) assessed academic intelligence, social perception, and socially intelligent 
behavior. Written language social perception was operationalized by the test Recognition of 
the Mental State Behind Words (Moss et al., 1955). The test Expression Grouping (O’Sullivan 
& Guilford, 1976) should measure nonverbal social perception. Results yielded a model with 
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four uncorrelated method-factors (i.e., written language, nonverbal, self-report, and other-
report) and three correlated ability-factors (i.e., academic intelligence, social perception, and 
heterosexual interaction). However, the correlative and factor-analytic results suggested a 
substantial overlap between social perception and academic intelligence (r = .67 on a latent 
level), which exceeded the correlation of social perception with socially effective behavior 
(r = .54). Wong et al. (Study 2) assessed social perception, social insight, and social 
knowledge. The test Social Translation served as a measure for written language social 
perception (O’Sullivan & Guilford, 1976), Expression Grouping as the nonverbal test. Social 
insight (written language) was operationalized by the Judgment in Social Situations test 
(Moss et al., 1955), social insight (nonverbal) by the test Cartoon Prediction (O’Sullivan and 
Guilford, 1976). Confirmatory factor analysis successfully identified the cognitive ability-
factors of social insight and social knowledge separable from but positively correlated with 
academic intelligence. However, social perception could not be separated from social insight. 
Lee et al. (2002) operationalized social knowledge and the social-cognitive flexibility (see 
Table 5.3 and Appendix A for a description of the measures of social-cognitive flexibility). 
Results of this study showed separable social intelligence ability factors distinct from but 
positively correlated with (general) creativity. 
In summary, the just described MTMM studies brought clear evidence for the 
multidimensionality of social intelligence and, in part, for the divergent and convergent 
construct validity. But still, some criticisms remain. (a) The assignment of the single tests to 
the ability domains in the different studies did not follow a consistent principle. For example, 
tests assigned to measure social perception were later applied as tests of social insight. (b) The 
factor loadings on the ability factors varied between performance measures and self-report 
inventories, although the method-related variance of self-report data was controlled for by the 
introduction of method-related factors. Therewith, the influence of self-report data on the 
identified factor structure could not be clarified. Thus, a pure performance construct could not 
be supported by data. (c) Moreover, no further convergent validity evidence was available 
since self-report data were already included in the social intelligence models. 
Weis and Süß (2007) applied a MTMM design that operationalized social 
understanding, social memory, and social knowledge. Written language, pictorial, and video-
based tests were applied. The written language measures of social understanding were the 
Chapin Social Insight Test and the Social Translation Test. The pictorial measure of social 
understanding was the Faces Test (Branch I in the MSCEIT; Mayer et al., 2002), and the 
video-based measure the IPT–15. Tasks for social memory were all newly constructed. The 
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TKIM served as the written language measure of social knowledge. Confirmatory factor 
analysis supported the postulated structure of correlated ability factors (i.e., social 
understanding, memory, and knowledge) and of a general social intelligence factor. In both 
models, method variance related to indicators based on written language was controlled by the 
introduction of a written language method factor. In the three-factor solution, social 
knowledge correlated significantly with social memory and social understanding (.42 and .50, 
respectively). Social memory and social understanding also correlated significantly (i.e., .45). 
The loadings on the written language method factor were heterogeneous, but all indicators 
loaded positively on this factor. Correlational and multiple regression analysis showed 
domain specific overlap of the social intelligence ability factors with specific domains of the 
BIS-Test (Jäger et al., 1997). 
In extension to previous MTMM studies, the factor structure was independent from 
self-report data so that a multidimensional performance construct of social intelligence was 
supported. The study of Weis and Süß (2007) also brought clear evidence for a bias of 
method-related variance of tests based on written language. Moreover, the study demonstrated 
the importance of MTMM designs and particularly, the application of auditory and nonverbal 
measures. 
5.4.2 Critical Summary 
To conclude the present chapter, the most striking methodological problems 
surrounding the measurement of social intelligence will be summarized and integrated. 
a) Lack of reference to theoretical models and conceptual confusion 
Tests or test batteries based on a theoretical model are sparse. Tests covering the same 
measurement constructs were given diverse labels (e.g., tests of social understanding can be 
found under the labels of nonverbal decoding skills, interpersonal sensitivity, empathic 
accuracy, and receiving abilities). Tests with identical labels sometimes assess different 
constructs (e.g., tests of social perception sometimes include interpretative requirements). 
Hence, attempts to integrate research in the field of social and emotional abilities first need to 
disentangle the different approaches so that the research can be interpreted profoundly. In this 
context, Bernieri (2001) demanded a univocal localization of the measurement construct 
within related construct “to avoid overgeneralization and misinterpretation” (p. 8). 
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b) Unsystematic application of measurement approaches 
Social intelligence literature includes diverse measurement approaches, all applied to 
measure the same construct. On the most general level, measurement approaches can be 
subdivided into assessing T-data (Cattell, 1965; i.e., cognitive ability tests), Q-data (Cattell, 
1965; i.e., self-report questionnaires), and behavior. Approaches can additionally be classified 
in terms of the applied material (or the task contents, i.e., written and spoken language, 
pictures, videos), the complexity and broadness of stimuli (e.g., the amount of context 
information), the queried modality (e.g., emotions, cognitions, etc.), item formats, and scoring 
procedures. The different approaches, however, were applied unsystematically within and 
across empirical studies. Thus, no consistent pattern of validity results emerged from 
empirical investigations. Again, the interpretation of results suffered from a lack of systematic 
and methodologically elaborate research designs. Recent studies based on MTMM designs, 
however, could finally improve the informative value about construct validity. 
c) Lack of genuineness and social relevance in task material 
Only about half of the tests and subtests made use of auditory, picture- and video-
based stimuli (24 out of 47). The relevance of the different communication channels in terms 
of their proportional use, however, seems to paint a different picture. According to Mehrabian 
and Ferris (1967), 93 % of communicative cues are transferred via auditory and visual 
channels. Only 7 % of relevant cues are transmitted over language contents. In addition, 
artificially constructed or posed task materials are no adequate substitution for the diversity of 
social situations that occur in real life. Thus, it seems inevitable to account for the 
genuineness and relevance of task material in order to validly assess social intelligence. This 
involves a balance of task material that addresses different communication channels and the 
systematic variation of task contexts that reflect real life requirements. 
d) Decontextualized stimuli 
Only a small number of tests included systematically varied context information and a 
large number did not include any. The application of decontextualized stimuli is not only 
problematic in terms of a lack of genuineness. Additionally, many of the described tests 
include requirements which cannot at all or hardly be accomplished without context 
information or situative cues. This is especially true for complex stimuli that allow several 
alternative interpretations. If tests provided complementary context information, they were 
rarely based on taxonomic considerations so that the generalizability of test results is limited.
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5.5 Social and Emotional Intelligence – Their Qualification and Value as a New 
Intelligence Construct 
To wrap up and conclude the theoretical and methodological foundations, social and 
emotional intelligence shall be evaluated against the formerly established requirements for 
new intelligence constructs. The basis for this evaluation is the knowledge accumulated 
throughout this thesis and up to the present chapter. This refers to the knowledge of the 
modified performance model of social intelligence, the Four-Branch-Model of Emotional 
Intelligence, and current measurement approaches. Table 5.6 summarizes the results of this 
evaluation in a simplified manner. 
Table 5.6 
Social and Emotional Intelligence Compared to the Requirements for Intelligence Constructs 
Requirement Social Intelligence 
Emotional 
Intelligence 
Theory 
development 
A-priori theoretical considerations about the localization of 
the intended construct within the sphere of individual 
differences (Matthews et al., 2005) 
Clear and nonredundant terminology (O’Sullivan, 1983) 
Based on empirical results (Süß, 2001) 
+ 
 
+ 
+ 
- 
 
- 
- 
Construct 
specification 
Definitions of the underlying cognitive requirements (Carroll, 
1993) 
High generality (heterogeneous in terms of contents) (Süß, 
2001) 
Stable over time (Süß, 2001) 
Minimum amount of knowledge requirements (Süß, 2001) 
+ 
+ 
∅ 
+ 
- 
+ 
∅ 
- 
Operationa-
lization 
Objective T-data (Süß, 2001; Weber & Westmeyer, 2001) 
Objective scoring rules (Weber & Westmeyer, 2001) 
Psychometrically sound (Matthews et al., 2005; Weber & 
Westmeyer, 2001) 
(+) 
o 
o 
(+) 
(+) 
o 
Validation 
Convergent and divergent construct validity (O’Sullivan, 
1983; Weber & Westmeyer, 2001) 
Careful selection of validation instruments (Schaie, 2001) 
Incremental predictive validity for heterogeneous external 
criteria (Süß, 2001) 
o 
(+) 
- 
- 
(+) 
- 
Note. + accomplished 
 (+) accomplished only for some measurement instruments or studies 
 - not accomplished yet 
 o equivocal results 
 ∅ no information available 
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The most striking weakness of emotional intelligence is the lack of a coherent 
theoretical model with a clear terminology about the underlying ability domains and a 
statement about the role of emotions, cognitions, and knowledge. Moreover, no attempts are 
made to overcome this weakness and to advance the development of more elaborate 
theoretical models. Scherer (2007), however, did make a first attempt in sorting the concepts, 
but he refrained from calling it an intelligence. In the field of social intelligence, integrative 
approaches to form theories and clarify concepts were only recently commenced (Süß et al., 
2005; Weis & Süß, 2005; Weis et al., 2006). Empirical findings could already provide support 
for the performance model of social intelligence. Empirical support for the Four-Branch-
Model cannot be derived from the literature since construct definitions and measurement 
constructs do not match. 
Operationalizations on both sides are not sufficiently mature. In terms of social 
intelligence, test approaches are too diverse to allow a clear statement about the objectivity 
and psychometric quality of the construct. For emotional intelligence, the MSCEIT alone does 
not allow objective measurement. Recent test developments (MacCann, 2006) and tests in the 
context of emotion research, however, show promising psychometric quality and, sometimes, 
allow objective scoring. In general, the psychometric properties of test approaches on both 
sides, in turn, vary substantially across studies and samples. Evidence for the divergent 
validity of tests of social intelligence is equivocal which was attributed to an unsystematic 
application of measurement approaches and a lack of MTMM designs. Evidence for the 
convergent construct validity was generally weak. Existing tests of emotional intelligence 
could not prove their divergent and convergent construct validity (i.e., high correlations with 
verbal academic intelligence and low correlations within the MSCEIT or with tests of 
emotion research). Moreover, a systematic variation task material in MTMM designs is not 
possible with the existing tests, which mostly consist of verbal task material. In summary, 
social intelligence can rely on an elaborated theoretical foundation, seemingly ahead of those 
of emotional intelligence. It was attempted to overcome the most central methodological 
problems in the subsequently described test development. 
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6 Program of the Present Work 
Aims, Design, Test Construction Principles, and Research Questions 
6.1 Aims and Objectives 
The aims of the present work were twofold. The first aim dealt with test development 
including the processes and procedures that are involved in test development and the 
principles of test construction. The result of the test development would be a comprehensive 
test battery, the Social Intelligence Test Magdeburg (SIM), as called hereafter when the entire 
battery is addressed. The second aim addressed the construct validation of social intelligence 
as assessed by the SIM. 
(1) Test development 
a) Test development was based on the modified performance model of Weis and Süß 
(2005) which defines social intelligence as a heterogeneous and multidimensional 
performance construct. Single tasks should be designed such that they match the 
performance determinants of ability domains and contain only cognitive requirements 
with a minimum amount of knowledge. 
b) By systematically varying the task material (i.e., the contents), a MTMM design was 
postulated which was directed at controlling for method-related variance in the single 
tasks. 
c) Test development also took into account additional taxonomic considerations 
establishing a hypothetical faceted model of social intelligence. The taxonomy should 
systematically vary (a) the task contents related to different task material (i.e., the 
content of the tasks), (b) the context information, and (c) the queried modalities. 
Whether the postulated facets represented separable and meaningful ability domains 
was to be explored. 
d) Task material solely comprised of genuine situations and persons. Therewith, situative 
cues and context information could be introduced. 
e) Test development aimed at resulting in psychometrically sound scales in terms of 
psychometric item and scale properties. The effect of item and response formats on the 
psychometric properties was to be explored. 
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(2) Construct validation 
 The present work postulated to provide evidence for the construct validity of social 
intelligence as assessed by the SIM. On the one hand, the internal structure of social 
intelligence was to be examined. On the other hand, the relationship of social 
intelligence to academic intelligence and to personality traits was to be investigated in 
order to prove divergent construct validity. 
6.2 Overall Design and Test Development 
6.2.1 General Test Construction Principles 
The MTMM design for test development contained three operative ability domains 
(i.e., social understanding, SU; social memory, SM; and social perception, SP). Social 
creativity and knowledge were omitted from the design. The definition of social creativity is 
not as explicit as adequate testing would require. In addition, the development of a scoring 
key to judge the number and diversity of “adequate” answers to a social problem would 
require a rule for the definition of what is “adequate” and a rule to determine diversity (i.e., 
what are meaningful categories). This is beyond the scope of the present work. The 
construction of an adequate social knowledge test seems an even more insurmountable 
problem. Social knowledge is context- and situation-specific. Test developers have to select 
the requested knowledge domain and, a-priori, determine what is correct or incorrect. The 
present aim was to assess a generally valid intelligence construct which stands in 
contradiction with the context-specificity of knowledge. Nevertheless, both social creativity 
and knowledge are interesting and worth pursuing in order to complement the model of social 
intelligence. Possible future directions in this concern will be addressed in Chapter 10. 
The remaining three ability domains were operationalized by the use of written and 
spoken language (V = written language and A = auditory / spoken language, respectively), 
pictures (P), and videos (F = film). First and foremost, these four material-related content 
domains were intended to control for method-related variance within the single tasks. Except 
for one single occasion (see the test description of social understanding), audio and pictorial 
information were strictly separated. The final design of the SIM resulted in a 3 x 4 cross-
classification of operations and contents illustrated in Table 6.1. This design represents the 
most basic classification common to all developed tasks. Initially, it was the intention to 
develop two tasks per cell. This goal was not accomplished within a single stage during the 
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test construction process. The present work comprised several small pilot studies and two 
larger main studies. The complete SIM was applied only in the second main study (see 
Table 6.6 for an overview of the tasks applied in the studies). 
Table 6.1 
MTMM Design of the SIM Cross-Classifying Operations and Contents 
 Contents 
Operations 
written language 
(V) 
spoken language 
(A) 
pictures 
(P) 
videos 
(F) 
social understanding
(SU) SUv SUa SUp SUf 
social memory
(SM) SMv SMa SMp SMf 
social perception
(SP) SPv SPa SPp SPf 
 
Apart from the core MTMM design, the development of every task was based on a 
simple taxonomy that only accounted for some of the previously mentioned taxonomic 
principles of social situations (see Chapter 4.3.3). This taxonomy guided the recording and 
final selection of task material which was sampled with genuine persons within their real-life 
contexts. The stimulus material varied the number of persons displayed (i.e., just one person, 
a dyad, or small groups) and the setting (i.e., private settings vs. public settings). Private 
settings included those involving family, friends, and acquaintances. Public settings included 
occupational contexts (e.g., at work place) and public life in general (e.g., practicing in a 
sports club, shopping in public malls or visiting a public exhibition, etc.). As far as possible, 
the setting was also varied in terms of the prevalent topic on the two core dimensions of the 
Interpersonal Circumplex (i.e., love and power; Wiggins, 1979). Situations could differ 
depending upon whether people were engaged in interactions that dealt with (a) closeness vs. 
distance or (b) dominance vs. submission. The taxonomic variations could, in some cases, not 
be executed stringently within one task. It was, however, assumed that the intended effect was 
accomplished when the context was varied across tasks. 
6.2.2 Test Construction Principles Underlying the Single Ability Domains 
The following passages will address the basic test approach for each operative ability 
domain and the core elements of the test construction process. 
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6.2.2.1 Social Understanding (SU) 
The basic test idea underlying the tasks of social understanding integrated the 
postdiction paradigm with a scenario approach. The scenario approach equaled the Situational 
Judgment Test paradigm in terms of compiling several items to one stimulus. Basically, two 
trains of thought were responsible for this decision. The first referred to the work with targets 
which is characteristic to the postdiction paradigm. It requires the test takers to judge the 
target in terms of different modalities (e.g., emotions, cognitions, relationships, personality 
traits, etc.). Performance is typically judged in terms of the deviation from the target’s answer. 
The second train of thought referred to the availability of relevant contextual information for 
every item, but , at the same time, considered ‘economic’ testing. Providing contextual 
information for every single item for several targets that are not associated with each other 
would require a large amount of testing time. A scenario approach allows the embedding of 
several items in the situative context of one scene that provides (a) background information 
about the target and (b) situative cues. 
The general procedure of all scenarios included the following elements: 
a) One scenario was related to one target person (i.e., a stranger). 
b) Each scenario started with an introduction of the target person himself or herself in a 
short video clip involving audio-visual information. It typically involved information 
about the biography of the targets including name, age, profession, hobbies, interests, 
and anything the target felt comfortable talking about. The introduction aims to 
provide test takers with an impression of the target’s voice and physical appearance. 
Additionally, subjects were provided with written information about the target’s 
biography which enframed the video-based self-presentation. A typical written 
introduction at the beginning of a scenario was as follows: 
“Christoph is standing in the center of the upcoming tasks. Christoph is 23 years old 
and single. He studies [… some biographical information …]. You will now watch a 
video clip of Christoph introducing himself. Pay careful attention to how he looks and 
to the way he speaks. [… video clip …]. You now have an impression of Christoph. 
Now, turn to the first scene and the first task.” 
c) Each scenario consisted of a minimum number of eight stimuli entities or scenes that 
represented the smallest structural elements. Each scene was introduced by a short text 
that described the upcoming scene and announced upcoming questions before the 
scene was played. This primed the test taker so that his or her attention could be 
directed towards relevant cues within the upcoming scene. 
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“You will now watch a video clip of Christoph and his girlfriend going swimming at a 
lake together with a group of friends. You will have to judge how Chistoph feels while 
saying hello to the group, what he wants to express by pulling his girlfriend into the 
water, and how often he is in a comparable situation with his girlfriend.” 
In Study 1, the test takers were given the option of reading over the items before being 
presented with the stimulus. This resulted in a much longer testing time and was 
therefore substituted with the introductory texts. 
d) In order to accomplish the taxonomic demands, each type of setting (i.e., private vs. 
public) was represented by each type of task material (i.e., written and spoken 
language, pictures, and videos). The resultant were the above-mentioned eight stimuli 
scenes per scenario. 
Target Selection and Material Sampling Process 
The present work attempted to select heterogeneous targets in order to include as 
many diverse persons and situations as possible. This would help ensure a balanced impact of 
indiosyncracy (Buck, 1983; Sabatelli et al., 1980, 1982) and the judge-target similarity (Cline, 
1964; Cronbach, 1955) on judgments, although, the placement of additional statistical 
controls would be valuable. Targets would equally represent both genders, different age 
group, different educational backgrounds (e.g., from high school graduates to university 
graduates), and different professions. Targets were selected from among family, friends, and 
acquaintances of the work group and came from different regions across Germany (e.g., from 
Berlin to Aachen and Bremen to Nürnberg). All potential targets to whom requests were sent, 
agreed to participate in the study. They were briefed about the aims of the study, the 
prospective efforts of material sampling, and the detailed process (see Appendix B for the 
original letter to the targets). Additionally, each other person involved in the recordings was 
also informed about the aims and the process of the study. After all participants had given 
their consent (with his or her signature) to being recorded and to releasing the recordings for 
scientific purposes, the targets were accompanied by a member of our staff (called the 
investigator hereafter) over a time period of two or three days. The recordings took place 
during the targets’ typical everyday life. Additionally, the targets were asked to provide 
genuine stimulus material based on written language (e.g., email or mail correspondence, 
diary entries, etc). All investigators reported that the recordings did not seem to have an 
impact on people’s behavior over the long run (i.e., after the first few minutes of recording). 
This corresponded with the findings of Carpenter and Merkel (1988) who could show that 
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different types of observation (i.e., one-way mirror, audio recordings, and video recordings) 
did not result in different interactions between couples. 
After a recording session, the material was viewed by both, the investigator and the 
target. While doing so, the target answered questions about his or her mental state with regard 
to specific scenes (assigned to an exact point in time). The targets responded either in open-
ended formats or on a visual analogous rating scale where the endpoints were provided by the 
investigator. The analogous scale was 10 cm long. Sometimes, additional background 
information about the persons involved (e.g., type of relationship with the target, for example, 
siblings, friends for ten years, etc.) or the context of the situation (e.g., negotiations about 
payments that have been going on for a couple of weeks without any outcome, etc.) were 
sampled. Targets were also asked to fill out several questionnaires: (a) the NEO FFI 
(Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993) as an inventory of the Big Five personality traits, (b) the 
Inventory of Interpersonal Problems-Circumplex (IIP-C; Horowitz, Strauss, & Kordy, 2000) 
as a measure of interpersonally relevant personality traits, (c) a social behavioral 
questionnaire based on prototypical acts (Amelang et al., 1989), (d) the social desirability 
scale of the Freiburger Persönlichkeitsinventar – Revidierte Fassung (FPI-R; Fahrenberg, 
Hampel, & Selg, 2001), and (e) a biographical questionnaire. 
In the first large study, only four scenarios were implemented. Four additional 
scenarios were added after the first study so that the final SIM version contained eight 
scenarios related to eight target persons. Table 6.2 shows the demographic characteristics of 
the final eight targets in alphabetical order and indicates the study assignment. Figure 6.1 and 
6.2 show the targets’ personality profiles on the Big Five and on the IIP-C. The scales range 
from 0 to 4, a higher score is indicative of a higher degree of the respective trait. The first four 
targets (Study 1) were restricted to a certain score and age range. Obviously, the heterogeneity 
of the profiles in terms of the demographic and personality variables was enhanced from 
Study 1 to Study 2. 
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Table 6.2 
Demographic Characteristics of Target Persons in Alphabetical Order 
target name gender age profession Education U / H Study 1/ 2 
Bringfried male 43 medical doctor U 2 
Christoph male 23 student of law U 1 / 2 
Conny female 41 owns a bistro H 2 
Friedrich male 69 estate agent H 2 
Hannah female 60 teacher / social education 
worker 
U 2 
Katharina female 26 student of psychology U 1 / 2 
Matthias male 33 dancing teacher (owns 
school) 
H 1 / 2 
Renate female 24 biotechnical assistant H 1 / 2 
Note. U = university education, H = highschool education 
 Study 1 / 2 = applied in Study 1 and 2, Study 2 = applied only in Study 2 
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Personality Profiles of the Targets on the Big Five (NEO-FFI, Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993) 
Note. black lines = Study 1 / 2, green lines = only Study 2, a high score on a particular trait 
indicates high expression of that trait 
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Figure 6.2 
Personality Profiles of the Targets on the Interpersonal Circumplex (IIP-C, Horowitz et al., 
2000) 
Note. black lines = Study 1 / 2, green lines = only Study 2, a high score on a particular trait 
indicates high expression of that trait 
 
Item Selection 
The recorded material was selected and edited so that adequate stimuli emerged. This 
basically implied selecting those entities within the recorded material that presented 
interesting and relevant social situations in response to which target information was 
available. After identifying these entities, the material was edited (shortened) so that relevant 
elements were still included but stimulus length reduced. Care was taken to ensure that the 
original meaning of the scene was not altered. In accordance with Cline (1964), the final item 
selection was done based on a consensus amongst the work group about the consistency of the 
target responses with the stimulus material and our knowledge about the targets. As a result, 
items were excluded when the group agreed that an item could not be answered univocally or 
that the target’s responses did not seem to correspond to his or her true mental state as 
expressed in the task material. 
Queried Modalities and Realization of Taxonomic Principles 
For each of the eight scenes per scenario, items were designed such that they 
addressed the target’s emotions, cognitions, and the target’s relationships to other persons 
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involved in the scene. Sometimes, it was necessary to construct an additional scene if one was 
not suitable for addressing every type of queried modality. Table 6.3 lists the queried 
information per modality (i.e., emotions, cognitions, and relationships) and some exemplary 
item formulations. 
Table 6.3 
Queried Information per Modality in the Social Understanding Tasks and Example Items 
 Emotion Cognition Relationship 
Requested 
information 
joy 
anger 
fear 
sadness 
excitement 
disappointment 
contempt 
surprise 
indifference 
concern 
depression 
compassion 
hostility 
under pressure 
happiness 
curiosity 
relaxation 
disgust 
amusement 
grief 
intentions / goals 
reason 
interest 
importance 
thoughts 
attitudes 
dominance* 
closeness* 
cooperation* 
activity* 
familiarity 
sympathy 
typicality 
frequency 
experience 
“How strongly is the feeling of 
anger present in the target?” 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very 
strongly) 
Thoughts: 
“How strongly does the 
target agree with the 
following thoughts?” 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very strongly) 
Circumplex: 
“How does the target see 
himself in relation to 
another person?” 
from 1 (very dominant) over 
4 (neither / nor) to 7 (very 
submissive) 
Example item 
formulation 
(only ratings-
based scales)  Intentions: 
“How strongly do the 
following goals determine 
the target’s behavior?” 
from 1 (not at all) to 7 
(very strongly) 
Others: 
“How familiar is the target 
with this person / this 
situation?” 
from 1 (not at all familiar) 
to 7 (very familiar) 
Note. * Interpersonal Circumplex dimension 
 
This classification finally resulted in a 8 x 2 x 4 x 3 – design, cross-classifying eight 
targets, two types of settings, four types of task material, and three types of queried 
modalities. After viewing or listening to the last scene and answering the last questions, 
participants were asked to rate the personality traits of the target persons on nine dimensions: 
(a) the Big Five personality traits Extraversion, Agreeableness, Conscientiousness, 
Neuroticism, and Openness and (b) the Interpersonal Circumplex dimensions which describe 
the target’s average relationships to his or her social interaction partners on the dimensions 
Dominant-Submissive, Active-Passive, Close-Distanced, and Cooperative-Competitive. The 
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personality ratings cannot be assigned to a special material-related scene but are overall 
ratings based on the general impression about the targets. 
Item and Response Formats 
In the first version of the scenarios including only four target persons (Study 1), three 
different item and response formats were applied, i.e., ratings-based (6-point), multiple 
choice, and open response formats. The aim of the first main study was to construct reliable 
and valid scales using various item formats to allow a selection of the most suitable. In the 
final test version, only ratings-based scales were applied. This decision was mainly based on 
the empirical results of Study 1 (see Chapter 7.4.2). 
Scoring 
Target scoring was applied to score the social understanding tasks. This required 
different scoring procedures dependent on different item formats. The scoring of free response 
formats was based on a scoring key based on the open answers of the target persons which 
were assigned a maximum number of credits. Participants’ responses were rated in terms of 
the agreement with the target answers and given full or partial credits for varying degrees of 
agreement. Two raters were applied which agreed in more 95 % of the cases. Multiple choice 
items were only applied when the correct answers could directly be derived from the facts 
collected during material sampling (e.g., the target and another person are siblings). Multiple 
choice items were dichotomously scored as correct or incorrect (1 / 0). 
For the use of ratings-based scales, the original target answer was transformed from 
the visual analogous rating scale into a Likert-based rating scale, in Study 1 from 1 to 6, and 
in Study 2, from 1 to 7. This was done by simply assigning a rating category to a target score 
within a certain range of the analogous scale. Therefore, the 10 cm analogous scale was 
divided into 100 mm and the target answer received a score from 0 to 100. Consequently, for 
the 7-point rating scale, a target answer of 0 to 14 received a score of 1, from 15 to 29 a score 
of 2, etc. For the 6-point rating scale, the calculation was done analogously. To calculate the 
final accuracy, the difference between the target’s and the participant’s answer was calculated 
and assigned a negative sign. Thus, better performance was indicated by a higher score. 
Finally, the difference derived was weighted according to the maximum possible difference 
per item. For example, in the 7-point rating scale, when the target answer lay in the middle of 
the scale (i.e., “4”), the maximum possible difference was “-3” for responses of “1” or “7”. 
When the target answer lay at the extremes of the rating scale, for example “7”, a maximum 
difference of “-6” for a response of “1” was possible. The items were accordingly weighted so 
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that each contributed equally to the total variance of the aggregated scale (e.g., the former 
item was multiplied by “2” in order to enhance the maximum possible difference from “-3” to 
“-6”). 
Some control questions were introduced in Study 2, that succeeded each scenario, 
which, amongst other objectives, allowed the investigation of the effect of assumed similarity 
on the performance. The control questions referred to the subjective sympathy of the test 
takers for, and similarity with, the target person, and to the self-rated cognitive and empathic 
accuracy (i.e., “How well do you think you could transpose yourself into the target’s 
perspective?” and “How strongly did you identify with the target?”). All control questions 
were based on a 7-point rating scale. 
For the ratings-based scales, group consensus scores were also calculated (i.e., 
proportion scoring; see Chapter 5.2.4.2) mainly to investigate the effect of this scoring 
method on the scales’ reliability and validity. Possible further scoring options and some 
additional exploratory research questions will be addressed in the context of Study 2. 
6.2.2.2 Social Memory (SM) 
Test development for the tasks of social memory and social perception can be 
described in a more compressed way. Like stimuli for every task in the SIM, material was 
sampled in diverse and systematically varied genuine situations involving real persons. The 
tasks systematically varied the number of involved persons in the stimulus material and the 
setting (i.e., private vs. public). No further actions were necessary during material sampling 
such as those that were necessary for the social understanding tasks. 
For the tests of social memory, material was edited so that sensible and socially 
relevant entities emerged without changing the original meaning of the scene. The final 
stimuli had to be capable of providing enough social information to memorize and recall. 
Most importantly, the later items had to refer only to information objectively present in the 
stimuli. This implied that no information referring to a person’s mental state could be 
questioned, unless it was presented in written or spoken language (see examples in Table 6.4). 
In every task, first, the stimuli were presented for a certain time (i.e., text and pictures could 
be read or looked upon for a certain time; audio or video material could only be watched or 
listened to once). Directly afterwards, the recall section started. Recall occurred either in free 
reproduction (for open response formats), by recognition tasks (i.e., for multiple choice 
formats), or similarly, in a type of paired associates test paradigm. Both, presentation and 
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response times were limited. Answers were scored in terms of the proportion of correct 
answers for multiple choice items. For open-ended answers, the number of achieved credits in 
relation to the maximum credits possible was calculated. Comparable to the open answers in 
the social understanding task, a scoring key provided the rules for the scoring. Table 6.4 
presents example items classified according to the underlying task material. 
Table 6.4 
Exemplary Item Contents Dependent On Task Material 
Task material Example items 
Written Language Based on written correspondence: “What reason does she provide for not writing a postcard during the holidays?” (recognition and reproduction) 
Spoken Language 
Based on conversations: “According to him, how is he treated by his family?” (recognition 
and reproduction) 
Based on conversations: memory for previously heard voices (recognition) 
Pictures 
Based on portrayals of heterosexual couples and colleagues: memory of the correct partner 
(i.e., paired-associates test paradigm) 
Based on complex picture sequences of interactions: “Which of the following extracts was 
pictured in the sequence?”, “Who, among the people shown, changed the seats during the 
sequence?” (recognition and reproduction) 
Videos Based on video clips: “What is the woman’s reaction after the boy has kissed her?”, Which of the following gestures stemmed from the video clip?” (recognition and reproduction) 
 
6.2.2.3 Social Perception (SP) 
The social perception tasks also made use of targets. Targets could be persons (i.e., 
their face or body or their voice), socially relevant written or spoken language material (e.g., 
an outspoken agreement such as “Yes” or “you’re right”), or more complex social interactions 
on various communication channels (e.g., the answer to a question in a letter exchange, 
change of the person who speaks in oral communications, the use of gestures or facial 
expressions, or interactive elements such as eye contact, the turning to or from someone, 
common laughter, etc). Comparable to the social memory tasks, only objectively present item 
contents could be queried. Thus, the target varied depending on the richness of information 
presented in the stimulus material. Typically, written and spoken material also addressed 
language content and therefore, information about mental states (directly uttered), which is 
obvious in Table 6.5 displaying possible targets dependent on task material. Picture- and 
video-based stimuli can only refer to postures and gestures that stand for certain mental states. 
Thus, mental states could not be used as targets when pictures or videos were applied. 
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Table 6.5 
Exemplary Targets of Social Perception Dependent on Task Material 
Task material Example items 
Written 
Language 
Target: “Does the writer criticize a lack of engagement?”; Stimulus: “I think you’re 
engagement is great.” (true or false?; CRT) 
Target: Has something positive or negative been expressed?; Stimulus: “Thanks for 
you’re Email, she lit me up.” (positive vs. negative, CRT) 
Spoken 
Language 
Target: uttered agreement; Stimulus: a conversation within which people say, for 
example, “you’re right” or “yes” (unbound reaction, SRT; CRT) 
Target: expression of irony vs. anger; Stimulus: real vs. fictional spoken sentences (irony 
vs. anger, CRT) 
Pictures 
Target: a pictorial portrayal of a person; Stimulus: a crowd of people in which the target 
has to be detected (unbound reaction, SRT) 
Target: eye contact vs. someone is watching someone; Stimulus: pictures of small groups 
of people in interaction (eye contact vs. watching, CRT) 
Videos 
Target: a video portrayal of a person; Stimulus: a crowd of people in which the target has 
to be detected (unbound reaction, SRT) 
Target: turning to or away from the interaction partner; Stimulus: videos of two people 
having a conversation (turning to vs. turning away, CRT) 
Note. SRT = simple reaction time task, CRT = choice reaction time task 
Prior to stimulus presentation, participants were provided with an example of the 
target they had to react upon in the upcoming trials. Reactions conventionally occurred by the 
use of a keystroke or a mouse click. Participants were instructed to react as quickly and 
accurately as possible. Performance was measured in terms of the time lag between the onset 
of the target stimulus (i.e., the first appearance of the target within the stimulus trial) and the 
participant’s reaction (i.e., the reaction time, RT). For most tasks, the reaction required a 
choice between two or three alternatives (i.e., choice reaction time task, CRT) (see Table 6.5 
for examples). Some tasks required a free decision of where (indicated by a mouse click on 
the head of the target) or when (indicated by one keystroke) a target emerged within the 
stimulus (unbound reaction when only one target was present within one stimulus entity). 
Reaction times for wrong responses were excluded from the final score as well as 
those that were preceded by a false alarm. A false alarm meant that the participant showed a 
reaction within a short time frame before the eventual target presentation. This could possible 
bias the eventual response. In addition to the exclusion of these reaction times, some tasks 
required preparatory data treatment before the final analysis because of skewed distributions 
or outlier problems. The details of how this treatment was conducted will be presented at the 
beginning of the results section of each study. 
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6.2.3 Test Documentation 
So far, the test construction principles common to all tasks of one operative ability 
domain have been described. The scale descriptions, numbers of items, presentation and 
response times, and concrete item contents, where appropriate, will be included directly in the 
materials sections of the two main studies. Furthermore, a CD is appended to this work that 
provides example tasks and the necessary instructions to allow the navigation between the 
examples. The documentation of the SIM of Study 2 will be present at the Department of 
Methodology, Diagnostics, and Evaluation Research (Institute of Psychology I) at the 
Otto-von-Guericke University Magdeburg. 
6.2.4 Technical Implementation and Procedures 
Technical Implementation 
The recordings were done using high-quality technical equipment: a digital video 
camera (Panasonic NV-GS50), a digital voice recorder (Olympus DM 20, substituted by Sony 
ICD-ST25 with Stereo Microphone ECM-719), and a digital photo camera (Minolta Dimage 
A1). The audio stimuli were edited using Cool Edit Pro 2.0, the video files by Pinnacle Studio 
9.4. Pictures were finished using Jasc Paint Shop Pro 7. For the final SIM, all tasks were 
implemented in the Windows® based experimental software Wmc Version 0.18 and the 
auxiliary software WmcUtil 0.04 based on the programming language Ewx 0.22 which was 
originally developed for this research project. 
In Study 1, only the social perception tasks were implemented in Wmc 0.18 in order to 
assess the exact reaction times. The other tasks were embedded within the Microsoft 
PowerPoint presentation software or presented in paper-and-pencil formats. In order to 
implement all the tasks in Wmc 0.18, which was done in Study 2, some technical 
specifications were adhered to - all audio files had to be in wave-formats (44 kHz, 16 Bit), 
videos in mpeg1-formats (384 x 288 pixels) including no audio stream. To designate the exact 
time of target stimulus onset within a video clip, the respective frame within the video had to 
be determined. This was done by using the software VirtalDubMod 1.5.10.0. Pictures had to 
be in bmp-format (maximum 640 x 480 pixels; 8 Bit, 256 colors). These files had to be 
transformed by using the auxiliary software WmcUtil ( see DVD) into the format “sim”. This 
transformation meant a considerable reduction in the quality of the pictures presented on the 
full screen. Consequently, the final size of the pictures was reduced to half (320 x 240 pixels) 
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in order to compress the size of the presentation. This also reduced errors in colors and 
contrasts. All data sampled by Wmc 0.18 were saved as .dat-files that could be imported into 
SPSS by conventional syntax commands. 
All assessments were conducted on PCs with the following system configurations: 
Windows 2000 professional operating system, 20 GB hard drive, Pentium 4 with 1.7 GHz 
processor speed, 256 MB RAM, Creative Labs CT4750 sound card, Matrox Millenium G550 
graphic card, and 15 inch monitor (60-75 Hz). Additional configurations that were necessary 
included, (a) the deactivation of the antivirus-software in order to avoid regular updates that 
resulted in the shut-down of the experimental software, (b) adjusting the mouse speed to 
medium, (c) adjusting the sound volume to medium, and (d) the extended audio settings 
“spatial” (“Räumlich”) had to be switched off. Since the Wmc 0.18 software could not present 
video files including an audio stream, the self-presentations of the target persons in Study 2 
were shown on a large screen, and speech was transmitted over a loudspeaker system 
(Logitech Z-3 M/N S-0085B; 50-60 Hz). Every PC was equipped with circumaural 
headphones so that each participant could listen to the auditory material without disturbance. 
Procedures 
The testing in the pilot and the main studies was done in group sessions consisting of 
three to nineteen participants. For group sizes larger than 6 participants, two investigators 
accompanied the testing and gave instructions alternately. In the two main studies, 10-minute 
breaks were introduced after about one or one-and-a -half hour of testing. General instructions 
given at the beginning of the first test session introduced the general procedure. Everyone was 
asked to switch off their cell phones. In addition, subjects received a rule to generate a 
personal five-digit code in order to allow anonymous testing. The code was also used to 
combine the data sets from different tasks into the complete data set. Following the general 
instructions, every task was introduced by the investigators and preceded by example items. 
This gave the participants the opportunity to ask questions and build up some familiarity with 
the type of task requirement. For the social understanding tasks in Study 2, one complete 
example scenario was provided (i.e., target “Birger”) involving one exemplary scene per task 
material. Subjects received monetary compensation for participating in the studies (see Table 
6.6). Subjects in Study 2 received half the compensation amount if they requested for detailed 
feedback about their results. About a quarter of the subjects asked for feedback. 
Table 6.6 presents an overview of the studies involving aims concerned with test 
development and the tasks applied as part of the SIM. The pilot studies took place in August 
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and October 2004 and were particularly directed at the inspection of a new test battery of 
general auditory tasks (Papenbrock, 2005; Seidel, 2007). 
Table 6.6 
Pilot Studies, Study 1 and 2: Coverage of the MTMM Design and Aims of Test Development 
Study 1 Study 2 
  
Pilot testing 
August tasks aims tasks aims 
SU 
V 
A 
P 
F 
One scenario 
(Matthias) 
Adjustment of test 
length and type of 
presentation 
Formulation of 
instructions and 
items 
Four 
scenarios 
(see Table 
6.2) 
General test format 
Item selection 
based on 
difficulties and 
item-total 
correlations 
Effect of item 
formats on scale 
properties 
Eight 
scenarios 
(see Table 
6.2)b
Adding of 4 scenarios, 
thus, more 
heterogeneity 
Item and scale 
properties 
Scoring options 
V - SMv1+2 SMv1+2 
A SMa1a SMa1b Sma1
b 
SMa2a
P - SMp1 SMp2 
SMp1a 
SMp2b
SM 
F - SMf1+2 
Item selection 
based on 
difficulties and 
item-total 
correlations 
Adjustment of 
presentation and 
response times SMf1+2
b
Item and scale 
properties 
V - SPv1a SPv1
a 
SPv2a
A SPa1a SPa1a SPa1
a 
SPa2a
P - SPp1a SPp1
a 
SPp2a
SP 
F - SPf1a
Task 
implementation 
General test format 
Item selection 
based on 
difficulties and 
item-total 
correlations 
SPf1a 
SPf2a
Item and scale 
properties 
Item selection based on 
difficulties and item-
total correlations for the 
new tasks 
Credit  5 € per hour or course credit 5 € per hour or course credit  
Subjects could choose: 5 € per hour or 
2.5 € plus detailed feedback of their 
performance 
Test 
length 
SI / 
total* 
 1.5 / 4 hours 3.5 / 10 hours 6.5 / 12 hours 
N  29 127 191 
Note. * test length of only social intelligence tasks / total test length including breaks 
 a implemented in Wmc 0.18, including stimuli and answers 
b implemented in Wmc 0.18, stimuli only; responses in paper-and-pencil format 
SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, SP = social perception, v = written 
language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, f = videos, ps = personality ratings 
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However, the study in August also intended to adjust the test length, modify the 
formulation of instructions and items, and test the type of stimulus presentation required for 
the social understanding and social auditory perception tasks. In November and December 
2004, the first main study was conducted which assessed four scenarios and tasks of social 
memory and perception (seven and four tasks, respectively). Thus, not every cell was 
represented by two tasks in Study 1. This study was specifically directed at investigating the 
adequacy of item and response formats of the social understanding tasks. Moreover, 
presentation and response times for the tasks of social memory and social perception should 
be adjusted. Additionally, the validity of these first versions of the tasks were examined in 
terms of the structure of social intelligence and the relationship to academic intelligence and 
personality. Study 2 was conducted between December 2005 and April 2006. The complete 
SIM was applied including 2 tasks per cell for social memory and perception and eight 
scenarios. The two written language and video-based tasks for social memory (SMv1+2 and 
SMf1+2) did not represent different types of tasks in terms of the formal characteristics, as 
did all tasks in the remaining cells. They only differed in the complexity of task stimuli and 
were treated as one task in the end. The general objective of Study 2 was to check the effect 
of task modifications on the scale properties, after Study 1, and replicate the results for 
validity of the SIM. The study examined whether the newly developed tasks complement the 
design in a meaningful way. Both main studies, study 1 and 2, required two testing days with 
five and 6 hours testing time each day. 
Data Analysis 
All data recorded by Wmc 0.18 were imported by SPSS syntax commands into SPSS. 
Paper-and-pencil data had to be typed into an SPSS data file by a member of our research 
project. Data from items that required rating of free responses as per the scoring key were 
rated by two persons each. In case of disagreement, a consensual rating had to be achieved. 
This applied, however, to less than 5 % of the responses. Finally, data were analyzed by the 
use of the statistical software SPSS, SYSTAT, and EQS (Bentler, 1992). 
6.3 Research Questions and Hypotheses 
Quantitative analyses were not conducted for the pilot studies. They were primarily 
aimed at finding out about the adequate (technical) implementation in terms of test length, 
material presentation, and instructions of only a few tasks (see Table 6.6). Thus, the 
subsequent research questions only referred to the main Studies 1 and 2. Table 6.7 presents an 
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overview of the research questions as they will be outlined in the upcoming passages. The 
table indicates which study addressed which research question and the applied statistical 
methods. Additionally, the research questions have been assigned numbers that correspond to 
those found in the body of the following text and in the headings of the result sections. 
Table 6.7 
Overview of Research Questions for Study 1 and 2 Including the Statistical Methods for 
Analysis 
Broad 
aim Research question 
Tasks / 
Measures S1 S2 Statistical Methods 
1A: Psychometric properties of items and scales SU, SM, SP x x Descriptive statistics, reliability analysis 
1A1: Influence of item format on 
psychometric properties SU x  
Descriptive statistics, 
reliability analysis 
Aim 1: 
Psycho-
metric 
proper-
ties 1A2: Influence of group consensus scoring 
on psychometric properties SU x x 
Descriptive statistics, 
reliability analysis 
2A: Structure of social intelligence  SU, SM, SP    
2A1: Do the tasks show consistent within-
domain correlations? Does data fir to 
measurement models of the operative ability 
domains? 
SU, SM, SP x x Pearson r SEM 
2A2: Does data support the general, 
structural, and hierarchical models of social 
intelligence? 
SU, SM, SP x x CFA, χ²-differences test 
2A3: Exploring content-related ability facet SU, SM, SP  x CFA 
2B: Convergent construct validity SU  x Person r 
2C: Divergent construct validity     
2C1: Do between-domain correlations 
support the separability of social intelligence 
from academic intelligence and personality? 
Does data support separable latent ability 
factors of social and academic intelligence? 
SU, SM, SP 
AI 
Personality 
x x Pearson r, CFA, χ²-differences test 
2C2: Does social intelligence show structural 
independency from academic intelligence? 
SU, SM, SP 
AI 
x x MRA, CFA 
Aim 2: 
Construct 
validity 
2C3: Does data support a combined facetted 
model of social and academic intelligence? 
In which way do the ability facets combine? 
SU, SM, SP 
AI 
 x CFA 
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Table 6.7 continued 
3A: Exploring the relationship with self-report 
questionnaires 
SU, SM, SP 
SR-data 
x x Pearson r 
3B: Exploring the gender differences of social 
intelligence tasks SU, SM, SP x x 
t-test of mean 
differences 
3B1: Exploring the gender differences for 
social understanding tasks crossed with the 
target’s gender 
SU x x 
t-test of mean 
differences, 
ANOVA 
3C: Exploring scoring alternatives SU    
3C1: Exploring the effect of item difficulty 
on the correlations between group 
consensus and target scoring 
SU  x Pearson r 
3C2: Exploring correlations-based scoring SU  x --- 
3D: Dimensionality of target score: Effect of 
assumed and real similarity on performance in 
the SU tasks 
SU  x Pearson r 
3E: Exploring the facetted structure of social 
understanding SU    
3E1: Investigating the meaning of the 
ability facets content, modality, and setting SU  x CFA 
3E2: Investigating the effect of common 
target variance SU  x CFA 
3E3: Investigating the interaction of task 
material with the queried modalities on the 
performance 
SU  x ANOVA 
3F: Exploring the process of social 
understanding tasks SU   -- 
3F1: Exploring whether performance 
depended on the point of assessment 
during one scenario 
SU  x 
t-test of mean 
differences, 
ANOVA, Pearson 
correlation 
Explora-
tory 
questions 
3F2: Exploring the relationship of SU 
tasks with long term memory of the item 
material and target persons 
SU  x Pearson r 
Note. SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, SP = social perception, 
AI = academic intelligence, SEM = structural equation model, EFA = exploratory 
factor analysis, CFA = confirmatory factor analysis, MRA = multiple regression 
analysis, ANOVA = analysis of variance, SR = self-report, S1 = Study 1, S2 = Study 2 
 
It must be noted that Study 1 was first and foremost directed at the test development. 
Therefore, the emphasis was centered on questions surrounding the psychometric properties 
and the descriptive statistics of the newly developed tasks. This analysis should allow 
conclusions about the necessary next steps in test development. The size of the sample and the 
amplitude and quantity of the tasks applied permitted further analysis surrounding above all 
the investigation of construct validity. Several further analysis would have been possible. 
However, it was refrained from investigating any possible research question in Study 1 due to 
constraints on time and space and due to limitations of data quality. 
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Ad Aim 1. Psychometric Item and Scale Properties 
1A: In line with the principles of classical psychometric test theory, the present work 
was directed at creating psychometrically sound tasks. This comprised item properties (item 
difficulty, variance, and item-total correlations rit) and scale properties (reliability indicated by 
internal consistency assessed by Cronbach’s alpha coefficients). It was expected that the 
internal consistency measures might not be as robust as those found for academic intelligence 
tasks which typically involve highly homogeneous item contents. The social intelligence tasks 
were rather heterogeneous. The reliability measures should, however, demonstrate a level of 
reliability that allows for the aggregation of items into a compound score. The score building 
of the social understanding tasks in terms of the difference between target’s and judge’s 
answers posed another problem. Item difficulty and variance could hardly be interpreted or 
evaluated since no comparison values were known. Therefore, these parameters could only be 
evaluated in terms of an internal comparison within the tasks and between Study 1 and 2. 
1A1: Study 1 was specifically directed at exploring the effect of different response 
formats on the psychometric properties of items and scales of social understanding. This 
analysis was the foundation for the test modifications in Study 2. 
1A2: Furthermore, the effect of group consensus scoring on the psychometric 
properties was examined in Study 1 and 2. 
Ad Aim 2. Construct Validity 
2A: Structure of Social Intelligence 
2A1: The study investigated whether the data supported the structure of social 
intelligence as specified in the performance model of Weis and Süß (2005). It was expected 
that the tasks within one ability domain would show coherent correlations with one another. 
The tasks would load on the respective operative ability factors modeled by structural 
equation modeling in order to establish measurement models. 
2A2: The study hypothesized that a confirmatory factor analysis provided evidence for 
the structure of social intelligence. Best data fit was expected for a three-factor model 
including social understanding, memory, and perception as positively correlated ability 
factors. Moreover, it was assumed that the tasks would positively load on a general factor of 
social intelligence. Based on the assumption of a hierarchical model, confirmatory factor 
analysis would also support a Schmid-Leiman solution and a hierarchical model with a 
higher-order general factor predicting variance in the second-order ability factors. Figure 6.3 
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displays the hypothesized models in one diagram. The left side represents the structural model 
of social intelligence with correlated ability factors. Removing the factor intercorrelations 
(dashed lines) between the factors and adding the general factor on the right side (dotted 
lines) results in a hierarchical Schmid-Leiman solution. If possible, the χ²-differences test 
would be applied in order to clarify which model provided a better fit to the data . 
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Figure 6.3 
Hypothesized Structural Equation Models of the Structure of Social Intelligence 
Note. SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, SP = social perception, v = written 
language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, f = videos 
continuous lines represent the social intelligence measurement models, dashed lines 
indicate the correlations between the ability factors in the structural solution, dotted 
lines indicate elements of the Schmid-Leiman hierarchical solution 
 
2A3: The role of different task material was also of interest. Theory, however, did not 
suggest whether material-related ability factors could be hypothesized as representing 
meaningful ability domains. The use of different task material implied different cues or 
communication channels. Accordingly, it remains an exploratory question whether and how a 
differentiation of task material resulted in meaningful content-related ability domains (e.g., 
language-based vs. language-free contents; auditory vs. visual communication channels vs. 
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semantic contents; etc.). If so, confirmatory factor analysis would support a model with four 
(or two or three, this number should be explored) content-related ability factors showing 
loadings of the respective tasks. 
2B: Convergent Construct Validity 
The relationship of the social intelligence tasks with a measure of nonverbal sensitivity 
should be investigated. Therefore, the Video Scale of the Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity 
(PONS; Rosenthal et al., 1979) was applied in Study 2. Earlier studies, however, could not 
prove the convergent validity of the PONS itself (Bernieri, 2001; Buck, 1983). Only Bänziger 
(2005) found a substantial correlation between the PONS and the MERT. Moreover, The 
Video-PONS showed rather low reliability (see Table 5.3). Thus, positive correlations 
between the PONS and, particularly, the social understanding tasks could be expected. But a 
lack of convergent validity evidence would not be seen as problematic for the developed 
tasks. 
2C: Divergent Construct Validity 
2C1: The study examined whether social intelligence could be separated from 
academic intelligence and personality traits. Correlative analysis was expected to demonstrate 
that within-domain correlations of the social intelligence tasks exceeded across-domain 
correlations with academic intelligence ability domains (i.e., on a general as well as on 
specific levels) and with personality traits. It was hypothesized that confirmatory factor 
analysis would show good data fit for models hypothesizing separate ability factors of social 
and academic intelligence on different levels of generality (e.g., general academic intelligence 
and general social intelligence; broad ability domains of academic and social intelligence, 
etc.) as displayed in Figure 4.6 (b). 
2C2: The study also examined if social intelligence would demonstrate structural 
independency from academic intelligence. Based on a regression-analytic approach, provided 
that social intelligence could not completely be explained by academic intelligence, some 
systematic variance had to remain. This could be demonstrated by calculating the identified 
structural equation models, this time relying on the residuals of the regression analysis when 
academic intelligence was controlled for. The model was expected to fit the data. 
2C3: The study explored whether social intelligence could be classified into an 
existing model of academic intelligence as a separable and meaningful operative or content-
related ability domain. Figure 6.4 presents a model of social and academic intelligence 
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combined in one structural equation model as was postulated in Figure 4.6 (a). According to 
this diagram, social intelligence was conceived as an additional content-related ability domain 
within a faceted model of operations and contents. It could be expected that the social 
intelligence tasks showed loadings on the operative academic ability factors (i.e., Reasoning, 
Memory, and Perceptual Speed) and on one social content factor so far not included in models 
of academic intelligence. If this model was confirmed by data, the academic intelligence 
construct would find a meaningful extension by social intelligence tasks as established in the 
Structure of Intellect Model of Guilford (1967). This research question was only addressed in 
Study 2. 
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Figure 6.4 
Hypothesized Model of Social and Academic Intelligence Integrated in One Faceted Model 
Note. white fields represent manifest and latent academic intelligence variables 
grey-shaded fields represent manifest and latent social intelligence variables 
capital letters: R = Reasoning, M = Memory, S = Speed 
small typed letters: v = verbal, n = numerical, f = figural, s = social 
 
3. Further Exploratory Research Questions Not Directly Related to the Aims 
3A: Relationship with self-report data 
The relationship of the social intelligence performance tasks to self-report 
questionnaires of social and emotional skills will be explored. Past empirical results, however, 
do not suggest that substantial correlations will be observed. 
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3B: Gender differences 
The gender differences between social intelligence tasks were examined. Although 
some authors have interpreted gender differences in favor of women as supportive of the 
validity of social and emotional abilities (Hall, 2001; Schutte et al., 1998), no hypotheses 
concerning a gender effect could be formulated. 
3B1: Against the background of the already described study of Bronfenbrenner et al. 
(1958; Chapter 4.3.3.5), gender effects on performance in the social understanding tasks were 
explored. In particular, the interaction of the targets’ and judges’ gender was concerned. 
3C: Exploring Scoring Alternatives 
3C1: Scoring alternatives for the social understanding tasks were explored in order to 
learn more about the nature of, for example, group consensus scoring or correlations-based 
scoring in the sense of Snodgrass (2001; see also Colvin and Bundick (2001). The analyses 
attached to research question 1A2 already addressed the effect of group consensus scoring on 
the item and scale properties. Additionally, the overlap of target and group consensus scoring 
was explored. In this context, no hypothesis about the expected overlap was set up because of 
the conceptual weaknesses of group consensus scoring. It was, however, expected that the 
overlap was influenced by the difficulty of the items, as could be demonstrated for four 
fictitious items in Figure 5.3 and 5.4 in Chapter 5.2.4. Thus, it was examined how items of 
low vs. high difficulty (or items where the modal response in the sample corresponded with 
the target’s answer vs. items where this was not the case) showed a differential correlation 
pattern. 
3C2: Besides group consensus scoring, correlations-based scoring (Snodgrass, 2001) 
was attempted and its effect on the psychometric properties and the within- and across 
constructs correlations was examined. 
3D: Exploring the Dimensionality of the Target Score 
The study examined how much of the target score’s variance could be explained by 
the assumed and the real similarity between judge and target. The indicator of assumed 
similarity was the similarity rating after each scenario. Real similarity was assessed by a 
compound score consisting of biographical and personality variables. This analysis was only 
possible on the level of one scenario. 
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3E: Exploring the Facetted Structure of Social Understanding 
3E1: The scenarios provided a 8 x 2 x 4 x 3 design cross-classifying eight targets, two 
settings, four material-related contents, and three modalities. Whether the partitioning into 
four material-related contents could be upheld is left to the empirical results related to 
research question 2A4 so that changes could occur in this faceted design. Additionally, Study 
2 investigated whether the facets of the queried modality and the setting, represented 
meaningful ability domains. Therefore, confirmatory factor analysis examined the fit of 
models postulating ability factors related to the facets (i.e., emotions, cognitions, and 
relationships for the modality facet; private and public for the setting facet). There was reason 
to assume the factors to be correlated since they were conceptualized as belonging to one 
social understanding domain. Bernieri (2001), however, accounted for the possibility that 
factors related to different modalities might be uncorrelated which he did not see as a threat 
but rather as evidence for a multifaceted social understanding domain. 
3E2: The role of common target variance on the identified structure within the social 
understanding tasks is a methodological question that concerned a possible bias within the 
tasks of social understanding. The study explored whether meaningful ability domains related 
to the postulated facets that emerged when variance due to the target persons was controlled 
for. Structural equation models were set up to postulate eight target-related method-factors 
and four content-related, three modality-related, or two settings-related ability factors, if these 
had been supported in the previous analyses. The ability-related factors were hypothesized to 
be correlated when, therewith, common target variance was bound in the target-related 
factors. These target-related factors were hypothesized, in contrast, to be uncorrelated 
3E3: Archer and Akert (1980) and Ekman et al. (1980) had investigated the effect of 
the availability of cues on subjects’ performances in tasks of social abilities. In accordance 
with their research question, the current study examined whether items assessing different 
modalities showed different degrees of difficulty depending on different underlying task 
material. It was possible that different task material (different communication channels) only 
allow specific judgments related to specific modalities (e.g., a judgment about the thoughts of 
a target might only be possible when language-contents were provided in written or spoken 
language). However, the scope of this analysis was surely restricted because different items 
were underlying the different modalities and contents so that the result could as well be an 
effect of the item characteristics. 
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3F: Process During Social Understanding Tasks 
3F1: The study examined whether there was an increase in the accuracy of judgments 
during the course of one scenario task. This could be interpreted as accumulated knowledge 
about the target, getting broader and deeper with every new stimulus. If an effect of the course 
within one scenario on the accuracy could be observed this could be attributed to the presence 
of an underlying knowledge structure. 
3F2: The study investigated whether performance in the social understanding tasks 
was related to long term memory of the task material and the background information about 
the targets in the social understanding tasks. If higher long term memory of only the task 
material in the social understanding tasks was associated with better performance in the 
scenarios, this would carefully point towards perception-based bottom-up processing as a 
meaningful determinant of social understanding abilities (Bless et al., 2004; Buck, 1983). If 
performance was related to long term memory of the background information, this would 
suggest knowledge-based top-down processing (Bless et al., 2004; Buck, 1983). 
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7 Study 1 
7.1 Sample 
One hundred and twenty seven students of the Otto-von-Guericke-University 
Magdeburg in Germany participated in the present study. One hundred and twenty four had 
graduated from German high school after the 13th grade (i.e., “Gymnasium”) as per regular 
schedule, one had graduated early with a “Fachhochschulreife” after the 12th grade, two did 
not provide information about their educational status. Participants’ areas of study at 
university were mainly first-year psychology, economic sciences, and mathematics. They 
were recruited in university classes and received monetary compensation (see Table 6.6) or 
course credits. One participant did not return after the first day of testing, this half data set 
was excluded from further analysis. The mean age of the participants was m = 21.35 
(sd = 3.06), and 53.5 % (i.e., 68) of the participants were females. 
7.2 Material 
7.2.1 Social Intelligence Tasks 
The general ideas and principles underlying the construction of the tasks have already 
been described and will be repeated in the upcoming task descriptions. During the process of 
test development, the responsibilities for test construction were partitioned between the 
present author and Kristin Seidel (Seidel, 2007). Kristin Seidel was responsible for the 
construction and description of the tasks based on written and spoken language. A detailed 
description of the tasks and the considerations underlying the construction and modifications 
can be found in Seidel (2007). The partitioning was, however, not possible for the social 
understanding tasks because of the scenario approach. These tasks will therefore be addressed 
in both works. 
The following passages present the newly developed social intelligence tasks and the 
assignment to the cells of the MTMM design. The assignments simultaneously represent the 
abbreviations used to refer to the respective tasks in the Tables and the results sections. A list 
of abbreviations is included in the index of abbreviations. 
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Social Understanding Tasks 
The scenario approach has already been described in detail in a previous section (see 
Chapter 6.2.2.1) and only the core features will be outlined at this point. In short, the scenario 
tasks required subjects to judge the emotions, cognitions, relationships, and the personality of 
target persons on a 6-point rating scale. To operationalize every content domain, judgments 
were based on information from written and spoken language, pictures, and videos. In the first 
study, four scenarios were applied presenting Renate (SU_RF), Christoph (SU_CP), 
Katharina (SU_KL), and Matthias (SU_MM) as target persons (see Table 6.2). Three different 
item formats were used (i.e., free response, multiple choice, and 6-point Likert-based rating 
scales). Material-related task contents were systematically varied within and across one 
scenario. It turned out to be difficult, however, to vary the item formats and the queried 
modality within and across the scenarios because some modalities were favored by a certain 
item format (e.g., the cognitive modality was better represented by free response formats, and 
emotions were better queried by the use of ratings-based scales). Therefore, the following 
cross-table (Table 7.1) emerged showing the number of items across the four scenarios 
classified in terms of the task material, the queried modality and the item formats. 
Table 7.1 
Number of Items in Social Understanding Tasks Classified into Contents, Modalities, and 
Item Formats (Study 1) 
Queried 
modality Item format SUv SUa SUp SUf ∑ ∑ 
Emotion 
Rating scales 
Multiple choice 
Free response 
31 
0 
0 
38 
0 
2 
8 
0 
0 
24 
0 
2 
101 
0 
4 
105 
Cognition 
Rating scales 
Multiple choice 
Free response 
2 
0 
2 
2 
0 
8 
2 
0 
2 
0 
0 
2 
6 
0 
14 
20 
Relationship 
Rating scales 
Multiple choice 
Free response 
18 
9 
2 
16 
1 
1 
5 
9 
1 
46 
11 
1 
85 
30 
7 
122 
 ∑ 64 68 27 86   
Note. SU = social understanding, v = written language, a = spoken language, = pictures, 
f = videos 
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Table 7.1 also presents the common abbreviations used hereafter for the newly 
constructed scales (see Note to Table 7.1). The scenarios contained between 27 and 86 items 
related to different task material. At the end of each scenario, the personality traits of the 
targets had to be rated on a 5-point rating scale on nine dimensions (i.e., the Big Five and four 
of the Interpersonal Problems – Circumplex). Performance was scored by target scoring (i.e., 
the weighted difference from the target answer). The average duration for each scenario was 
estimated to be 20 minutes. Data sampling, however, showed large variation between the 
testing times of different subjects. At times, a scenario lasted about half an hour. This was, in 
part, due to some subjects who watched, listened to, or read the scenes more than once which 
was possible in the PowerPoint presentation format. The final reliabilities (Cronbach’s alpha) 
of the scales were .75 / .68 / .65 / .76 for the written and spoken language, pictorial, and 
video-based scales, respectively. How these scales were eventually composed will be 
presented when the psychometric properties of the scales are described (see Chapter 7.4.2.1). 
Social Memory Tasks 
Social Memory – written language (SMv1+2): Memory for Written Correspondence 
Participants were presented four written one-way or two-way correspondences (e.g., a 
letter written after a skiing vacation) and told to memorize as many socially relevant details as 
possible. Reading times varied between 1:30 min. and 3:20 min. Participants were then asked 
to freely reproduce the information from the texts in free response format items (e.g., “What 
does the writer say that she felt sorry for?”). Response time was limited (between 2:00 min. 
and 2:30 min.). The test contained a total of 38 items and was subdivided into two halves for 
data sampling. The task showed a reliability of .74 (Cronbach’s alpha) in the present sample. 
Social Memory – spoken language 1 (SMa1): Memory for Conversations 
Participants listened to twelve audio-recorded monologues and conversations between 
two or more people (e.g., a male person talking about a conflict at work with both colleagues 
and superiors) and were told to memorize as many socially relevant details as possible. The 
length of the stimuli varied from 1:36 min. to 2:14 min. Participants were then asked to freely 
reproduce the information from the recordings in free response format items (e.g., “According 
to the speaker, how did the superior react?”). Response time was limited to 1:00 min. The test 
contained 62 items. This test was also subdivided into two halves for data sampling. 
Cronbach’s alpha for the present sample was .78. 
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Social Memory – pictorial 1 (SMp1): Memory for Couples (Weis & Süß, 2007) 
This task required subjects to observe and memorize pairs of people as well as 
possible. Subsequently, participants were shown one of a pair and were asked to identify the 
correct partner from four alternatives. All persons displayed wore different clothing in the 
recall section. This task was applied in the study reported in Weis and Süß (2007). Te pictures 
were presented in blocks. In contrast to three blocks in the original version, two blocks of 
eight pictures each were presented in the present study. Weis and Süß (2007) had only 
included pictures of heterosexual couples. In the present modifications, only the first block 
portrayed heterosexual couples. In the second block, pictures showed pairs of colleagues of 
the same gender (i.e., four pictures with male, four with female colleagues). The recall section 
followed directly after one presentation block. Every picture, including the presentation and 
the recall sections, stayed on the screen for three seconds. Subjects’ response time was also 
limited to three seconds. Subjects indicated their answer by marking the correct alternative on 
the answering sheet. Performance was scored as the proportion of correct answers. The 
reliability of the task in the present sample was .52. 
Social Memory – Pictorial 2 (SMp2): Memory for Situations 
This task was a first version applied to test the item and the general test format. The 
total testing time available was restricted to a few minutes. Therefore, consecutive to the task 
SMp1, a first short version of the present task was administrated. Participants were required to 
memorize as many socially relevant details out of a sequence of pictures showing actions of 
different numbers of people in one context (e.g., the first sequence showed three pictures of 
family members at a family get-together having dinner and taking a boat trip). Pictures stayed 
on the screen for five seconds each. The first sequence of the family get-together involved 
five different persons. Pictures of the second sequence showed teachers during their break 
carrying out different activities in the staff room (e.g., talking to each other, having lunch, 
changing seats, etc.). This sequence consisted of nine pictures involving a total of 16 people. 
After viewing the sequence, participants had to answer open-ended and a few multiple choice 
questions about socially relevant details. Figure 7.1 presents one example picture extracted 
from the second sequence and an associated example item. The first sequence comprised 
seven items, and the second sequence eight items. Answering time was limited to 1:00 and 
2:00 min. respectively, for sequence 1 and 2. The testing procedure showed that participants 
had problems answering the questions within the given time frame. The free responses were 
rated by two raters in terms of the accordance with the correct answer. Performance was 
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scored in terms of the number of achieved points in relation to the maximum number of 
points. Multiple choice answers were scored as proportion correct. Cronbach’s alpha in the 
present sample was .14. 
 
“Which of the three women sitting side by side were talking to each other?” 
(open-ended response) 
Example item: 
 
Within a sequence of nine pictures, subjects also see the following one. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.1 
Example Picture and Item for Social Memory – pictorial 2 (SMp2) (Study 1) 
Social Memory – video-based 1+2 (SMf1+2; Weis & Süß, 2007): Memory for 
Situations - Videos 
Only one type of task assessed social memory based on video material. This test 
approach was presented in the study conducted by Weis and Süß (2007). Two levels of 
complexity could be differentiated within the task associated with the number of people 
involved in the video scenes (i.e., less than five people representing SMf1 and more than four 
people SMf2). No separated analyses, however, were conducted for the two sub-tasks. The 
task comprised of four video scenes presenting different social events (i.e., a dinner, an 
excursion of a kindergarden group, an exhibition, and a bowling night). Participants viewed 
each video scene once and were instructed to memorize as many socially relevant details as 
possible. After viewing each scene, subjects had to answer mostly open-ended and some 
multiple choice questions. Table 7.2 presents an overview of the four scenes including 
example items and the number of items. Answering time was limited to 1:15 min. for each 
scene. Testing, however, showed that the answering time was too short to allow answers to 
every item. The free responses were rated by two raters in terms of the accordance with the 
correct answer. Performance was scored in terms of the number of achieved points in relation 
to the number of available points. Multiple choice items were scored as proportion correct. 
The reliability of the task in the present sample was .47. 
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Table 7.2 
Video Scenes in the Social Memory – Videos Task, Example Items and Video Length (Study 1) 
Content Scene description Example item Video length 
Item 
count 
1: Dinner 
A family, consisting of parents and an 
elder sister and a younger brother, is 
having dinner during their vacations 
in Spain. They are eating Paella. 
“Who did the young boy kiss during 
the dinner?” (free response format) 2:02 9 
2: Kindergarden 
excursion 
A group consisting of several adults 
and children is seen at a barbecue. 
“How many children have their 
barbecue sitting together at one table?” 
(free response format) 
2:39 7 
3: Exhibition 
Three people are observed talking to 
each other during the welcome speech 
of an exhibition. 
“Do the woman and the man on her 
right side look into each others’ eyes?” 
(multiple choice) 
1:38 7 
4: Bowling 
event 
A group of seven adults is seen sitting 
together at one table at a bowling 
event. 
“How does the woman returning to the 
group learn what has happened while 
she was away?” (multiple choice) 
1:48 9 
 
Across the social memory tasks, the following taxonomic classifications were 
achieved (see Table 7.3). Some problems concerning the accomplishment of the taxonomic 
principles and the accounting for socially relevant item contents were encountered during test 
construction. These problems were associated each other. Private and public settings could be 
enclosed in every single task. One task (SMp1) included situations with dyads only. Two 
tasks (SMp2 and SMf1+2) involved groups of people. Thus, a lower level of complexity (i.e., 
task material presenting only a single person) was not achieved since it turned out difficult to 
include socially relevant item contents when only one person was displayed. In this respect, 
just querying the physical appearance of the person or single movements  did not seem to be 
socially relevant. The focus was therefore the stimuli containing small groups and pairs of 
people. Another problem regarded the transformation of pictorial and video-based material 
into items and responses based on written language. It turned out to be difficult to formulate 
items so that concrete pictorial stimuli contents were addressed univocally. For example, one 
scene included a male person leaning forward onto a table, the related item asked for the 
posture of this man and subjects were to describe the physically present posture. However, 
several responses included descriptions of how the man appears while leaning onto the table 
(e.g., relaxed, interested, etc.). Moreover, subjects’ responses sometimes showed a large range 
of possible interpretations because of the same type of problem. 
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Table 7.3 
Taxonomic Principles Underlying the Social Memory Tasks Based on Pictorial and Video 
Material (Study 1) 
  Setting 
  Private Public 
Two people SMp1 block 1: heterosexual couples SMp1 block 2: colleagues 
Number of persons 
involved Small groups (number 
of persons in 
parentheses) 
SMp2 sequence 1: family 
excursion (5) 
SMf scene 1: dinner (4) 
SMf scene 4: bowling 
night (6) 
SMf scene 3: exhibition 
(3) 
SMp2 sequence 2: 
teacher (16) 
SMf scene 2: 
kindergarden excursion 
(16) 
Note. SM = social memory, p = pictures, f = videos 
Social Perception Tasks 
Social Perception – written language (SPv1): Perception of Social Cues in Texts 
Subjects were presented one or two written target statements or questions on one half 
of the screen (e.g., “Does the sender criticize a lack of engagement?”). Subsequently, a short 
text was presented on the other half of the scree two seconds after the target statement (e.g., “I 
think you’re engagement is great.”). Based on this text, subjects had to make a decision about 
the truthfulness of the statements (“true” vs. “false”) or whether the question could be 
answered with “yes” or “no” (i.e., choice reaction time), as quickly as possible. For the case 
of two presented target statements or questions, both needed to be true for the answer to be 
“true”. Target statements or questions and the text could be seen simultaneously for a limited 
time. Subjects indicated their decision by pressing the respective key representing their choice 
(e.g., “<” for false, “-“ for true). Response time was limited to 12 sec. Performance was 
scored in terms of the reaction time for correct responses accounting for false alarms. The task 
consisted of 35 items presented in one row without breaks. Cronbach’s alpha reliability 
coefficient for the present sample was .83. 
Social Perception – auditory (SPa1): Perception of Social Cues in Spoken Language 
Subjects were made to listen to extracts from audio-recorded conversations (e.g., a 
telephone conversation between two male friends about study concerns). Prior to the 
presentation of the recordings, they were instructed to attend to specific target cues. Target 
cues could vary according to the complexity (e.g., a laughter, mention of a given name, 
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interruptions, or agreement, etc.). Subjects had to react as quickly as possible as soon as they 
perceived the respective cue within the recordings. Either one or more than one cue had to be 
attended to (simple vs. choice reaction time). Subjects indicated their decision by pressing the 
respective key representing their choice (e.g., “<” for mentioning a name, “-“ for agreement). 
Answering time was limited in terms of the time until the next cue emerged within the 
recordings. Performance was scored in terms of the reaction time for correct responses 
accounting for false alarms. The task consisted of 13 audio recordings and a total of 136 
items. Cronbach’s alpha in the present sample was .88. 
Social Perception – pictorial (SPp1): Person Perception – Pictures 
Subjects had to detect given target persons within pictures of crowds at different 
public locations (e.g., a market place, a store, a mall, a pedestrian zone, etc.). Prior to the test 
trials, the targets were presented with portrayals showing the persons’ whole body. 
Afterwards, subjects had to indicate as quickly as possible the location of the target within the 
crowd by a mouse click on the target’s head. Targets wore different clothing in their 
presentation and in the trials. The position of the targets within the pictures varied 
unsystematically. The task comprised three practice blocks and seven test blocks, each block 
contained ten items. Either one, two or three targets had to be attended to within one block. 
One picture, however, displayed only one target person. Answering time was limited to 10 
seconds. Performance was scored in terms of the mean reaction time of correct trials. 
Cronbach’s alpha in the present sample was .90. 
Social Perception – video-based (SPf1): Person Perception – Videos 
Subjects had to detect target persons within videos of crowds at public locations (e.g., 
a market place, a store, a mall, a pedestrian zone, etc.). The item presentation was preceded by 
videos of the targets showing their whole body. Afterwards, subjects watched videos of 
crowds and had to react as quickly as possible when they detected the target. Either one, two 
or three targets had to be attended to within one block (simple or choice reaction time). 
Targets wore different clothing in their presentation and in the trials. Subjects indicated their 
response by pressing the respective key (e.g., “<” when target person 1 appeared in the video, 
“-“when target person 2 appeared in the video). The task comprised one practice block and 
three test blocks, containing ten items each. Answering time was limited in terms of the video 
length (i.e., no reaction was possible after the video had stopped). The length varied between 
8 and 47 seconds. The target appeared in the videos at varying points in time. The point of 
emergence was determined in terms of the respective frame in the video. For example, a video 
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of 10.96 seconds consisted of 274 frames, one frame representing 40 ms. Target appearance 
across all videos ranged from the first frame to frame 667 so that subjects did not build up 
expectations about the target appearance. Performance was scored in terms of the mean 
reaction time of correct trials accounting for false alarms prior to the target appearance. 
Figure 7.2 presents an example video stream showing the start and the end of a video and the 
point of target appearance. Reactions prior to that point were scored as a false alarm (e.g., a 
possible distracter person prior to target appearance). Valid reactions could only occur after 
the target appeared. The reliability coefficient in the present sample was .70. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Video length 
(e.g., 10.96 sec. or 
274 frames) 
Target 
appearance 
(e.g., frame 
160)
Video start 
(0 sec. or 0 
frames) 
Reactions = 
false alarm 
Reactions = 
correct response 
(in ms) 
Figure 7.2 
Schema of Scoring Reaction Times and Accounting for False Alarms of the Task SPf1 
(Study 1) 
7.2.2 Validation Instruments 
Academic Intelligence: BIS-Test (Jäger et al., 1997) 
The BIS-Test was assessed as a test for academic intelligence. The test was based on 
the BIS-Model which represents a faceted hierarchical model cross-classifying an operational 
and a content facet with seven broad ability factors (i.e., operational facet: BIS-
R = Reasoning, BIS-M = Memory; BIS-S = Speed, and BIS-C = Creativity; content facet: 
BIS-V = verbal ability, BIS-N = numerical ability, and BIS-F = figural-spatial ability) and 
resulting twelve cells. The BIS-Model has been described in Chapter 4.1. The structure of the 
BIS-Model assessed by the BIS-Test has been replicated several times (Beauducel & 
Kersting, 2002; Brunner & Süß, 2005; Süß et al., 2002). The manual reported high internal 
consistency coefficients. Test-retest reliability coefficients ranged from .65 for BIS-C to .90 
for BIS-R (Jäger et al., 1997). 
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The complete BIS-Test comprised of 45 tasks assigned to the twelve cells, each 
including requirements of one operational and one content domain. In Study 1, however, the 
complete test was not applied due to time constraints and due to an arrangement with a 
diploma student (Feigenspan, 2005). Her thesis concerned the development of a computer-
administrated BIS-Test version. She partly relied on the present sample to examine the 
equivalence of the computer-administrated and the paper-and-pencil version. Therefore, tasks 
that could not be administrated completely on the computer were not applied. Tasks for 
BIS-C (twelve tasks) and one figural-spatial task from a total of 15 tasks of BIS-R were 
omitted because they required open response format. Likewise, some tasks for BIS-M and 
BIS-S were excluded. Finally, BIS-M was assessed by seven tasks (two, two, and three, for 
the verbal, numerical, and the figural-spatial cell), BIS-S was also assessed by seven tasks 
(two, three, and two, for the verbal, numerical, and the figural-spatial cell). A total of 28 tasks 
and one warming-up task were assigned to five parts that were administrated at different 
points in  time throughout the two testing days (see Appendix C for the order of testing 
including instruction and working time per task). The five parts lasted about 15 minutes each 
and included between five and six tasks. The reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) for 
the six broad ability factors in the present sample were .72 / .70 / .81 / .65 / .73 / .82 for 
BIS-S / -M / -R / -F / -V / -N, respectively. 
Personality: NEO-FFI (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993) 
The NEO-FFI was applied as a self-report measure of the Big Five personality traits 
Neuroticism (NEO-N), Agreeableness (NEO-A), Extraversion (NEO-E), Conscientiousness 
(NEO-C), and Openness (NEO-O). The questionnaire consisted of 60 items. Subjects had to 
rate their agreement with a given statement on a 5-point rating scale (from 0 “I completely 
disagree” to 4 “I completely agree”). The final scales consisted of the mean ratings over all 
items per scale accounting for the number of missings. Reliability coefficients reported in the 
manual (Cronbach’s alpha) were .85, .80, .71, .71, and .85 for (NEO-N, -E, -O, -A, -C, 
respectively). Results from the present study basically supported these findings and showed 
alpha coefficients of .81 (NEO-N), .76 (NEO-E), .72 (BIS-O), .72 (NEO-A), and .86 
(NEO-C). 
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7.2.3 Instruments Peripherally Related to Research Questions 
Baseline Measures 
Simple Reaction Time Task (SRT; Oberauer, Süß, Wilhelm, & Wittmann, 2003; 
Sander, 2005) 
The SRT task version applied in the present study was extracted from the Working 
Memory test battery presented in Sander (2005). The task was implemented in the 
experimental software Wmc 0.18. Stimuli were presented and reactions sampled only by the 
use of the computer. Subjects had to react as quickly as possible with a keystroke on the space 
bar as soon as a white dot appeared on the screen. Prior to the dot, a small white fixation cross 
emerged to direct the subjects’ attention to the upcoming stimulus. The time delay between 
the presentation of the fixation cross and the dot varied between 970 and 2970 ms. The task 
consisted of five example trials and ten blocks including five test trials each. Subjects 
performance was scored as the mean reaction time for accurately accomplished trials. A trial 
was accomplished accurately when a reaction occurred within a certain time frame after a dot 
presentation and without a prior false alarm. Cronbach’s alpha coefficient in the present study 
was .96. The SRT was intended to serve as a baseline measure for the social perception tasks 
in which keystrokes were required as responses. 
Mouse Speed Task (MT; Oberauer et al., 2003; Sander, 2005) 
The Mouse Speed task also stemmed from the Working Memory test battery presented 
in Sander (2005). The task assessed the subjects’ baseline speed in moving the mouse pointer 
from a preset position to an occurring dot on the screen. Prior to the dot, a fixation cross 
announced the upcoming stimulus. The position of the dot could vary over the whole screen. 
The task was implemented in the experimental software Wmc 0.18 and administrated on the 
computer only. The task consisted of ten example trials and three blocks of 25 trials each. 
Performance was scored as the mean reaction time of correct trials. A correct response 
required hitting the dot with the mouse pointer within a range slightly larger than the dot 
boundaries and no early or late reaction outside of a predefined reaction frame. The Mouse 
Speed task showed high reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) of .98 for the present 
sample. The task served as a baseline measure for the social perception tasks that required a 
mouse reaction (SPp1). 
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Readspeed (Rüsseler & Münte, 2001) 
The Readspeed task was applied as a baseline measure for the social perception tasks 
requiring the quick reading of words or sentences (SPv1). It was extracted from research on 
reading disabilities. The task consisted of a meaningful text containing 198 words presented 
one after another. Subjects had to press the space bar as soon as they had read the word. After 
the keystroke, the word disappeared and the next one emerged. Subsequent to the text, three 
multiple-choice items about the text contents controlled whether the subjects had pressed the 
space bar without reading the words. Performance was scored in terms of the mean reading 
time for one word. Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient in the present sample was .996. 
Self-report Questionnaires 
Biographical Questionnaire 
Biographical data for each participant were sampled by a questionnaire containing 
items that addressed the age, gender, level of education, and the high school grades per 
subject-matter reported in the leaving certificate. Additionally, the general musical experience 
was dichotomously scored (“Do you have musical experience? Yes or No?”) and a self-
perceived hearing capability was assessed (dichotomous item: normal vs. disabled hearing 
capability). 
Computer Experience (Feigenspan, 2005; Süß, 1996) 
The items were adapted from questionnaires applied in previous studies (Feigenspan, 
2005; Süß, 1996). They referred to the individual experiences in dealing with a computer in: 
(a) the time period for which the subjects were now familiar with computers (in years), (b) the 
average time spent at the computer (multiple choice: several hours per day, week, month, or 
less), (c) the life-context of using the computer (e.g., work-related or private activities), 
(d) the self-assessed amount of knowledge and skills in using the computer for different 
purposes (i.e., data and text processing, internet and email services, programming, course-
related activities, etc.), and (e) the self-assessed experience in relation to people of the same 
age group. Computer experience was conceived as a possible performance determinant of 
computer-administrated tasks. It was particularly relevant for the study by Feigenspan (2005) 
which tested a computer version of the BIS. 
Social Behavior Questionnaire (Amelang et al., 1989) 
The Social Behavior questionnaire aimed at assessing self-reported socially intelligent 
social behavior, operationalized by 40 prototypical behavioral acts. These were derived from 
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a study based on the implicit theory approach (Amelang et al., 1989; see Chapter 5.1.1) and 
represented prototypical socially intelligent actions. Subjects rated each act in terms of how 
often they had performed this act themselves in the past on a 4-point rating scale from 1 
(“never”) to 4 (“frequently”). The compound score consisted of the mean ratings over all 
items accounting for the number of missing values. The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s 
alpha) for the present study was .83. 
7.2.4 Instruments Not Related to Research Questions 
Several instruments were applied during data sampling that were not related to any 
research question or analysis in the present study. They will not be described in detail but are 
listed below, and include information about the intended measurement constructs. More 
information for most of the tasks is available in the doctoral thesis of Seidel (2007) which 
provides details about the tasks and the associated analyses. 
Questionnaires 
- Masculinity-Femininity (Hathaway, McKinley, & Engel, 2000): a 56-item self-report 
about the tendency to exhibit typically male or female interests or behavior. 
- Hearing Screening Inventory (Coren & Hakstian, 1992): a twelve-item self-report 
about the subjects’ hearing sensitivity in everyday life. 
General Auditory Tasks – Nonverbal Tonal Tasks 
- Recognition of Repeated Tones (Stankov & Horn, 1980): a 17-item performance task 
to assess the ability to recognize one tone within a sequence of eight tones that is 
played once. 
- Tonal Analogies (Stankov & Horn, 1980): a 17-item performance task that measures 
the ability to identify a pitch difference, from among 4 alternatives, that was 
equivalent to a previously played pitch difference. 
- Tonal Figures (Stankov & Horn, 1980): a 17-item performance task to assess the 
ability to recognize accordance in the tonal composition of tonal sequences between a 
target sequence and four alternative sequences. 
- Tonal Series (Stankov & Horn, 1980): a 21-item performance task that assessed the 
ability to identify the logical completion of a tonal series of four tones by selecting the 
correct tone from four alternatives. 
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- Chord Decomposition (Stankov & Horn, 1980): a 14-item performance task 
measuring the ability to identify the correct three single tones that constitute a 
previously played target three-tone-chord. 
General Auditory Tasks – Nonverbal Tasks 
- Auditory Inspection Time Task – Pitch / Loudness (Deary, Head, & Egan, 1989): In 
general, inspection time tasks assess the discrimination ability between two stimuli 
only differing to a predetermined varying degree in one attribute (e.g., two tones only 
differ in their loudness between 50dB and 55 dB). The present study included two 
auditory inspection time tasks. One required the discrimination of pitch levels (AIT-
P), and the other of levels of loudness (AIT-L), containing 120 items. 
- Rhythm Reproduction (Stankov & Horn, 1980): a 20-item performance task that 
required participants to reproduce rhythms by a keystroke on one key. Rhythms could 
vary in length and complexity. 
- Sound Recognition: a 20-item performance task requiring the recognition of 20 
previously heard target sounds out of 45 sounds. 
General Auditory Tasks – Language-Based Tasks 
- Recognition of Repeated Voices (Stankov & Horn, 1980) : a 25-item performance 
tasks that assessed the ability to recognize the one voice within a sequence of eight 
voices (speaking the same word) which was heard only once. 
- Masked Words (Stankov & Horn, 1980): a 35-item performance task assessing the 
ability to identify spoken words (e.g., “tree”, “table”, etc.) against a noisy background 
varying in intensity (i..e., typical noise of a party), responses had to be written down in 
free format. 
- Audiobook: a 14-item performance task requiring subjects to reproduce as many 
details as possible from a previously memorized text, the text was played twice and 
contained facts about a specific topic (i.e., a report about a journey to Macao) without 
including any socially relevant details; answering time was limited to 3 minutes. 
- Dissected Sentences (Stankov & Horn, 1980): a 19-item performance task assessing 
the ability to rearrange previously disarranged words in order to compose a 
meaningful sentence. Participants had to freely produce the sentences and write them 
down. 
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7.3 Procedures 
The procedures common to both studies have been described in Chapter 6.2.4. 
Appendix C presents the order of administration and the planned duration of the single tasks 
for testing days 1 and 2. The order involved changing requirements, concerning different task 
contents (e.g., auditory vs. video-based tasks) and operations (e.g., reasoning requirements vs. 
self-reports, etc.). Baseline testing took place prior to the tasks that the baseline measurement 
was directed at. Testing per day was planned to last about five hours and was partitioned into 
four sessions including three breaks of about ten minutes each. Some tasks, particularly the 
scenario tasks, however, showed large variance in testing time due to single participants (see 
the task description). Since each task began and provided instructions to the entire group at 
the same time, testing time increased by an average of half an hour per day. 
7.4 Results 
7.4.1 Preparatory Data Analysis 
Before starting the main analysis of the present study, data of the newly constructed 
tasks were screened for missing values and distributions. Fidell and Tabachnik (2003) have 
stressed the importance of such preparatory data screening processes to exclude violations of 
assumptions for applying certain statistical analyses. 
1. As a first step in data screening, items and subjects were excluded when the number of 
missing values exceeded 15 % of the data points. Additionally, outlying data points 
were inspected and treated only if they influenced bivariate distributions or if an 
implausible deviation from the sample mean occurred. 
The following steps were taken for tasks based on reaction time scores (i.e., only 
social perception measures and baseline speed measures): 
2. Trials based on a wrong answer were set to missing. 
3. Trials preceded by a false alarm were set to missing. 
4. Reaction times lower than 100 ms were set to missing. 
5. If necessary, based on a screening of the distribution of a first compound score, 
reaction times of single trials slower than 3 sd above the mean of the sample were set 
equal to 3 sd (trimming of outliers on the group level). 
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6. If necessary, reaction times of single trials of 3 sd above the mean of the individual 
were set equal to 3 sd above the individual mean (trimming on an individual level). 
The following paragraphs present the results of the data screening and, if necessary, 
the results of any preparatory data treatment. Analogous to the test construction, the present 
work focused on the social understanding tasks and on the pictorial and video-based tasks of 
social memory and perception. For a detailed description of the scale construction and data 
treatment of the tasks based on written and spoken language, see Seidel (2007). 
Social Understanding Tasks 
The number of missing values in the social understanding tasks ranged from 0 to 16 
per item for 126 participants which was less than 15 % of the data points per item. However, 
four subjects exceeded the threshold of 15 % missing values (between 44 and 94 missings for 
259 items). Since these were newly constructed tasks without any possibility to refer to 
established empirical results, the subjects were excluded from further analysis. 
Social Memory – SMp1 
No actions were required because just one data point was missing in the Memory for 
Couples task SMp1. 
Social Memory – SMp2 
As expected from the experiences during data sampling, the task Memory for Social 
Situations – pictures (SMp2) showed large numbers of missings. Out of 15 items, just four 
items had less than 15 % missing values (nine items had more than 50 % missing values). 
Therefore, only the four items were used for further analysis. After excluding the items, 
another 27 subjects still had more than 15 % missing values. This amounted to more than one 
fifth of the total sample. Therefore, this task will be omitted from any consecutive 
multivariate analysis because of a significantly large reduction of the sample size. However, 
the psychometric properties of the task will be reported hereafter. 
Social Memory – SMf1+2 
Comparable but less severe problems occurred in the Memory for Social Situations 
task based on videos (SMf1+2). Data sampling had shown that subjects had difficulties 
working on every item because of short presentation and response times. Of the original 31 
items, 16 had more than 15 % missing values. In the remaining 15 items, eleven subjects had 
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more than 15 % missings and were excluded from further analysis. Again, no substitution of 
missing values was performed because of the lack of experience with the task. 
Social Perception – SPp1 
The number of missing values in both tasks of social perception (SPp1 and SPf1) was 
counted before any recoding or transformation was executed according to steps 2 through 6 
explained above. Thus, a missing value represented an item that had not been worked on (i.e., 
absence of a response during predefined answering time). Of the original 100 items on the 
pictorial task, only 4 had more than 15 % missing values and were excluded. No subjects 
showed more than 15 % missing values. According to step 2, the reaction times of wrong 
responses were set to missing. As expected, the task was easy to accomplish. Figure 7.3 
shows the distribution of the number of wrong responses (i.e., a mouse click not on the head 
of the target person). About 75 % of the subjects had six or less missing values because of 
wrong answers, and 50 % of the subjects had less than four. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.3 
Histogram of Missing Values Due to Wrong Responses in SPp1 (Study 1) 
Before composing the final score, items with wrong responses more than the threshold 
value were excluded (i.e., this applied to ten items). A first screening of the distribution of the 
compound score of all remaining items showed a close to normal distribution (see Figure 7.7 
below). No reaction times of single trials were slower than 100 ms. Thus, no further steps of 
data preparation were required. For calculating Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient, 
missing values of all remaining items and subjects were substituted by the mean value of each 
subject to avoid a small sample size due to listwise deletion. 
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Social Perception – SPf1 
The number of missings due to the absence of a response was counted per item. Of the 
original 40 items, twelve items had more than 15 % missings. Surprisingly, five subjects had 
between 15 and 28 missing values in 28 items; they were excluded from further analysis. 
According to step 2 and 3, the reaction times of wrong responses and those preceded by a 
false alarm were set to missing. A false alarm could be interpreted as a possible distracter 
person in the video before the target person appeared. A wrong response represented a key 
stroke indicating the wrong target person in choice reaction time trials. 
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Figure 7.4 
Histogram of Missing Values Due to False Alarms (Left Graph) and Wrong Responses (Right 
Graph) in SPf1 (Study 1) 
The number of false alarms or wrong responses was low on average (see Figure 7.4; 
mfalse alarm = 1.43, sdfalse alarm = 1.44; mwrong = 1.07, sdwrong = 1.29, respectively). However, three 
more items were affected by a number of false alarms too large to include them in the 
analysis. No reaction times were slower than 100 ms. A screening of the final score 
distribution of the remaining items showed a close to normal distribution (see Figure 7.7 
below). Two slight outliers were kept in the data set and inspected for influences on the 
bivariate distributions. Thus, no further steps of data preparation were necessary. For 
calculating Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient, missing values were substituted by the 
mean value of each subject to avoid a small sample size due to listwise deletion. 
 154 
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7.4.2 Psychometric Properties and Descriptives – Research Questions 1A 
The present Chapter serves two purposes. On the one hand, basic descriptive statistics 
and reliabilities of the tests applied in the study will be presented. On the other hand, the 
Chapter intends to focus on test development. This mainly includes an investigation of item 
difficulties and item-total correlations (rit) to find out about adequate item formats. The 
present chapter includes all analyses in the context of research question 1A. 
7.4.2.1 Social Understanding Tasks 
Analysis Prior to Selection of Item Format 
The social understanding tasks were arranged within four different scenarios. The 
aggregation of items belonging to one scenario was not primarily of interest as the units of 
analysis. In contrast, scales were constructed according to the material-related task contents to 
represent the cells of the design. Therefore, all items of one content domain were combined to 
one score. Additionally, the final personality ratings were aggregated to one scale. The left 
side of Table 7.4 presents the results of a first reliability analysis showing the underlying 
number of items (item count), range in item-total correlations, and Cronbach’s alpha 
coefficients based on all item formats. All parameters are presented for the entire scale 
including all formats in the first lines in boldface. Parameters are as well presented for the 
three types of item formats within the entire scale. The analysis showed a large range in item-
total correlations for all item formats and no sufficiently reliable scales (α between .403 and 
.618). 
On the right side of Table 7.4, the same parameters are presented after item selection. 
The scale was optimized based on the item-total correlations so that higher reliabilities were 
achieved. Exceptions were allowed only when one item was needed to maintain heterogeneity 
and a balanced taxonomy. Although some item-total correlations were still low, sufficiently 
reliable scales could be built for most of the scales based on all item formats (α between .635 
and .772). No item format seemed to have failed completely so that the final scales comprised 
all item formats except for the pictorial task. 
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Table 7.4 
Reliability Analysis Social Understanding Tasks, all Item Formats, Target Scoring (Study 1) 
  All items Items selected based on rit
Content 
domain 
Item 
format 
Item 
count rit range Cronbach’s α 
Item 
count rit range Cronbach’s α 
SUv 
Altogether 
Rating 
MC 
Open 
64 
52 
7 (1) 
4 
-.593 - .434 
-.360 - .434 
-.593 - .157 
-.033 - .236 
.594 
33 
27 
3 
3 
.052 - .511 
.062 - .511 
.371 - .421 
.052 - .282 
.742 
SUa 
Altogether 
Rating 
MC 
Open 
71 
58 
1 
12 
-.292 - .379 
-.292 - .379 
.150 
-.218 - .244 
.452 
33 
24 
1 
8 
.049 - .502 
.049 - .502 
.380 
.055 - .255 
.680 
SUp 
Altogether 
Rating 
MC 
Open 
26 
15 
8 
3 
-.112 - .337 
-.112 - .329 
-.027 - .337 
-.080 - .018 
.403 
10 
6 
4 
- 
.063 - .509 
.063 - .509 
.286 - .391 
- 
.635 
SUf 
Altogether 
Rating 
MC 
Open 
78 
69 
5 
4 
-.159 - .376 
-.159 - .376 
-.063 - .239 
-.035 - .215 
.618 
40 
38 
1 
1 
.097 - .422 
.097 - .406 
.223 
.413 
.772 
SUps Rating 36 -.113 - .599 .581 21 .123 - .422 .675 
Note. SU = social understanding, v = written language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, 
f = videos, ps = personality ratings 
 
Table 7.4 also shows the conceptual failure to provide a balanced number of items 
within the content-related scales representing all three item formats (e.g., one item based on 
multiple choice format and 58 based on rating format in the spoken language scale). The 
number of items per format was too unequal to allow a direct comparison of the psychometric 
qualities of the separate scales based on different formats each. Instead, to provide answers to 
question 1A2 (i.e., influence of item format on the psychometric properties), scales based on 
rating formats alone were composed. Ratings-based scales were chosen because this was the 
only type of item format which provided a reasonable number of items. These scales were 
then compared to the scales based on all item formats (right side of Table 7.4). 
Analysis Based on Rating Format Scales – Target Scoring 
Table 7.5 presents the results of the reliability analysis based on rating format alone. 
The scales on the left side of the table were based on target scoring. These scales were 
optimized according to the aforementioned principles, separately for the two scoring methods 
(see group consensus scoring on the right side of the Table). The upper line of each content-
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domain (in boldface) shows the parameters after item selection. The ratings-based scales (the 
left columns in table 7.5) and the scales containing all three item formats (the right columns in 
Table 7.4) achieved comparable levels of reliabilities although the number of items was 
smaller in the ratings-based scales (e.g., α for the spoken language tasks was .680 for all item 
formats and .678 for only rating format). For this reason and due to the limited possibility of 
constructing separate scales of other item formats, the subsequent analysis relied on scales 
based on rating format only. Table 7.5 also shows that the range in item-total correlations was 
large in the unselected scales (between -352 and .599; see lower line of each content domain). 
To build internally consistent scales, a large numbers of items had to be excluded. The final 
scales show sufficiently strong reliability coefficients (α between .653 and .764). 
Table 7.5. also presents the range of item difficulties (i.e., mean difference from target 
answer in single items) prior to and after item selection. The range did not change at the low 
end of item difficulties (i.e., easy items were maintained in item selection). A relatively large 
proportion of items at the higher end of the difficulty scale were excluded. Thus, in all five 
scales, the range of item difficulties was reduced due to item selection (e.g., from -3.409 to 
-2.509 at the higher end of difficulty for the spoken language scale). 
Table 7.5 
Reliability Analysis Social Understanding Tasks, Rating Formats Only, Target and Group 
Consensus Scoring (Study 1) 
 Target scoring Group consensus scoring 
Item 
count rit range 
Cron-
bach’s α 
Range of item 
difficulties* 
Item 
count rit range 
Cron-
bach’s α 
Range of 
means 
SUv** 
27 
52 
.039 - .552 
-.352 - .415 
.745 
.564 
[-3.115; -.32] 
[-3.573;-.041] 
38 
52 
.090 - .515 
-.150 - .469 
.769 
.725 
[.192; .971] 
[.192; .943] 
SUa** 
22 
58 
.042 - .568 
-.282 - .394 
.678 
.416 
[-2.509; -.235] 
[-3.409; -.235] 
24 
58 
.059 - .542 
-.126 - ;361 
.662 
.510 
[.174; .443] 
[.173; .743] 
SUp** 
5 
15 
.087 - .694 
-.107 - .365 
.653 
.459 
[-2.984; -.361] 
[-3.372;-.361] 
9 
15 
.094 - .466 
-.042 - .427 
.549 
.479 
[.217; .627] 
[.217; .631] 
SUf** 
38 
69 
.083 - .404 
-.135 - .364 
.764 
.620 
[-3.31; -.172] 
[-3.713;-.124] 
35 
69 
.083 - .397 
-.156 - .368 
.691 
.596 
[.190; .869 
[.184; .864] 
SUps 
** 
21 
36 
.123 - .422 
-.113 - .599 
.675 
.581 
[-2.262; -.654] 
[-2.694;-.533] 
33 
36 
.085 - .372 
-.001 - .374 
.698 
.693 
[.228; .477] 
[.228; .478] 
Note. * possible range [-5.00; .00], a higher score indicating better performance 
 ** upper line of each ability domain printed in boldface indicates scales with a 
reduced item number after item selection, lower line indicating scales prior to item 
selection 
 SU = social understanding, v = written language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, 
f = video, ps = personality ratings 
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Analysis Based on Rating Format Scales – Group Consensus Scoring 
In the right columns of Table 7.5, the reliability analysis for group consensus scoring 
is shown. The concept of group consensus scoring has been discussed as problematic. The 
present analysis was not aimed at seriously considering group consensus scoring as an 
alternative scoring option. Rather, it was interesting to investigate the effect of this scoring 
method on the psychometric properties. Obviously, the range in item-total correlations of the 
unselected items (lower line of each content domain) showed better item properties. Thus, 
scales prior to item selection showed larger reliability coefficients for group consensus 
scoring. After item selection, however, the reliabilities could not attain a higher level 
compared to target scoring although more items were maintained in the scales. The range of 
means of the single items basically remained the same prior to and after item selection. 
Distributions 
An inspection of the univariate and bivariate distributions revealed two problems 
concerning outliers. One person showed an outlying value only in the pictorial scale. The 
outlier was nearly 7 sd below the group mean (see Table 7.6 for the parameters involving the 
outlier, in parenthesis of SUp parameters). Any mistakes in the raw data or any syntax error 
were checked and no mistake was found. The subject did not conspicuously differ in any 
other task and so no reason for this outlying performance could be detected. This value was 
substituted by the mean performance in the remaining social understanding scales. No change 
in bivariate correlations was detected afterwards. Another subject showed strongly outlying 
values on three of the social understanding scales which biased the bivariate correlations up to 
rdiff = .17 between the auditory and pictorial scale (see Table 7.7 above the diagonal). This 
person was omitted from the analysis. The final scales are presented in Table 7.6, showing the 
final N, means, standard deviations, range of scores, and distribution parameters, both for 
target and group consensus scoring. The final N arose from the exclusion of four subjects due 
to missing values and one subject due to the influence of outliers on the bivariate distributions 
and thus the correlational results. The means of the target scoring scales varied slightly 
between the content domains (m between -1.05 (SUp) and -1.612 (SUf)). t-test for paired 
samples showed significant mean differences between all paired comparisons (alpha level was 
adjusted according to the number of t-test) except for the differences between SUa with SUv 
and SUps. Thus, the pictorial scale was the one with the lowest mean difficulty whereas the 
video-based scale was most difficult to accomplish. This finding, however, could not be 
interpreted any further because no comparison values were available. Table 7.6 shows the 
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influence of the outlier in the pictorial scale (in parentheses) which was substituted for the 
final scale. 
Table 7.6 
Descriptive Statistics of Social Understanding Tasks Target and Consensus Scoring (Study 1) 
 Task Item count M SD Range Skewness Kurtosis 
SUv 27 -1.325 .406 [-2.58; -.66] -.688 .055
SUa 22 -1.254 .377 [-2.43; -.56] -.413 -.024
SUp* 5 -1.05 (-1.078) .486 (.574) [-2.80 (-4.40); -.20] -.905 (-2.091) .908 (8.755)
SUf 38 -1.612 .364 [-2.59; -.90] -.408 -.120
TS
 
SUps 21 -1.213 .397 [-2.57; -.49] -1.024 1.342
SUv 38 .411 .053 [.27; .51] -.311 -.634
SUa 24 .315 .047 [.19; .40] -.348 -.291
SUp 9 .404 .090 [.08; .55] -.911 .798
SUf 35 .339 .043 [.20; .42] -.848 .702
G
C
S 
SUps 33 .324 .045 [.17; .42] -.553 .306
Note. N = 121, * in parentheses are parameters before deletion of an outlying data point 
(≈ -7 sd) 
 SU = social understanding, v = written language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, 
f = video, ps = personality ratings 
 TS = target scoring, GCS = group consensus scoring 
 
The distribution parameters were basically normal showing the influence of the outlier 
prior to substitution (SUp in parentheses). Figure 7.5 illustrates the univariate distributions of 
the final social understanding scales (target scoring) of the different content domains. 
Comparable distribution forms emerged for the personality rating scales and for all scales 
based on group consensus scoring. 
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Figure 7.5 
Histograms of Social Understanding Final Scales (Study 1) 
Note. (a) SUv, (b) SUa, (c) SUp, (d) SUf 
 
Correlations between Social Understanding Tasks – Target and Group Consensus 
Scoring 
Finally, Table 7.7 shows the zero-order correlations between the social understanding 
scales within and between the scoring methods. Results yielded rather consistent correlations 
within one scoring method (r = .203 - .524 for target scoring) except for the scales based on 
personality ratings. They turned out as marginally correlated with the remaining scales 
(r = .037 - .116 for target scoring). Interestingly, the correlations within the target scoring 
scales based on all item formats were generally lower than those based only on rating formats 
(r = .120 - .469). These correlations are also presented in Table 7.7 (in parentheses in the 
upper half). This preliminarily pointed towards a method-related influence on the correlation 
size related to the different numbers of items of different formats. However, one additional 
finding put this finding into another perspective: The correlations between the personality 
rating scales (i.e., only ratings-based from the beginning) and the content-related scales based 
on all item formats were substantially higher for the written and the spoken language tasks 
while the remaining scales did not a show a change in correlation size. This could not have 
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been expected because different item formats were underlying the scales. This result 
suggested that no method effect was responsible for the larger correlations within the content-
related scales when only ratings-based format was applied. Thus, it strengthened the 
conclusion to rely on ratings-based items in the upcoming analysis and in test modifications. 
Still, it could not be clarified why the correlations with the personality rating scales were such 
small. 
Table 7.7 
Intercorrelations of Social Understanding Scales based on Target and Consensus Scoring 
(Study 1) 
  Target Scoring Group Consensus Scoring 
  SUv SUa SUp SUf SUps SUv SUa SUp SUf SUps 
SUv  .563** .351** .509** .102  
SUa 
.524** 
(.364**) 
 .373** .501** .053  
SUp 
.269** 
(.200*) 
.203* 
(.120) .324** .080
 
SUf 
.504** 
(.469**) 
.509** 
(.331**) 
.332**
(.300**) .033
 
Ta
rg
et
 S
co
ri
ng
 
SUps 
.116 
(.158) 
.078 
(.217*) 
.127
(.098)
.037
(.004)
 
SUv .748** .454** .125 .441** .076  
SUa .422** .864** .108 .498** .104 .456**  
SUp .127 .189* .878** .277** .115 .200* .307**  
SUf .506** .614** .171 .801** .153 .386** .554** .396** G
ro
up
 
C
on
se
ns
us
 S
c.
 
SUps .113 .217* .102 .100 .863** -.041 .335** .164 .247**
Note. N = 121 below diagonal; N = 122 above diagonal 
 intercorrelations of scales based on all item formats in parentheses; correlations above 
the diagonal represent the parameters prior to the deletion of one subject because of 
multivariate outliers; shaded cells: intercorrelations between the scoring methods 
relying on the same content scales 
 SU = social understanding, v = written language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, 
f = videos, ps = personality ratings 
 
Target and group consensus scoring were highly intercorrelated between the 
corresponding content-related scales (r = .748 - .878, see lower part of Table 7.7). The 
remaining correlation coefficients between the methods were generally lower. These 
correlations, however, should not be interpreted any further as long as no empirical results 
were available that allow a conclusion about the nature of group consensus scoring (see 
Chapter 5.2.4 for more detailed considerations and Study 2 for further analyses). 
7.4   Results   
 162 
7.4.2.2 Social Memory Tasks Based on Pictures and Videos 
The social memory scales were inspected by the same kind of reliability analysis. It 
yielded rather low Cronbach’s alpha coefficients (see Table 7.8; SMp1: α = .524, SMf: 
α = .469). Some items were not included in the final scales because of zero or negative item-
total correlations (see second-left column of Table 7.8 for the number of items prior to and 
after item selection). The task SMp2 had already shown a large number of missing values. 
The remaining four items could not be aggregated to a compound score because of rather low 
item-total correlations. This task was omitted from any further analysis. Table 7.8 presents the 
descriptive statistics of the final pictorial and video-based tasks of social memory and 
perception including the reliability coefficients. The resulting reliability coefficients were not 
high. This was to be accounted for in the upcoming correlative analyses. 
Table 7.8 
Descriptive Statistics of Social Memory and Perception Tasks, Pictures and Videos (Study 1) 
Task (N) Item count M SD Range 
Skew-
ness 
Kurto-
sis rit range α 
SMp1 (126) 13 (16) .651 .176 [.23; 1.00] -.159 -.766 .107 - .371 (-.052 - .339) 
.524 
(.484)
SMp2 (99)* 4 .000 .528 [-1.230; 1.110] -.039 -.741 -.035 - .150 .136
SMf1+2 
(115)* 9 (15) .000 .437 [-1.13; .89] -.447 -.167 
.093 - 280 
(-.151 - .236) 
.469 
(.335)
SPp1 (126) 74 (85) 1858.109 298.120 [1257.46; 2661.26] .297 -.380 .121 - .734 (.038 – 509) 
.897 
(.873)
SPf1 (121) 23 (25) 4450.907 988.969 [2518.95; 8056.55] .757 1.1666 .121 - .520 (-.121 - .520) 
.697 
(.683)
Note. * z-scores 
 in parentheses are parameter before item selection based on rit-inspection 
 SM = social memory, SP = social perception, p = pictures, f = videos 
 
Figure 7.6 displays the boxplots of the final score of the two memory tasks SMp1 and 
SMf1+2. The task SMp1 showed a slight ceiling effect. Item difficulties did not drop below 
the guessing rates but instead reached the high end of the scale (.432 - .904 for multiple 
choice items based on four choice alternatives). No distribution problems were encountered 
for the video-based task. 
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Figure 7.6 
Boxplots of SMp1 (Left Graph) and SMf1+2 (Right Graph) (Study 1) 
7.4.2.3 Social Perception Tasks Based on Pictures and Video 
A reliability analysis suggested the exclusion of eleven and two items respectively for 
SMp1 and SMf1, due to zero or negative item-total correlations. The resulting reliabilities, 
however, were good. The descriptive statistics of the two social perception tasks based on 
pictures and videos are also presented in Table 7.8, including Cronbach’s alpha prior to and 
after item selection. Long reaction times were observed in the two tasks. Consequently, the 
typical skewed distributions for reaction time scores was not found in the present study. 
Figure 7.7 presents the boxplots of the tasks showing a few outliers that were, so far, not 
trimmed in the data. This should only be done if the outliers turned out to bias bivariate 
distributions, which was not the case. 
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Figure 7.7 
Boxplots of SPp1 (Left Graph) and SPf1 (Right Graph) (Study 1) 
7.4.2.4 Further Measures 
Table 7.9 presents the descriptive statistics and reliabilities of the social memory and 
perception tasks based on written and spoken language. The detailed analysis is presented in 
Seidel (2007). These parameters represent the final scores underlying further analysis in the 
present study. Any special problems encountered during scale construction were to be 
described in Seidel (2007). 
Table 7.9 
Descriptive Statistics of Social Intelligence Tasks Based on Written and Spoken Language 
(Study 1) 
Task (N) Item count M SD Range Skew-ness 
Kurto-
sis rit range α 
SMv1+2 
(125) 26 (38) .502 .13 [.06; .76] -.646 .644 .16 - .46 .74
SMa1 (125) 61 (62) .528 .092 [.21; .70] -.921 1.609 -.05 - .45 .78
SPv1 (108) 32 (35) 5455.441 689.978 [3491.59; 7182.97] -.282 .411 .11-62 .83
SPa1 (125) 109 (136) 792.507 68.45 [601.83; 956.69] -.051 -.334 .10 - .46 .88
Note. in parentheses are item numbers before item selection based on rit-inspection 
SM = social memory, SP = social perception, v = written language, a = spoken 
language 
 
Table 7.10 below presents the psychometric properties of the remaining tests and 
questionnaires applied in the present study and relevant for any research question. The BIS 
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descriptives were based on the standardized aggregated cells for the respective operative and 
content-related ability domains. The reliability statistics for the operative and content-related 
ability domains were based on content- and operation-homogenous parcels, respectively. No 
special problems were encountered concerning the distributions or reliabilities. The reaction 
time data for the three baseline measures were treated according to the principle described in 
Chapter 7.4.1. Problems with missing values in the baseline measures did not occur. The 
distributions, however, were skewed, particularly for the SRT and the Readspeed task. These 
distributions were therefore modified as per steps 4 through 6 described in Chapter 7.4.1. 
Table 7.10 
Descriptive Statistics of Further Measures (Study 1) 
Task (N) Item count M SD Range 
Skew-
ness 
Kur-
tosis rit range α 
BIS-R* (124)** - .000 .563 [-1.36; 1.32] .015 -.434 .586 - .699 .813
BIS-M* (124)** - .000 .583 [-.156; 1.43] .204 -.159 .503 - .526 .700
BIS-S* (124)** - .007 .561 [-1.33; 1.59] .274 .026 .475 - .688 .723
BIS-V* (124)** - -.000 .586 [-.165; 1.31] -.281 .381 .457 - .706 .726
BIS-F* (124)** - .000 .498 [-1.17; 1.20] -.101 -.337 .414 - .545 .646
BIS-N* (124)** - .007 .593 [-1.16; 1.80] .514 .093 .651 - .709 .815
SRT (125) 50 242.140 21.453 [203.60; 300.36] .504 .082 .415 - .720 .961
MT (126) 75 686.280 69.354 [538.33; 885.30] .339 -.052 .344 - .725 .976
Readspeed* (122) 198 .000 1.000 [-2.253; 3.013] .226 .249 .590 - .849 .996
NEO-N (126) 12 1.682 .555 [.67; 3.17] .351 -.470 .241 - .613 .808
NEO-E (126) 12 2.441 .480 [1.33; 3.33] -.246 -.584 .149 - .697 .755
NEO-O (126) 12 2.525 .498 [1.25; 3.92] -.103 -.102 .082 - .552 .716
NEO-A (126) 12 2.540 .451 [1.42; 3.42] -.299 -.265 .070 - .582 .722
NEO-C (126) 12 2.631 .588 [1.00; 3.92] -.302 -.338 .305 - .667 .863
SB Questionnaire 
(123) 40 2.701 .330 [1.98; 3.78] .152 .390 .135 - .536 .825
Note. * z-scores 
** reliability analysis based on content- and operation-homogenous parcels, four 
parcels for BIS-R, three parcels for BIS-S, -M, -V, -F, -N 
 R = Reasoning, M = Memory, S = Speed, V = verbal abilities, F = figural-spatial 
abilities, N = numerical abilities, NEO-N = Neuroticism, NEO-E = Extraversion, 
NEO-O = Openness, NEO-A = Agreeableness, NEO-C = Conscientiousness, 
SB = social behavior, α = Cronbach’s alpha 
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7.4.3 Construct Validity 
The research questions underlying the following analysis were twofold. First and 
foremost, the structure of social intelligence assessed by the newly constructed tasks was 
examined. Secondly, the relationship between social intelligence and academic intelligence 
and personality traits was investigated in order to prove divergent construct validity. 
7.4.3.1 Structure of Social Intelligence – Research Question 2A 
Correlational Results Based on Original Scales 
The research question underlying the present analysis concerned the internal structure 
of social intelligence as assessed by the newly developed tasks. Social intelligence and the 
more specific operative ability domains were to prove consistently positive within-domain 
correlations and should load on the same factors. Prior to any multivariate analysis, 
Table 7.11 presents the correlations between the newly developed tasks of social intelligence. 
The social understanding and social memory operative domains showed coherent within-
domain correlations. The social understanding tasks correlated with r = .204 - .524 with each 
other, the lowest correlation was between the spoken language and the pictorial task. The 
social memory tasks showed correlations between r = .096 and r = .526. Again, the lowest 
correlations were associated with the pictorial task. In turn, the highest intercorrelations were 
found for language-based tasks. This finding, however, could be associated with the rather 
low reliability coefficient of the pictorial and the rather high coefficients of the language-
based tasks. 
The correlations within the social perception domain, however, did not support a 
coherent ability domain. Only the pictorial and video-based tasks showed substantial 
convergent overlap. The pattern of correlations across the ability domains was unsystematic. 
Particularly the auditory social memory task was substantially correlated with the social 
understanding tasks. No further tasks showed systematic overlap with tasks related to other 
ability domains. Tasks based on common contents showed only partially coherent within-
domain correlations. The language-based tasks especially, seemed to share some common 
variance. However, any further evidence about the internal structure of social intelligence and 
support for the different ability domains should be derived from confirmatory factor analysis. 
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Table 7.11 
Correlations Between Social Intelligence Tasks (Study 1) 
 SUv SUa SUp SUf SMv1 SMa1 SMp1 SMf1 SPv1 SPa1 SPp1 SPf1 
SUa .524**       
 (121)       
SUp .269** .204*      
 (120) (120)      
SUf .504** .509** .333**     
 (121) (121) (120)     
SMv .248** .132 .160 .220*    
 (120) (120) (119) (120)    
SMa1 .296** .205* .247** .191* .526**    
 (121) (121) (120) (121) (124)    
SMp1 .066 .107 -.009 -.060 .096 .179*    
 (121) (121) (120) (121) (125) (125)    
SMf -.139 -.002 .053 -.060 .269** .342** .240**    
 (110) (110) (109) (110) (114) (114) (115)    
SPv1 .014 -.064 -.103 .013 -.248* -.081 -.118 -.065 .037 .185 -.053 
 (104) (104) (103) (104) (107) (108) (108) (98) (103) (104) (101) 
SPa1 .006 -.052 .006 .093 .021 .063 .043 -.041 .004  .042 .034 
 (120) (120) (119) (120) (124) (124) (125) (114) (107)  (120) (116) 
SPp1 -.104 -.117 .136 -.040 .023 .078 -.046 -.070 .183 .100  .409** 
 (121) (121) (120) (121) (125) (125) (126) (115) (108) (125)  (116) 
SPf1 -.025 -.048 .055 -.064 -.035 .109 .023 -.024 -.076 .126 .471**  
 (117) (117) (116) (117) (120) (121) (121) (111) (105) (121) (121)  
Note. pairwise N in parentheses; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
 correlations between social perception tasks corrected for speed baseline above 
diagonal 
SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, SP = social perception, v = written 
language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, f = videos, ps = personality ratings 
 
Correcting for Speed Baseline Variance in Social Perception? 
Thus far, the social perception tasks represented the original scales. Initially, it was 
intended to control for the relevant mental speed baselines. Therefore, three baseline speed 
measures had been applied in the present study, assessing reading speed as baseline for the 
verbal social perception task (SPv1), simple reaction time task (SRT) as baseline for tasks 
relying on keystrokes (SPv1, SPa1, and SPf1), and mouse speed task (MT) as baseline for the 
pictorial social perception task (SPp1). Additionally, it was thought that SRT might also 
influence the task SPp1 (based on the use of the mouse) because it included the most basic 
mental speed requirements not primarily included in the MT which had more coordinative 
requirements. 
7.4   Results   
 168 
The social perception tasks correlated with the baseline measures to varying degrees. 
As expected, SPv1 showed the highest correlations with the readspeed baseline (r = .212, 
p < .05, N=104) and zero correlations with both other baseline measures. SPa1 was 
substantially related to SRT (r = .371, p < .01, N=124). SPp1 correlated most highly with the 
mouse speed task (r = .397 p < .01, N=126), SPf1 correlated with the SRT (r = .187, p < .05, 
N=120). However, against expectations, the SPf1 task showed a larger correlation with the 
mouse speed baseline (r = .231, p < .05, N=121) than that with the intended SRT baseline 
measure. The baseline measures themselves correlated only marginally positively with one 
another with only one significant correlation between the SRT and Readspeed (r = .218, 
p < .05, N=121). 
Because of the equivocal correlation pattern between the baseline measures and the 
social perception tasks, all common speed baseline variance was partialled out of the social 
perception tasks in a multiple regression analysis and the residuals were saved as baseline 
corrected scales. However, controlling for the baseline variance did not change the correlation 
pattern within the social perception domain (see Table 7.11 above diagonal). The picture- and 
video-based tasks still correlated substantially (r = .409) and the relationship between SPv1 
and SPp1 remained nearly exactly the same (r = .185). Most of the other correlations lost in 
size so that a coherent social perception domain was to be questioned. To anticipate the 
further analysis, structural equation modeling could not support a measurement model of 
social perception so that this domain was not included in further analysis about the internal 
structure of social intelligence. In any later analysis, only the baseline corrected scales were 
applied. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis 
The SIM relied on the performance model of social intelligence (Weis & Süß, 2005). 
Consequently, the hypotheses postulated a structural model of social intelligence with three 
correlated ability factors as well as a hierarchical model of social intelligence, reflected in a 
Schmid-Leiman solution. Confirmatory factor analysis was believed to provide the required 
empirical support for the postulated structure of social intelligence. To test the hypotheses, 
several models were postulated. Table 7.12 presents the rational underlying the tested models 
and the summary of fit statistics. The models underlying the analysis postulated a general 
social intelligence factor with loadings of all social understanding and memory variables 
(Model A), a structural model with two correlated operative ability factors, social 
understanding and memory (Model B), a structural model with two uncorrelated operative 
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ability factors (Model C), and a hierarchical social intelligence model with two uncorrelated 
operative ability factors and one general social intelligence factor with loadings of all 
variables (Schmid-Leiman solution) (Model D) 
Before turning to the results, two additional remarks are necessary. (a) Prior to the 
factor analysis, measurement models for the single operative ability domains were 
established. These supported social understanding and social memory as coherent ability 
factors with positive and meaningful loadings of all indicators. A measurement model for the 
social perception factor could not be established involving all indicators. (b) Due to the 
exclusion of several subjects in different tasks, the listwise N was only 109. This number was 
clearly at the lower end of the possible sample size to analyze the postulated models. 
Therefore, all conclusions should be derived with care and needed replication in Study 2. No 
special problems, however, were encountered during the analysis except for model D. Due to 
a condition code because of an error term at lower bound, an equality constraint was 
introduced. 
Table 7.12 
Fit Statistics for Confirmatory Factor Analyses of the Structure of Social Intelligence 
(Study 1) 
Model χ² DF p (χ²) CFI RMSEA SRMR 
CI 
RMSEA* 
A: General factor model 53.904 20 <.001 .750 .125 .103 [.085; .165] 
B: 2-Factor structural model 
(SU and SM correlated) 26.391 19 .119 .946 .060 .071 [.000; .110] 
C: 2-Factor structural model 
(SU and SM uncorrelated) 33.464 20 .030 .901 .079 .103 [.025; .124] 
D: Hierarchical model 
(Schmid-Leiman)** 9.436 13 .739 1.000 .000 .037 [.000; .070] 
Note. N = 109; * CI = 90%; ** two error terms constrained to be equal 
 SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, p = pictures, f = videos 
 
Table 7.12 presents the fit statistics of the confirmatory factor analysis for all 
postulated models. The general factor model (Model A) did not show a good data fit 
(CFI = .750; χ² = 53.904, p < .001). The loadings of the pictorial and video-based social 
memory tasks were close to zero while the remaining tasks all loaded positively on this factor. 
The structural model with two correlated operative ability domains (Model B) showed 
reasonable fit statistics (CFI = .946; χ² = 26.391, p=.119). Figure 7.8 displays the 
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standardized solution showing factor loadings and the factor intercorrelation. Error terms are 
displayed besides the manifest variables. Except for the pictorial social memory task, all tasks 
loaded significantly on the postulated ability factors (between .34 and .78). Factors were 
substantially correlated (r = .35). Model C tested the same structural model with uncorrelated 
ability factors. Data fit was weaker than that for model B (CFI = .901; χ² = 33.464, p < .05). 
Models B and C were nested. A χ²-differences test showed a significant increase of model fit 
for Model B with correlated ability factors (χ²-difference = 7.037, df = 1, p < .01). 
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Figure 7.8 
Standardized Solution of the Structural Model of Social Intelligence (Model B) with Two 
Operative Ability Domains (Study 1) 
Note. CFI = .946; χ² = 26.391 (p=.119); * p < .05; error terms are enclosed with the 
manifest variables 
SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, v = written language, a = spoken 
language, p = pictures, f = videos 
 
Model B and the χ²-differences test comparing Model B and C supported the 
convergence between the two operative ability factors and thus, the existence of a higher-
order general social intelligence factor. This should be tested in the next model. A hierarchical 
Schmid-Leiman solution was postulated in Model D. As was mentioned before, some 
problems were encountered during the analysis so that two error terms were constrained equal 
(see Figure 7.9). Thus, the results of the analysis should be interpreted with care and the 
model needed replication in the next study. Fit statistics, however, turned out to be very good 
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(CFI = 1.000; χ² = 9.436, p=.739). The standardized solution of the model is shown in Figure 
7.9. The loadings on the two uncorrelated operative ability factors were heterogeneous but 
were all in one direction (between -.27 and -.74 on the social understanding factor and 
between .22 and .89 on the social memory factor). The loadings of the social understanding 
tasks on the respective factor were all negative. Since the factor was not correlated with any 
other factor, the negative loadings did not present a problem. Interestingly, the pictorial task 
of social memory showed a higher loading on the social memory factor than in the structural 
model which was also significant (.22 compared to .10). Except for the pictorial and video-
based tasks of social memory, all tasks loaded positively on the general social intelligence 
factor. Only the loadings of SUv, SMv, and SMa reached significance. 
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Figure 7.9 
Standardized Solution of the Hierarchical Model (Schmid-Leiman; Model D) of Social 
Intelligence (Study 1) 
Note. CFI = 1.000; χ² = 9.436, p=.739; * p < .05; error terms are enclosed with the manifest 
variables 
a error terms constrained to be equal 
SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, v = written language, a = spoken 
language, p = pictures, f = videos 
 
Originally, it was intended to explore the content-related domains as possible 
meaningful ability factors. The design of the SIM applied in the present study, however, was 
restricted and not all cells in the design were operationalized by two tasks. Moreover, the 
social perception tasks had not shown any convergent validity evidence so that these were not 
applied. Thus, it was not possible to investigate the structure of the content domain relying on 
 171
7.4   Results   
 172 
factors related to only one content domain because these would have relied on two tasks only. 
Therefore, this analysis should be focused on in the next study that included a more elaborate 
design of the SIM. Furthermore, the analysis of the faceted structure of social intelligence was 
also postponed to Study 2. 
In summary, the results supported the postulated structure and pointed towards a 
hierarchical model of social intelligence. At the same time, confirmatory factor analysis 
reflected the aforementioned problems related to the lack of convergence of the social 
perception domain and to the lack of reliability of pictorial and video-based tasks of social 
memory. 
7.4.3.2 Divergent Construct Validity – Research Question 2C 
Relationship to Academic Intelligence – Research Question 2C1 
The study aimed at proving that social intelligence as assessed by the newly developed 
tasks could be separated from academic intelligence. Academic intelligence was measured by 
the BIS-Test (Jäger et al., 1997) which allowed an investigation of the construct relationship 
on different hierarchical levels (i.e., a general factor level, the level of broad ability domains 
related to operations and contents, and a more specific level of the cells resulting from the 
cross-classification of the operative and content-related ability domains). The single tasks of 
social intelligence most closely reflected the hierarchy level of the single cells of the BIS-
Test. Therefore, as a first step, the intercorrelations of the tasks to the BIS cells were 
inspected (Table 7.13). 
The four social understanding tasks were only marginally correlated with all BIS cells 
(r between -.172 and .215 with most correlations around zero). The social memory tasks 
correlated substantially with cells of all three BIS operative ability domains except for the 
video-based task. Particularly, the correlations of the tasks based on written and spoken 
language with BIS-Reasoning and BIS-Speed were equally large or even larger than the 
correlations with the BIS-Memory ability domain (Table 7.13). Thus, correlations generally 
suggested large overlap of the social memory domain with BIS operative ability domains. 
However, no clear pattern of overlap was discovered so that further analysis should rely on 
the investigation of the factor correlations. 
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Table 7.13 
Correlations of Social Intelligence Tasks with BIS Cells (Study 1) 
 BIS cells 
 RV RF RN MV MF MN SV SF SN 
SUv (119) .203* .026 .038 .068 .091 .078 .101 -.037 .007
SUa (119) .082 -.056 .051 .153 .081 -.086 .215* -.110 -.034
SUp (119) .040 -.107 .009 .058 -.027 .002 .077 .007 .000
SUf (119) -.012 -.053 -.086 .106 .108 -.040 .062 -.085 -.172
SMv (123) .456** .178* .240** .323** .067 .102 .489** -.192* .184*
SMa1 (123) .446** .042 .202* .282** .193* .205* .503** -.150 .171
SMp1 (124) .252** .010 .153 .191* .223* .246** .141 .016 .184*
SMf (113) .101 -.048 -.016 .079 .045 .124 .276** -.143 .085
SPv1 (103) -,244* -,196* -,125 -,257** -,021 -,115 -,311** ,017 -,227*
SPa1 (119) ,080 ,084 ,076 -,212* -,077 ,013 -,064 -,129 -,062
SPp1 (120) -,125 ,008 ,005 -,044 ,009 ,051 -,088 -,164 -,042
SPf1 (115) -,005 -,040 ,055 ,019 -,113 -,166 -,076 -,149 -,003
Note. pairwise N in parentheses; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, SP = social perception, v = written 
language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, f = videos, ps = personality ratings, 
R = BIS-Reasoning, M = BIS-Memory, S = BIS-Speed, V = verbal, F = figural-spatial, 
N = numerical 
 
The social perception scales in the present analysis represented the baseline corrected 
scales. The speed baseline measures themselves showed partly substantial correlations with 
the BIS cells (i.e., SRT: r between -.256 and .063; MT: r between -.382 and -.100; 
Readspeed: r between -.313 and .164). Therefore, the baseline corrected scales of social 
perception were applied in order to investigate the pure overlap with the BIS cells without 
common speed baseline variance. Results showed still meaningful correlations of the written 
language social perception task (SPv1) with all three BIS operative domains and particularly, 
with cells based on verbal material. In contrast, the correlations of the remaining social 
perception residual variables with the BIS domains were generally around zero. Thus, no 
further conclusions about the measurement constructs of the so could be derived from this 
result. 
Correlational analysis provided first evidence about the overlap of social and academic 
intelligence and suggested an independent social understanding domain. Results related to the 
social memory domain did not allow such a clear interpretation. Moreover, the BIS cells, 
were not independent from one another (r ranging from .011 for cell MF with SF to .694 for 
cell RN with SN) so that further evidence about construct overlap was to be derive from 
confirmatory factor analysis. 
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Prior to investigating the relationship between social and academic intelligence based 
on the latent factor intercorrelations in the confirmatory factor analysis, the fit of the BIS 
structure as the model of reference was investigated by structural equation modeling. 
Therefore, two models were postulated. The models were based on content- and operation-
homogeneous parcels, respective for the operative and content abilities. The parcels for the 
operative ability domains consisted of equal variance components from every content domain 
(i.e., content-homogeneous). In turn, the operation-homogeneous parcels for the content 
abilities consisted of equal variance components for each operative ability. Model E included 
three correlated operative ability factors (BIS-Reasoning, -Memory, -Speed, see Table 7.14) 
based on content-homogenous parcels. The second model contained three correlated content 
ability factors (BIS-Verbal, -Figural-Spatial, -Numerical, see Model F in Table 7.14) based on 
operation-homogenous parcels. Data fit from confirmatory factor analysis supported both 
models (see Table 7.14 Models E and F). Every parcel loaded positively and significantly on 
the respective factors, and factor intercorrelations were consistently high. The BIS structure 
had already been replicated several times and therefore an illustration of the BIS structure as 
supported by confirmatory factor analysis is not presented at this point. 
Thus, the models of reference for investigating the construct overlap of social and 
academic intelligence were (a) the two-factor structural model of social intelligence with 
correlated ability factors and (b) the a model of the corresponding operative ability factors 
BIS-Reasoning and BIS-Memory. It was refrained from investigating the fit of models relying 
on general factor or hierarchical models. The general factor model of social intelligence had 
shown bad data fit. Moreover, relying on a hierarchical model on both sides to investigate 
construct overlap would have implied too many parameters for the comparably small sample 
size. Table 7.14 presents the fit statistics. 
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Table 7.14 
Fit Statistics for Confirmatory Factor Analyses of the Divergent Construct Validity of Social 
with Academic Intelligence (Study 1) 
Model χ² DF p (χ²) CFI RMSEA SRMR 
CI 
RMSEA* 
E: BIS-operative factorsa 42.250 32 .106 .971 .052 .050 [.000; .091] 
F: BIS-content factorsa 26.065 24 .349 .994 .027 .047 [.000; .081] 
G: SI-BIS 4 correlated ability 
factorsb 100.049 84 .112 .954 .043 .075 [.000; .071] 
H: SI-BIS, SU uncorrelated 
with BISb 101.229 86 .125 .956 .041 .077 [.000; .070] 
I: 2-Factor structural model 
(residuals of SU and SM, 
correlated)c
21.702 13 .06 .920 .079 .076 [.000; 136] 
Note. * CI = 90%; a N = 119; b N = 106; c N = 107 
 SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, p = pictures, f = videos 
 
Initially, all possible factor intercorrelations were postulated in Model G (i.e., between 
social understanding and memory, between BIS-Reasoning and –Memory, and between all 
BIS and social intelligence factors). The model showed reasonable data fit (CFI = .954; 
χ² = 100.049, p=.112). The factor loadings were consistently high. Meaningful and significant 
factor intercorrelations between social memory and both BIS factors, as well as between 
social memory and social understanding were observed. Social understanding showed a true 
zero correlation with BIS-Reasoning (r = .00) and only a marginal relationship with 
BIS-Memory (r = .15). Therefore, the second model dropped the correlations between social 
understanding and both BIS-factors (Model H). The model fit was not meaningfully better 
(CFI = .956; χ² = 101.229, p=.125). Models G and H were nested, the χ²-differences test was 
not significant (χ²-difference = 1.18, df = 2, n.s.). In accordance with the principle of 
parsimony, the more restricted model (Model H) was accepted proving the independence of 
social understanding from the BIS-Memory and the BIS-Reasoning domain. Figure 7.10 
displays the standardized solution of Model H showing the remaining factor intercorrelations 
and the factor loadings. The loadings on the social intelligence ability factors equaled the 
loadings from the two-factor structural model of social intelligence (see Figure 7.8). 
Moreover, the correlation between the two social intelligence factors stayed the same. The 
social memory factor, however, correlated with the BIS ability factors to a larger extent than 
with social understanding. Another model, however, that constrained the factor 
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intercorrelations between social memory and BIS factors to 1, did not converge in 
confirmatory factor analysis. Therefore, the independency of the factors could not be tested at 
this stage. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7.10 
Standardized Solution of Construct Overlap of Social and Academic Intelligence (Model H) 
(Study 1) 
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Note. CFI = .956; χ² = 101.229, p=.125; *p < .05; error terms are enclosed with the manifest 
variables 
R = BIS-Reasoning, M = BIS-Memory, P1-3 = Parcel 1-3, SU = social understanding, 
SM = social memory, v = written language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, 
f = videos 
 
The preceding analysis could not convincingly prove whether social memory was 
independent from academic intelligence, particularly from BIS-Memory. Therefore, as a last 
step to prove divergent construct validity with academic intelligence, the previously identified 
structure of social intelligence should show independence from the BIS structure. Therefore, 
the structural model of social intelligence was supported by previous analysis was tested once 
again by confirmatory factor analysis, this time relying on the residuals of the single tasks 
after partialling out the complete BIS variance (i.e., BIS variance of all operative and content 
scales was entered in multiple regression analysis predicting the single social intelligence 
tasks; the residuals of the social intelligence tasks were saved). Figure 7.11 presents the 
standardized solution of the model, fit statistics are presented in the last row of Table 7.14. 
The model fit dropped slightly compared to the model based on the original data (CFI = .920; 
χ² = 21.702, p=.06), however, the factor loadings and factor intercorrelations were obtained in 
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comparison to the initial model based on the original variables. Only the pictorial social 
memory task did not fit into the model with a zero loading on the social memory factor. 
Therefore, the loading was omitted from the model. This last model provided first evidence 
for the structural independency of both social intelligence ability factors from the structure of 
the BIS despite the, in part, substantial between-domain correlations, particularly for social 
memory. 
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Figure 7.11 
Standardized Solution of Two-Factor Structural Model of Social Intelligence When BIS 
Variance was Controlled (Model I) (Study 1) 
Note. CFI = .920; χ² = 21.702, p=.06; * p < .05; error terms are enclosed with the manifest 
variables 
SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, v = written language, a = spoken 
language, p = pictures, f = videos 
 
Relationship to Personality Traits – Research Question 2C1 
As hypothesized, the tasks of social intelligence did not show substantial correlations 
with the Big Five personality traits assessed by the NEO-FFI (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993). 
Table 7.15 presents the correlations. Only the Openness factor correlated significantly with 
social memory tasks. The size of the correlations, however, did not raise doubts about the 
divergent construct validity of social intelligence from personality traits. 
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Table 7.15 
Correlations of Social Intelligence Tasks with Big Five Personality Traits (Study 1) 
 NEO-N NEO-E NEO-O NEO-A NEO-C 
SUv (121) .050 -.167 .004 .062 -.058 
SUa (121) .149 -.035 .031 .085 .024 
SUp (121) -.027 -.059 -.067 -.018 .013 
SUf (121) .060 .047 .022 .075 .032 
SMv (125) .007 -.047 .177* -.031 -.047 
SMa1 (125) -.009 -.069 .180* .099 .039 
SMp1 (126) .045 .150 .178* .075 .036 
SMf (115) -.089 .112 .131 .088 .101 
SPv1 (108) ,016 -,079 -,185 ,030 ,078 
SPa1 (125) ,046 ,011 ,130 ,132 -,014 
SPp1 (126) -,089 -,099 ,001 ,018 ,023 
SPf1 (121) -,013 -,153 -,102 ,013 -,085 
Note.  pairwise N in the left column; * p < .05 
SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, SP = social perception, v = written 
language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, f = videos, NEO-N = Neuroticism, NEO-
E = Extraversion, NEO-O = Openness, NEO-A = Agreeableness, 
NEO-C = Conscientiousness 
 
7.4.4 Further Exploratory Questions – Research Questions 3A / 3B 
Relationship to Self-Report Data – Research Question 3A 
Correlations between the newly developed tasks and self-reported socially intelligent 
behavior (Amelang et al., 1989) were marginal with only one significant negative correlation 
with the spoken language scale of social understanding (rSUa;self-report = -.235; p < .05; N = 
118). This conformed, however, to frequently reported empirical results in existing literature 
(Brown & Anthony, 1990; Riggio et al., 1991) and to the expectations of the researcher. 
Gender Differences – Research Question 3B 
Gender differences in favor of women have been found to be interpreted as a positive 
validity result for tests intended to assess social and emotional abilities (Hall, 2001; Schutte et 
al., 1998). It would need additional theoretical underpinnings to support this idea which was 
not intended to be accomplished in the present work. Therefore, a specific direction of gender 
differences was not hypothesized and the following analysis was only exploratory in nature. 
To avoid inflation of the alpha-probability, the alpha level was adjusted dividing the alpha-
probability (.05) by the number of exploratory tests (12 tests related to 12 social intelligence 
tasks), which resulted in a new alpha-probability of .004. 
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A t-test for independent samples showed gender differences of which nearly all were 
in favor of women (except for two tasks). Only two video-based tasks, however, showed a 
significant effect (SUf: t =-3.617, df = 119, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .629; SMf: t = -3.109, df = 
113, p=.002, Cohen’s d = .563). Two more tasks showed meaningful effect sizes also in favor 
of female subjects without reaching statistical significance (SUa: Cohen’s d = .464; SMa: 
Cohen’s d = .457). 
Gender Differences in Targets, Subjects, and Their Interaction – Research Question 
3B1 
Bronfenbrenner et al. (1958) found gender effects on judgmental accuracy, depending 
on the target’s and the subject’s gender, and on their interaction. To bring his results back to 
memory (see Chapter 4.3.3.5), he reported a positive correlation between performance of 
male subjects in judging male and males judging female targets; and a negative correlation 
between performance of female subjects in judging male and females judging female targets. 
He attributed this to a similarity effect of females targets with an better performance when 
judging targets of the same sex. His study, however, did not include the same targets for every 
judge so that any inference or comparison to different targets was not possible. This question 
should be addressed in the upcoming analysis. 
A general social understanding scale for every target was built by aggregating the 
items of the final scales across the different content domains excluding the personality ratings 
since they were not correlated with the remaining scales. Both scales for female targets 
(SU_KL and SU_RF) and for male targets (SU_CP and SU_MM) were combined to form one 
score each. Both scores were highly correlated (r = .539, p < .01, N=121). As a first step, the 
same correlative analysis, as in the Bronfenbrenner study, was conducted . Results showed 
substantial positive correlations for both gender groups of subjects with r = .478 of (males 
judging males) with (males judging females) and r = .541 of (females judging males) with 
(females judging females). This did not conform with Bronfenbrenner’s findings. Similarity 
between subjects’ and targets’ gender did not seem to have an impact on the performance. 
Secondly, a two-factor analysis of variance (repeated measurements) was conducted 
postulating one between-subjects factor (i.e., the subject gender) and one repeated 
measurement factor (target gender). Results are presented in Table 7.16. Both main effects 
were highly significant showing women outperforming men in judging both male and female 
targets and female targets being easier to judge than male targets. No significant interaction 
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effect was discovered. Figure 7.12 illustrates the results by the help of a graph. Again, the 
present results did not suggest an influence of the similarity in gender. 
Table 7.16 
Results of Two-Factor Analysis of Variance Examining the Effect of Target and Subject 
Gender on Performance (Study 1) 
Source of variance 
Sums of 
square DF 
Mean 
squares F Probability Eta² 
.072 Repeated measures (target gender) 2.269 1 2.269 40.409** <.001 
.060 Between-subjects (subject gender) 1.899 1 1.899 11.009** <.001 
 Interaction effect .071 1 .071 1.264 .263 
Note. N = 122 
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Figure 7.12 
Results of the ANOVA Showing Gender Effects on Performance in Social Understanding 
Scales (Study 1) 
These outcomes, however, were only based on two male and two female targets and 
should be replicated in Study 2. Thus, no generalization was possible. More importantly, 
different targets were judged on different items so that this result could as well be an effect of 
items of different difficulties underlying the scales. The controversial results of 
Bronfenbrenner and of the present study demonstrate the importance of conducting further 
studies containing different and, above all, numerous targets so that any effect of single target 
persons can be reduced. If the results could be replicated, this could mean different things. For 
example, women could be generally easier to judge (i.e., a higher sending accuracy) or their 
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target answers could correspond better with the cues contained in the stimulus material. These 
questions, however, cannot be answered at this point.
7.5 Summary and Discussion Study 1 
In general, this first empirical attempt to investigate the psychometric properties and 
validity of the SIM showed promising results. The reliabilities of most of the tasks were 
sufficiently high after item selection. The number of items that showed low item-total 
correlations was generally low, however, this varied between the tasks and was largest for 
social understanding. The results of construct validation supported the postulated structure of 
social intelligence with two correlated ability factors - social understanding and memory. All 
tasks loaded on their respective factors with, however, low loadings of the pictorial and video-
based tasks of social memory which could be attributed to the rather low reliability 
coefficients for those tasks. The structural model was replicated relying on the residuals of the 
social intelligence tasks when BIS variance was partialled out showing structural 
independency from the BIS structure. Although with slight psychometric problems, a 
hierarchical model of social intelligence was supported by the data. This model clearly needed 
replication in the second study. Correlational results and confirmatory factor analysis clearly 
demonstrated an independent social understanding factor. Social memory was substantially 
correlated with BIS-Memory. However, a model postulating perfectly correlated memory 
factors for both constructs (i.e., fixing the factor intercorrelation to r = 1) did not converge 
and should be tested in the upcoming study. Additionally, the social understanding tasks did 
not correlate substantially with the Big Five personality traits. Altogether, results pointed 
towards the divergent construct validity of social intelligence with academic intelligence and 
personality traits. However, results also revealed some meaningful problems relevant to test 
modifications and extensions in Study 2. 
Concept and Design of the Social Understanding Tasks 
The intended faceted design of the social understanding tasks has not yet been 
accomplished. The present study was unable to provide convincing results regarding which 
item format worked best. This was because only the ratings-based scales included sufficient 
item numbers to investigate separate scales. What can be concluded from the present study is 
that the ratings-based scales seems to work as well or better than the remaining two item 
formats. The within-domain correlations also suggest the use of ratings-based scales because 
they showed a clearer pattern of intercorrelations compared to those based on all item formats. 
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Additionally, open response formats were seen to be uneconomical in terms of scoring. 
Therefore, it was decided to focus only on ratings-based formats in the consecutive task 
modifications. 
The restriction to the use of only ratings-based scales in the final social understanding 
scales of the present study, however, posed another problem not directly visible from the 
results and not attended to prior to and during scale construction: The distribution of the 
target’s answers was not balanced across the 6-point rating scale. Figure 7.13 presents the 
distributions of the target answers across the six possible rating categories, separately for the 
four targets (a-d) and overall targets (e). Rating category “1”, in particular, was 
overproportionally represented. This problem should be addressed at this point in order to 
decidedly conclude what modifications were required for Study 2. 
The possible consequences of the unequal distributions were possibly skewed 
distributions of the target scores and an enforcement of a bias related to the rating tendencies 
of the judges. This represents an important problem for the present study. At this point in the 
present work, a more detailed analysis of the effect of this problem on the psychometric item 
properties and the validity results was not undertaken because of several reasons. Most 
importantly, it had already been difficult to select items for the final scales that approximated 
the intended taxonomic principles (because of an unbalanced conceptualization of the social 
understanding tasks). Any further item selection based on the distribution of the target answer 
would enhance the imbalance of item contents making the derivation of conclusions from this 
analysis difficult. Instead of only post-hoc statistical means in the present study, this problem 
should be addressed in Study 2 by attempting to imply more balance into the distribution of 
the target answers. Further scoring or statistical means will additionally be addressed in Study 
2 (see Chapter 6.3 for the exploratory questions surrounding this problem). 
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Figure 7.13 
Distribution of the Target Answers on Ratings-Based Items in Scenarios (Study 1) 
Note. Targets (a) Matthias, (b) Katharina, (c) Renate, (d) Christoph, (e) overall 
 
The different modalities were also not equally represented in the items of social 
understanding tasks. Due to the large numbers of items excluded during item selection, the 
content-related scales did not include equal proportions of every target and every modality. 
Thus, the generalizability and representativeness was clearly reduced in the present study. 
Specifically, it appeared difficult to assess the target’s cognitions by the use of ratings-
based scales. This modality was most frequently represented in open response formats. As a 
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post-hoc explanation, the formulation of ratings-based items seems to have been difficult or at 
least counter-intuitive during the item construction. Subsequent test modifications needed to 
find a way to deal with this problem because only ratings-based scales were applied hereafter. 
Number of Missing Values and Specific Psychometric Weaknesses 
The screening of the data revealed problems with missing values, particularly in one 
pictorial and the video-based task of social memory. This observation conformed with the 
experiences during data sampling when subjects had complained of not having enough time to 
view the stimuli and answer the questions. Consequently, the resulting reliabilities were rather 
low which was attributed to the relatively small number of items. One of the tasks completely 
failed because of too many missing values. Subsequent test modifications are needed to 
account for this problem. Another concern related to the social memory tasks referred to (a) 
the transformation of picture- and video-based stimuli into adequate item formulations and (b) 
the scoring of the circumscriptions of these stimuli within the subjects’ answers. It was 
decided that the items would be reformulated by using pictures as additional information and 
by including multiple choice format items based on pictorial stimuli as well. This should 
allow the presentation of pictures within the items in order to avoid circumscriptions as far as 
possible. Despite these problems within the social memory domain, it seemed surprising that 
the two tasks still fit into a structural model of social intelligence. Any problems encountered 
during confirmatory factor analysis could be attributed to a lack of reliability of these two 
tasks. 
The social perception tasks did not show problems with the measurement quality. 
Validity results, however, did not support a consistent ability domain. Task intercorrelations 
were marginal except for the pictorial and the video-based task. These tasks, however, 
represented very similar requirements so that this result did not seem surprising. Attempting 
to provide a post-hoc explanation, the lack of convergent validity within the social perception 
domain could be attributed to disparate levels of “social complexity” or diverse targets 
referred to in the different content-domains. The auditory task required the identification of 
cues about interactive behavior during spoken conversations whereas the pictorial and video-
based tasks “only” required the identification of target persons wearing different clothing. 
Therefore, the test modifications and extensions should focus on adding other types of targets 
in all four content domains to assimilate the requirements. 
The main focus of the present study lay on the test development and thus, on the 
investigation of adequate item and response formats, scoring methods, and presentation and 
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answering times. However, data also allowed the investigation of the construct validity in 
terms of the structure of social intelligence and its relationship to academic intelligence and 
personality traits (i..e., divergent construct validity). Confirmatory factor analysis supported a 
two-factor structural model of social intelligence (r = .35 between social understanding and 
social memory) and also a hierarchical solution with a higher-order general social intelligence 
factor. However, some measurement problems were encountered in the hierarchical model so 
that this model needed replication in Study 2. 
The present study also supported the divergent construct validity of the social 
intelligence operative ability domains. The social memory factor, however, showed large 
correlations to the BIS operative domains BIS-Memory and –Reasoning so that it was not 
clear whether this factor was truly independent from academic intelligence. A last model 
postulated in confirmatory factor analysis, however, could prove the independency of the 
social intelligence structure from the BIS operative ability structure. 
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8 Study 2 
8.1 Sample 
A total of 190 subjects participated in Study 2. They received full monetary 
compensation (see Table 6.6) or half of the money and, in turn, detailed feedback about their 
results in the study. As requested by the “Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft” (DFG), an 
unselected sample was applied. Thus, subjects were recruited by a promotion booth on the 
Christmas market in Magdeburg 2005, flyers in medical practices and in public institutions, 
posters, and an editorial article in a daily newspaper in Magdeburg (“Volksstimme”). Only 
subjects between 23 and 40 years of age were recruited for the study. One subject was 
excluded from further testing after the first day because it turned out that she was only 19 
years old. Three more subjects did not return for the second testing day without any obvious 
reasons. They were excluded from any further analysis. Three other participants demonstrated 
low compliance and comprehension problems during data sampling. An inspection of their 
written responses in several tasks strongly supported this impression and they were also 
excluded from the data set. One other participant was excluded while the answers to the 
paper-and-pencil tests were transferred into SPSS data files. The participant had shown 
extreme response tendencies in every task based on rating scales and always marked the 
lowest or highest rating category. 
The final sample consisted of 182 subjects, heterogeneous in age, education, and 
occupations. Mean age was m = 28.69 (sd = 5.57), 107 were females (58.8 %). However, 
Figure 7.1 clearly shows that age groups were not equally represented in the sample. One 
hundred and forty had a German high school degree (“Gymnasium”) or a corresponding 
degree which equaled 76.9 %, 37 of these had finished a university degree. Eleven subjects 
had a 12th grade high school degree (“Fachhochschulreife”), and 31 had finished German 
middle school (“Realschule”). All presently lived in the region around Magdeburg. The 
professions of the subjects ranged across diverse occupational fields, from academic 
professions (e.g., medical doctors, teachers, economists, graduate engineers, computer 
scientists etc.), service and nursing occupations, to commercial or mechanical occupations. 
Appendix D presents the standard scores of the samples in Study 1 and 2 based on the 
normative sample of the academic intelligence test applied in both studies (BIS-Test; see 
Jäger et al., 1997). The aggregated scores for the cells, scales of the ability domains, and the 
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general academic intelligence level are shown. The comparability of the scores was restricted 
since the tasks entering the aggregation were not always the same. However, most of the tasks 
were applied in both studies. Appendix D shows that the performance of the sample in Study 
2 was slightly lower for some ability domains. The variance maintained at the same level. 
Consequently, the upcoming analysis needed to consider possible sample effects when the 
difficulty of the newly constructed tasks were interpreted. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1 
Age Distribution of the Sample in (N=182) (Study 2) 
 
One possible way to deal with this sample effect was to correct for age effects that 
might have been responsible for the differences in the level of performance. Appendix D also 
presents the age correlations for the BIS cells, the scales of the ability domains, and the 
general academic intelligence level for the present sample. Several meaningful age 
correlations were discovered, particularly for the cells of the BIS-Reasoning domain (r 
between -.112 and -.316) and the BIS-Memory domain (r between -.153 and -.166). 
Surprisingly, the smallest correlations were found for the cells of the BIS-Speed domain 
where usually the largest correlations could have been expected (Cattell, 1971, 1987). 
Appendix D also presents the correlations with age after the academic intelligence scores 
were standardized for the respective age group based on the sample of Brunner and Süß 
(2005; N = 1247). The age groups were determined relying on sensible categories that were 
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sufficiently represented in the reference sample. The age categories were between 23 and 25, 
26 and 30, 31 and 35, 36 and 40. However, the correlations of the scores corrected for age 
showed a bias in the opposed direction. Now, the BIS-Speed cells showed positive age 
correlations (r between .064 and .204), the remaining correlations lay around zero with one 
more significantly positive correlation with the numeric reasoning cell (r = .164). Since the 
results of the age standardization were such equivocal, the uncorrected scores were applied 
hereafter. The specificity of the sample, however, needed to be accounted for in interpretation 
of the research results. 
 
8.2 Material 
8.2.1 Principles and Aims of Task Modifications and Extensions 
The responsibilities for the task modifications and extensions remained the same as 
those applied in Study 1. The ideas and principles underlying the modifications, their 
realizations, and the additional construction of tasks based on written and spoken language 
can be referred to in the work of Seidel (2007). The present work focused on the pictorial and 
video-based tasks of social memory and social perception. The scenario presentation is 
included in both works since the test approach did not allow a material-related separation. 
Social Understanding 
Tasks of social understanding did not show psychometric problems related to the 
reliabilities of the final scales. Nevertheless, Study 1 suggested some substantial changes in 
the already existing scenarios and associated guidelines for the construction of new scenarios. 
The changes addressed, above all, some formal but also some content-related characteristics: 
a) Technical Implementation: 
In Study 1, the test length of the scenarios had varied largely which extended the 
planned total testing time substantially. Tasks were now implemented in Wmc 0.18. This 
circumvented the problem of subjects watching, listening to or reading stimuli for as long as 
or as often as they wanted to. The program did not allow returning to a previous page to start 
the presentation again, as was allowed by the PowerPoint presentation software in Study 1. 
Presentation time for pictures was limited to 10 seconds per picture, reading times were also 
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limited to a comfortable but not extensive level (between one and three minutes for texts 
presented on maximally two screens). In general, these measures reduced testing time. 
The implementation in Wmc 0.18 implied that video-based stimuli could no longer 
include an audio stream so that the self-presentations at the beginning of each scenario had to 
be shown via beamer on a large screen and loudspeakers (see Chapter 6.2.4 for the technical 
details). Responses were still given in paper-and pencil format in Study 2. 
b) Instructions to scenes: 
Another change related to the introduction to each scene. In the first study, subjects 
could first read the questions, then view or listen to the stimuli, and then read the questions 
again. The introduction was now extended by summarizing the upcoming questions in one or 
two sentences (see Chapter 6.2.2.1 for an example). It was expected that this change would 
additionally reduce the overall testing time. 
c) Accomplishment of taxonomy: 
To account for the taxonomic demands, the cross-classification of settings, modalities, 
and task material was accomplished within and across each scenario and resulted in a 
8 x 4 x 2 x 3 design: eight targets, four types of task material, two types of settings (i.e., 
private vs. public), and three types of queried modalities (i.e., emotions, cognitions, and 
relationships).  
d) Adjustment of item format 
The item formats were changed to only 7-point rating scales. For items already based 
on rating scales, this basically meant a transformation of the visual analogous scale of the 
original target answers into seven instead of six categories. The most prevalent reason for the 
adjustment was that some rating dimensions demanded a true middle category (i.e., bipolar 
scales; for example, a target described himself as active vs. passive in relation to a third 
person). Since only one item format was to be applied throughout the scenarios, the unipolar 
rating dimensions and the personality ratings at the end of each scenario were also 
transformed into 7-point rating scales. 
During the course of test modifications, the modalities of emotions and relationships 
could easily be queried by already existing items. Items that queried the cognition of the 
target were, so far, only in free response or multiple choice format. The change to rating 
scales required the construction of a new item type not included in the scenarios of Study 1. 
Therefore, the open-ended answers of the targets were translated into item formulations (e.g., 
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one open-ended answer of Matthias was “It’s getting ridiculous, it’s almost funny how she is 
constructing her thoughts, I’m angry that she doesn’t stop misrepresenting my motives”, the 
resulting item was “What does Matthias think in this situation? How much would he agree 
with the following thoughts? (a) She doesn’t understand me. (b) She intends to discriminate 
against me. (c) We are at cross-purposes.”). Sometimes, the targets had to be contacted again 
in order to get their answers to these newly formulated items on the visual analogous scale as 
the basis for the rating scales. This presented a problem because of the large time delay 
between the recording of the scene and the querying of the target information. However, the 
problem could not be solved otherwise. 
The personality ratings were originally 5-point rating scales from 0 to 4. In order to 
determine the target score, the “correct” response receiving a score of “0”-deviation was 
calculated by a linear transformation of the 5- to a 7-point rating scale (i.e., from 0-4 to 1-7) 
by multiplying by 1.4 and adding 1. 
e) Control questions were added at the end of each scenario (see Chapter 6.2.2.1). 
f) Adding of four scenarios 
Between Study 1 and 2, four scenarios were added enhancing the heterogeneity of the 
targets, the task material, and the situative contexts. This allowed the investigation of gender 
effects of judge and target for a broader target range. 
g) Example scenario 
An example scenario preceded the eight test scenarios. It was directed at making 
subjects familiar with the test principle and navigation between the scenes within the 
experimental program. 
Social Memory 
The social memory tasks mainly suffered from low reliabilities (SMp and SMf) and a 
large number of missing values. Moreover, the testing time devoted to the social memory 
tasks based on videos and pictures was restricted in Study 1. 
a) Technical implementation: Social memory tasks except for those based on written 
language were now implemented in the Wmc 0.18 experimental program. This 
allowed fixed presentation times, and also fixed response time when answers were 
recorded by the PC (SMa2 and SMp1). 
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b) Enlarged number of items: More testing time was available for the social memory 
tasks. This allowed the enhancement of item numbers thus hopefully increasing 
reliability coefficients. 
c) Enlarged presentation and answering time: The undesired large correlations with BIS-
Reasoning and BIS-Speed which were even larger than those with BIS-Memory were 
assumed to be due to the speed effect included in the first task versions. Thus, 
presentation and response time were extended in order to reduce this effect. The 
extension of test time resulted in a lower number of missing values. At the same time, 
the amount and complexity of stimuli was reduced (e.g., less pictures in one sequence 
and shorter video scenes). 
d) Presentation format: The presentation format of the picture sequences in the task 
SMp2 was changed. In the first version, subjects could see each picture for five 
seconds and could not return to an earlier presented picture. The task applied in the 
second study allowed deliberate browsing within one picture sequence and only an 
overall presentation time limitation was introduced. Thus, subjects could decide for 
themselves how much time they wanted to spend looking at one picture. This 
modification was also supposed to enhance real-life fidelity. 
e) A new task was added based on auditory material. It attempted to find an equivalent 
task to the Memory of Couples task (SMp1). The task will be described in the 
upcoming material section. 
Social Perception 
The core problems related to the social perception tasks represented the lack of 
convergence between the tasks based on different task material. This was attributed to the 
different levels of complexity contained in the tasks. So far, only one task per cell was 
developed. Thus, the changes in the test approach centered on developing an additional 
second task per cell. 
a) Task extensions: New task developments addressing the pictorial and video-based task 
concerned the extension of complexity of the task material and of the cognitive 
requirements. The complexity mainly referred to the types of target cues which 
represented social interactive cues instead of persons only in the two new tasks. 
b) In turn, the new tasks based on written and spoken language were sought to be less 
complex. 
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c) The existing tasks had proven useful and did not show psychometric weaknesses. 
Therefore, the number of items and thus, the testing time was reduced. Some 
additional changes within these tasks concerned specific modifications of procedures 
and implementations. These will be addressed in the upcoming task descriptions. 
8.2.2 Social Intelligence Tasks 
Social Understanding Tasks 
The test principle of social understanding tasks were already made familiar (see 
Chapter 6.2.2.1). In short, the scenario tasks required subjects to judge the emotions, 
cognitions, relationships, and the personality of target persons on 7-point rating scales. To 
operationalize every content domain, judgments were based on information from written and 
spoken language, pictures, and videos. In Study 2, eight scenarios were applied involving 
target persons Renate (SU_RF), Bringfried (SU_BS), Conny (SU_CK), Christoph (SU_CP), 
Katharina (SU_KL), Friedrich (SU_FB), Hannah (SU_HR), and Matthias (SU_MM) (see 
Table 6.2 and Figures 6.1 and 6.2 for the demographic and personality characteristics of the 
target persons). Subjects had to judge the targets’ mental states in terms of three different 
modalities (i.e., emotions, cognitions, relationships) based on four different types of task 
material (i.e., written and spoken language, pictures, and videos) and two types of settings 
(i.e., private and public). Additionally, the personality traits of the targets based on nine 
dimensions (Big Five and Interpersonal Problem Circumplex) had to be judged. All items 
were 7-point rating scales. Table 8.1 presents the number of items in the faceted design of the 
social understanding tasks cross-classifying eight targets, three modalities, two settings, and 
four types of task material. Targets are numbered in the order of testing. Items were selected 
to equally represent taxonomic categories across all scenarios. 
A total number of 115, 125, 113, and 124 items were applied for the scales related to 
the task material (for v, a, p, and f, respectively). No cell in the design stayed empty. Each 
scenario was planned to last about 20 minutes. There was still variance observed during data 
sampling. The average deviation from the planned task time was, however, substantially 
smaller than in Study 1. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients for the final scales in the present 
sample were .77, .84, .79, and .83 for the scales SUv, SUa, SUp, and SUf. 
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Table 8.1 
Number of Items in the Faceted Design of the Social Understanding Tasks (Study 2) 
  Targets in order of testing* 
  1 (RF) 2 (BS) 3 (CK) 4 (CP) 5 (KL) 6 (FB) 7 (HR) 8 (MM)   
  pr pu pr pu pr pu pr pu pr pu pr pu pr pu pr pu ∑ ∑ ∑ 
E 2 4 3 4 5 5 3 3 4 5 1 3 4 1 4 3 54 Etot: 214 
C 4 4 1 1 4 3 1 1 1 3 3 4 4 2 2 2 40 Ctot: 160 V 
R 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 1 4 1 21 
115 
Rtot: 130 
E 1 5 5 3 5 5 4 1 5 5 4 6 6 4 4 1 64  
C 5 5 4 3 3 2 4 2 1 4 1 1 3 4 3 3 48  A 
R 4 1 1 3 1 1 4 2 4 4 4 4 1 1 4 1 40 
152 
 
E 5 1 4 5 3 4 1 3 4 1 4 1 1 5 1 5 48  
C 2 3 3 3 1 1 1 1 4 4 1 2 3 3 1 3 36  P 
R 1 1 4 4 1 1 4 1 3 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 29 
113 
 
E 1 4 1 1 3 6 4 3 1 6 1 1 4 5 2 5 48  
C 3 1 4 3 1 1 4 1 3 3 2 1 1 4 2 2 36  F 
R 4 1 1 1 4 4 1 4 4 2 1 1 1 3 4 4 40 
124 
 
 ∑ 64 64 66 55 74 51 66 64    
Note. v = written language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, f = videos 
 e = emotions, c = cognitions, r = relationships 
 pr = private, pu = public 
 
In contrast to the social understanding tasks in Study 1, the test development in Study 
2 accounted for the positions of the target answers on the rating scale. It was attempted to 
select items that allowed an equal distribution across the rating categories. Figure 8.2 presents 
the distribution of target answers across the items for each of the eight scenarios and across all 
scenarios. Diverse distributions were achieved not implying as one-sided distributions as in 
Study 1. Equal distributions, however, were not achieved and only the distribution across all 
scenarios was balanced with a slight overrepresentation of the categories “1” and “5”. This 
problem should additionally be addressed by statistical means in the exploratory research 
questions at the end of the present study. 
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Figure 8.2 
Distribution of Target Answers on Items in the Scenarios (Study 2) 
Social Memory Tasks 
Social Memory – written language (SMv): Memory for Written Correspondence 
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Participants were presented with six written one-way or two-way correspondences 
(e.g., a letter written after a skiing vacations) and told to read and to memorize as many 
socially relevant details as possible. Reading times varied between 1:30 min. and 2:30 min. 
Participants were then asked questions about these details . Response format was both, open-
ended and multiple choice. In the open-ended response format items, subjects had to freely 
reproduce the information from the text (e.g., “What does the writer say that she felt sorry 
about?”). In the multiple choice items, subjects had to identify the correct answer out of five 
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choice alternatives (e.g., “Which of the following reasons does the writer name for writing the 
letter instead of a postcard?”). Response time was limited (from 1:20 min. and 2: 20 min.). 
The test contained a total number of 48 items. The test was subdivided into two halves for 
data sampling since the full version was too long to maintain adequate concentration. The task 
showed a reliability of .84 (Cronbach’s alpha) in the present sample. 
Social Memory – spoken language (SMa1): Memory for Conversations 
Participants listened to six monologues or conversations between two or more people 
(e.g., a male person talks about a conflict at work with colleagues and superiors). Subjects had 
to memorize as many socially relevant details as possible. The length of the stimuli varied 
from 0:43 min. to 1:30 min. Participants had to answer 36 questions about these details in 
multiple choice and open-ended formats (e.g., “For what, according to the speaker, was he 
criticized at work?”). Response time was limited (from 0:45 min. to 1:45 min.). Cronbach’s 
alpha for the present sample was .80. 
Social Memory – spoken language (SMa2): Memory for Voices 
Participants listened to 12 conversations between at least two people. After each 
conversation, subjects were presented five different voices and they had to decide by the way 
of a mouse click on the respective number which of the five voices was heard in the 
conversation. Answers were scored in terms of the proportion of correct answers. The 
reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) for the present sample was .19. 
Social Memory – pictorial 1 (SMp1): Memory for Couples (Weis & Süß, 2007) 
This task required subjects to view and memorize pairs of people (i.e., heterosexual 
couples and colleagues of the same sex). In the recall section, subjects were shown one person 
and they had to identify that person’s corresponding partner from four alternatives. All the 
people portrayed in the recall section wore different clothing. The task’s reliability in the first 
study was not sufficient (i.e., α = .524). For Study 2, the number of items was extended from 
16 to 18. The former blocks consisting of eight pairs each, separated into either heterosexual 
couples (block 1) and colleagues of the same sex (block 2), were dissolved. In the present 
task, three blocks of five, six, and seven couples were presented. In each block, both types of 
pairs were presented (Block 1: 3/2; Block 2: 3/3, Block 3: 3/4, numbers representing couples / 
colleagues). Consequently, the choice of alternatives for one person contained partners from 
the opposite and the same gender. The recall section again followed directly after one 
presentation block. Each picture stayed on the screen for three seconds. Response time was 
Study 2 Chapter 8 
 197
limited to ten seconds. The task was implemented in Wmc 0.18, including the presentation 
and recall section. Subjects responded by way of a mouse click on the number of the correct 
choice alternative. Performance was scored as the proportion of correct answers. The 
reliability of the task in the present sample for the total of 18 items was .56. 
Social Memory – pictorial 2 (SMp2): Memory for Situations - Pictures 
Participants had to memorize socially relevant details from a sequence of pictures 
showing different numbers of people interacting within one situative context. The task 
contained one example and four test sequences with varying numbers of pictures. Table 8.2 
presents the picture sequences in the order of testing, example items, the total number of 
pictures and items per sequence, and the presentation and response times. The task was 
implemented in the experimental software. This allowed some important changes. 
Presentation times were no longer fixed to one picture but to one sequence (see Table 8.2). 
Both, presentation and response times were extended. The response format was changed to 
multiple choice and open-ended formats with an emphasis on multiple choice items. With 
this, subjects did not have to freely reproduce item contents which was thought to have 
extended the influence of the speed component. Moreover, more objective and economic 
testing and scoring was allowed. The choice alternatives frequently consisted of pictures so 
that the problem of circumscribing pictorial information by written language was avoided. 
Appendix E presents two example items with pictorial choice alternatives. The examples stem 
from the first picture sequence (i.e., family get-together). The task contained a total of 22 
items. The multiple choice items were scored in terms of the proportion of correct answers, 
and the free responses were rated by two raters in terms of the accordance with the correct 
answer. Credit points were given for the number of achieved points in relation to the 
maximum number of points. Cronbach’s alpha for the task in the present sample was .46. 
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Table 8.2 
Overview of Picture Sequences of the Task SMp2 Including Number of Items, and 
Presentation and Answering Times (Study 2) 
Sequence Picture 
count 
Example item Item 
count 
Presentation 
time 
Answering 
time 
1: Family get-
together: a group of 
adults having dinner 
and doing a boat trip 
3 “Put the following people in 
the correct order according 
to their positions at the 
dinner table from left to 
right.” 
4 (3/1) 1:00 1:00 
2: Ice cream parlor: 
a young woman 
having icecream 
4 “How many times does the 
woman look into the menu 
together with the serving 
staff?” 
5 (3/2) 1:20 1:20 
3: Party: many 
young people at a 
party 
5 “Which of the following 
pairs of people had eye 
contact?” 
6 (5/1) 1:40 1:50 
4: Staff room of 
teachers: teachers 
during their break 
5 “Who of the following 
persons was seen smiling?” 
7 (5/2) 1:40 2:00 
Note.  * in parentheses are the numbers of multiple choice / free response format items, 
respectively 
 
Social Memory – video-based 1+2 (SMf; Weis & Süß, 2007): Memory for Situations - 
Videos 
The tasks SMf1 and 2 only differed in the complexity of task material. No separate 
analyses, however, were conducted for the two sub-tasks and they will be treated as one 
(called SMf hereafter). The task comprised one example video scene and five test video 
scenes presenting different social events. Participants viewed each video scene once and were 
instructed to memorize as many socially relevant details as possible. After viewing each 
scene, subjects had to answer open-ended and multiple choice items about details. The item 
construction for Study 2 included the same principle that was just described for the pictorial 
social memory task SMp2 (i.e., pictorial choice alternatives). It was intended to achieve a 
smaller number of missing values by using shorter video scenes and providing longer 
response times. Table 8.3 presents an overview of the five scenes including a short 
description, an example item, the numbers of items, the stimuli length, and the answering 
times. 
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Table 8.3 
Overview of Video Scenes of the Task SMf1+2 Including the Number of Items, and 
Presentation and Answering Times (Study 2) 
Sequence Video 
length* 
Example item Item 
count** 
Answering 
time 
1: In a pub: several male adults 
are seen in a pub, talking and 
playing cards 
1:13 “Which of the following gestures 
was included in the scene?” 
7 (5/2) 2:00 
2: Group work: three young 
people are working together at 
one table 
1:30 “What does the young woman do 
when the young male leaves the 
room?” 
7 (4/3) 2:00 
3: A bowling night: a group of 
seven adults during a bowling 
night is seen sitting together at 
one table. 
1:07 “How does the woman returning to 
the group learn what has happened 
while she was away?” (Multiple 
Choice) 
7 (4/3) 2:00 
4: Staff room of teachers: 
teachers during their break 
involved in different activities 
1:32 “Which is the correct order of 
appearance of the following 
situations depicted in pictures?” 
7 (3/4) 2:00 
5: Snooker training: a coach is 
seen giving advice and several 
others are practicing at the 
tables 
1:36 “With whom of the following 
persons does the coach have a 
Einzelbetreuung?” 
7 (5/2) 2:00 
Note. * in minutes and seconds 
** in parentheses are the numbers of multiple choice / free response format items, 
respectively 
 
Multiple choice items were scored in terms of the proportion of correct answers, and 
free responses were rated by two raters in terms of the accordance with the correct answer. 
Credits were given for the number of achieved points in relation to the number of available 
points. The reliability of the task in the present sample was .65. Finally, Table 8.4 presents the 
taxonomic classifications achieved by the social memory tasks based on pictures and videos. 
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Table 8.4 
Taxonomic Principles Underlying the Social Memory Tasks Based on Pictures and Videos 
(Study 2) 
  Setting 
  Private Public 
Two people SMp1: heterosexual couples SMp1: colleagues 
Number of 
persons 
involved 
Small groups (number 
of persons in 
parentheses) 
SMp2 sequence 1: family 
excursion (5) 
SMf scene 1: pub (6) 
SMf scene 3: bowling night (6) 
SMp2 sequence 3: party (many) 
SMf scene 2: group work (3) 
SMp2 sequence 2: ice cream 
parlor (5) 
SMf scene 5: snooker training 
(9) 
SMp2 sequence 4: teacher (16) 
SMf scene 4: staff room teacher 
(many) 
 
Social Perception Tasks 
Social Perception – written language 1 (SPv1): Perception of Social Cues - Texts 
Subjects were presented with either one or two written target statements or questions 
on one half of the screen (e.g., “Does the sender criticize a lack of engagement?”). Based 
upon a subsequent short text (e.g., “I think you’re engagement is great.”) presented on the 
other half of the screen, they had to decide as quickly as possible about the truthfulness of the 
statements (“true” vs. “false”) or whether the question could be answered with a “yes” or “no” 
response (i.e., choice reaction time). When two statements or questions were applied, both 
needed to be true for a “true”-answer. Target statements or questions and the text could be 
seen simultaneously for some time. Subjects indicated their decision by pressing the keys 
representing their choice. Response time was limited to 20 seconds . Performance was scored 
in terms of the reaction time for correct responses also accounting for false alarms. The task 
consisted of 60 items, arranged in two blocks with 30 items each. The first block contained 
items with one statement or question, the second block items with two questions or 
statements. Subjects had the possibility to take a self-timed break in the middle of each block. 
Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficient for the present sample was .97. 
Social Perception – written language 2 (SPv2): Perception of Social Cues - Texts 
This task was newly developed and intended to contain less complex reading 
requirements than the task SPv1. The task consisted of short sentences presented in two 
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blocks with 30 sentences each. In the first block, subjects had to decide whether the sentence 
expressed socially relevant contents or not (e.g., social: “Don’t feel burdened by a bad 
conscience.”, not social: “The accounting is only preliminary.”). In the second block, subjects 
had to decide whether the sentence expressed something positive or negative (e.g., positive: 
“I’d be happy to keep contact with you.”, negative: “I don’t feel really well.”). Both tasks 
represented choice reaction time tasks. Within one block, subjects could take a self-timed 
break. Care was taken to ensure that each item could be answered unequivocally. Answers 
were scored in terms of the reaction time for correct responses also accounting for possible 
false alarms. Cronbach’s alpha in the present sample was .98. 
Social Perception – spoken language 1 (SPa1): Perception of Social Cues in Spoken 
Language 
Subjects listened to seven extracts from conversations (e.g., a conversation about a 
birthday present). Prior to presentation, subjects were instructed to attend to specific target 
cues within the conversation. Examples of target cues were provided. Targets differed across 
conversations and varied in complexity (e.g., mentioning of a name, filling words, agreement 
or disagreement, change of speaker, etc.). Subjects had to react as quickly and as accurately as 
possible by pressing the key assigned to the target cue (e.g., “<” when agreement is 
expressed, “-“ when disagreement is expressed). Either one or more than one cue had to be 
attended to (simple vs. choice reaction time). Response time was limited in terms of the time 
frame until the next cue emerged within the recordings. Performance was scored in terms of 
the reaction time for correct responses also accounting for false alarms. The task consisted of 
a total of 93 items. Cronbach’s alpha for the present sample was .91. 
Social Perception – spoken language 2 (SPa2): Perception of Emotions in Voices 
Subjects were required to decide which of two given emotions was expressed in a 
spoken statement (e.g., irony vs. anger, positive vs. negative, etc.). The task consisted of 6 
blocks, each block containing ten sentences. In the first three blocks, stimuli contained real 
and sensible sentences. In the next three blocks, stimuli consisted of senseless sentences only 
spoken with a certain prosody. Subjects were instructed not to attend to the content of the 
spoken real sentences. Performance was scored in terms of the reaction time for correct 
responses also accounting for false alarms. The reliability (Cronbach’s alpha) in the present 
sample was .92. 
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Social Perception – pictorial 1 (SPp1): Person Perception – Pictures 
This task required subjects to detect a given target person within pictures of crowds at 
public locations (e.g., a market place, a store, a mall, a pedestrian zone, etc.). Prior to the 
trials, the target person was presented in portrayals showing the person’s whole body. The 
targets wore different clothing in the prior presentation and the test trials so that subjects had 
to attend to the person itself and not to, for example, a specific jacket. Targets had to indicate 
as quickly as possible the location of the target person by a mouse click on the its head. The 
position of the targets in the pictures varied unsystematically. Contrary to the task in Study 1, 
only one target had to be attended to within one block of pictures. The items for the present 
version were selected so that the target was equally visible in the pictures in order to avoid 
missing values. The task comprised one practice block of five pictures and three test blocks 
including 15 trials each. Response time was limited to ten seconds. Additionally, unlike in 
Study 1, subjects had to execute a complementary click on a dot on the screen prior to each 
single test trial. This was intended to control the mouse position before each trial to provide 
each subject with identical conditions prior to each test trial. Performance was scored in terms 
of the mean reaction time of correct trials. Cronbach’s alpha in the present sample was .91. 
Social Perception – pictorial 2 (SPp2): Perception of Body Language – Pictures 
The task required subjects to decide which of two or three given target cues was 
presented in a picture. The target cues varied between blocks. The task consisted of one 
practice block and three test blocks. Examples prior to one block illustrated the target cues. 
Table 8.5 presents the different blocks and the respective cues, the item contents, and the 
number of items. Pictures from one situative context were spread across the blocks so that one 
block could not be classified into one specific taxonomic class. The situations involved 
between three and twelve persons. Subjects had to react as quickly and as accurately as 
possible by pressing the key assigned to the target cue (e.g., “<” when the picture showed a 
gesture independent from the conversation, “-“ when the picture showed a gesture illustrating 
the conversation). Response time was limited to ten seconds. Performance was scored in 
terms of the reaction time for correct responses. The task consisted of 43 items. Cronbach’s 
alpha for the present sample was .95. 
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Table 8.5 
Target Cues of SPp2, Taxonomic Classifications and Item Numbers (Study 2) 
Block Target cues ”Does the picture show ... Item contents 
Item 
count 
Example 
(1) A gesture independent from the conversation 
(2) A gesture helping to illustrate the conversation 
7 
1 
(1) A person looking at another person (without eye 
contact) 
(2) Two persons having eye contact 
13 
2 
(1) One person smiling or laughing 
(2) Two persons smiling or laughing with each other 
12 
3 
(1) One person watching someone else working 
(2) More than one person working on their own 
(3) More than one person working together 
Pictures across the 
sequences contained the 
following situations: 
- a barbecue 
- a meeting at work 
- group work 
- a wedding 
- a relocation 
- mechanics at work 
- a party 
11 
 
Social Perception – video-based 1 (SPf1): Person Perception – Videos 
The task required subjects to detect one given target person within videos of crowds at 
different public locations (e.g., a market place, a store, a mall, a pedestrian zone, etc.). Prior to 
each block of test trials, the respective target person was portrayed in a short video extract 
showing the whole body. The targets wore different clothing in the presentation and in the 
final test trials. During the trials, subjects had to react as quickly as possible by pressing the 
space bar when they detected the target person. The task consisted of one example block with 
five videos and three test blocks with ten videos each. Contrary to Study 1, only one target 
had to be attended to within one block of trials. The items for the present version were 
selected such that the target was equally visible in the videos in order to avoid missing values. 
Response time was limited in terms of the length of the video. The length varied between 7 
and 27 seconds. The target appeared in the videos at varying points in time, the point of 
emergence was determined in terms of the respective frame in the video. Target appearance 
across the videos ranged from the first frame to frame 479 so that subjects’ expectations about 
the target appearance were not built up (one frame equaling 40 ms). Performance was scored 
in terms of the mean reaction time of correct trials accounting for false alarms prior to target 
appearance. The reliability coefficient in the present sample was .71. 
Social Perception – Video 2 (SPf2): Perception of Body Language – Videos 
The task required subjects to decide when one target cue of possible one, two or three 
given targets cues appeared in short video scenes. The target cues varied between the scenes. 
The task consisted of one practice scene and four test scenes. Examples prior to one scene 
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exemplified the target cues. Table 8.6 presents an overview of the scenes showing the 
respective targets, the taxonomic classifications of the scenes and the number of items per 
scene. Subjects had to react as quickly and as accurately as possible by pressing the key 
assigned to the target cue (e.g., “<” when the picture showed a gesture independent from the 
conversation, “-“ when the picture showed a gesture illustrating the conversation). Response 
time was limited to terms of the time until the next target cue emerged in the video. 
Performance was scored in terms of the reaction time for correct responses accounting for 
false alarms. The task consisted of 37 items. Cronbach’s alpha for the present sample was .84. 
Table 8.6 
Target Cues of SPf2, Taxonomic Classifications and Item Numbers (Study 2) 
Video 
scene 
Target cues 
”When does the video show ... 
Taxonomic classification Item 
count 
Example (1) A gesture independent from the conversation 
(2) A gesture helping to illustrate the conversation 
A male person conducting a 
seminar (public, one person 
involved) 
11 
1 (1) A person showing joy A woman a conversation on the 
telephone (private, one person 
involved) 
6 
2 (1) Someone turning away from someone 
(2) Someone turning towards from someone 
A conflict conversation between 
a couple (private, two persons 
involved) 
7 
3 (1) A man starting the conversation without prior cue 
(2) A man reacting on someone by starting to talk 
A male person conducting a 
seminar (public, one person 
involved) 
8 
4 (1) Both men focusing their attention on the other 
one 
(2) One or both focusing their attention on a task or 
another person 
Two male persons having a 
meeting with others (who were 
not visible) (public, two persons 
involved) 
5 
 
8.2.3 Validation Instruments 
Academic Intelligence: BIS Test (Jäger et al., 1997) 
The BIS-Test served as the test for academic intelligence (see Chapter 7.2.2). Because 
of time constraints, the complete test could not be applied. The task selection was based on 
conceptual considerations. Tasks of BIS-Creativity were not included because an equivalent 
operational ability domain was not operationalized for social intelligence. Of the remaining 
nine cells of the BIS-Model, three tasks for each cell were selected that allowed a modeling of 
the BIS with equal contributions from the relevant ability domains. One task of the cell MV 
(Memory verbal; task “ST” = “sinnvoller Text”) was modified because it included social 
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contents in the original version. The task was substituted by a text about “ground” (“Boden”) 
corresponding in terms of word count and number of items which did not include social 
contents. Additionally, two tasks were applied that represented supposedly easier versions of 
the numeric speed tasks “XG” and “SI" (XG = “x larger by ...”, “SI = divided by seven”). 
They were simplified by enclosing different numeric operations (e.g., “larger by 2” instead of 
“larger by 3”; or “divided by 5” instead of “divided by 7”). These tasks, however, did not 
substitute the original tasks but rather complement the test battery because of previously 
experienced problems with the task difficulties. 
A total of 30 tasks including a warm-up task was partitioned into four parts of seven to 
eight tasks. The parts lasted about 20 to 25 minutes and were administrated at different points 
in time throughout the two testing days (see Appendix F for the order of testing including 
instruction and working time per task). Cronbach’s alpha reliability coefficients in the present 
sample for the 6 ability domains were .82 / .82 / .85 / .75 / .78 / .83 for BIS-S / -M / -R / -F / -
V / -N based on parcels of each domain. 
Personality: NEO-FFI (Borkenau & Ostendorf, 1993) 
The NEO-FFI served as a measure for the Big Five Neuroticism (NEO-N), 
Agreeableness (NEO-A), Extraversion (NEO-E), Conscientiousness (NEO-C), and Openness 
(NEO-O) (see Chapter 7.2.2). Reliability coefficients (Cronbach’s alpha) in the present study 
were .87 (NEO-C), .76 (NEO-A), .69 (BIS-O), .79 (NEO-E), and .84 (NEO-N). 
Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS; Rosenthal et al., 1979) – Video 
The Video subscale of the PONS was applied as a measure of nonverbal sensitivity. 
The full PONS could not be applied because all language-based stimuli were in the English 
language and not enough testing time was available. A test description is provided in 
Table 5.3 (for the psychometric properties) and in Appendix A (scale description). The 
original Video subscale contained 40 items (i.e., presenting either face or body). 20 items 
were added displaying face and body simultaneously. The original 40-item Video PONS did 
not show good reliability coefficients in previous studies (alpha < .40) and it was hoped to 
improve the reliability with the additional items. In the present study, however, the PONS-
Video subscale showed a reliability coefficient of .30 (Cronbach’s alpha), and the extended 
60-item version showed a reliability of .40. 
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8.2.4 Instruments Peripherally Related to Research Questions 
Baseline Measures 
The Simple Reaction Time Task (SRT; Oberauer et al., 2003; Sander, 2005) and the 
Mouse Speed  task (MT; Oberauer et al., 2003; Sander, 2005) assessed as baseline measures 
for the social perception tasks were the same as in Study 1 (see Chapter 7.2.3). The reliability 
coefficients for the present sample showed equally high parameters (.96 and .98, for SRT and 
MT). 
Readspeed 
Seidel (2007) developed a new task to assess the readspeed baseline for the social 
perception tasks based on written language (SPv1 and SPv2). The task in Study 1 did not truly 
prove whether the subjects in fact read every single word. The new task was based on the 
Working Memory literature (Daneman & Carpenter, 1980). It included 60 sentences 
presenting either senseless or reasonable contents. Subjects had to decide for each sentence 
whether it was true or false and press the respective key on the keyboard as quickly as 
possible. Performance was scored in terms of reaction time for correct answers. Cronbach’s 
alpha for this newly constructed task was .98. 
Long Term Memory Task (LTM) 
This task was not included in the core design of the SIM. However, long term memory 
could be conceived as a relevant domain of social abilities (Bless et al., 2004). It was assessed 
relying on the stimuli and background information contained in the social understanding 
tasks. Participants had not been instructed to memorize the information included in the 
scenarios. It was expected, however, that subjects were capable to remember this information 
because they processed it during working on the scenarios. The task was administered at the 
very end of the second testing day. The delay between the last scenario (Matthias) and the 
long term memory task was about 30 minutes. Thus, for the scenarios of the second testing 
day, the delay between stimuli presentation and recall was the same for every participant. For 
scenarios of the first testing day (Renate, Bringfried, Christoph, and Conny), the delay from 
stimulus presentation to the recall questions depended on the individual’s dates of testing. The 
difference between the two testing days ranged from one to 32 with a mean difference of 7.34 
days (sd = 5.36). 50.8 % of the participants completed the two testings within 7 days, another 
16 % within just one day. The question of influence of this delay on performance however, is 
an empirical one and the delay should be controlled for if an effect is found. 
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The task consisted of seven items per scenario. Four items queried specific 
information contained in the task material, one item for each type of material (e.g., “What did 
Matthias say to his father as he helped him clear up?” ... (a) ”You should have asked me 
before.”, (b) “You helped me a lot.”, etc.). One item presented an extraction from one of the 
scenes of one scenario and asked the participant to determine the correct target person. Two 
items referred to background information about the target persons given in the introduction or 
in the descriptions of the situations at the beginning of one scene. Item formats of the 
resulting 56 items were both, multiple choice (with five alternative) and free response. 
Performance was scored in terms of the proportion of correct answers for items based on 
multiple choice formats, and as the points achieved in relation to the available points for free 
responses. The latter were rated by two raters. Cronbach’s alpha for the entire scale including 
56 items was .82. 
Self-Report Questionnaires 
Exhaustion Questionnaire 
At certain points during one testing day (two per day, see Procedures in the next 
Chapter), the participants’ subjectively perceived exhaustion was assessed on the following 
dimensions - tiredness, exertion, and weariness. Responses were given on a 6-point rating 
scale from 1 (very rested / strained / awake) to 6 (very tired / fresh / weary), for each of the 
three dimensions. Item 2 was reversely coded. 
Biographical Questionnaire Including Musical and Computer Experience 
(Feigenspan, 2005; Süß, 1996) 
The biographical data sampled from each participant addressed age, gender, level of 
education, number and age of children if any, occupation, and mother tongue. Additionally, 
hearing capabilities (two choices: normal vs. disabled), vision, self-assessed musical abilities 
in relation to members of the same age group (5-point rating scale), and the type of musical 
experience, if reported was collected. The computer experience questionnaire separately 
assessed in Study 1 was embedded in the present questionnaire and shortened. Items 
addressed the time spent at the computer (i.e., multiple choice: several hours (a) per day (b) 
per week (c) per month and (d) less) and self-assessed computer experience in relation to 
members of the same age group (5-point rating scale). Finally, subjects had to split their time 
spent at the computer into the activities they are typically engaged in (in terms of percentage 
of the entire time spent at the computer). The following activities were included, (a) emailing, 
internet, computer games, (b) text and data processing, and (c) programming activities. 
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Social Behavior Questionnaire (Amelang et al., 1989) 
The social behavior questionnaire based on prototypical acts was applied to assess 
self-reported social behavior (see Chapter 7.2.3). The reliability coefficient (Cronbach’s 
alpha) for the present study was .88. 
Schutte Emotional Intelligence Scale (SEIS; Schutte et al., 1998) 
The SEIS was applied to assess self-reported emotional intelligence. Subjects had to 
indicate their agreement with 33 given statements. Answers were given on a 5-point rating 
scale from 1 (“I completely disagree.”) to 5 (“I completely agree.”). Cronbach’s alpha in the 
present sample was .85. 
Empathy (Enzman, 1996) 
The 14-item questionnaire of empathy was extracted from Enzmann (1996). Only the 
subscales; empathic compassion and cognitive perspective taking were selected, each 
represented by seven items. The questionnaire was translated by Enzmann from the English 
version of Davis (1980). Subjects had to indicate their agreement with the given statements. 
Answers were based on a 5-point rating scale from 1 (“I completely disagree.”) to 5 (“I 
completely agree.”). The two seven-item subscales showed reliability coefficients of .75 and 
.74 for perspective-taking and empathic compassion, respectively. 
Altruism (Fahrenberg et al., 2001) 
The 12-item Altruism scale of the FPI-R (Scale 2: social orientation; Fahrenberg et al., 
2001) was applied. Subjects had to judge each of the 12 statements in terms of whether they 
agreed with it or not on a 2-point rating scale (1 = true, 2 = false). The reliability (Cronbach’s 
alpha) in the present sample was .59. 
Depression (Alter & Muff, 1979) 
The Depression questionnaire was extracted from a list of social behavioral indicators 
of depressive symptoms that stemmed from a Delphi-study by Alter and Muff (1979). The 
questionnaire contained 24 items based on a 4-point rating scale from 1 (“I do not agree.”) to 
4 (“I agree.”). Cronbach’s alpha in the present sample was .88. 
8.2.5 Instruments Not Related to Research Questions 
As in Study 1, several instruments not related to any research question or analysis 
were applied. They are listed as follows, including information about the intended 
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measurement constructs. Detailed task descriptions and statistical analyses related to these 
tasks are described in Seidel (2007). 
General Auditory Tasks 
General Auditory Tasks – Nonverbal Tonal Tasks 
- Recognition of Repeated Tones (Stankov & Horn, 1980): a 15-item performance task 
to assess the ability to recognize one tone within a sequence of eight tones that was 
played only once. 
- Tonal Series (Stankov & Horn, 1980): a 15-item performance task that assessed the 
ability to identify the logical completion of a tonal series of four tones by selecting the 
correct tone out of four alternatives. 
General Auditory Tasks – Nonverbal Tasks 
- Rhythm Reproduction (Stankov & Horn, 1980): a 19-item performance task that 
required participants to reproduce rhythms by a keystroke on one key, rhythms could 
vary in length and complexity. 
General Auditory Tasks – Language-Based Tasks 
- Masked Words (Stankov & Horn, 1980): a 27-item performance task assessing the 
ability to identify spoken works (e.g., “tree”, “table”, etc.) against a noisy background 
varying in intensity (i..e., typical noise of a party), responses had to be written down in 
free format. 
- Audiobook: a 19-item performance task requiring subjects to answer multiple choice 
items (with 5 choice alternatives) based on a previously memorized text, the text 
contained facts about a journey report to the Island Macao without including any 
socially relevant details. 
- Dissected Sentences (Stankov & Horn, 1980): a 16-item performance task assessing 
the ability to rearrange previously disarranged words in order to compose a 
meaningful sentence, participants had to freely produce a sentence and write it down. 
Working Memory Tasks 
Tasks of Working Memory were sought to measure the simultaneous storage and processing 
as one of the core executive functions established in models of working memory (Oberauer et 
al., 2003; Sander, 2005; Süß et al., 2002). These were especially intended to validate the 
general auditory tasks in the study of Seidel (2007). 
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- Memory Updating – numerical, adaptive Version (MUN; Sander 2005): Subjects saw 
a 3x3 matrix on the screen, of which some cells were shaded. Only the non-shaded 
cells had to be attended to. Numbers appeared and disappeared in the non-shaded cells 
and had to be memorized by the subjects. Numerical operations (upward arrow 
indicating +1; downward arrow -1) appeared in the cells and had to be applied on the 
previously remembered numbers. The result of the operation had to be remembered 
again. After a series of arrows, a question mark appeared asking for the correct 
outcome in the respective cell. Difficulty was related to the number of non-shaded 
cells. The levels of difficulty in the adaptive version ranged from one to six non-
shaded cells. When a level was accomplished, the next level started. 
- Word Span, adaptive version (WS; Sander, 2005): Subjects were presented with a 
series of words on the screen (between three and nine words). Words had to be 
remembered and put into the order of the physical size of the object denominated by 
the words. The first letters of the words then had to be reproduced in the correct order. 
Difficulty levels were associated to the numbers of words presented. When a level was 
accomplished, the next level started. 
- Dot Span adaptive version (DS; Süß et al., 2002): Subjects were presented a 10x10-
matrix on the screen in which dots appeared and disappeared successively. The dot 
positions had to be remembered and reproduced. Additionally, after the last dot was 
presented, subjects had to judge whether the pattern was symmetrical (vertically, 
horizontally, or both) or asymetrical. After this judgment, subjects had to indicate by 
the way of a mouse click in the empty matrix where the dots had been positioned. 
Difficulty depended on the number of dots presented (between 2 and 6). When one 
level of difficulty was accomplished, the next level started. 
 
Table 8.7 presents an overview of the design of Study 2 including only tasks related to 
any research questions. 
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Table 8.7 
Design Presenting Performance Tests Related to the Research Questions (Study 2) 
  Methods 
 Construct Written language(V) 
Spoken language
(A) 
Pictorial 
(P) 
Video-based 
(F) 
Social 
Understanding 
(SU) 
Eight scenarios: SUv, SUa, SUp, and SUf 
Social Memory 
(SM) 
SMv1 
SMv2 
SMa1 
SMa2 
SMp1 
SMp2 
SMf1 
SMf2 
So
ci
al
 In
te
lli
ge
nc
e 
Social Perception 
(SP) 
SPv1 
SPv2 
SPa1 
SPa2 
SPp1 
SPp2 
SMf1 
SMf2 
 
 Written language (V)  
figural-spatial 
(F) 
numerical 
(N) 
Reasoning (R) 
WS 
WA 
TM 
 
AN 
CH 
AW 
RD 
ZN 
SC 
Memory (M) 
WM 
ST („Boden“) 
PS 
 
WE 
OG 
FM 
ZZ 
ZP 
ZW 
A
ca
de
m
ic
 In
te
lli
ge
nc
e:
 
B
IS
-T
es
t 
Speed (S) 
UW 
TG 
KW 
 
ZS 
BD 
OE 
SI (7/5) 
XG (3/2) 
RZ 
Fu
rt
he
r 
T
es
ts
 
Social 
Understanding 
(SU) 
   
Profile of 
Nonverbal 
Sensitivity (PONS, 
Rosenthal et al., 
1979) 
Note. SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, v = written language, a = spoken 
language, p = pictures, f = videos 
8.3 Procedures 
Chapter 6.2.4 included a detailed description of the procedures of both studies. For 
Study 2, Appendix F shows the order of administration and the planned testing time per task 
for testing day 1 and 2. Again, the order reflects changing requirements, concerning different 
task contents (e.g., spoken language vs. video-based tasks) and operations (e.g., reasoning 
requirements vs. self-reports, etc.). Testing was planned for about six hours, including four 
sessions and three breaks of five to 20 minutes each. Again, variance in the testing time per 
task was observed for tasks where participants were independently allowed to time their 
responses (i.e., the scenarios, the Working Memory tasks, and self-report questionnaires). 
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Since instructions and starting time for each task was coordinated for the entire testing group,   
there was about a half hour variance in total testing time per day. 
After the first and the last session each day, the participants’ subjectively perceived 
exhaustion was assessed on the dimensions of tiredness, exertion, and weariness. All three 
dimensions were highly intercorrelated within the four measurement points (r = .48 - .77) and 
were aggregated to compute a combined score of exhaustion. Table 8.8 presents the means 
and standard deviations of the four measurement points (T1 and 2 for Day 1 and 2, 
respectively), where, a high score is indicative of low exhaustion. The mean differences from 
T1 to T2 for both testing days were significant at .001 level (Day 1: t = 14.100, df = 180; 
Day 2: t = 11.757, df = 181). 
Table 8.8 
Means (m) and Standard Deviations (sd) of the Reported Exhaustion During Testing (Study 2) 
 Day 1 T1 
Day 1 
T2 
Day 2 
T1 
Day 2 
T2 
M* 3.745 2.730 3.873 2.995 
SD 0.834 0.934 0.871 0.998 
Note. * 1-6 rating scale, a high score indicating low exhaustion 
 T measurement point 
 
Although the level exhaustion increased from the first to the last test session, it did not 
reach the low end of the scale which would have indicated extreme exhaustion, but stayed at 
the medium level. Whether exhaustion had an effect on task performance, will be statistically 
examined. 
8.4 Results 
8.4.1 Preparatory Data Analysis 
The steps conducted prior to the main analyses in order to check the data for missing 
values and distribution problems relied on the same principles as described in Study 1. They 
shall be repeated briefly here. 
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1. Items or subjects were excluded when the number of missing values exceeded 15 % of 
the data points. Outlying data points were inspected and treated only if they influenced 
bivariate distributions or if an implausible deviation from the sample mean occurred. 
Data treatment of reaction time scores (i.e., social perception and baseline measures): 
2. Trials based on a wrong answer were set to missing. 
3. Trials preceded by a false alarm were set to missing. 
4. Reaction times lower than 100 ms were set to missing. 
5. Based on the screening of the distribution of a first compound score, if necessary, 
reaction times of single trials slower or faster than 3 sd above the mean of the sample 
were set equal to 3 sd (trimming of outliers on the group level). 
6. If necessary, reaction times of single trials of 3 sd above or below the mean of the 
individual were set equal to 3 sd above the individual mean (trimming on an 
individual level). 
Social Understanding Tasks 
The social understanding tasks in Study 1 had not exhibited meaningful problems 
related to missing values (i.e., four subjects were excluded because of a large number of 
missing data). In Study 2, neither any item nor subject exceeded the permitted number of 
missing values. No item had more than four missing values out of 182 subjects; 90 % of the 
subjects had three or less missing values out of 576 items and a maximum missing number 
of 19. 
Social Memory – SMp1 
No problems related to missing values had been encountered in this task in Study 1. In 
the present study, the task was only computer administrated including stimulus presentation 
and answers. Subjects were not forced to decide between the alternatives but could also wait 
until the next item emerged on the screen. No item had more than 15 % missing values. 
However, five subjects exceeded the threshold of 15 % missings (i.e., up to 14 for 18 items) 
and were excluded. For the remaining subjects, a missing value was set equal to a wrong 
answer. 
Social Memory – SMp2 
This task was not included in the final analyses in Study 1 because there were too 
many missing values. In the present study, the presentation and answering times were 
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extended. Of the original 24 items in the present task, four items substantially exceeded the 
threshold of 15 % missings (i.e., up to 76 missings from 182 subjects). These items were 
always the last items within one picture sequence so that this result suggested that these items 
could not have been worked on within the available time allotted. Hence, these items were 
excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, five subjects had a large number of missings across 
the remaining items and were excluded from the analysis of this task. For the remaining items 
and subjects, a missing value was set equal to a wrong answer. 
Social Memory – SMf 
The same missing problem occurred for the video-based social memory task in Study 
1 so that the answering times were extended and the videos were shortened. No item had 
more than 15 % missing values in the present study. Three subjects, however, had more 
missing values than allowed and were excluded from the dataset (i.e., up to 14 missing values 
for 40 items). For the remaining subjects, a missing value was set equal to a wrong answer. 
Social Perception – SPp1 
Missing values were counted prior to any recoding due to wrong answers. Therefore, a 
missing value represented the absence of a response. All items and subjects showed only a 
marginal number of missing values (i.e., up to four missings in 45 items; up to 11 missing 
data points in 182 subjects, respectively for subjects and items). After recoding the wrong 
answers into missing values, the number of missings in six items exceeded the acceptable 
level (i.e., between 34 and 93 for 182 subjects); these items were excluded from the analyses. 
The general level of correctness, however, was still high as was expected from Study 1. 
Figure 8.3 presents the distribution of wrong answers. 
No reaction times were lower than 100 ms. A screening of the distribution of a first 
compound score of the remaining 39 items showed a slightly skewed distribution with several 
outlying values slower than 3 sd away from the mean. Therefore, reaction times of single 
trials slower than 3 sd were set equal to 3 sd (i.e., step 5). The distributions prior to and after 
the trimming are shown in Figure 8.4. The distribution was normalized substantially so that 
no further steps were necessary. 
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Figure 8.3 
Distribution of Missings Due to Wrong Answers in SPp1 (Study 2) 
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Figure 8.4 
Boxplots of Reaction Time Score SPp1 Prior to and After Trimming Based on 39 Items 
(Study 2) 
Social Perception – SPp2 
This task had not been administered in Study 1. It was intended to include more 
complex requirements. The target stimuli thus were much more diverse and complex than in 
SPp1. Prior to any screening of the distributions, it was examined whether different stimuli 
showed substantially different reaction times. This was not the case, so the subsequent 
analysis relied on a compound score based on all target cues. 
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An inspection of the number of missings due to an absence of a response showed only 
very small numbers for both trials and subjects. In the next step, wrong responses were 
recoded into missing values. Only those items were included in the main analysis that showed 
a mean performance higher than the guessing rate (choice reaction time tasks with two or 
three choices). Six items had to be excluded because of a too large difficulty index. No 
reaction times were lower than 100 ms. An inspection of the distribution of a first compound 
score showed a slightly skewed distribution so that reaction times of single trials slower than 
3 sd were set equal to 3 sd. Figure 8.5 presents the boxplots of the final scale before and after 
this trimming step. No further steps were necessary. 
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Figure 8.5 
Boxplots of Reaction Time Score SPp2 Prior to and After Trimming Based on 37 Items 
(Study 2) 
Social Perception – SPf1 
The number of missing values per trial and subject were screened prior to any 
recoding of wrong answers or false alarms. Thus, a missing value only represented the 
absence of a response. Two items showed a large number of missings (81 missing data points 
for 182 subjects) and were excluded from further processing. However, five subjects 
exceeded the threshold of 15 % missings and were also omitted from the dataset. Afterwards, 
trials with a preceding false alarm or with a wrong response were set to missing. No wrong 
responses were discovered and only a very small number of false alarms occurred (i.e., 
between zero and three). A screening of the compound score showed no outlying values or 
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skewed distributions. No reaction times were lower than 100 ms. Figure 8.6 presents the 
distribution of the final scale. 
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Figure 8.6 
Boxplots of Reaction Time Score SPf1 Based on 28 Items (Study 2) 
Social Perception – SPf2 
Like the second pictorial social perception task SPp2, this task was also applied for the 
first time and should also depend on more complex stimulus and target material. In contrast to 
the video-based person perception task (SPf1), one video contained several target cues 
following in one row with varying distances in between. The absence of a response was 
attributed to a wrong or delayed perception of the relevant stimuli. Thus, the inspection of 
missings included the absence of a response or a wrong response. This screening step showed 
that five items exhibited an accuracy level below the guessing rate. These were not included 
in the further analysis. 
The screening of the distribution of the final score showed two meaningful outliers on 
both sides of the distribution so that scores beyond 3 sd were set equal to 3 sd above (below) 
the mean. The resulting distributions are shown in Figure 8.7. No further trimming steps were 
conducted. 
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Figure 8.7 
Boxplots of Reaction Time Score SPf2 Prior to and After Trimming Based on 37 Items 
(Study 2) 
Long term memory 
The task that assessed the long term memory of the information contained in the social 
understanding tasks was also newly constructed and inspected for missing values. One subject 
had to be excluded in this analysis because nearly half of the answers were missing (24 data 
points for 56 items). 
8.4.2 Psychometric Properties and Descriptives – Research Question 1A 
After the preparatory steps, the psychometric properties of the newly constructed 
scales were analyzed. Before building the final scales, the item-total correlations were 
inspected. Items were excluded that showed negative or zero item-total correlations. At the 
same time, it was attempted to maintain the taxonomic representativeness of the items. Most 
of the time, this was not problematic because many items were applied. 
8.4.2.1 Social Understanding Tasks Research Question 
Table 8.9 presents the results of the reliability analysis of the social understanding 
tasks. The scales were optimized separately for target and group consensus scoring (left and 
right side of the table, respectively). 
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Table 8.9 
Reliability Analysis Social Understanding Tasks, Target and Group Consensus Scoring 
(Study 2) 
 Target scoring Group consensus scoring 
Item 
count rit range 
Cron-
bach’s α 
Range of item 
difficulties* 
Item 
count rit range 
Cron-
bach’s α 
Range of 
means 
SUv** 
51 
115 
.070 - .458 
-.277 - .341 
.752 
.455 
[-4.839; -.786] 
[-4.821; -.654] 
72 
115 
.069 - .347 
-.173 - .324 
.765 
.601 
[.154; .382] 
[.154; .473] 
SUa** 
62 
152 
.071 - .464 
-.313 - .344 
.791 
.621 
[-4.605; -.884] 
[-4.632; -.697] 
103 
152 
.073 - .365 
-.173 - .350 
.839 
.763 
[.149; .437] 
[.080; .438] 
SUp** 
47 
113 
.058 - .400 
-.185 - .385 
.754 
.495 
[-4.471; -.748] 
[-4.476; -.732] 
86 
113 
.076 - .347 
-.122 - .337 
.792 
.744 
[.169; .395] 
[.169; .403] 
SUf** 
77 
124 
.053 - .453 
-.289 - .417 
.841 
.721 
[-4.536; -.721] 
[-4.546; -.604] 
101 
124 
.089 - .445 
-.107 - .420 
.834 
.798 
[.160; .472] 
[.159; .472] 
SUps 
** 
60 
72 
.068 - .462 
-.268 - .482 
.851 
.809 
[-3.825; -1.053] 
[-3.824; -.974] 
71 
72 
.120 - .391 
.079 - .397 
.831 
.831 
[.189; .361] 
[.189; .361] 
Note. * possible range [-6.00; .00], a higher score indicating better performance 
 ** upper line of each ability domain printed in boldface indicates scales with a 
reduced item number after item selection, lower line indicating scales prior to item 
selection 
 SU = social understanding, v = written language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, 
f = videos, ps = personality ratings 
 
Reliability Analysis – Target and Group Consensus Scoring 
In Study 1, the number of items was reduced substantially after item selection. The left 
columns in Table 8.9 still show a large number of items with negative item total correlations 
that were excluded from the scales. In the scales based on written and spoken language and on 
pictures, more than half of the items were excluded (56, 59, and 58 %, respectively). Only the 
tasks based on videos and the personality rating scales showed satisfactorily reliable scales, 
before item selection. All final scales were sufficiently reliable. In Study 1, the range of item 
difficulties had been reduced. This time, the range of item difficulties was approximately the 
same before and after item selection. The effect of the item selection on the taxonomy of 
social understanding is shown in Table 8.10. The facetted structure included an 
8x4x3x2 design cross-classifying eight targets, four contents, three modalities, and two 
settings. On the lowest level, 192 cells resulted from the cross-classification including 
between one and six items. After item selection, 63 cells did not contain any more items 
(shaded cells in Table 8.10). This meant a reduction in representativeness of the taxonomy. 
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Table 8.10 
Number of Items Selected for the Social Understanding Scales (Study 2) 
  Targets in order of testing* 
  1 (RF) 2 (BS) 3 (CK) 4 (CP) 5 (KL) 6 (FB) 7 (HR) 8 (MM)  
  pr pu pr pu pr pu pr pu pr pu pr pu pr pu pr pu ∑ ∑ ∑ 
E 1 (2) 2 (4) 1 (3) 2 (4) 1 (5) 2 (5) 2 (3) 2 (3) 1 (4) 3 (5) 0 (1) 2 (3) 4 (4) 0 (1) 0 (4) 1 (3) 24 Etot: 108
C 3 (4) 3 (4) 1 (1) 0 (1) 3 (4) 0 (3) 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 (1) 2 (3) 1 (3) 0 (4) 2 (4) 2 (2) 1 (2) 1 (2) 21 Ctot: 75V 
R 1 (1) 0 (1) 1 (1) 0 (1) 1 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) 1 (3) 0 (1) 2 (4) 0 (1) 6 
51 
Rtot: 54
E 0 (1) 3 (5) 4 (5) 2 (3) 2 (5) 2 (5) 3 (4) 0 (1) 1 (5) 2 (5) 3 (4) 5 (6) 2 (6) 3 (4) 1 (4) 0 (1) 33  
C 3 (5) 1 (5) 1 (4) 0 (3) 2 (3) 0 (2) 2 (4) 0 (2) 0 (1) 1 (4) 0 (1) 0 (1) 2 (3) 3 (4) 0 (3) 2 (3) 17  A 
R 0 (4) 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (3) 0 (1) 0 (1) 2 (4) 0 (2) 2 (4) 1 (4) 3 (4) 3 (4) 0 (1) 0 (1) 1 (4) 0 (1) 12 
62 
 
E 5 (5) 0 (1) 1 (4) 1 (5) 0 (3) 1 (4) 0 (1) 1 (3) 1 (4) 0 (1) 1 (4) 1 (1) 0 (1) 4 (5) 0 (1) 3 (5) 19  
C 0 (2) 3 (3) 2 (3) 1 (3) 0 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 0 (1) 1 (4) 2 (4) 0 (1) 1 (2) 2 (3) 0 (3) 0 (1) 1 (3) 15  P 
R 0 (1) 1 (1) 3 (4) 1 (4) 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 (4) 0 (1) 0 (3) 1 (1) 2 (2) 1 (1) 0 (1) 0 (1) 0 (2) 0 (1) 13 
47 
 
E 1 (1) 2 (4) 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 (3) 2 (6) 3 (4) 2 (3) 1 (1) 6 (6) 0 (1) 1 (1) 3 (4) 5 (5) 0 (2) 2 (5) 32  
C 2 (3) 1 (1) 1 (4) 2 (3) 0 (1) 0 (1) 2 (4) 1 (1) 2 (3) 2 (3) 2 (2) 0 (1) 1 (1) 4 (4) 1 (2) 1 (2) 22  F 
R 3 (4) 1 (1) 0 (1) 1 (1) 1 (4) 4 (4) 1 (1) 1 (4) 2 (4) 1 (2) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (1) 1 (3) 1 (4) 3 (4) 23 
77 
 
 ∑ 36 (64) 27 (64) 26 (66) 27 (55) 32 (74) 28 (51) 40 (66) 21 (64)    
Note. v = written language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, f = videos, e = emotions, 
c = cognitions, r = relationships, pr = private, pu = public, tot = total sum 
 shaded cells indicating that no item is included in the final scales 
 
No systematic effect, however, could be discovered so that no element of the facetted 
design had to be omitted completely. On average, 47.25% of the items were selected. Only 
the items assessing the relationship of the targets to other people were marginally 
underrepresented in the scales based on written and spoken language (i.e., only 29 and 30 % 
of the items were selected). Moreover, the private settings of the scenarios Katharina (KL) 
and Matthias (MM) were also more reduced than the remaining scales (31% and 21% of the 
items were selected, respective for Katharina and Matthias). Only two scenes were completely 
omitted by item selection, namely, the public setting of the scenario Christph (CP) based on 
spoken language material and the private setting of the scenario Matthias (MM) based on 
pictorial material. 
In Study 1, the scales based on group consensus scoring were less reliable than the 
target scoring scales. In Study 2, less items had negative or zero item-total correlations (see 
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Table 8.9; i.e., between 62 and 99 %) and the scales before and after item selection were more 
reliable. 
Descriptive Statistics – Target and Group Consensus Scoring 
The descriptive statistics of the final scales are presented in Table 8.11, both for target 
and group consensus scoring. Remarkably, the scale means based on target scoring lay about 
one point lower compared to Study 1 (mStudy 1 between -1.612 and -1.05 for the content-related 
scales). This corresponded to the change in the rating scale from a 6-point to a 7-point scale 
from Study 1 to Study 2. At the same time, the standard deviation remained the same (sdStudy 1 
between .364 and .486). It seemed that the difficulty of the scales based on target scoring 
increased from Study 1 to Study 2. 
Table 8.11 
Descriptive Statistics of Social Understanding Tasks Target and Consensus Scoring (Study 2) 
 Task (N) Item count 
M all target 
(old / new targets) 
SD all target 
(old / new targets) Range 
Skew-
ness 
Kur-
tosis 
SUv (182) 51 -2.628 (-2.401 / -2.969) .397 (.433 / .476) [-3.77; -1.79] -.313 -.145
SUa (182) 61 -2.269 (-2.294 / -2.252) .423 (.510 / .474) [-3.66; -1.26] -.505 .144
SUp (182) 49 -2.252 (-2.195 / -2.315) .422 (.458 / .548) [-3.61; -1.27] -.499 .632
SUf (182) 77 -2.122 (-1.831 / -2.364) .389 (.394 / .473) [-3.42; -1.33] -.506 .711
TS
 
SUps (182) 57 -2.208 (-2.181 / -2.239) .472 (.501 / .560) [-3.73; -1.12] -.375 .114
SUv (182) 72 .231 .023 [.14; .29] -.696 1.034
SUa (182) 103 .244 .024 [.15; .29] -.975 1.871
SUp (182) 86 .232 .023 [.13; .28] -1.038 2.235
SUf (182) 101 .238 .024 [.15; .29] -.913 1.439
G
C
S 
SUps (182) 71 .263 .033 [.14; .33] -.949 1.756
Note. SU = social understanding, v = written language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, 
f = videos, ps = personality ratings 
TS = target scoring, GCS = group consensus scoring 
old targets: targets applied already in Study 1; new targets: targets only applied in 
Study 2 
 
This could be attributed to two aspects. On the one hand, the sample in Study 2 was 
more heterogeneous in terms of age and education and showed a lower level of performance 
in several of the academic intelligence tasks. This might explain an increase in item difficulty 
in the present study. On the other hand, this effect could also be due to the test modifications 
and extensions after Study 1. Four more scenarios and thus, four more targets were applied in 
the present study which were more heterogeneous. Table 8.11 presents the scale means 
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separately for the “old” and the “new” targets. It shows that the enhanced difficulty in Study 2 
could be attributed, to some extent, to the new targets. Except for the spoken language scale, 
all scale means based on only the “old” targets showed a lower item difficulty. It appeared 
important after these findings to find a way to develop a more systematic way to investigate 
the item and scale difficulties. The was to be addressed again in the Discussion in Chapter 9. 
Looking at the mean difficulties of the content-related scales, those based on written 
language seemed most difficult (-2.628) whereas the video-based scale showed the lowest 
difficulty (-2.122). All paired mean comparisons of the written language scale with the 
remaining scales were significant (t = 10.669 – 20.319; df = 181; p < .001). At the same time, 
all paired comparisons of the video-based scale with the remaining scales showed significant 
mean differences (t = 2.782 – 20.319; df = 181; p < .01). For this analysis, the alpha-level was 
adjusted by dividing it by the number of t-tests because they were all exploratory. This 
finding contradicted the results from Study 1 where the pictorial scale showed the lowest 
difficulty. Again, the development of a system to estimate item difficulties prior to scale 
construction appeared indispensible. Moreover, a replication of the present results was 
necessary. 
The means of the scales based on group consensus scoring showed a decrease in 
consensus (i.e., .232 - .263 in Study 2 compared to .363 - .486 in Study 1) which, at first sight, 
corresponded to the increased item difficulty observed in target scoring. The effect of item 
difficulty on the level of consensus was to be explored in Chapter 8.4.4.3. Thus, it is not 
possible to make any conclusions about the interaction between the target and group 
consensus scoring scales at this point. 
Distributions 
Figure 8.8 presents the distributions of the social understanding scales based on target 
scoring separately for the four content-related scales. The scales were rather normally 
distributed as was already seen in the parameters for skewness and kurtosis in Table 8.11. The 
video-based scale showed some outliers which, however, did not influence the bivariate 
distributions because they represented different subjects. The distributions of the scales based 
on the personality ratings and all consensus based scales were equivalent to those displayed in 
Figure 8.8. 
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(c)            (d) 
Figure 8.8 
Histograms of Social Understanding Scales (Study 2) 
Note. (a) SUv, (b) SUa, (c) SUp, (d) SUf 
Within-Domain Correlations 
As a last step, the correlations within the social understanding scales were examined. 
Table 8.12 presents the intercorrelations within and between the scoring methods. Within one 
scoring method, the scale intercorrelations were consistently large (r = .391 - .645 for target 
scoring and r = .512 - .709 for group consensus scoring). In contrast to Study 1, the 
personality ratings were also substantially correlated with the content-related scales in both 
scoring methods. The origin of this change in correlation size was not obvious. The only 
evident change between Study 1 and 2 regarded the application of 7-point rating scales also 
for the personality ratings (these were based on 5-point rating scales in Study 1). Whether this 
was the only reason for this finding could not be clarified at the moment. 
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The pattern of correlations between the scoring methods was not as clear as in Study 1. 
The target and group consensus scoring scales based on the same contents were correlated 
with r = .748 - .878 in Study 1. The remaining correlations were rather unsystematic and all 
were smaller than those between the same task contents. In Study 2, the correlations between 
the target and consensus scoring based on written language and personality ratings were 
substantially smaller than those based on the other contents (r = .314 / .466, respectively for 
SUv and SUps). Moreover, some correlations between different content-related scales were 
larger than those within one task content. The correlation pattern will be addressed again in 
Chapter 8.4.4.3 so that, at present, no further conclusions were undertaken. 
Table 8.12 
Intercorrelations of Social Understanding Scales based on Target and Consensus Scoring 
(Study 2) 
  Target Scoring Group Consensus Scoring 
  SUv SUa SUp SUf SUps SUv SUa SUp SUf SUps 
SUv    
SUa .391**   
SUp .512** .537**  
SUf .635** .568** .691**  
Ta
rg
et
 S
co
ri
ng
 
SUps .645** .472** .487** .547**  
SUv .314** .556** .448** .473** .230**  
SUa .478** .743** .593** .622** .401** .634**  
SUp .443** .540** .687** .626** .422** .598** .650**  
SUf .500** .592** .669** .783** .465** .535** .709** .682** G
ro
up
 
C
on
se
ns
us
 S
c.
 
SUps .392** .357** .495** .568** .466** .512** .548** .671** .678**
Note. N = 182, * α < .05, ** α < .01 
 SU = social understanding, v = written language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, 
f = videos, ps = personality ratings 
 shaded cells: intercorrelations between the scoring methods relying on the same 
content scales 
 
8.4.2.2 Social Memory and Perception 
The scales of the pictorial and video-based social memory and perception tasks were 
built according to the same principle as the social understanding tasks. Additionally, a 
reliability analysis was conducted for the long term memory task (LTM) and the PONS. The 
results of these analyses are presented in Table 8.13. In Study 1, the memory tasks had shown 
rather low reliability coefficients (i.e., .524, .136, .469, respective for SMp1, SMp2, and 
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SMf). In the present study, the reliabilities improved for all of the scales (.557, .455, and .649 
respectively for SMp1, SMp2, and SMf). Yet, the final reliability coefficients were not 
sufficiently high. 
Table 8.13 
Descriptive Statistics of Social Memory and Perception, Long Term Memory, and PONS 
(Study 2) 
Task (N) Item count M SD Range 
Skew-
ness 
Kurto-
sis rit range α 
SMp1 (177) 17 (18) .698 .156 [.24; 1.00] -.353 -.054 .087 - .327 (-.010 - .331) 
.557 
(.535)
SMp2 (177) 15 (20) .497 .156 [.10; .93] .059 -.128 .076 - .243 (-.115 - .219) 
.455 
(.394)
SMf (179) 29 (40) .558 .138 [.17; .86] -.153 -.242 .057 - .412 (-.197 - .387) 
.649 
(.566)
SPp1 (182) 39 1970.612 281.291 [1368.00; 2805.08] .503 .273 .244 - .563 .906
SPp2 (182) 37 1828.090 402.535 [968.96; 3078.84] .401 .018 .411 - .705 .954
SPf1 (177) 28 3096.509 580.436 [1869.54; 4688.30] .472 -.250 .100 - .460 .714
SPf2 (182) 32 1134.754 124.757 [737.50; 1508.68] .069 .402 .061 - .636 .844
LTM (181) 52 (56) .649 .125 [.23; .91] -.600 .527 .068 - .452 (-.045 - .438) 
.816 
(.804)
PONS (179) 33 (60) .876 .071 [.64; 1.00] -.065 .556 .068 - .351 (-.056 - .268) 
.571 
(.397)
Note. in parentheses are parameter before item selection based on rit-inspection 
SM = social memory, SP = social perception, p = pictures, f = videos; LTM = long 
term memory; PONS = Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity 
 
All four social perception tasks showed sufficient reliability coefficients (between .71 
and .95), and all items correlated positively with the final score. Only the task SPf1 was at the 
lower end of an acceptable reliability coefficient (α = .714). The long term memory task 
showed good reliability; only four items were excluded due to their item-total correlations. 
Interestingly, the overall performance in the long term memory task (m = .649) was at about 
the same level as the remaining social memory tasks (m = .497 - .757; see Table 8.14 for the 
means of the tasks based on written and spoken language). This was especially interesting 
because the subjects had not been instructed to memorize the information from the social 
understanding tasks. This result corresponded with the findings of Bless et al. (2004) who 
found better performance in memory tasks of individuals who were instructed to process the 
information compared to those who had only been told to memorize the information. A paired 
t-test showed significant mean differences for all paired comparisons of the long term 
memory task with the remaining social memory tasks (adjusted alpha-level of .008 for 
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exploratory tests). The written language and the first pictorial tasks were significantly better 
accomplished (t = 13.376 / 3.760; df = 180 / 175; p < .001; respective for the comparisons 
with SMv and SMp1). All other comparisons were significant in favor of the long term 
memory task (t between -5.231 and -13.365; df between 176 and 180; p < .001). This overall 
comparison was, however, only valid to a limited extent since the general long term memory 
score ignored the differentiation between different task contents. This question will be 
addressed in more detail in Chapter 8.4.4.6. 
The PONS (video version with 40 items and extended video version with 60 items) 
was also inspected for distribution and reliability. Nine items showed a mean performance 
below the guessing rate of .50 (m = .209 - .429) and were excluded. Afterwards, a reliability 
analysis showed that the reliability of the original video scale (40 items) was not sufficient 
which was, however, expected from the literature. Unfortunately, the adding of 20 items did 
not improve the reliability (.397 for the 60-item scale). Twenty-seven items with negative or 
zero item-total correlations were excluded so that the reliability of the final scale could be 
improved to α = .571. The distribution still showed three subjects with a performance around 
the guessing rate of the task (.52 - .58). Therefore, they diverged largely from the group mean 
(m = .876, sd = .071). The distribution parameters showed a substantial deviation from the 
normal distribution including these three subjects (skewness = -1.273, kurtosis = 2.940). 
Thus, these subjects were excluded from the analysis. 
8.4.2.3 Further Measures 
The psychometric properties of the remaining social intelligence tasks based on 
written and spoken language are presented in Table 8.14. The scale construction and 
preparatory data analysis of these scales are described in Seidel (2007). Except for the spoken 
language social memory task (SMa2), all tasks showed sufficient reliability coefficients and 
no meaningful deviations from the normal distribution. 
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Table 8.14 
Descriptive Statistics of Social Intelligence Tasks Based on Written and Spoken Language 
(Study 2) 
Task (N) Item count M SD Range 
Skew-
ness 
Kurto-
sis rit range α 
SMv1+2 
(182) 48 .757 .110 [.30; .97] -.815 1.040 .070 - .461 .844 
SMa1 (182) 36 .601 .135 [.17; .88] -.596 .281 .101 - .480 .804 
SMa2 (182) 12 .498 .147 [.17; .83] .034 -.454 -.011 - .137 .185 
SPv1 (182) 60 4680.565 1346.238 [2176.12; .9503.66] .755 .606 .351 - .782 .974 
SPv2 (182) 60 2021.445 520.139 [847.75; .3689.65] .297 .065 .535 - .774 .978 
SPa1* (182) 93 -.002 .545 [-1.15; .1.63] .534 .100 .084 - .504 .909 
SPa2* (181) 46 -.010 .702 [-1.50; 2.31] .469 .479 .265 - .609 .924 
Note. * z-scores 
SM = social memory, SP = social perception, v = written language, a = spoken 
language 
 
Table 8.15 presents the descriptive statistics of all further measures relevant for the 
present research questions (i.e., the BIS scales, the speed baseline measures, the personality 
traits, and the self-report questionnaires). The reliability coefficients of the BIS scales were 
analyzed relying on the content- and operation-homogeneous parcels, respective for the 
operative and content abilities. The parcels for the operative ability domains consisted of 
equal variance components from every content domain (i.e., content-homogeneous). In turn, 
the operation-homogeneous parcels for the content abilities consisted of equal variance 
components for each operative ability. The scale descriptives were based on the aggregated 
scales relying on standardized-z-scores. 
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Table 8.15 
Descriptive Statistics of Further Measures (Study 2) 
Task Item count M SD Range 
Skew-
ness 
Kur-
tosis rit range α 
BIS-R* ** - .050 .634 [-1.26; 1.67] .367 -.509 .676 - .753 .852
BIS-M* ** - .022 .608 [-1.68; 1.43] -.015 -.531 .662 - .675 .817
BIS-S* ** - .022 .579 [-1.56; 2.21] .142 .786 .624 - .729 .823
BIS-V* ** - .034 .556 [-1.15; 1.78] .155 -.391 .581 - .666 .776
BIS-F* ** - .024 .540 [-1.15; 1.44] .218 -.498 .506 - .684 .753
BIS-N* ** - .036 .611 [-1.21; 2.07] .571 .257 .667 - .727 .834
SRT 50 249.984 28.426 [180.65; 356.26] .940 1.422 .371 - .758 .964
MT 75 732.448 72.906 [543.83; 921.20] .138 -.146 .290 - .699 .975
Readspeed 60 2656.157 552.542 [1350.85; 4083.21] .033 -.393 .400 - .874 .977
NEO-N 12 1.653 .653 [.25; 3.58] .523 .110 .257 - .708 .844
NEO-E 12 2.497 .562 [.67; 3.58] -.532 .611 .206 - .697 .792
NEO-O 12 2.571 .505 [1.00; 3.67] -.101 -.213 -.015 - .578 .690
NEO-A 12 2.611 .512 [1.00; 3.92] -.404 .373 .173 - .586 .761
NEO-C 12 2.675 .636 [1.08; 3.92] -.330 -.428 .390 - .678 .867
SB Questionnaire 40 2.722 .336 [1.75; 3.54] -.217 -.116 .168 - .575 .876
SEIS 33 3.780 .378 [2.67; 4.88] -.215 .013 .177 - .559 .848
Altruism 12 .637 .186 [.08; 1.00] -.344 -.236 .146 - .354 .591
Empathy – 
Compassion 7 3.837 .622 [2.14; 5.00] -.258 -.288 .300 - .565 .735
Empathy – 
Perspective taking 7 3.479 .675 [1.86; 4.86] -.299 -.397 .320 - .638 .753
Depression 24 1.832 .429 [1.04; 3.08] .614 -.229 .169 - .631 .882
Note. N = 182, * z-scores 
** reliability analysis of the BIS scales based on content- and operation-homogenous 
parcels, four parcels for BIS-R, three parcels for BIS-S, -M, -V, -F, -N 
 R = Reasoning, M = Memory, S = Speed, V = verbal abilities, F = figural-spatial 
abilities, N = numerical abilities, NEO-N = Neuroticism, NEO-E = Extraversion, 
NEO-O = Openness, NEO-A = Agreeableness, NEO-C = Conscientiousness, 
SB = social behavior, SEIS = Schutte Emotional Intelligence Scale 
 
The reliability coefficients were good across all measures. Only one self-report 
questionnaire showed no satisfactory reliability coefficient (i.e., Altruism, α = .591). This 
scale, however, was only based on 12 items. The two subscales of the Empathy questionnaire 
(i.e., empathic compassion and cognitive perspective taking) were analyzed separately 
because the subscales were only marginally intercorrelated (r = .130; N = 182; n.s.). 
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8.4.3 Construct Validity 
In the context of examining the construct validity of social intelligence, the internal 
structure of social intelligence should be investigated (research question 2A) as a first step. As 
a second step, the relationship of the social intelligence tasks to the PONS should be explored 
in order to investigate the convergent construct validity (research question 2B). As a third 
step, social intelligence should prove divergent construct validity with academic intelligence 
and personality (research question 2C). 
8.4.3.1 Structure of Social Intelligence – Research Question 2A 
The structure of social intelligence should be investigated by relying on correlational 
(research question 2A1) and confirmatory factor analysis (research question 2A2). As a last 
step, the faceted structure of social intelligence should be explored (research question 2A3). 
Correlational Results – Research Question 2A1 
Table 8.16 presents the correlations for the social intelligence tasks. The correlations 
within the social understanding scales are not included in this table since they were already 
presented in Table 8.12. As Table 8.12 shows, the scales yielded substantial within-domain 
correlations (r between .391 and .691). Moreover, Table 8.16 shows only marginal and 
unsystematic correlations between the social understanding tasks and social memory and 
perception. The social memory tasks were rather consistently intercorrelated (r = .137 - .630) 
with the smaller and nonsignificant correlations of the spoken language task SMa2. This task, 
however, had a poor reliability coefficient of α = .185 which could be responsible for the 
small correlations. The correlations between social memory and social perception were 
heterogeneous ranging from r = -.471 to r = .073; negative correlations represented a 
hypothesis-conforming relationship because of the negatively coded reaction time scores of 
social perception. The correlations within the social perception tasks were also heterogeneous 
but all were positive in sign. In the present study, four tasks were added (i.e., SPv2, SPa2, 
SPp2, and SPf2). In comparison to Study 1, most of the tasks were meaningfully and 
significantly correlated across the different content domains. 
 
 Table 8.16 Correlations Between Social Intelligence Tasks (Study 2) 
 SUv SUa SUp SUf SMv SMa1 SMa2 SMp1 SMp2 SMf SPv1 SPv2 SPa1 SPa2 SPp1 SPp2 SPf1 SPf2 
SMv .098 .126 .165* .155*       -.291** -.191** .043 .003 -.024 .030 .013 .013
 (182) (182) (182) (182)             
SMa1 .086 .206** .152* .127 .630**      -.140 -.163* .125 -.131 .053 .052 .062 .051
 (182) (182) (182) (182) (182)            
SMa2 .000 .048 .003 -.068 .170* .203**     -.173* -.141 .010 -.043 -.091 -.079 -.192* .007
 (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (182)           
SMp1 .029 .074 .163* .109 .327** .284** .122    -.161* -.063 -.173* .000 -.207** -.079 -.206** -.180*
 (177) (177) (177) (177) (177) (177) (177)          
SMp2 .075 .037 .154* .109 .377** .341** .152* .249**   -.074 -.052 -.041 -.008 -.097 .002 -.116 -.064
 (177) (177) (177) (177) (177) (177) (177) (173)         
SMf .016 .054 .068 -.026 .406** .454** .137 .189* .326**  -.118 -.101 .099 -.167* -.186* -.010 -.141 -.085
 (179) (179) (179) (179) (179) (179) (179) (174) (176)        
SPv1 -.062 -.056 -.083 -.123 -.471** -.283** -.201** -.225** -.147 -.103  .333** .098 .143 .081 .167* -.008 .006 
 (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (177) (177) (179)         
SPv2 -.125 -.081 -.122 -.171* -.425** -.326** -.178* -.174* -.148* -.077 .660**  .019 .183* .053 .022 -.142 -.002 
 (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (177) (177) (179) (182)        
SPa1 -.002 -.132 -.086 -.047 -.040 .073 .016 -.216** -.076 .066 .113 .217**  .150* .151* .066 .158* .406** 
 (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (177) (177) (179) (182) (182)       
SPa2 .051 -.045 -.055 .007 -.109 -.190* -.053 -.065 -.055 -.169* .317** .361** .292**  -.038 .167* .043 .178* 
 (181) (181) (181) (181) (181) (181) (181) (177) (176) (178) (181) (181) (181)      
SPp1 .025 -.040 -.039 -.044 -.067 .006 -.074 -.257** -.127 -.198** .206** .217** .318** .141  .273** .374** .096 
 (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (177) (177) (179) (182) (182) (182) (181)     
SPp2 -.048 -.059 -.118 -.059 -.032 .008 -.083 -.125 -.030 -.028 .256** .174* .176* .256** .366**  .210** .236** 
 (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (177) (177) (179) (182) (182) (182) (181) (182)    
SPf1 .119 -.078 -.033 .095 -.067 .006 -.197** -.236** -.144 -.146 .137 .090 .235** .136 .397** .258**  .191* 
 (177) (177) (177) (177) (177) (177) (177) (172) (172) (174) (177) (177) (177) (176) (177) (177)   
SPf2 .071 -.008 -.068 .039 -.038 .023 .009 -.210** -.086 -.094 .116 .128 .466** .257** .195** .289** .237**  
 (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (182) (177) (177) (179) (182) (182) (182) (181) (182) (182) (177)  
Note. pairwise N in parentheses, * p < .05, ** p < .01, correlations of baseline-controlled measures above diagonal, SU = social understanding, 
SM = social memory, SP = social perception, v = written language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, f = videos, ps = personality ratings 
 230 
Study 2  Chapter 8 
 231
At first sight, the task modifications and extensions conducted after Study 1 seemed to 
have succeeded better in assessing a coherent ability domain of social perception. Originally, 
the intention was to control for the speed baselines of the social perception tasks in order to 
exclude this variance. Three baseline speed measures were applied (i.e., simple reaction time, 
a mouse speed, and a reading speed task). For example, the written language social perception 
tasks were supposed to rely on the reading speed and on the simple reaction time of 
participants. Other tasks were supposed to rely on the mouse speed and the simple reaction 
time (i.e., SPp1); all other tasks should only rely on the simple reaction time. Thus, the 
relevant baseline measures differed between the tasks. The baseline measures were 
intercorrelated to a medium extent (rSRT, MT = .313; rSRT,Readspeed = .309; rMT, Readspeed = .181). 
The zero-order correlations between the social perception tasks and the baseline measures 
showed an equivocal pattern (see Appendix G for the correlations of the social perception 
tasks with the baseline measures and within the baseline measures). All tasks were correlated 
with SRT (r = .198 - .433), most of the tasks with MT (r = .088 - .491) and the reading speed 
(r = .139 - .792). 
In order to control for the baseline, all three baseline measures were entered into a 
multiple regression analysis to predict each social perception task, and the standardized 
residuals were saved. Otherwise, different variance parts would have been removed. The 
intercorrelations of the standardized residuals are presented above the diagonal in Table 8.16. 
Some of the previously substantial correlations were reduced to nearly zero (e.g., SPv2 with 
SPa1 or SPp1), some maintained to a substantial extent (e.g., SPp1 with SPf1; SPa1 with 
SPf2). The social understanding task correlations were zero prior to and after the baseline 
correction (see Appendix G for the correlations which were not included in Table 8.16 due to 
limited space). The correlations with the social memory domain are also presented above the 
diagonal in Table 8.16. Most of them decreased to a substantial extent after controlling for the 
speed baseline measures, particularly those between the written language social perception 
tasks and the social memory tasks. 
In summary, it was clear that the speed baseline measures represented a substantial 
amount of variance within the social perception measures. The amount of explained variance 
by all three baseline measures ranged from R² = .060 for SPf1 to R² = .638 for the task SPv2. 
It was a very conservative strategy to control for the total baseline variance in all of the social 
perception tasks. At the same time, it seemed clear that this controlled variance was not of 
interest in terms of assessing the social perceptual components in the perception tasks. 
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Therefore, the subsequent analysis relied on the standardized residuals of the social 
perception tasks. 
Confirmatory Factor Analysis – Research Question 2A2 
Confirmatory factor analysis should investigate the structure of social intelligence as 
postulated in the performance model of Weis and Süß (2005). Prior to the factor analysis, 
measurement models for the single operative ability domains were established. These 
supported social understanding and social memory as coherent ability factors with positive 
and meaningful loadings of all indicators. A measurement model for the social perception 
factor could not be established involving all indicators. The written language tasks did not 
load on the social perception factor, and all other indicators showed positive loadings 
(between .22 and .49). Therefore, a model involving the remaining variables was postulated. 
Nevertheless, the subsequent confirmatory factor analysis was conducted by partially 
including the social perception tasks except for those based on written language. 
The rationale of the analysis postulated several general, structural, and hierarchical 
models of social intelligence. Table 8.17 presents the rational and the model fit statistics. Two 
general factor models were postulated with Model A involving the indicators of all three 
ability domains and Model B only relying on the social understanding and memory tasks. 
Both models showed poor data fit with a slight advantage of the model excluding the social 
perception tasks from the analysis (CFI = .461; χ² = 280.180; p < .001). In Model A, the 
social perception tasks did not load on the general factor (-.09 - .02). The loadings of the 
social understanding and memory tasks on the general factor in Model B were all significant 
and positive in sign (.25 - .76). 
In the next step, four structural models were established postulating three (two) 
operative ability factors (social understanding and social memory with or without social 
perception). The ability factors were either correlated or not (Model C and E respective for 
three and two correlated factors and Model D and F respective for three and two uncorrelated 
factors). Data fit of all structural models was substantially better than that of the general factor 
models. Both of the two-factor models of social understanding and memory (Model E and F), 
however, showed a substantially better data fit than the three-factor models (Model C and D) 
indicating that social perception as assessed in the present study did not fit into a structural 
model of social intelligence. Thus, all further models were established without the social 
perception tasks. 
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Table 8.17 
Fit Statistics for Confirmatory Factor Analyses of the Structure of Social Intelligence 
(Study 2) 
Model χ² DF p (χ²) CFI RMSEA SRMR 
CI 
RMSEA*** 
A: General factor model (with 
SU, SM, and SP variables)* 451.026 104 <.001 .371 .142 .138 [.128; .155] 
B: General factor model (with 
SU and SM variables)** 280.180 35 <.001 .461 .202 .167 [.180; .224] 
C: 3-Factor structural model 
(SU, SM, and SP correlated)* 159.158 101 <.001 .895 .059 .074 [.041; .076] 
D: 3-Factor structural model 
(SU, SM, and SP uncorrelated)* 165.906 104 <.001 .888 .060 .088 [.042; .076] 
E: 2-Factor structural model 
(SU and SM correlated)** 31.072 34 .612 1.000 .000 .043 [.000; .049] 
F: 2-Factor structural model 
(SU and SM uncorrelated)** 36.075 35 .418 .998 .013 .075 [.000; .057] 
G: Hierarchical modela 
(Schmid-Leiman)** 
22.469 26 .663 1.000 .000 .046 [.000; .050] 
H: 2 content factors (language 
and nonlanguage-based)** 279.340 34 <.001 .460 .205 .166 [.183; .227] 
I: Facetted model: 2 operative 
and 2 content factors (both 
correlated)** 
14.396 23 .915 1.000 .000 .030 [.000; .024] 
Note. * N = 167, ** N = 172, *** CI = 90%, a two error terms constrained to be equal 
SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, SP = social perception 
all social perception factors composed without written language tasks 
 
The structural models relying on two operative ability factors showed very good data 
fit; the models were nested. A χ²-differences test showed a significantly better fit of Model E 
with two correlated ability factors (χ²-difference = 5.003, df = 1, p < .05). Figure 8.9 presents 
the standardized solution of Model E. Social understanding and memory were significantly 
correlated with r = .20 whereas this correlation was substantially lower than that in Study 1 
(rSU, SM = .35). All indicators loaded positively and significantly on the respective ability 
factors. Thus, the structure of social intelligence as supported in Study 1 could be replicated 
in the present study. 
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Figure 8.9 
Standardized Solution of the Structural Model of Social Intelligence (Model E) with Two 
Correlated Operative Ability Domains (Study 2) 
Note. CFI = 1.000; χ² = 31.072 (p=.612); * p < .05; error terms are enclosed with the 
manifest variables 
SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, SP = social perception, v = written 
language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, f = videos 
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The next model (Model G) postulated a hierarchical model of social intelligence with 
two uncorrelated operative ability factors and one general social intelligence factor (Schmid-
Leiman solution). The error term of the video-based social memory task was found to be at 
the lower bound and was constrained to be equal with the error term of the pictorial social 
memory task SMp2 (see Figure 8.10 for the standardized solution). The loading pattern was 
rather consistent for the operative ability factors with only positive and significant loadings on 
social understanding and almost only significant loadings on social memory. Only the second 
spoken language social memory task (SMa2) did not load significantly on the social memory 
factor which could have been due to the low task reliability. The loadings on the social 
memory factor were all negative in sign which was, however, not problematic because all 
factors were postulated to be orthogonal. The loadings on the general social intelligence factor 
were rather heterogeneous but all pointed to the same direction which was not found in Study 
1. The general model fit was very good although (CFI = 1.000; χ² = 22.469, p=.663) it was 
seen as problematic to introduce an equality constraint. Thus, Model G pointed towards the 
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hierarchical character of social intelligence although the model had to be interpreted with care 
due to the measurement problems. Moreover, the loadings on the general factor were partially 
small. This was, however, no surprise since the factor intercorrelation between social 
understanding and memory was rather small. Models E and G were nested. The χ²-differences 
test showed a nonsignificant difference (χ²-difference = 8.603, df = 8, n.s.) so that Model E is 
the preferred model due to the principle of parsimony. 
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Figure 8.10 
Standardized Solution of the Hierarchical Model of Social Intelligence (Model G, 
Schmid-Leiman) (Study 2) 
Note. CFI = 1.000; χ² = 22.469, p=.663; * p < .05; error terms are enclosed with the manifest 
variables 
a error terms constrained to be equal 
SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, SP = social perception, v = written 
language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, f = videos 
 
Exploring the Content Factors  - Research Question 2A3 
As a last step, the faceted structure of social intelligence should be investigated. 
Therefore, first a model relying only on the content-related factors should be established. The 
content model (Model H) only differentiated between a language-based content factor and a 
content factor based on language-free material. The tasks based on written and spoken 
language should load on the language-based factor, and the pictorial and video-based tasks 
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should load on the language-free content factor. It was not distinguished further into the four 
different task contents or any other differentiation because the written language and the video-
based content factors would then only rely on two indicators. The model showed poor fit 
statistics (CFI = .460; χ² = 279.340, p < .001; see Table 8.17) and the loading pattern was 
rather heterogeneous. 
This fact notwithstanding, Model I postulated a faceted model of social intelligence 
according to the faceted design of the MTMM matrix underlying the SIM (see Table 8.17 for 
the fit statistics). It postulated two correlated operative factors (i.e., social understanding and 
memory as established in the structural models) and two correlated content factors (i.e., 
language-based and language-free). No measurement problems were encountered during 
optimization. The model showed very good fit statistics (CFI = 1.000; χ² = 14.396, p=.915). 
Figure 8.11 shows the standardized solution of Model I. The factor intercorrelations and 
loadings of the operative ability factors were similar to those in the two-factor structural 
model of social intelligence (rSU, SM (Model E) = .20; rSU, SM (Model I) = .25). 
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Figure 8.11 
Standardized Solution of the Faceted Model I (Model I) of Social Intelligence (Study 2) 
Note. CFI = 1.000; χ² = 22.469, p=.663; * p < .05; error terms are enclosed with the manifest 
variables 
SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, SP = social perception, v = written 
language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, f = videos 
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All loadings on the operative factors reached significance and were positive in sign. 
The loadings on the content-related factors were very heterogeneous so that the factors were 
hardly interpretable (-.01 - .76 for language-based contents and -.13 - .76 for language-free 
contents). The two factors were negatively intercorrelated (r = -.26) which was attributed to 
the negative loadings on the language-free content factor. Models E, G, and I were nested 
(i.e., the structural model, the hierarchical Schmid-Leiman solution and the faceted model). 
The difference between Model G and I was significant (χ²-difference = 8.073, df = 3, p < .05) 
with an advantage of the faceted model (Model I). Moreover, no measurement problems had 
occurred for Model I so that the hierarchical nature of social intelligence had to be questioned. 
However, comparing Model I with the structural social intelligence model (Model E), the 
difference turned out to be not significant (χ²-difference = 16.676, df = 11, n.s.). Thus, the 
more parsimonious Model E was preferred. 
The results from confirmatory factor analysis basically replicated the results from 
Study 1. Thus, the postulated structure of social intelligence could be supported a second time 
relying on a totally different sample. The structural model showed the best fit statistics and at 
the same time, was the most parsimonious model. Factor loadings were equal to those in 
Study 1 whereas the factor intercorrelation was substantially smaller. The hierarchical model 
was also replicated with still, however, some measurement problems. Moreover, data 
supported a faceted model of social intelligence postulating two correlated operative ability 
factors and two content factors with heterogeneous loadings of the respective task contents. 
The content factors were hardly interpretable because of the loading pattern. There did not 
seem to be meaningful common content-related variance in the tasks; this factor rather 
seemed to allocate “residual” variance. 
8.4.3.2 Convergent Construct Validity – Research Question 2B 
The Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (Rosenthal et al., 1979) was utilized in the 
present study. The PONS assessed nonverbal sensitivity which was supposed to be related to 
social understanding as defined in the present work. Only the video-based items were selected 
for testing because the test was in the English language. The correlations with the social 
understanding tasks ranged between r = -.004 and r = -.163 (N = 179; p < .05). The negative 
sign did not conform to the coding so that no evidence for the convergent construct validity 
with the PONS was provided. The social memory tasks, however, correlated with the PONS 
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between r = .042 and r = .181 (N = 179; p < .05), the social perception tasks with r between 
-.119 and .101. These correlations were in the expected direction but still rather low. 
In turn, empirical evidence of existing studies could not prove the convergent validity 
of the PONS itself (Bernieri, 2001; Buck, 1983). Only Bänziger (2005) found a substantial 
correlation between the PONS and the MERT. Moreover, the psychometric problems 
surrounding the PONS had to be accounted for as the test reliability was rather low with α = 
.57. Moreover, the distribution of the PONS was skewed due to a ceiling effect (m = .876; 
sd = .71 for a maximum score of 1). An inspection of possible influential cases, however, did 
not show any substantial influences by single values. 
8.4.3.3 Divergent Construct Validity – Research Question 2C 
Relationship to Academic Intelligence (Cell Level) – Research Question 2C1 
The rationale of the analysis to investigate the divergent construct validity with 
academic intelligence was similar to that of Study 1. Social intelligence should be 
discriminable from academic intelligence as assessed by the BIS-Test (Jäger et al., 1997). The 
BIS-Test provided the opportunity to compare the two constructs on several hierarchical 
levels (i.e., the cells, the broad ability factors, a general level, and in terms of the faceted 
structure). 
As a first step, the correlations between the social intelligence tasks and the BIS cells 
were analyzed. The cells cross-classified the operations BIS-Reasoning, -Memory, and –
Speed, and the contents BIS-verbal, -figural-, and –numerical abilities. Correspondingly, the 
cells were labeled respective to the first letter of the operative and the content ability factors 
(e.g., the BIS-Reasoning cell based on figural contents was labeled cell RF). The BIS cells 
and social intelligence tasks were supposed to be on the same hierarchical level and both 
represented cross-classifications of operative ability and content domains. Table 8.18 presents 
the intercorrelations. The social understanding tasks were only marginally correlated with the 
BIS cells and only showed significant correlations with verbal reasoning (r = .121 - .233) and 
numerical speed (r = .054 - .229). The social memory tasks were systematically and most 
highly correlated with all BIS-Memory cells. The tasks SMv was also correlated with the cells 
RV, RN, SV, and SN. Only the second spoken language task (SMa2) was not meaningfully 
correlated with any BIS cell which could be attributed to the tasks’ low alpha coefficient of 
.182. In Study 1, the overlap with the BIS-Reasoning and –Speed domains was substantially 
larger for all social memory tasks. This was attributed to a high task difficulty and too much 
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restricted presentation and answering times of the social memory tasks. Thus, at first sight, 
the task modifications in Study 2 seemed to have succeeded in reducing variance related to 
speed requirements and the use of written language. 
Table 8.18 
Correlations of Social Intelligence Tasks with BIS Cells (Study 2) 
 BIS cells 
 RV RF RN MV MF MN SV SF SN 
SUv (182) .222** .109 .154* -.038 -.030 -.029 .127 .045 .202**
SUa (182) .233** .166* .121 .144 .084 .100 .020 .115 .170*
SUp (182) .121 -.009 -.071 .084 -.007 .018 .121 .027 .054
SUf (182) .208** .084 .076 .073 .018 .033 .117 .135 .229**
SMv (182) .449** .156* .305** .498** .340** .349** .332** .132 .292**
SMa1 (182) .349** .082 .120 .524** .253** .302** .288** .112 .194**
SMa2 (182) .032 .057 .037 -.025 .105 .134 .048 .027 -.007
SMp1 (177) .181* .105 .082 .314** .220** .319** .066 .091 -.013
SMp2 (177) .189* .098 .110 .260** .244** .234** .152* .112 .123
SMf (179) .045 .044 .035 .297** .259** .247** .074 .083 -.068
SPv1 (182) -.153* -.068 .006 -.132 -.112 -.118 -.079 -.025 .030
SPv2 (182) -.131 -.041 .115 -.165* -.012 -.112 -.090 -.084 .078
SPa1 (182) .045 .008 .144 .069 -.057 .009 -.011 -.052 .103
SPa2 (181) -.071 -.091 .026 -.047 -.093 .061 -.023 -.092 .115
SPp1 (182) .021 -.008 .100 -.036 -.194** -.224** -.059 -.291** .034
SPp2 (182) .047 -.112 -.057 .042 -.105 .014 .062 -.086 .039
SPf1 (177) .135 .058 .115 .038 -.194** -.045 .117 -.145 .189*
SPf2 (182) .137 .029 -.013 -.072 -.063 -.037 -.012 .015 .072
Note. pairwise N in parentheses in left column, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, SP = social perception, v = written 
language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, f = videos; R = BIS-Reasoning, 
M = BIS-Memory, S = BIS-Speed, V = verbal, F = figural-spatial, N = numerical 
 
The social perception variables in the present analysis were represented by the 
residuals after the baseline speed variance was partialled out. They showed only some 
unsystematic correlations across the BIS cells. The two person perception tasks based on 
pictures and videos were correlated with the figural memory cell; the pictorial task was also 
related to figural speed as would be expected. The correlations with the BIS cells of the 
original tasks were substantially larger particularly for the written language tasks (see 
Appendix G for the complete correlation matrix). SPv1 correlated with the BIS cells with r = 
(-.430) – (-.175) prior to the baseline control, and SPv2 with r = (-.475) – (-.190). The highest 
correlations for both tasks were discovered within the verbal reasoning cell. The correlations 
disappeared completely after partialling out the baseline variance. The same change of 
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correlations was discovered for the spoken language tasks. Only the correlations of the 
pictorial and video-based social perception tasks of person perception (SPp1 and SPf1) were 
maintained to a meaningful extent. 
In summary, the correlative pattern supported the independency of the social 
understanding and the social perception tasks from the BIS cells. It also pointed to successful 
task modifications of the social memory tasks. The overlap between these tasks and the BIS-
Memory cells, however, was still rather large so that it was not clear whether social memory 
was discriminable from BIS-Memory. 
Relationship to Academic Intelligence (Broad Ability Factor Level) – Research 
Question 2C1 
The BIS cells were partly substantially intercorrelated (see Appendix G; between 
r = .092 for SF with RN and r = .686 for SN with RN). Therefore, the construct overlap on the 
level of the broad ability factors should be investigated by the use of confirmatory factor 
analysis. Before any analysis including social and academic intelligence ability factors were 
conducted, the structure of the operative and the content ability facet of the BIS should be 
empirically supported by confirmatory factor analysis. Therefore, two models were 
established, one postulating three correlated operative ability factors (Model J; BIS-
Reasoning, -Memory, and –Speed), and the other three content ability factors (Model K; BIS-
Numerical, -Verbal, and –Figural-Spatial abilities). Table 8.19 presents the model fit 
statistics. The models relied on homogeneous parcels including three per factor. The model 
based on the operative factors showed reasonable data fit (CFI = .980; χ² = 38.544, p < .05). 
All parcels loaded significantly and positively on the respective factors (.71 - .87), and the 
factors were significantly correlated with r between .47 and .58. The content-factor model did 
not fit the data quite as well (CFI = .942; χ² = 64.623, p < .01) although all factors showed 
coherent loadings (.64 - .80) and were significantly correlated with r = .67 - .75. 
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Table 8.19 
Fit Statistics for Confirmatory Factor Analyses of the Divergent Construct Validity of Social 
with Academic Intelligence (Study 2) 
Model χ² DF p (χ²) CFI RMSEA SRMR 
CI 
RMSEA* 
J: BIS-Operative factorsa 38.544 24 <.05 .980 .058 .040 [.018; .090] 
K: BIS-Content factorsa 64.623 24 <.01 .942 .097 .058 [.068; .125] 
L: SI-BIS 4 correlated ability 
factorsb 144.078 98 <.01 .954 .052 .059 [.033 .070] 
M: SI-BIS, SU uncorrelated 
with BISb 146.884 100 <.01 .954 .052 .066 [.033; .070] 
N: SI-BIS, SU uncorrelated 
with BISb and SM 152.625 101 <.01 .949 .055 .077 [.036; .071] 
O: BIS facetted structure based 
on cellsa** 29.792 17 <.05 .977 .043 .064 [.021; .102] 
P: SI-BIS facetted structure; SI 
integrated in BISb*** 20.137 12 .065 .979 .061 .043 [.000; .106] 
Q: SI-BIS facetted structure; SI 
as additional content-factorb*** 11.452 10 .323 .996 .028 .024 [.000; .088] 
R: SI-BIS facetted structure; SI 
as additional operative 
factorb*** 
23.253 10 <.01 .966 .086 .038 [.040; .131] 
S: 2-Factor structural model 
(residuals of SU and SM, 
correlated)b
32.241 34 .554 1.00 .000 .044 [.000; .051] 
T: SI facetted model with SU 
and SM correlated and language 
and not language-based factors 
correlated (based on 
residuals)b*** 
22.036 25 .634 1.00 .000 .034 [.000; .052] 
Note. a N = 182, b N = 172, * CI = 90%, ** four equality constraints, *** two equality 
constraints, SI = social intelligence, SU = social understanding, SM = social memory 
 
Turning to the investigation of construct overlap, the rationale of confirmatory factor 
analysis first established three models which examined whether the operative ability factors of 
social and academic intelligence were separable or not. All three models were based on the 
BIS operative structure (i.e., only BIS-Reasoning and BIS-Memory) and the structural model 
of social intelligence with correlated social understanding and memory factors (Model E in 
Table 8.16). Model L introduced correlations between all four ability factors (i.e., BIS-
Reasoning and –Memory; social understanding and memory). The model showed reasonable 
data fit and positive loadings of all of the indicators on the respective factors. The factor 
social understanding, however, was only marginally and not significantly correlated with the 
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BIS-Reasoning and –Memory factors (r = .14 and .02, respectively). Therefore, the next 
model (Model M) omitted the factor intercorrelations between the BIS and social 
understanding. The model fit did not change substantially (CFI = .954; χ² = 146.884, p < .01) 
and the χ² difference test was not significant (χ²-difference = 2.806, df = 2, n.s.) so that the 
more parsimonious model M was accepted as the better solution. The model is presented in 
Figure 8.12. All indicators loaded substantially on their respective ability factors. Social 
memory was meaningfully correlated with BIS-Memory (r = .67) and also with BIS-
Reasoning (r = .39). Compared to Study 1, the overlap of social memory with BIS-Reasoning 
was reduced as was intended by the task modifications (r = .46 in Study 1).The correlation, 
however was still of substantial size. 
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Figure 8.12 
Standardized Solution of Model M Showing Factor Intercorrelations between Social and 
Academic Intelligence (Study 2) 
Note. CFI = .954; χ² = 146.884, p < .01; * p < .05; error terms are enclosed with the manifest 
variables 
R = BIS-Reasoning, M = BIS-Memory, P1-3 = parcel 1-3; SU = social understanding, 
SM = social memory, v = written language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, 
f = videos 
 
Social understanding and memory were only marginally intercorrelated (r = .18) as 
was the case in the structural model of social intelligence (r = .20 in Model E in Figure 8.9). It 
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was not clear whether the two social ability factors represented two ability factors of the same 
ability construct. Therefore, a third model omitted the correlations within the social 
intelligence factors (Model N). The model fit worsened a little bit and the χ² -difference test 
showed a significantly better data fit for Model M with correlated social intelligence factors 
(χ²-difference = 5.741, df = 1, p < .05). 
Relationship to Academic Intelligence (Integration of Social Intelligence into the 
Faceted BIS Structure) – Research Question 2C3 
The next series of confirmatory factor analyses investigated whether social 
intelligence fit into the faceted structure of the BIS-Model. The faceted structure of the 
BIS-Model could only be established by examining the cells of the BIS that cross-classify 
three operative (BIS-Reasoning, -Memory, and -Speed) and three content ability factors (BIS-
Verbal, -Numerical, and -Figural-spatial abilities). The factors were supposed to be 
intercorrelated. The forth operative ability factor of creativity was not included in the design 
of the present study. Moreover, the cells of the BIS-Reasoning domain did not equate exactly 
with the original test conceptualization since only three out of five tasks per cell were applied 
in the present study. This restricted faceted model of the BIS (Model O in Table 8.19) showed 
a reasonable fit to the data (CFI = .977; χ² = 29.792, p < .05) but needed the introduction of 
four equality constraints because of several error terms at a lower bound. 
However, the BIS-Numerical and –Speed ability domain did not correspond to the 
already established faceted model of social intelligence. Therefore, the model of reference 
only relied on the BIS-Reasoning and BIS-Memory cells, cross-classified with Verbal and 
Figural-Spatial abilities. The model of reference for the social intelligence domain relied on 
four combined indicators for the cross-classification of social understanding and memory as 
operative factors and language-based and language-free contents (i.e., SUl, SUlf, SMl, SMlf; 
with l = language-based and lf = language-free contents). Thus, the operative and the content 
structure corresponded with the respective structure of the BIS. 
The first model to investigate a combined faceted structure integrated social 
intelligence completely into the BIS structure (Model P). For example, the language-based 
social understanding cell (SUl) loaded on the BIS-Reasoning and the BIS-Verbal factor, and 
the language-free social memory cell (SMlf) loaded on the BIS-Memory and the BIS-Figural 
factor. Model P showed good data fit. The factor loadings on the content factors, however, 
varied substantially between the social and academic intelligence cells with mostly larger 
loadings of the BIS-cells. Again, two equality constraints had to be introduced because error 
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terms appeared at the lower bound. The next model (Model Q) established a separate “social 
content” factor with loadings of all the social intelligence cells which no longer were allowed 
to load on the BIS content factors. It was still necessary to introduce two equality constraints 
on error terms. The model showed very good fit statistics (CFI = .996; χ² = 11.452, p=.323). 
Models P and Q were nested. The χ²-differences test showed a significantly better data fit for 
Model Q with the additional social content factor (χ²-difference = 8.685, df = 2, p < .01). 
Figure 8.13 presents the standardized solution of Model Q. The loading pattern on the 
content-factors was still heterogeneous, particularly on the social content factor. Moreover, 
the social and academic intelligence cells loaded differentially on the reasoning factor. The 
operative factors were not meaningfully intercorrelated (r = .08). 
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Figure 8.13 
Standardized Solution of Combined Faceted Model of Social and Academic Intelligence 
(Model Q) (Study 2) 
Rv 
SUl 
SUlf 
Mv 
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Memory 
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social 
.08 
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.52* 
.43* 
.56* 
.67* 
.19* 
.10 
.82* 
.86* 
-.11 
.43 
.38 
.54 
.49 
.65 
.72 
.50 
.76 
Note. CFI = .996; χ² = 11.452, p=.323; * p < .05; error terms are enclosed with the manifest 
variables 
R = BIS-Reasoning, M = BIS-Memory, v = BIS-Verbal contents, f = BIS-Figural-
spatial contents, SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, l = language-based, 
lf = language-free contents 
 
A third model postulated an additional “social operative” factor with loadings of all 
social intelligence cells (Model R), and omitted the separate “social content” factor. These 
cells loaded again on the content factors of the BIS-Model as postulated in Model P. The 
model fit, however, was worse than for Model Q (CFI = .966; χ² = 23.253, p < .01) and the 
model also needed equality constraints. 
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The results from this analysis pointed towards a possible classification of the social 
intelligence operative structure into the BIS operations whereas the social intelligence 
contents could not be subsumed under the BIS-content structure. However, the loading pattern 
was rather heterogeneous and some psychometric problems occurred so that equality 
constraints needed to be introduced. 
Relationship to Academic Intelligence (Structural Independency) – Research Question 
2C2 
As a last step, the structural independency of social from academic intelligence should 
be investigated. Therefore, the BIS variance was partialled out of the social intelligence 
variables by entering the BIS scales (i.e., the broad operative and content ability factors) into 
a regression on every single social intelligence variable and saving the standardized residuals. 
Then, two further models were established that had shown good data fit in the analysis of the 
internal structure of social intelligence (Chapter 8.4.3.1). First, the structural model was 
replicated with a social understanding and a social memory factor (Model S equivalent to 
Model E). The model showed very good data fit (CFI = 1.000; χ² = 32.241; p=.554). No 
problems were encountered during optimization. The loading pattern was rather homogeneous 
and the two ability factors were small but meaningfully intercorrelated. Moreover, the 
correlation between the ability factors in Model S (r = .19) was not substantially smaller than 
that in the original Model E (r = .20). Figure 8.14 presents the standardized solution of Model 
S. Furthermore, the faceted model of social intelligence with two correlated operative and two 
correlated content factors should be replicated by examining the residuals (Model T with an 
equivalent Model I). This model also showed very good fit statistics although again, two 
equality constraints needed to be introduced because of error terms at the lower bound. A 
comparison of the nested Models S and T showed no significant difference and the more 
parsimonious Model S was accepted (χ²-difference = 10.205, df = 9, n.s.). In summary, this 
analysis showed that the structure of social intelligence was independent from the common 
BIS variance. 
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Figure 8.14 
Standardized Solution of the Structural Model of Social Intelligence (Model S) when Variance 
of the BIS was Controlled for (Study 2) 
Note. CFI = 1.000; χ² = 32.241 (p=.554); * p < .05; error terms are enclosed with the 
manifest variables 
SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, v = written language, a = spoken 
language, p = pictures, f = videos 
 
Relationship to Personality Traits – Research Question 2C1 
To prove the divergent construct validity, social intelligence should also be 
discriminable from personality traits. Several trait inventories were applied in the present 
study (i.e., the Big Five assessed by the NEO-FFI, two subscales of Empathy: empathic 
compassion and cognitive perspective taking, Altruism, and Depression). Table 8.20 presents 
the correlations between the trait variables and the social intelligence tasks. Only the social 
understanding tasks showed unsystematic correlations with some personality traits. The scales 
SUv and SUa were negatively intercorrelated with Agreeableness and Conscientiousness, 
SUv negatively with empathic compassion, SUa negatively with Extraversion and positively 
with Depression. The scale SUp correlated slightly positively with Neuroticism and 
negatively with Agreeableness. However, the correlative pattern showed that the overlap 
between the social intelligence tasks and personality traits was generally small and above all 
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smaller than the within-domain correlations. It was not clear, however, why the scale 
intercorrelations were partly substantially negative. 
Table 8.20 
Correlations of Social Intelligence Tasks with Personality Traits (Study 2) 
 NEO-N NEO-E NEO-O NEO-A NEO-C EC PT Altru-ism Depression 
SUv (182) .055 -.130 -.005 -.284** -.165* -.203** -.093 .071 .064 
SUa (182) .131 -.204** -.042 -.243** -.212** -.063 .013 -.070 .238** 
SUp (182) .149* -.087 -.011 -.149* -.140 -.024 .056 .083 .144 
SUf (182) -.003 -.014 -.065 -.151* -.107 -.071 .007 .142 .051 
SMv (182) .089 -.036 -.033 .033 -.107 .019 -.062 .008 .056 
SMa1 (182) .077 -.108 .010 .062 -.110 -.034 -.003 .005 .086 
SMa2 (182) -.042 .011 .037 .074 .056 .038 .084 .005 -.088 
SMp1 (177) -.119 .051 .090 .091 -.002 -.014 .069 .000 -.075 
SMp2 (177) .040 -.060 -.038 .041 .047 -.009 -.053 .113 .008 
SMf (179) .145 -.063 -.080 .126 -.086 -.087 .019 .017 .011 
SPv1 (182) -.043 -.127 .020 -.061 .136 -.044 .069 -.106 .012 
SPv2 (182) -.064 -.024 -.094 -.022 .101 -.077 .123 -.106 -.080 
SPa1 (182) .074 .010 -.169* .070 -.043 -.049 -.061 .011 -.029 
SPa2 (181) .038 .044 -.065 -.071 .071 .065 .048 .060 -.012 
SPp1 (182) .028 -.058 .013 -.111 .029 .082 .019 .000 .039 
SPp2 (182) .065 -.132 .061 .049 .073 .066 .110 .019 .109 
SPf1 (177) .073 .001 -.004 -.059 .021 -.065 .102 .025 .096 
SPf2 (182) .142 -.057 -.062 .035 -.065 -.101 -.020 -.025 .153* 
Note.  pairwise N in parentheses, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
SU = social understanding, SM = social memory, SP = social perception, v = written 
language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, f = videos, NEO-N = Neuroticism, 
NEO-E = Extraversion, NEO-O = Openness, NEO-A = Agreeableness, 
NEO-C = Conscientiousness, EC = empathic compassion, PT = perspective taking 
 
Appendix H presents the intercorrelations within the personality traits that were 
generally high and all in the expected direction so that no syntax mistake could be responsible 
for the negative scale intercorrelations with social understanding. 
8.4.4 Further Exploratory Analyses 
8.4.4.1 Relationship to Self-Report Data – Research Question 3A 
Two self-report questionnaires of social and emotional skills were assessed in the 
present study, the Social Behavior Questionnaire of Amelang et al. (1989) and the Schutte 
Emotional Intelligence Scale (Schutte et al., 1998). The two measures were substantially 
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intercorrelated (r = .509; N = 182; p < .001). The social intelligence tasks were generally 
uncorrelated with the self-report inventories. Correlations ranged between r = -.144 and 
r = .108 with the Social Behavior Questionnaire and between r = -.182 and r = .118 with the 
Schutte Emotional Intelligence Scale. These correlations were reduced to zero when variance 
of the personality traits was controlled for. 
This latter finding was due to a large overlap between the self-report inventories and 
the personality traits presented in Table 8.21. Entering all personality traits as predictors into a 
regression analysis with each self-report inventory as criterion measures, the amount of 
explained variance was rather large. Self-reported social behavior could be explained with R² 
= .282 (F9/172 = 7.517; p < .001), and self-reported emotional intelligence with R² = .443 
(F9/172 = 15.184; p < .001). The scale intercorrelation based on the standardized residuals was 
reduced to a meaningful extent compared to that of the original scales. However, they were 
still substantially correlated (r = .294; N = 182; p < .001) which pointed to some meaningful 
construct overlap of self-reported social and emotional skills. 
Table 8.21 
Correlations of Self-Report Inventories with Personality Traits (Study 2) 
 NEO-N NEO-E NEO-O NEO-A NEO-C Altru-ism EC PT 
De-
pression 
SB 
Questionnaire -.265** .344** .251** .097 .255** .309** .153* .248** -.291** 
Schutte EI 
Scale -.459** .456** .164* .194** .440** .217** .175* .330** -.500** 
Note.  N = 182; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
SB = Social Behavior; EI = Emotional Intelligence, NEO-N = Neuroticism, NEO-E = 
Extraversion, NEO-O = Openness, NEO-A = Agreeableness, 
NEO-C = Conscientiousness, EC = empathic compassion, PT = perspective taking 
 
8.4.4.2 Gender Differences 
Overall Gender Differences of Social Intelligence Tasks – Research Question 3B 
The question of gender differences in the social intelligence tasks was only 
exploratory. As was already mentioned in Study 1, some authors interpreted gender 
differences in favor of women as a positive validity result for measures of social and 
emotional abilities (Hall, 2001; Schutte et al., 1998). It was not self-evident to formulate such 
an assumption based on the present conceptualization of social intelligence. Therefore, the 
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alpha-level was adjusted in order to account for the accumulation of error (new alpha-level = 
.003). Applying this alpha-level, three social memory tasks and one social perception task 
showed significant gender differences in favor of women (SMv: t =-3.979, df = 180, p < .001, 
Cohen’s d = .573; SMa1: t = -4.031, df = 180, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .585; SMf: t = -3.233, df 
= 177, p=.001, Cohen’s d = .478; SPv2: t = 3.395, df = 180, p < .001, Cohen’s d = .497). 
Nearly all remaining tasks showed gender differences in the same direction, but did not reach 
significance. Interestingly, three social understanding tasks (SUv, SUa, and the personality 
ratings) showed a nonsignificant tendency of males to perform better. 
Gender Differences in Targets, Subjects, and Their Interaction – Research Question 
3B1 
The more interesting question referred to the effect of the target gender on the 
performance of male and female subjects. Therefore, a general scale of every target was 
composed by aggregating all of the items from the final social understanding scales across the 
four content scales and the personality rating scale. All general scores of male and female 
targets were combined to one score for each target gender. These scores were highly 
correlated (r = .826, p < .001, N=182). In Study 1, male performances in judging male and 
female targets were positively intercorrelated as were female performances in judging male 
and female targets. This result was replicated in the present study which included two 
additional male and female targets. Results showed substantially positive correlations for both 
gender groups with r = .849 (p < .001; N = 75) of males judging males, with males judging 
females and r = .810 (p < .001; N = 107) of females judging males with females judging 
females. No interaction effect occurred that could have been attributed to an influence of the 
similarity of judge and target in terms of gender. 
To investigate the effect of the target gender interaction with the subjects’ gender 
more closely, a two-factor analysis of variance (repeated measurements) was conducted 
postulating one between-subjects factor (i.e., the subject gender) and one repeated 
measurement factor (target gender). Results are presented in Table 8.22 and contradict the 
results from Study 1. Only the main effect of the repeated measurement reached significance 
showing a lower item difficulty for male targets than for female targets. No significant 
interaction effect was discovered. Figure 8.15 illustrates the results by plotting the group 
means. 
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Table 8.22 
Results of Two-Factor Analysis of Variance of the Effect of Target and Subject Gender on 
Performance in Social Understanding Scales (Study 2) 
Source of variance 
Sums of 
square DF 
Mean 
squares F Probability Eta² 
.093 Repeated measures (target gender) 4.489 1 4.489 210.599** <.001 
 Between-subjects (subject gender) .026 1 .026 .115 .735 
 Interaction effect .000 1 .000 .006 .940 
Note. N = 182 
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Figure 8.15 
Results of the ANOVA Showing Gender Effects on Performance in Social Understanding 
Scales Based on all Targets (Study 2) 
In Study 1, female targets had been easier to judge. The present finding was all the 
more surprising because four of the targets were the same as in Study 1. In order to look at 
this more closely, Table 8.23 presents the means and standard deviations of the single targets 
comparing Study 1 and 2. It must be noted that the scale range was changed from Study 1 to 
Study 2 which is indicated in the right column of the table. The maximum possible deviation 
is “-5” in Study 1 and “-6” in Study 2. It turned out that the two female targets added in 
Study 2 (Conny (CK), and Hannah (HR)) were the scenarios with the highest difficulty. 
Moreover, the scenario with target Katharina (KL), which was among the easiest in Study 1, 
turned out to take the third rank in terms of difficulty after CK and HR. 
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Table 8.23 
Means and Standard Deviations of Social Understanding Performance for the Single Targets 
(Study 2) 
Target RF BS CK CP KL FB HR MM scale 
Gender female male female male female male female male 
Study 1 -1.269 (.488) -- -- 
-1.444 
(.433) 
-1.340 
(.341) -- -- 
-1.555 
(.373) -5 – 0 
Study 2 -2.038 (.368) 
-2.142 
(.398) 
-2.425 
(.448) 
-2.073 
(.396) 
-2.362 
(.406) 
-2.143 
(.475) 
-2.690 
(.558) 
-2.256 
(.435) -6 – 0 
Note. sd in parentheses 
Thus, the contradicting results did not only seem to be due to the adding of four 
different and more difficult scenarios, but also to a change in difficulty of the scenario 
Katharina (KL). 
To confirm this finding, the two-factor analysis of variance was conducted again 
utilizing only the four targets that were applied in Study 1 to the present sample. Results 
showed a significant effect of the repeated measures related to the target gender (F1/180 = 
4.675; p < .05) and a significant interaction effect of target and subject gender (F1/180 = 8.256; 
p < .01). Figure 8.16 plots the group means and demonstrates the diverse effect compared to 
Study 1 (see the small graph on the right side showing Figure 7.12 from Study 1). The 
performance in scenarios relying on female targets was equal to that of Study 1 with, 
however, only a small tendency for females to perform better. A diverse effect occurred for 
male targets with a substantially better performance by male subjects. It could not be 
determined at this point whether the task modifications contributed to this change or whether 
the sample in the present study found it more difficult to judge, for example, Katharina. A 
post-hoc explanation could account for the university background of the scenario Katharina, 
so that the student subjects in Study 1 could judge Katharina’s mental states better than the 
heterogeneous sample in Study 2. However, the effect was obscured by the use of different 
items in both samples and across the different scenarios. 
In any case, these results still needed replication, possibly utilizing even more targets 
and a balanced ad heterogeneous sample in terms of similar educational and occupational 
backgrounds. 
8.4   Results   
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Figure 8.16 
Results of the ANOVA Showing Gender Effects on Performance in Social Understanding 
Scales Based on Four Targets Applied in Study 1 (Study 2) 
Note. Results from Study 1 on the right side 
8.4.4.3 Scoring Alternatives – Research Question 3C 
Group Consensus Scoring – Research Question 3C1 
Group consensus scoring (i.e., proportion scoring) assigns the relative frequency of a 
rating category in the sample to a subject’s answer matching this rating category. This method 
is frequently applied as an alternative scoring procedure when no objectively correct answer 
can be identified. In some approaches, group consensus scoring seems to be selected because 
it represents a convenient procedure requiring no additional effort towards scale construction 
(e.g., the Faces Test of the MSCEIT). However, several researchers have questioned the 
adequacy of this scoring method (Matthews et al., 2005; Schulze et al., 2007; Tagiuri, 1969). 
The most frequent critique addresses the problem of item difficulty. One criticism points out 
that single items cannot identify highly able subjects (whose answers are rare compared to the 
standard answer of the sample average) because consensus scoring favors agreement with the 
sample average (see Chapter 5.2.4.2 for a more detailed description of the entire procedure 
and the associated discussion). Thus, the concept of item difficulty cannot be applied to items 
scored by group consensus. It could be argued, however, that this ceases to be problematic 
when items are aggregated to a scale. But empirical studies have not addressed this problem 
so far. In this respect, there are other approaches that investigated the relationship of group to 
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expert consensus scoring as one possible external standard to evaluate the usefulness of this 
scoring procedure. The scale intercorrelations were rather low in the scales of the predecessor 
of the MSCEIT (i.e., the MEIS; r = .26) and rather high for the MSCEIT scales (r = .96). Both 
correlations were critized for either being too low or too high (Roberts, et al., 2001). 
Consequently, it had to be questioned what the “adequate” correlation size would to be 
expected when group consensus scoring is correlated with other scoring procedures. 
The present study, however, applied target scoring. The question addressed in the 
present analysis referred to whether correlations between group consensus scores and target 
scores of the same scale are generally capable of providing useful information about either 
scoring method. In this respect, target scoring could as well represent any other scoring 
method applying comparable scoring algorithms (e.g., specific expert scoring procedures). 
Thereby, a more thorough look could be given to the effect of item difficulty on the 
intercorrelations between different scoring methods. 
In Chapter 5.2.4, an artificial simulation was undertaken by varying the difficulty of 
items scored by target scoring and assessing the effect on the bivariate distributions between 
the two scoring methods. In the present analysis, the same question was addressed relying on 
the data of the social understanding tasks in the present study. The two scoring methods were 
shown to be highly correlated on the general level of the content-related scales (r = .687 - .783 
for the spoken language, pictorial, and video-based scales; see Table 8.12 for the entire 
correlation matrix) with smaller correlations for the written language scales and the 
personality rating scales (r = .314 / .466 for SUv and SUps respectively). The first three data 
columns in Table 8.24 summarize these parameters showing the correlations between the 
scoring methods of each content-related scale, the respective reliability coefficients, means, 
and standard deviations. It could be speculate that the lower correlation between the written 
language scales were attributable to the enhanced mean difficulty of the target scoring of 
about one standard deviation (m = -2.628 compared to a mean difficulty of -2.213 for the 
remaining scales). It was worth noting, however, that the mean target score of the personality 
rating scale was at about the same level as those scales (SUa, SUp, and SUf) that showed the 
highest correlations between the scoring methods. 
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Table 8.24 
Scale and Item Properties of Social Understanding Scales Separately for Different Scoring 
Procedures and Item Difficulties 
Deviation Target Answer – Sample Mode** 
SU scale r(TS, GCS)
α 
TS 
α 
GCS 
Mean 
(TS)* 
Mean 
(GCS)* 0 -1 -2 (-3) – (-6) 
SUv .314 .752 .765 -2.628 (.397) 
.231 
(.023) 6 7 7 16 
SUa .743 .791 .839 -2.269 (.423) 
.244 
(.024) 18 13 11 3 
SUp .687 .754 .792 -2.252 (.422) 
.232 
(.023) 17 16 6 10 
SUf .783 .841 .834 -2.122 (.389) 
.238 
(.024 25 26 9 9 
SUps .466 .851 .831 -2.208 (.472) 
.263 
(.033) 13 27 18 2 
Note. * sd in parentheses; **number of items 
TS = target scoring, GCS = group consensus scoring, SU = social understanding, 
v = written language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, f = videos, ps = personality 
ratings 
 
This contradictory finding was further examined. The focus therefore switched from 
the scale to the item level. Items were classified according to the deviation between the target 
answer of an item and the mode of the sample’s raw answers. The target answer represented 
the rating category that provided the highest (best) score in target scoring when selected by a 
subject. At the same time, the mode of the sample’s raw answers represented the rating 
category providing the highest (best) score in group consensus scoring. Thus, a “0” indicated 
zero deviation between the target answer and the mode, “-5” a deviation of five points 
between the target answer and the sample mode. The right columns of Table 8.24 present the 
number of items within each scale, classified into different deviation categories between the 
target answers and the mode value of the sample’s raw answers. The full range of possible 
deviations is not displayed because of very few answers in the categories with the largest 
deviations. The categories “-3” to “-5” were combined. A deviation of “-6” did not occur. 
Obviously, the distribution of different deviation categories differed between the content-
related scales with a strikingly different distribution for the written language scale. 
Additionally, the personality rating scale stood out because, as opposed to the remaining 
scales, a zero deviation occurred substantially less than a deviation of “-1”. 
In order to analyze the effect of item difficulty on the inter-scoring correlations more 
closely based on statistical methods, the two extreme deviation classes were first inspected. 
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Therefore, for the two example scales SUf and SUps, items were aggregated to new 
compound scores. Thus, the “low difficulty scale” only contained items where the sample’s 
mode answer was identical with the target answer (i.e., a deviation of “0”). The “high 
difficulty scale” only contained items with a large deviation (“-3” to “-5”). The same items 
scored by group consensus scoring were aggregated to the respective scales. Prior to any 
further analysis, the reliabilities of the resulting four scales per content domain were 
calculated. These were rather low due to a reduction in the number of items. The reliabilities 
were estimated for a test length of 60 items by the Spearman-Brown-Formula and turned out 
as sufficient (i.e., the number corresponded to the mean number of items in the original 
content-related scales). 
Afterwards, the correlations between the scoring methods were investigated separately 
for the two content scales and the item classes related to the deviation categories (Table 8.25). 
The correlations between the scoring methods were consistent for each of the content 
domains. The inter-scoring correlations for the “low difficulty scales” were r = .766 / .787, 
respectively with SUf and SUps. The inter-scoring correlations for the “high difficulty scales” 
were r = -.186 / -.226, respectively. 
Table 8.25 
Example Scales: Effect of Item Difficulty on the Correlations Between the Scoring Methods 
 Low difficulty: Zero deviation High difficulty: Deviation of “-3” to “-5” 
SU 
scale r(TS, GCS)
α 
TS** 
α 
GCS** 
Mean 
(TS)* 
Mean 
(GCS)* r(TS, GCS)
α 
TS 
α 
GCS 
Mean 
(TS)* 
Mean 
(GCS)* 
SUf .905 .766.577 (25)
.731 
.531 (25) 
-1.374 
(.385)
.256
(.033) -.186 
.755
.316 (9) 
.548 
.154 (9) 
-3.287 
(.574) 
.221 
(.033) 
SUps .850 .787.444 (13)
.830 
.514 (13) 
-1.377 
(.381)
.272 
(.046) -.226 
.669
.063 (2) 
.779 
.105 (2) 
-2.993 
(1.052) 
.264 
(.093) 
Note. N = 182; * sd in parentheses; ** number of items in parentheses 
upper line of reliability parameters indicates reliability estimation based on 
Spearman-Brown-Formula (60 items) 
TS = target scoring, GCS = group consensus scoring, SU = social understanding, 
f = videos, ps = personality ratings 
 
It could be reasoned that the two scoring methods for the “high difficulty scales” were 
not intercorrelated because these items measured not the same measurement construct. 
However, the intra-scoring correlations suggested that the same underlying ability was 
measured by both, the “high” and the “low difficulty scales”. The empirically determined 
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correlations were corrected for attenuation because of the low reliabilities of the original 
scales. The intra-scoring correlations of the SUf scales between the scales based on different 
item difficulty were estimated at rcorr = .794 (remp = .338) for target scoring and for rcorr = .980 
(remp = .279) for group consensus scoring. The correlations between the SUps scales of item 
groups were estimated at rcorr = .120 (remp = .020) for target scoring and at at rcorr = .892 
(remp = .207) for group consensus scoring. The low correlation between the “high difficulty” 
personality rating scales for target scoring was based only on two items which restricted the 
validity of the scale. But in general, the results supported the original assumption that the 
inter-scoring correlations were largely influenced be item difficulty, at the same time 
measuring the same construct. 
Table 8.25 also shows that the expected large difference in mean difficulty of the 
target scoring scales was not reflected in the scales based on group consensus scoring. 
Interestingly, the scales based on the two difficulty classes in the target scoring scales showed 
a standardized mean difference of Cohen’s d = 4.913 / 3.424 (respective for SUf and SUps). 
The scales scored by group consensus showed only a standardized mean difference of 
Cohen’s d = 1.417 / .242 (respective for SUf and SUps). This result showed that the means in 
group consensus scoring scales did not seem to be affected by any external standard such as a 
target answer. 
So far, two extremes of item difficulties were regarded showing two extremes in 
correlation size between the scoring methods. As a last step in this analysis, the video-based 
scale was picked exemplarily and items with a deviation of “-1” between the target answer 
and the sample’s mode answer (i.e., “medium difficulty scale”) were selected. This 
represented the category most frequently occurring within the present data. The overall 
correlation between the scoring methods was r = .772 (Cronbach’s alpha =.717 / .605 
respectively for target and group consensus scoring, based on 26 items). The simulation in 
Chapter 5.2.4 had shown that a curvilinear relationship appeared under the condition of at 
least one point deviation between the target score and the sample’s mode answer and the same 
target raw answer. Conventionally, within one aggregated scale, different item difficulties and 
items based on different target answers are desired and combined to a composite score. The 
curvilinear relationship, however, can also be shown in the present data when single items are 
considered. 
Only those items were selected out of the video-based scale, all showing a deviation of 
“-1” between the target answer and the sample’s mode answer and all relying on a target 
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answer of “6”. The inter-scoring correlation was r = .446. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was 
.457 for target scoring and .410 for group consensus scoring. Figure 8.17 presents the 
bivariate distributions between the target and the group consensus scores for all of the 
aforementioned video-based scales showing (a) the “low difficulty scale” (r = .905), (b) the 
“high difficulty scale” (r = -.186), (c) the “medium difficulty scale” (i.e., only items based on 
a deviation of -1; r = .772), and (d) a selection of items from the “medium difficulty scale” 
based only on target answers of “6” (r = .446). 
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 target score (medium difficulty; target answer = 6; r = ,446)
Figure 8.17 
Bivariate Distributions Between Target and Group Consensus Scores Based on Different Item 
Difficulties 
The Figure clearly shows that for single classes of items, the shape of the distribution 
depended on the item difficulty and that a curvilinear relationship emerged when focusing on 
items that relied on the same target answer. The shape of distributions were similar when 
items were regarded which, for example, relied on a target answer of “5” and showed a 
deviation of “-2”. 
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Conclusively, it appeared problematic to interpret the correlations of group consensus 
scoring scales with other scoring methods providing a criterion such as target scoring 
procedures or types of expert scoring procedures. Obviously, the correlations are determined 
by several different classes of item difficulties so that the aggregation of items of different 
difficulties obscures the true relationships between the scoring methods. 
Correlations-Based Scoring – Research Question 3C2 
The correlations-based scoring method is conventionally applied in interaction 
research and is a subtype of target scoring (Bronfenbrenner et al., 1958; Funder, 2001; Ickes 
et al., 1990; Kenny & Winquist, 2001; Snodgrass, 2001). Correlations-based scoring assigns 
each subject (i.e., the judge) a score based on the correlation between the subject’s and the 
target’s answers on a set of items. Therewith, the information from the single items is lost. 
Interaction paradigms typically involve the same person as both, the target and the judge, 
being put into an encounter. The scoring method is sought to account for an interaction effect 
of the accurate sending and perceiving of cues (Ickes et al., 1990; Snodgrass, 2001). 
Snodgrass (2001) provided a detailed description of this scoring method and stressed both, the 
limitations and advantages. She acknowledged that other scoring methods were much more 
fine-grained and would show report higher reliabilities. By correlating a set of items in order 
to build the score, a subsequent reliability analysis could only rely on the set information and 
was only possible if several targets were applied. Snodgrass, however, did not report 
reliability coefficients. According to Snodgrass, correlations-based scoring was influenced by 
stereotypes which she equaled with “good guesses” or the use of heuristics in social 
judgments. She further claimed that correlations-based scoring compensated for different 
rating tendencies of the judge and the target by relying on z-standardized scores. For example, 
if a target person tended towards extreme answers and a judge towards the middle of the 
scale, this would be equaled with inaccuracy in the target scoring procedure applied in the 
present study. The overall target answers were only inspected for tendencies and did not show 
specific features. There could be, however, rating tendencies of single subjects or for subsets 
of items so that it seemed interesting to look at this type of scoring procedure. 
In the present analysis, correlations-based scoring was applied to the content-related 
scales of the social understanding tasks. Therefore, each subject’s answers were correlated 
with the target answers for the item sets of one content domain. The correlations were 
transformed to Fisher’s Z to allow a comparison between them. Every subject received eight 
scores for each content-related scale representing the correlations with the answers of the 
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eight targets. The correlations relied on a number of items between nine and 23 (Snodgrass 
reported a basis of 13 items for calculating the correlations). Thus, it was possible to conduct 
further analysis separately for the content domains which would not have been possible when 
only the correlation across all items had been calculated. 
A reliability analysis of the content-related scales (each consisting of eight scores 
associated with the eight targets) showed generally low reliability coefficients. The written 
language scale even showed a negative value due to a negative covariance matrix between the 
items. Cronbach’s alpha for the content scales and the personality rating scale was -.009 / .295 
/ .058 / .294 / .215, respectively for SUv / SUa / SUp / SUf / SUps. However, since Snodgrass 
did not report reliabilities, no comparison was possible. It could be speculated, however, that 
this type of scoring produced homogenous variance within one scenario instead of within the 
content-related scales across the different scenarios (i.e., attached to one target person). 
Therefore, the reliability of the target-related general scales across the contents was also 
analyzed. The reliabilities were low on average with only one exception of the scenario 
Renate (RF) with α = .423. The remaining coefficients were α = .027 / .104 / .002 / .257 / 
.111 / .128 / -.018 for the other seven scenarios (BS, CK, CP, KL, FB, HR, and MM 
respectively). Thus, the content-related scales were applied hereafter, acknowledging that it 
was problematic to aggregate the scales due to the low reliabilities. 
The descriptives of the scales and the correlations within the social understanding 
tasks are presented in Table 8.26. All scales were normally distributed, the distribution 
parameters did not indicate substantial deviations from the normal distributions (i.e., 
skewness between -.241 and .113; kurtosis between -.299 and .734. No outlying values were 
discovered. The range of scores was rather large. The smallest range was discovered for the 
written language scale (scores between .11 and .54), the largest range for the personality 
rating scale was (scores between -.14 and .73). According to Kenny and Winquist (2001), this 
large variance was a precondition for detecting covariances with other variables and it showed 
that the answers across subjects did not converge too much. The correlations within the social 
understanding scales, however, did not support a coherent domain of social understanding and 
thus no convergent validity. Only three correlations reached significance (i.e., between SUv 
and SUp, and SUf with SUa and SUp). The correlations with the scales based on target 
scoring were inconsistent with the largest correlations between the scales of the same content 
domain (r = .271 - .430). 
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Table 8.26 
Descriptives of Social Understanding Scales (Correlations-Based Scoring), Intra- and 
Interscoring Correlations 
   CBS TS 
CBS M SD SUv SUa SUp SUf SUv SUa SUp SUf SUps 
SUv .340 .089     .404** -.003 .227** .182* .162* 
SUa .435 .098 .053    .066 .430** .201** .154* .014 
SUp .301 .104 .250** .112   -.050 -.130 .279** .039 -.162* 
SUf .370 .135 .131 .218** .261**  .001 .055 .243** .382** -.125 
SUps .317 .140 .144 .069 .001 -.061 .106 -.049 .035 -.028 .271** 
Note. N = 182, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
SU = social understanding, v = written language, a = spoken language, p = pictures, 
f = videos, ps = personality ratings, CBS = correlations-based scoring, TS = target 
scoring 
 
As a next step, the correlations of the correlations-based scales with the remaining 
social intelligence tasks and with measures of academic intelligence and personality were 
explored. The correlations with the social memory tasks still showed rather low but positive 
correlations. The scale SUa, however, correlated more highly with the social memory tasks; 
r = .227 / .270 / .338, for SMf, SMv and SMa1 respectively (see Table 8.12 for the original 
correlation matrix). The correlations with the social perception tasks as well as with the BIS 
cells did not change meaningfully. In contrast, the correlations with personality traits were 
substantially different (see Table 8.27). 
Table 8.27 
Correlations of Social Understanding Tasks (Correlations-Based Scoring) with Personality 
Traits 
 NEO-N NEO-E NEO-O NEO-A NEO-C EC PT Altruism Depression 
SUv -.001 -.025 .036 -.073 .002 -.050 -.030 .061 -.053 
SUa .039 -.082 -.018 .022 -.017 .038 .109 -.031 .035 
SUp -.061 .151* -.080 .172* .149* .059 .124 .095 -.125 
SUf -.148* .181* .058 .162* .201** .162* .111 .244** -.162* 
SUps -.029 .030 .085 .008 -.118 -.007 .024 -.086 .039 
Note.  N = 182; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
SU = social understanding, , v = verbal, a = auditory, p = pictorial, f = video-based, 
ps = personality ratings; NEO-N = Neuroticism, NEO-E = Extraversion, 
NEO-O = Openness, NEO-A = Agreeableness, NEO-C = Conscientiousness, EC = 
empathic compassion, PT = perspective taking 
 
The target scoring scales had shown partly negative correlations with, for example, 
Extraversion, Agreeableness or Altruism (see Table 8.20 for the original correlations). The 
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newly scored scales correlated to a generally small extent with the personality traits which 
still supported the divergent construct validity. The sign, however, changed for most of the 
correlations, particularly for the video-based scale. Although no real expectations were 
formulated for the relationship of the social intelligence tasks to personality traits, the positive 
correlations conformed with what is reported in the academic intelligence literature 
(Ackerman & Heggestad, 1997) and with what could be expected for social or emotional 
abilities within a social competence framework (see Chapter 3 and Figure 3.1). The 
correlations with self-reported social and emotional skills were still around zero with one 
significantly positive correlation between the video-based scale and the Schutte Emotional 
Intelligence Scale of r = .208 (N = 182; p < .01). The correlations with the PONS did not 
change meaningfully. 
As a last step, gender differences were explored. In contrast to the target scoring 
scales, all variables showed female subjects perform better with two significant mean 
differences of the pictorial and video-based scales (t = 3.637 / 2.697; df = 180; p < .01; 
d = .529 / .400; respective for SUp and SUf). 
In summary, the social understanding scales scored by correlations-based scoring 
showed meaningful divergence to the target scoring scales. The problems, however, 
concerned the low reliabilities and the loss of information of single items. Moreover, the 
correlations between the social understanding scales did no longer support a coherent ability 
domain. These problems notwithstanding, the lack of negative correlations with personality 
traits such as Agreeableness and the gender differences in favor of women conformed with 
the literature. At present, it could not be clarified whether the change in these results was only 
due to the purported compensation of different rating tendencies or to the different scoring 
procedure in general. In general, there appeared no reason for substituting the target scoring 
procedure by the correlations-based scores. 
8.4.4.4 Exploring the Dimensionality of the Target Score: Effect of Assumed and Real 
Similarity – Research Question 3D 
Effect of Similarity on Social Understanding Scales Scored by Traditional Target 
Scoring 
The idea underlying the analysis described below resulted from Cronbach’s critique of 
the traditional target scoring procedure (Cronbach, 1955). He claimed that the target score 
consists of various components representing different types of accuracy (e.g., stereotype or 
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differential accuracy; see Chapter 5.2.4.1; for a detailed description see also Kenny & 
Winquist, 2001). These accuracy components are sought to be influenced by the assumed and 
the real similarity between judge and target. Cronbach established a complicated scoring 
system that purportedly allowed the identification of the separate variance components. This 
scoring system, however, was criticized for being too analytical (Funder, 2001). Moreover, it 
only works when all targets are judged on the same items and so, it could not be applied to the 
social understanding scales in the present study. 
Therefore, the current section attempted to examine the effect of the operationalized 
assumed and real similarity between judge and target on the accuracy of the social 
understanding tasks. It had to be accounted for that the original idea of Cronbach only 
referred to the similarity in the use of rating formats. However, as several researchers 
acknowledged; the judge-target relationship, in terms of familiarity or similarity, effects the 
accuracy of judgments (Bronfenbrenner et al., 1958). Thus, it appeared reasonable to suggest 
that the interaction of assumed and real similarity in terms of the biographical data and 
personality as coded here, could determine the judgmental accuracy to a certain extent. Since 
the similarity concept was related to each target person separately, the analysis relied on the 
general performance in one scenario across the content domains. Scores were built including 
the items from the content-related scales. The reliability coefficients were found to be 
reasonable. Cronbach’s alpha for the general scores were .674 / .582 / .711 / .628 / .632 / .774 
/ .845 / .615 for the scenarios in the order of testing (i.e., RF, BS, CK, CP, KL, FB, HR, and 
MM). The scenarios were highly intercorrelated with r between .416 and .646. 
The indicator for the assumed similarity was assessed at the end of each scenario (i.e., 
“How similar do you think you are to the target person?”, 7-point rating scales from “not at 
all similar” to “extremely similar”). Additionally, several indicators of the real similarity 
between the subjects and the targets were built by comparing different biographical data (i.e., 
gender, age, parenthood, and education) and by correlating the NEO-FFI profiles. The 
indicators for the biographical data were dichotomously scored with “0“ (dissimilar) and “1” 
(similar). For example, if subject and target were similar in parenthood (i.e., both having 
children), the subject received a score of “1”. For assessing the similarity in age, different age 
groups were composed around the target’s age that received different degrees of similarity 
(i.e., within +/- 2 years meant a score of “4”, within +/- 3 through 6 years meant a score of 
“3”, within +/- 7 through 10 years meant a score of “2”, and beyond +/- 11 meant a score of 
“1”). Thus, both dichotomous (i.e., similarity in gender, parenthood, and education) and 
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continuous variables (i.e., assumed similarity, similarity in age, the correlation with the 
personality profile of each target) were applied in the following analysis.  
Prior to building a prediction model on the performance score for each target, the zero-
order correlations were examined. It turned out that the similarity in age did not have a 
meaningful correlation with the performance score (r between -.104 and .079) so that this 
variable was excluded from the regression analysis. Assumed similarity did also not correlate 
substantially with any performance measure. However, it was retained in the analysis because 
Cronbach’s model also considered a possibly meaningful interaction effect of assumed and 
real similarity. The regression analysis included both continuous and dichotomous variables, 
the latter were already coded as dummy variables. This needed to be accounted for when 
interpreting the resulting regression coefficients. Table 8.28 presents the results of the 
regression analysis. The analysis showed only some small effects on the performance in the 
scenarios. Only the performance in the scenario Renate was significantly predicted by the 
similarity indicators with about 8.1 % of explained variance (R²adj). The further prediction 
models did not reach significance, the amount of explained variance (R²adj) ranged between 
0 % and 2.5 %. 
With regard to the single predictors, the beta-coefficients did not show a coherent 
pattern of prediction and varied substantially between the scenarios. Many zero-order 
correlations and beta-coefficients were negative in sign. The expected interaction effect 
between the assumed similarity and the real similarity indicators could only be detected in the 
scenario Christoph (CP). Here, assumed similarity showed a suppressing effect enhancing the 
prediction of the similarity in the personality profiles. 
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Table 8.28 
Multiple Regression Analysis to Predict the Performance in the General Target-Related 
Social Understanding Scores (Target Scoring) by Similarity 
CR 1 (RF) 2 (BS) 3 (CK) 4 (CP) 5 (KL) 6 (FB) 7 (HR) 8 (MM) 
PR r β r β r β r β r β r β r β r β 
AssSim -.018 -.014 -.044 -.027 -.095 -.082 -.050 -.085 .068 .068 -.006 -.007 -.037 -.028 .023 .033
Gender .159 .189* -.098 -.129 -.059 -.062 .059 .028 -.047 -.047 -.024 -.040 -.076 -.057 .153 .119
Parent-
hood .009 -.027 -.098 -.104 .000 -.054 .035 .014 .071 .071 -.086 -.064 -.066 -.037 .174 .118
Educa-
tion .245 .243** -.015 .005 -.070 -.085 -.056 -.063 .180 .180* -.112 -.094 -.043 -.029 .129 .097
Perso-
nality -.121 -.138 -.138 -.119 .067 .078 .112 .135 .026 .026 -.065 -.046 .073 .062 .011 .001
R² 
(R²adj) 
.106 
(.081) 
.040 
(.013) 
.023 
(.000) 
.025  
(.000) 
.046 
(.018) 
.020 
(.000) 
.014 
(.000) 
.052 
(.025) 
F 4.161** 1.465 .818 .907 1.676 .716 .489 1.937 
DF*** 
(reg/res) 
5/175 
(181) 
5/174 
(180) 
5/176 
(182) 
5/176 
(182) 
5/175 
(181) 
5/175 
(181) 
5/176 
(182) 
5/176 
(182) 
P .001 .204 .540 .478 .143 .612 .785 .090 
Δ R² 
sympathy 
(β) 
.001 .125 (-.407**) 
.024 
(-.202*) .002 .007 
.073 
(-.311**) .008 .001 
Note. * p < .05, **p < .01, *** N in parentheses 
PR = predictor, CR = criterion (general target-related performance score), 
AssSim = assumed similarity, predictors are all indicators of similarity (higher value 
indicating higher similarity) 
 
Interestingly, adding perceived sympathy into the regression model enhanced the 
prediction in three scenarios. The perceived sympathy was assessed by only one item per 
scenario on a 7-point rating scale from 1 (not at all sympathetic) to 7 (very sympathetic). The 
last line in Table 8.28 presents the increase in R² and the beta coefficients indicating the 
significance of the single predictor. The zero-order correlations of ‘perceived sympathy’ with 
the general performance in the scenarios for BS, CK, and FB were r = -.313 / -.187 / -.235 
respectively, indicating a negative effect of ‘perceived sympathy’ on the performance in these 
three scenarios. In general, the amount of explained variance was still low. However, some 
interesting effects could be discovered when only specific scenarios were regarded separately 
supporting the importance of carefully considering the selection of targets in terms of 
heterogeneity and number. 
Study 2  Chapter 8 
 265
Effect of Similarity on Social Understanding Scales Scored by Correlations-Based 
Score 
Snodgrass (2001) claimed that correlations-based scoring methods compensate for the 
differential use of rating scales by subjects and targets. At the same time, it was argued that 
this type of scoring is influenced by the use of guessing strategies in social judgments (i.e., 
stereotypes as the foundation for heuristic judgments). Thus, it should be explored whether 
correlations-based scores were predicted by the assumed and the real similarity between 
subjects and targets to a larger extent than the conventional target scoring procedure. Table 
8.29 presents the results of the same multiple regression analysis as presented in Table 8.28, 
this time applying the correlation-based scores as the criterion variables. In order to allow a 
direct comparison with the aforementioned analysis, the same predictors were applied. The 
fact that the reliabilities of these scales were very low (see preceding Chapter) must be taken 
into account. This resulted in a limited capability to predict systematic variance. 
Except for two scenarios, the regression model predicted a significant amount of 
variance in the social understanding tasks with R²adj between .075 and .102. Again, the beta 
coefficients did not show a systematic effect on performance. No variable showed a 
significant contribution across all scenarios. The assumed similarity showed a negative effect 
on the performance in the scenarios Conny (CK) and Christoph (CP). Contrarily, it showed a 
positive effect on performance in the scenario Friedrich (FB). 
In general, larger amounts of variance were predicted in these scores by the indicators 
of assumed and real similarity. Adding ‘perceived sympathy’ to the model, the prediction was 
significantly enhanced for three scenarios (i.e., CK, CP, and FB), with ΔR² = 0.148, / 0.029 / 
0.026 respectively. Corresponding to the other predictors, sympathy effected the performance 
in different directions for different scenarios. The beta coefficients (see Table 8.29) for the 
scenarios CK and CP for ‘perceived sympathy’ were negative in sign and the zero-order 
correlations showed the same direction (rsv.symp = -.436 / -.236; respectively for CK and CP). 
Performance in the scenario Friedrich (FB), on the other hand, was positively affected by 
‘perceived sympathy’ with a positive zero-order correlation (rsv.symp = .240). 
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Table 8.29 
Multiple Regression Analysis to Predict the Performance in the General Target-Related 
Social Understanding Scores (Correlations-Based Scoring) by Similarity 
CR 1 (RF) 2 (BS) 3 (CK) 4 (CP) 5 (KL) 6 (FB) 7 (HR) 8 (MM) 
PR r β r β r β r β r β r β r β r β 
AssSim .183 .141 .023 .012 -.171 -.202** -.203-.200* .056 -.004 .178 .205**.083 .051 .021 .029
Gender .200 .144 -.143-.148* .035 -.007 .090 .081 .227 .264* -.033 -.123.199 .195* -.124 -.083
Parent-
hood -.138 -.112 .028 -.076 -.245 -.277** .043 -.015 .004 .094 -.167 -.173*.065 -.003 -.149-.151*
Educa-
tion .054 .095 .159 .151* .047 -.004 -.013 -.020 .061 .049 -.191 -.149*.171 .168* .017 .068
Perso-
nality .098 .031 .213 .21** .014 .036 -.049 -.006 .163 .201* .010 .077.043 .073 -.031 -.039
R² 
(R²adj) 
.078 
(.052) 
.088 
(.062) 
.102 
(.077) 
.048  
(.021) 
.096 
(.070) 
.099 
(.073) 
.075 
(.048) 
.036 
(.008) 
F 2.973* 3.352** 4.018** 1.765 3.710** 3.827** 2.843* 1.307 
DF*** 
(reg/res) 
5/175 
(181) 
5/174 
(180) 
5/176 
(182) 
5/176 
(182) 
5/175 
(181) 
5/175 
(181) 
5/176 
(182) 
5/176 
(182) 
P .013 .006 .002 .122 .003 .003 .017 .263 
Δ R² 
symp 
(β) 
.019 .000 .148 (-.496**) 
.029 
(-.221*) .004 
.026 
(.190*) .000 .008 
Note. * p < .05, **p < .01, *** N in parentheses 
PR = predictor, CR = criterion (general target-related performance score), 
AssSim = assumed similarity, symp = perceived sympathy, predictors are all 
indicators of similarity (higher value indicating higher similarity) 
 
To summarize, no general conclusion about the effect of similarity or sympathy on the 
performance in the social understanding tasks could be undertaken. Many diverse effects 
occurred in the analysis showing no systematic pattern of prediction by single predictor 
variables. This finding added to the results from the analysis of gender differences related to 
different target genders on the performances. Both findings point towards the importance of 
applying many and heterogeneous targets in order to balance effects of single target persons 
within the performance scales. 
However, it still needs to be considered that different items were underlying the 
different scenarios and the comparability of the scales was restricted. Nevertheless, the 
general scenario scores were highly correlated (see above). They contained only items that 
were included in the final content-related scales which had shown good internal consistencies. 
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Thus, there was at least some evidence that the performances within the scenarios was not 
only determined by different items but also by the same underlying ability domain. 
If this assumption was accepted, it could be reasoned in accordance with Snodgrass 
(2001) that the use of heuristics play a more prominent role when correlations-based scores 
are applied. However, these heuristics contributed diversely to the performance in the social 
understanding tasks, frequently resulting in lower scores. 
8.4.4.5 Exploring the Faceted Structure of Social Understanding – Research Question 3E 
The social understanding tasks were based on a 4 x 3 x 2 design cross-classifying four 
content domains (i.e., written and spoken language, pictures, and videos; V, A, P, and F, 
respectively), three modality domains (i.e., emotions, cognition, and relationships; E, C, and 
R, respectively), and two setting domains (i.e., private and public; PR and PU, respectively). 
This design was realized through the application of eight scenarios, each related to one target 
person. Originally, the design served as a methodological tool to balance possibly relevant 
variance components, to enhance representativeness of task material, and to control for 
method-related variance. However, literature suggested that some of the classificatory 
elements could as well represent meaningful ability domains that share systematic common 
variance. For example, academic intelligence theories distinguish between content ability 
domains related to verbal, figural-spatial or numerical contents (Carroll, 1993; Jäger, 1982). 
Tests of emotional abilities focus only on emotional task contents purporting that these 
represent a meaningful ability domain. However, tests of emotional intelligence 
conventionally do not systematically vary other modalities. Most of the tests of social abilities 
also do not systematically vary the contents (i.e., most of them rely only on written language) 
or the settings (see Table 5.3 and Chapter 5.3). 
The tasks applied in the present study allowed the investigation of the social 
understanding structure by relying on the three potential ability facets of contents, modalities, 
and settings. Whether the data supported a general social understanding factor beyond the 
specific ability factors, was also investigated. 
As a first step, the 4 x 3 x 2 design was realized by building the respective 24 cells. 
The item-total correlations and the reliabilities of the scales were examined. Table 8.30 
presents the results from this analysis showing the number of items in the cells, the 
descriptives, the empirically determined reliability coefficients, and the estimated reliabilities. 
The reliability estimation was conducted by applying the Spearman-Brown-Formula. The 
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applied test length was that of the content-related scales of social understanding with an 
average item number of 60. 
Table 8.30 
Psychometric Properties of the Social Understanding Cells Cross-Classifying Contents, 
Modalities, and Settings 
Cell* αemp Item Count % Items selected rtt est M SD 
SU_VEPR .400 14 54 0.74 -1.991 .498 
SU_VCPR .434 18 90 0.72 -2.463 .485 
SU_VRPR .293 6 46 0.81 -2.220 .623 
SU_AEPR .525 22 65 0.75 -2.242 .469 
SU_ACPR .483 18 75 0.76 -2.353 .474 
SU_ARPR .533 20 87 0.77 -1.816 .429 
SU_PEPR .477 16 70 0.77 -2.698 .540 
SU_PCPR .300 9 56 0.74 -2.398 .671 
SU_PRPR .463 15 83 0.78 -2.212 .499 
SU_FEPR .365 9 53 0.79 -1.991 .540 
SU_FCPR .451 13 72 0.79 -2.217 .553 
SU_FRPR .529 17 85 0.80 -1.990 .442 
SU_VEPU .630 20 71 0.84 -2.815 .506 
SU_VCPU .395 13 65 0.75 -2.846 .543 
SU_VRPU .314 5 63 0.85 -1.869 .637 
SU_AEPU .619 23 77 0.81 -2.206 .485 
SU_ACPU .334 9 38 0.77 -2.631 .645 
SU_ARPU .366 10 59 0.78 -1.893 .482 
SU_PEPU .396 18 72 0.69 -1.984 .443 
SU_PCPU .458 16 80 0.76 -2.198 .493 
SU_PRPU .358 10 91 0.77 -1.776 .444 
SU_FEPU .581 25 81 0.77 -2.109 .447 
SU_FCPU .571 13 81 0.86 -2.731 .645 
SU_FRPU .501 16 80 0.79 -1.680 .474 
Note. * first letter: content domain, second letter: modality domain, third and forth letter: 
setting domain, SU = social understanding, V = written language, A = spoken 
language, P = picture, F =video, E =emotion, C = cognition, R = relationships, PR = 
private, PU = public, αemp = empirical α, rtt est = estimated rtt
 
Prior to the reliability estimation, the item-total correlations were inspected. Items 
with a negative value were excluded from the analysis. Table 8.30 presents the percentage of 
items that were included in the final cells. It is worth noting that the percentage of items 
selected was generally larger than that of the overall content-related scales (see Chapter 
8.4.2.1). Between 41 and 44 % of the items in the scales SUv, SUa, and SUp showed positive 
item-total correlations. Only in the SUf scale, 81 % of the items correlated positively with the 
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total scale (see Table 8.9). Moreover, the empirically determined reliabilities were already 
high, accounting for the reduced number of items per cell. Consequently, the cells showed 
reasonable estimated reliability coefficients of rtt est between .69 and .86. The zero-order 
correlations were inspected and did not show a consistent pattern. Most of the correlations 
were positive in sign ranging from zero to .481. Only some were negative. The mean 
correlations between the cells was low with r = .14. 
Prior to investigating the faceted structure in combined models with all facets, the 
structure within one facet needed to be examined. Therefore, confirmatory factor analysis was 
applied to test a series of several models. The rational of analysis is presented in Table 8.31. 
All factors of one facet were postulated to be correlated. First, a general factor model 
with loadings of all cells was analyzed (Model U). Models V and W investigated the structure 
of the content facet. Model V postulated four ability factors according to the design. Model W 
established a two-factor structure including a language-based and a language-free factor 
(Model W) as identified in the faceted structure model of social intelligence (see Model I in 
Figure 8.11). Models X examined the factor structure of the modality facet postulating a 
three-factor solution with all three modalities (Model X). Finally, Model Y established a two-
factor model of the two setting domains. Table 8.31 presents the rationale for analysis and the 
summary of fit statistics from confirmatory factor analysis. 
None of the models showed a good data fit which was not surprising due to the low 
correlations between the cells. The loadings of the cells on the various latent factors were 
mostly positive in sign with the exceptions of two of the 24 cells which had slightly negative 
loadings of between -.03 and -.07 in all models (i.e., the SU_VRPU and SU_ARPU). The 
remaining loadings on all latent factors ranged between .22 and .73. 
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Table 8.31 
Fit Statistics for Confirmatory Factor Analyses of the Structure of the Social Understanding 
Facets 
Model χ² DF p (χ²) CFI RMSEA SRMR CI RMSEA* 
U: General factor model of SU 532.348 252 <.001 .624 .078 .091 [.069; .087] 
V: 4-Factor model of content 
facet (V-, A-, P-, and F-factors) 524.908 246 <.001 .626 .079 .091 [.070; .088] 
W: 2-Factor model of content 
facet (lb- and lf-factor) 531.469 251 <.001 .624 .079 .091 [.069; .088] 
W1: 2-Factor model of content 
facet (V- and A/P/F-factor) 528.033 251 <.001 .629 .078 .091 [.069; .087] 
X: 3-Factor model of modality 
facet (E-, C-, and R-factor) 501.124 249 <.001 .662 .075 .091 [.065; .084] 
X1: 2-Factor model of modality 
facet (E/C- and R-factor) 509.019 251 <.001 .654 .075 .091 [.066; .084] 
Y: 2-Factor model of setting 
facet (PR- and PU-factor) 532.349 251 <.001 .643 .079 .091 [.069; .088] 
Note. N = 182, * CI = 90% 
SU = social understanding, v = written language, a = spoken language, p = picture, 
f = video, lb = language-based, lf = language-free factor, e =emotion, c = cognition, 
r = relationships, pr = private, pu = public 
 
However, some conclusions were possible about the adequate number of factors per 
facet. Model V investigated the structure of the content facet and showed a perfect correlation 
of r = 1.00 between the pictorial and the video-based factor and a very high correlation of r = 
.90 between the pictorial and the auditory factor. The written language factor correlated with 
the other factors with r = .76 / .77 / .85 (with A, P, and F, respectively). From these high 
correlation indices computed, it was not clear whether the factors were structured as 
postulated by the original design. Moreover, data fit was not significantly better than that of 
the general factor model (Model V; χ²-difference = 7.440, df = 6, n.s.). 
Two more models were hypothesized representing first a two-factor solution (Model 
W) with a language-based and a language-free factor comparable to the faceted social 
intelligence structure from Model I (see Figure 8.11). Due to the slightly lower correlations of 
the written language factor compared to the other correlations, Model X1 postulated a two-
factor solution with a separate written language factor and a combined content factor with 
loadings of all cells belonging to the spoken language, pictorial, and video-based content 
domains. The latent factor intercorrelations were still very high. The language-based and 
language-free factors in Model W correlated with r = .95, the written language factor with the 
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factor of the remaining contents r = .86. The χ²-differences test still showed that Model U 
fitted the data better than Model W. However, the data fit of Model W1 was significantly 
better than that of Model U (χ²-difference = 4.315, df = 1, p < .05) suggesting the separability 
of the verbal content factor. 
Models X examined the factor structure of the modality facet. The three-factor 
solution in Model X showed a perfect correlation of r = 1.00 between the emotion’s and the 
cognition’s modality domains. The correlations of the modality relationships with the 
emotions and cognitions domain were r = .60 and .83, respectively. Therefore, Model X1 was 
established postulating a two-factor solution with a combined emotion and cognition modality 
factor and a relationships factor. The two factor correlated with r = .72. Finally, Model Y 
examined the settings facet and did not find evidence for separable ability domains related to 
the private and public task settings. Both factors correlated perfectly with r = 1.00. 
So far, the structure of only one facet at a time was examined. Now, the combined 
facetted models of social understanding should be established. The settings facet will be 
omitted from the analysis because data showed that no differentiation was possible between 
the two setting domains. Thus, a reduced faceted design was applied relying on cells on a 
higher level of analysis. The design relied on the 4 x 3 classification of four contents and three 
modalities. Another reliability analysis was conducted with these 12 cells. The results are 
presented in Table 8.32 including the number of items in the cells, the descriptives, the 
empirically determined reliability coefficients , and the estimated reliabilities. The reliabilities 
were estimated by applying the Spearman-Brown-Formula to a test length of 60 items. 
Again, the reliabilities were relatively high for the small item number in the cells. 
Moreover, the number of items that were omitted due to a negative item-total correlations was 
low compared to the overall content-related scales (see Chapter 8.4.2.1). In general, both 
reliability analyses based on the cells suggested that the scales were more internally consistent 
and items were more homogeneous when the entity of analysis was smaller. 
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Table 8.32 
Psychometric Properties of the Social Understanding Cells Cross-Classifying Contents and 
Modalities 
Cell* αemp Item Count % Items selected rtt est M SD 
SU_VE .638 34 63 0.76 -2.504 .397 
SU_VC .583 29 71 0.74 -2.622 .430 
SU_VR .261 14 67 0.60 -1.965 .384 
SU_AE .718 45 70 0.77 -2.187 .418 
SU_AC .471 33 69 0.62 -2.515 .363 
SU_AR .577 32 80 0.72 -1.821 .348 
SU_PE .572 32 67 0.71 -2.367 .404 
SU_PC .515 26 72 0.71 -2.271 .439 
SU_PR .483 25 86 0.69 -1.958 .355 
SU_FE .646 36 75 0.75 -2.103 .396 
SU_FC .623 25 74 0.80 -2.517 .490 
SU_FR .636 33 83 0.76 -1.839 .371 
Note. * first letter: content domain; second letter: modality domain, SU = social 
understanding, V = written language, A = spoken language, P = picture, F =video, 
E = emotion, C = cognition, R = relationships 
αemp = empirical α, rtt est = estimated rtt, 
 
The zero-order correlations between the cells are presented in Table 8.33. Only the 
correlations below the diagonal are relevant at present. The correlations between the cells 
were consistently high with only very few zero or slightly negative correlations. The cells 
SU_VE, SU_PR, and SU_FR showed some systematically lower correlations with other cells. 
The correlations were generally larger than those between the previous cells which 
additionally varied the setting (mean r = .26 compared to .14 in the preceding analysis). 
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Table 8.33 
Correlations between the Social Understandings Cells Cross-Classifying Contents and 
Modalities 
Cella SU_VE SU_VC SU_VR SU_AE SU_AC SU_AR SU_PE SU_PC SU_PR SU_FE SU_FC SU_FR
SU_VE  .376** .009 .186* .131 .269** .340** .146* .300** .363** .448** .303**
SU_VC .399** .219** .450** .334** .484** .441** .325** .389** .612** .503** .396**
SU_VR .021 .200**  .250** .228** .202** .176* .213** .220** .261** .252** .272**
SU_AE -.100 .291** .145  .331** .248** .286** .300** .232** .502** .413** .329**
SU_AC .089 .345** .099 .376** .108 .357** .361** .098 .349** .394** .217**
SU_AR .161* .380** .247** .217** .004 .248** .214** .395** .275** .366** .518**
SU_PE .156* .336** .167* .324** .297** .263** .096 .151* .357** .478** .321**
SU_PC -.009 .184* .189* .364** .283** .253** .155* .245** .372** .346** .289**
SU_PR .267** .312** .269** .072 -.037 .419** .167* .208** .335** .378** .381**
SU_FE .165* .514** .161* .522** .377** .224** .328** .374** .200**  .514** .336**
SU_FC .431** .458** .221** .238** .317** .298** .355** .295** .308** .454** .448**
SU_FR .275** .310** .288** .163* .065 .504** .280** .272** .395** .241** .442**
Note. N = 182; * p < .05; ** p < .01 
a first letter: content domain; second letter: modality domain 
 correlations based on cell residuals (with target variance partialled out) above diagonal 
v = written language, a = spoken language, p = picture, f =video, e =emotion, 
c = cognition, r = relationships 
 
Eventually, confirmatory factor analysis should be used to examine the faceted 
structure of social understanding as operationalized by the 12 cells. The rationale of the 
analysis and the fit statistics of the models are presented in Table 8.34. First, a general factor 
model was established (Model Z) with loadings of all of the cell indicators on one general 
factor. The second model postulated the entire 4 x 3 design with four correlated content 
factors and three correlated modality factors (Model AA). According to the preceding results 
(see Model V), further models combined the emotions and the cognitions factor on the 
modality facet. Consequently, Model AB relied on a 2 x 2 design with two correlated 
modality factors (EC and R) and two correlated content factors (i.e., a V-factor and a 
combined factor of A-, P-, and F-contents). Model AC postulated a language-based and a 
language-free factor on the content facet and two modality factors. All factors were 
correlated. Since the content factors showed rather high intercorrelations in the preceding 
analysis, the next model established one general factor with the loadings of all of the 
indicators and two uncorrelated modality factors (hierarchical solution; Model AD). This 
model tested whether a differentiation into different content factors was necessary. A final 
8.4   Results   
 274 
model in the course of this analysis relied on the 2 x 2 faceted structure as identified in Model 
AC. Additionally, a higher order general social understanding factor with the loadings of all 
of the indicators was introduced. The correlations between the ability factors were omitted 
(Model AE). This model tested whether data supported a hierarchical faceted structure of 
social understanding. 
Table 8.34 
Fit Statistics for Confirmatory Factor Analyses of the Faceted Structure of Social 
Understanding 
Model χ² DF p (χ²) CFI RMSEA SRMR CI RMSEA* 
Z: General factor model of SU 202.708 54 <.001 .722 .123 .096 [.105; .141] 
AA: 4x3-Facetted model (4 
contents v, a, p, f and 3 
modalities e, c, r) 
54.101 33 .012 .961 .059 .047 [.028; .087] 
AB: 2x2-Facetted model (v- 
and a/p/f-content factors, and 2 
modality factors e/c and r)a
65.422 41 .009 .954 .057 .050 [.029; .082] 
AC: 2x2-Facetted model (2 
contents lb and lf and 2 
modalities e/c and r) 
62.491 40 .013 .958 .056 .051 [.026; .081] 
AD: Hierarchical model 
(general content factor and 2 
modalities e/c and r) 
69.821 42 .004 .948 .060 .054 [.034; .085] 
AE: Hierarchical model with 
2x2-facetted design 
(uncorrelated factors) and 
general SU-factor 
52.149 31 .010 .961 .061 .047 [.030; .089] 
AF: 2x2-Facetted model AC 
based on cell residuals (target 
variance controlled)a
58.866 41 .035 .971 .049 .041 [.014; .075] 
Note. N = 182; * CI = 90%; a two error terms constrained to be equal 
SU = social understanding, v = written language, a = spoken language, p = picture, 
f = video, lb = language-based, lf = language-free factor; e =emotion, c = cognition, 
r = relationships, pr = private, pu = public 
 
Data fit for the general factor model was poor (Model Z; CFI = .722; χ² = 202.708; p < 
.001). The loadings were all positive and varied between .34 and .69. Model AA postulated 
the original 4 x 3 design and showed substantially better data fit (CFI = .961; χ² = 54.101; 
p=.012). The loadings on the modality factors were rather homogeneous and ranged between 
.38 and .71. Again, the emotion and cognition factors correlated perfectly with r = 1.00 and 
were combined in further analysis. The relationships factor correlated with the emotions and 
cognitions factors with r = .58 and .66 respectively. The loadings on the content-related 
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factors, however, were not consistent; a few loadings were slightly negative. The loadings on 
the written and spoken language factor ranged between -.08 and .93, and those on the pictorial 
and video-based content factors ranged between -.23 and .34. Thus, the factors could not be 
identified as coherent ability factors of the respective content domains. 
According to the preceding results, the next model postulated a 2 x 2 faceted structure 
with a separate written language content factor and a combined factor of the remaining 
contents. Two modality factors were established (i.e., E/C and R), all factors belonging to one 
facet were correlated. The model showed reasonable data fit close to the fit of the 4 x 3 
faceted structure model. One error term appeared at the lower bound so that an equality 
constraint was introduced. Models AA and AB were nested. The χ²-differences test showed 
no significant better fit for Model AA (χ²-difference = 11.321, df = 8, n.s.) and the more 
parsimonious Model AB was accepted supporting the combination of the ability factors E and 
C and the content factors A, P, and F. The correlation between the content factors, however, 
was again very large (r = .92). To explore the structure more closely, another faceted model 
was established (Model AC). This model postulated a different structure on the content facet 
and combined the written and spoken language factors into a language-based content factor. 
The pictorial and video based factors were combined into a language-free content factor. 
Again, the emotions and cognitions modality factors were combined. The data fit was slightly 
better than that for Model AB (CFI = .958; χ² = 62.491; p=.013). Moreover, the relation of χ² 
to the degrees of freedom was slightly better than that of Model AB. Again, the χ²-difference 
test showed no significant better fit for Model AA (χ²-difference = 8.390, df = 7, n.s.) so that 
the more parsimonious Model AC was supported. The content factors still showed a rather 
large intercorrelation (r = .84). Because of the necessary equality constrained in Model AB 
and the slightly worse relation of χ² to the degrees of freedom compared to Model AC, Model 
AC was accepted as the best model to utilize. 
Figure 8.18 presents the standardized solution showing the loadings and factor 
intercorrelations. The modality factors exhibited a reasonably large correlation (r = -.48). The 
negative sign corresponded with the loadings on the two factors which were negative on the 
emotions/ cognitions factor and positive on the relationships factor. 
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Figure 8.18 
Standardized Solution of Faceted Model of Social Understanding (Model AC) 
Note. CFI = .958; χ² = 62.491, p=.013; * p < .05; error terms are enclosed with the manifest 
variables 
v = written language contents, a = spoken language contents, p = pictorial contents, 
f = video-based contents, e = modality emotion, c = modality cognition, r = modality 
relationships 
 
The loadings particularly on the content factors, however, were very heterogeneous. 
Except for one indicator (i.e., .17; the spoken language contents emotion modality), all 
loadings were of equal direction but varied largely between -.06 and -.77. The loadings on the 
modality factors were more homogeneous showing only one outlying loading (-.03 for cell 
VE). The model clearly supported the differentiation into the modality factors and their 
coherence as an ability domains. The factor intercorrelations between the content factors, 
however, raised doubts concerning the necessity of this differentiation. Moreover, the loading 
pattern did not support the content factors as meaningful and useful content domains. 
The next model tested whether the content facet in fact represented a necessary 
differentiation. Therefore, a model was established with two modality factors and one general 
factor consisting of the loadings from all of the cell indicators (Model AD). The modality 
 276 
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factors were kept uncorrelated. The model showed reasonable data fit (CFI = .948; 
χ² = 69.821; p=.004). A χ²-differences test showed a significantly better fit for Model AC 
(χ²-difference = 7.330; df = 2, p < .05) supporting the differentiation into the two content 
domains. 
Another hierarchical model was postulated relying on the faceted 2 x 2 structure 
supported in the previous analysis (Model AC). Additionally, one general social 
understanding factor with loadings of all of the indicators was introduced where the ability 
factors of the two facets were kept uncorrelated. The model also showed reasonable data fit 
(CFI = .961; χ² = 52.149; p=.010). The loadings on the general social understanding factor 
were rather homogeneous and ranged between .23 and .73. The loadings on the modality 
factors remained stable compared to Model AC. The loadings, however, on the content-
related factors changed meaningfully (i.e., loadings on the language-based content factor were 
between -.49 and .25; loadings on the language-free content factor ranged between -.36 and -
.08). The loadings did not exhibit a consistent pattern, particularly on the language-based 
contents; thus this factor could not be identified as a coherent ability domain. 
In summary, the models supported a modality facet that differentiated between 
relationships and emotions / contents as meaningful ability factors. The loadings on the 
modality factors were generally consistent. Contrarily, evidence for a meaningful content 
related ability facet was weaker. Particularly, the loadings on the language-based content 
factors were very heterogeneous, making this factor unable to be interpreted. However, a 
general social understanding factor was supported by the consistently large loadings of all of 
the indicators. 
Effect of Target-Related Variance – Research Question 3E2 
The social understanding tasks (i.e., the scenarios) were related to eight different target 
persons. The large correlations between all of the scales or between the previously identified 
ability factors might have been elevated by the common variance related to information from 
the scenarios (i.e., information about the same target persons). Thus, the effect of the target 
related variance on the social understanding structure was to be explored in this section. 
Originally, it was intended to control for the common target variance by establishing 
uncorrelated target related factors in addition to the previously established faceted structure. 
Therefore, cell indicators were built relying only on the cross-classification of contents, 
modalities, and targets. The same principle for the cell building was applied as in the 
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preceding analysis. The estimated reliabilities of the cell indicators ranged between .44 and 
.92 (based on 5 – 23 items). The cell intercorrelations within the scenarios did not suggest 
underlying common variance in most of the scenarios. Only the scenarios Renate (RF) and 
Hannah (HR) showed meaningful within-scenario correlations of r between .126 and .406. 
The correlations for the remaining scenarios ranged from r = -.201 to r = .348. 
Attempts to conduct confirmatory factor analysis relying on these cells was not 
successful and most of the models did not converge. Therefore, the model should be 
approximated by exploratory factor analysis in order to extract factor scores of the target 
related factors. The procedure applied was as follows. First, the factor score of the first 
principle component of all of the indicators was saved. Thus, the common variance of all of 
the indicators was determined which could be labeled as a general social understanding factor. 
This factor score was partialled out of every single cell indicator. Through this step, the 
desired common social understanding variance was controlled for. This step was intended to 
correspond with the establishment of a general factor of social understanding besides the eight 
target related factors. The latter would only assemble variance purportedly unrelated to the 
common social understanding variance. Without this step, the target related factors would also 
include general social understanding variance which was not the desired outcome. 
Subsequently, in order to build indicators of the common target variance per scenario, eight 
further exploratory factor analyses were conducted and the factor scores were saved. Each one 
of the factor analyses entered only the residuals of all of the indicators related to one scenario. 
These factor scores were sought to contain only the variance common to one target person 
(i.e., without any common social understanding variance) only. Finally, these factor scores 
were partialled out of the previously built cells (i.e., cross-classifying contents and modalities) 
in order to examine the faceted structure without the influence of the target related variance. 
The intercorrelations between the cell residuals are presented in Table 8.33 above the 
diagonal. All correlations increased in size compared to those between the original cell 
indicators. The two-faceted model with 2 x 2 factors of contents and modalities (Model AC) 
was replicated relying on the cell residuals (see Model AF in Table 8.34). The model showed 
good data fit (CFI = .971; χ² = 58.866; p=.035). However, one error term was at the lower 
bound so that an equality constraint on two error terms was introduced. The loadings on the 
modality factors were stable compared to Model AC. The loadings on the emotions / 
cognitions factor ranged between .48 and .76, and on the relationships factor between .41 and 
.72. The factor intercorrelation was higher than in Model AC (r = .74). The loadings on both 
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content factors, however, revealed a heterogeneous pattern showing both positive and 
negative loadings ranging from -.48 to .38; an interpretation of the two factors was not 
possible. The factor intercorrelation also changed substantially from .84 in Model AC to .29 
in Model AF. This was surprising because the underlying cell intercorrelations were also 
larger between the cells of the same contents. 
In summary, the results suggested that controlling for common target variance seemed 
to replicate and support the modality facet with two factors. The content related factors were 
not supported by data, which cannot be explained at this point. However, the way the factor 
scores of the common target variance were composed was certainly not the most ideal way. It 
would have been better to extract the factor scores from confirmatory factor analysis since 
this would have excluded the error variance from the factor scores which is now still included. 
Thus, it did not seem surprising that the residuals of the cell indicators intercorrelated to a 
large extent because the unsystematic variance was removed by partialling out the factor 
scores of the target factors. 
Interaction effect of tasks contents and modalities on performance in social 
understanding tasks – Research Question 3E3 
The third research question related to the facetted design of the social understanding 
tasks, referred to the question of whether performance varied between the cells. Archer and 
Akert (1980) investigated the effect of task material on the performance of social 
understanding tasks in a between-subjects design. Each group of subjects worked on the same 
tasks but was provided with different task material (i.e., different cues). One group was 
provided with the full material (i.e., including audio and pictorial information). One group 
was provided only with video information, one with auditory information. Results showed 
that there was no meaningful general influence of the type of cues or the task material on the 
accuracy. However, some specific effects were discovered showing that some task material 
favored performance in some aspects. In certain cases, subjects’performance reached a level 
comparable to the “full material condition” when only one part of a scene or just one piece of 
information was provided. 
The design of the social understanding tasks in the present study did not allow for the 
replication of this analysis. A difference between the mean performance in the cells of the 
social understanding tasks could not be attributed unambiguously to an interaction of task 
material with the queried modality but could also be an effect of different tasks underlying 
each cell. However, the items within the cells were also heterogeneous (see Table 6.3 in 
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Chapter 6.2.2.1) with the only common element, for example, being the judgment of emotions 
based on pictorial material. In any event, the investigation of the mean differences between 
the cells still appeared interesting and could turn out to be relevant for possible subsequent 
test modifications. 
Thus, the mean differences between the cells of the 4 x 3 design were investigated by 
applying a two-factor analysis of variance involving two repeated measurement factors (i.e., 
one factor with four contents and one factor with three modalities). The means and standard 
deviations of the cells are included in Table 8.32. Table 8.35 presents the results of the 
ANOVA with two repeated measurements factors. Both repeated measurement factors and the 
interaction effect reached significance. Figure 8.19 shows the means of the cells. Post hoc 
tests revealed significant mean differences between most of the paired comparisons except for 
the comparisons between (a) the cells SU_VR and SU_PR, (b) the cells SU_AR and SU_FR, 
and (c) the cells SU_AC and SU_FC. 
Table 8.35 
Analysis of Variance with Two Repeated Measurement Factors (Contents and Modalities) 
Source of variance 
Sums of 
square DF 
Mean 
squares F Probability Eta² 
.028 Repeated measures (contents) 15.083 3 5.028 43.870** <.001 
.237 Repeated measures (modalities) 129.689 2 64.844 445.753** <.001 
.033 
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Figure 8.19 
Mean Performance in the Cells of the 4 x 3 Facetted Design of Social Understanding Tasks 
Note. 1 = written language, 2 = spoken language, 3 = pictures, 4 = videos 
 280 
Study 2  Chapter 8 
 281
In general, there was a large effect of the modality facet, which exhibited better 
performance for the judgment of relationships and lower performance for the judgment of 
cognitions. The effect of the content facet was small but significant and showed the lowest 
performance in cells based on written language. This finding replicated the results from the 
analysis of the descriptives of the social understanding scales (see Chapter 8.4.2.1 and 
Table 8.11). 
The interaction effect in the surprisingly high mean performance of the cell SU_PC 
clearly suggested an effect of the task construction. The pictorial cells showed the second 
lowest performance in judging emotions and relationships but the best performance in judging 
cognitions. There was no plausible explanation for this effect except for the fact that the items 
for this cell were possibly constructed to be easier because of the assumption that it could be 
harder to judge emotions based only on pictorial information. 
8.4.4.6 Process During the Tasks of Social Understanding – Research Question 3F 
This last section regards the processes that underlie the social understanding tasks. 
Some researchers distinguished between the role of perception, interpretation, and knowledge 
in social judgments (Bless et al., 2004; Buck, 1983) and some were concerned with the 
necessary amount of extrapolation from the task material to the requested output (i.e., direct 
vs. mediated perception; see Buck, 1983; Gage & Cronbach, 1955). For a more detailed 
description of these processes see Chapter 4.3.3.1 and 5.2.4.1. The definitions underlying the 
test construction clearly suggested that only the interpretation of the task material should 
determine the performance in the social understanding tasks. Knowledge requirements should 
only be included to a minimum extent. Consequently, both perception (i.e., of the relevant 
cues in the task material) and interpretation requirements should be addressed by the social 
understanding tasks. Thus far, it was not clear whether these postulated processes were in fact 
realized by the tasks. The tasks provided substantial background information which could be 
used to assemble a knowledge base about the target person. The consecutive questions are 
whether test takers only rely on information from the task material for judging the mental 
states of target persons or how much knowledge about target persons or the presented 
situations contributed to their performance? 
A study which would be capable to provide answers to these questions would require a 
different design than the one of the present study. How such designs could be established will 
again be addressed in Chapter 10. At present, these questions were approached in two 
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different ways. First, the present analysis examined whether there was an increase in the 
accuracy of judgments during the course of the scenario tasks. If an effect of the course of the 
tasks within one scenario on the accuracy could be observed, this could then be attributed to 
the assembling of an underlying knowledge structure (Research Question 3F1). Second, the 
relationship of performance in the social understanding tasks to the long term memory (LTM) 
task was explored (Research Question 3F1). 
Performance During the Course of the Scenarios – Research Question 3F1 
As a first step, the correlations of the mean performance for each item with the item 
position in terms of the underlying scene within the course of the scenarios was assessed. 
Table 8.36 presents the data basis for this analysis in the form of the distribution of task 
contents across the course of the scenarios. 
Table 8.36 
Distribution of Items Across All Scenarios According to the Contents and the Positions Within 
the Scenarios 
 Position within scenarios 
Material 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Written language 5 0 5 41 5 8 0 29 15 0 7 
Spoken language 32 32 11 0 0 6 58 9 4 0 0 
Pictures 11 9 27 13 19 6 11 17 0 0 0 
Videos 17 17 14 4 20 41 0 10 0 1 0 
 
Table 8.36 shows the absolute position within each scenario (i.e., numbered from the 
beginning scene through to the last). However, the number of the scenes varied between 
scenarios (between eight scenes for CK, KL, FB, and MM; nine scenes for BS, CP, and R; 
and eleven scenes for RF). Prior to any correlative analysis, the position within each scenario 
was recoded according to the maximum possible number of scenes. Thus, the positions in the 
scenarios with eight scenes were weighted by 1.375 (positions based on nine scenes were 
weighted by 1.222) in order to standardize the maximum possible range of scenes to 11. If the 
positions were not weighted, the correlations at the high end of the item position would have 
relied on a reduced number of targets. Thus, weighting the positions according to the 
maximum number of scenes seemed to be the best approach. 
As it can be seen in Table 8.36, the task contents were distributed unequally across the 
scenes so that any analysis based on these raw data would be biased by the influence of 
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different task contents. The contents showed different levels of accuracy as did the different 
modality domains. The modality domains were unequally represented within one scene (i.e., 
the number of items per modality domain varied between one and six). Therefore, the means 
of the previously applied cells (see Table 8.32) were subtracted from the score on each item in 
order to account for the mean accuracy level. 
The resulting overall correlation of the mean accuracy per item with the standardized 
position of the scene within the scenarios was around zero with r = .047 (N = 182; n.s.). 
Looking at the single scenarios, the pattern of correlations was equivocal. Table 8.37 presents 
the correlations for each scenario, showing mostly positive correlations. The scenarios 
Christop (CP) and Hannah ( HR) showed a small negative correlation (r = -.116 / -.099, 
respectively). Mean Performance in the course of scenario Friedrich (FB), however, 
correlated substantially with the item position (r = .465, N = 182, p < .01). Since the level of 
accuracy was controlled for, this result could not be an effect of the order of scenes within the 
scenario. 
Table 8.37 
Correlations of Item Position and Performance for the Single Scenarios 
 Scenarios / Target persons 
 Overall 1 (RF) 2 (BS) 3 (CK) 4 (CP) 5 (KL) 6 (FB) 7 (HR) 8 (MM)
Pearson r 
(performance with 
item position) 
.047 
(.020) 
.026 
(.018) 
-.002 
(.007) 
.049 
(-.034) 
-.116 
(-.158) 
.035 
(-.042) 
.465** 
(.458) 
-.099 
(-.121) 
.044 
(.030) 
Note. ** p < .01 
 correlations not corrected for the mean accuracy level in parentheses 
 
These results generally suggested no substantial influence of the course of testing on 
the performance within the scenarios. Thus, there was no evidence for an influence of 
accumulated knowledge on performance. Only performance in the scenario Friedrich was 
significantly and positively correlated to the item position. The reason for this finding could 
not be clarified at the moment. However, to assess the influence of the order of scenes (i.e., 
information from different task material and background information) within one scenario on 
performance more profoundly, experiment variations would be necessary that vary the order 
of the scenes between groups. 
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Relationship to Long Term Memory 
The long term memory task was based on the information contained in the scenarios. 
The long term memory task differentiated between memory for the information included in 
the task material (LTM_mat) and memory for the background information provided in the 
introductions to the scenarios and the scenes (LTM_back). A higher performance could point 
towards a more profound information processing of the respective information in the 
scenarios. Thus, if higher long term memory of only the task material was associated with 
better performance in the scenarios, this would carefully point towards perception based 
bottom-up processing as a determinant of social understanding abilities (Bless et al., 2004; 
Buck, 1983). If performance was related to the long term memory of the background 
information, this would suggest knowledge based top-down processing (Bless et al., 2004; 
Buck, 1983). 
To examine this research question, two long term memory scales were constructed. 
One represented a general scale related to the information of task materials (i.e., LTM_mat). 
For example, one item  required the identification of the correct wording within a written 
language scene. Another scale included items related to the background information contained 
in the scenarios (LTM_back). For example, the recall of the number of children a target 
person has was requested. Table 8.38 presents the reliabilities of the long term memory 
scales, the correlations within the long term memory scales and with the content related social 
understanding scales. 
Table 8.38 
Reliabilities of the Long Term Memory Task and their Correlations with the Social 
Understanding Scales 
 Cronbach’s alpha (Item number) 
r within LTM 
rmat / back
SUv SUa SUp SUf SUps 
LTM_mat .718 (35) .155*(.120) 
.156*
(.063) 
.169* 
(.063) 
.145 
(.097) 
.107
(.050) 
LTM_back .527 (13) 
.510**
(.344**) .098
(.089) 
.094
(.026) 
.082 
(.008) 
.088 
(.050) 
.011
(-.025) 
Note. N = 181; *p < .05, correlations with residuals of LTM (social memory tasks partialled 
out) in parentheses 
LTM_mat = material-related long term memory; LTM_back = background 
information-related long term memory, su = social understanding, v = written 
language contents, a = spoken language contents, p = pictorial contents, f = video-
based contents, ps = personality ratings 
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The scale reliabilities were reasonable for the material related long term memory scale 
(35 items). However, the reliability of the background related long term memory scale was 
not sufficient, but the scale was only based on 13 items. Both scales were highly 
intercorrelated with r = .510. Focusing on the correlations between the social understanding 
scales and the original long term memory scales, there was a small effect for the long term 
memory scale based on the material related information (r between .107 and .169). The 
correlations with the background information related scale were consistently smaller and not 
significant. However, the long term memory scales were related to the social memory tasks 
(r = .148 - .657); this correlation could be attributed to the common variance of social 
memory and understanding. As expected, controlling for the variance of social memory 
resulted in a substantial decrease in correlations between long term memory and the social 
understanding scales (see parentheses in Table 8.38). Thus, no evidence was provided 
whether performance in the social understanding tasks was determined by a more profound 
information processing of either the material related scale or the background information. In 
any event, it is certain that performance was determined to a large extent by interpretative 
demands as was intended by the task constructions and supported in the present analysis. 
8.5 Summary and Discussion Study 2 
The leading aims of Study 1 and 2 were the construction and validation of a test 
battery of social intelligence, the SIM. A first version of the SIM was applied in Study 1 
based on a sample of 126 university students. After Study 1, item formats, the number of 
items, and presentation and answering times were adjusted according to the empirical results 
and subjects’ experiences during testing. Study 2 was particularly directed at the verification 
of the results obtained from Study 1. However, limitations exist when comparing the two 
studies due to the fact that different sample characteristics such as age distribution and 
occupational range existed. Moreover, some task modifications or extensions were not based 
on empirical results, which further limited the comparison between the studies (e.g., the 
change of the rating format of the social understanding tasks from six- to seven-point scales). 
Aside from these limitations, Study 2 replicated, extended, and partly contradicted the results 
from Study 1. The following section will briefly summarize the main findings. A discussion 
of the necessary steps for further test development will be resumed in the final Chapters. 
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Test Construction and Psychometrics – Research Question 1A 
Social Understanding Tasks 
The aim of task modification after Study 1 included: the enhancement of heterogeneity 
of the tasks (i.e., more target persons), the balancing of the taxonomic elements within the 
tasks, a reduction and a standardization of testing time per scenario across the sample, the use 
of only one rating format (i.e., seven-point rating scales), and an increase of the number of 
items in order to improve the reliabilities. The test modifications in Study 2 realized the 
intended changes to a large extent. One problem, however, was the testing time which still 
varied between the test takers. However, the extent of variation could be reduced. 
The screening procedures and the investigation of the psychometric properties of the 
data mainly supported the task modification steps. Problems with missing values or 
distributions did not occur. Furthermore, the reliabilities of the final scales were sufficiently 
high and the scales were highly intercorrelated. In Study 1, the correlations were rather small 
between the personality ratings and the content related social understanding scales (r = .078 - 
.127). Contrarily, all social understanding scales showed high correlations with the 
personality ratings in Study 2 (r = .472 - .645). In Study 1, the rating scales were based on 
6-point scales for the content related scales and on 5-point scales for the personality ratings. 
Whether this change contributed to this finding, however, could not be clarified. 
Problematically, the number of items showing a negative item-total correlation was 
large for most of the scales. Surprisingly, the same analysis relying on the more specific cells 
of the design generally showed a relatively larger number of items with sufficient item-total 
correlations. This finding suggested that the concept of homogeneity (and the application of 
Cronbach’s alpha as an indicator for the reliability) might not be an appropriate concept for 
the social understanding tasks. The tasks were constructed to contain heterogeneous elements. 
Thus, an alternative method to determine the reliability of the scales should be considered in 
the future (e.g., retest reliability). 
The standard deviation of the social understanding scales seemed to be restricted 
compared to the standard deviations in Study 1. The scale range was increased in Study 2 
(i.e., from a 6-point to a 7-point rating scale) and the means in Study 2 in comparison to 
Study 1 reflected this change. However, the standard deviation of the tasks remained at about 
the same level as in Study 1 (.364 - .486 versus .389 - .472, respectively for Study 1 and 2). 
The origin of this finding was not clear since also the sample was more heterogeneous. 
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Social Memory Tasks 
The problems encountered in Study 1 regarded too short presentation and answering 
times which resulted in a large number of missing values in the pictorial and the video based 
tasks (SMp2 and SMf). Due to the resulting small amounts of items, the reliabilities of the 
scales were sometimes low and one task could not at all be used in the analysis (i.e., SMp2). 
Additionally, the social memory tasks applied in Study 1 showed meaningful (but undesired) 
reasoning and speed requirements as reflected by high correlations to the BIS Reasoning and 
Speed domain. This was in part attributable to the short presentation and answering times and 
thus, to unwanted speed variance. Task modifications in Study 2 involved the extension of 
presentation and answering times, or, in turn, the reduction of the relative number of stimuli. 
Additionally, the number of items was increased in order to enhance the reliabilities. 
The analysis in the present study showed that the task modifications succeeded only to 
a limited extent in improving the psychometric properties of the social memory tasks. It was 
proven that the number of missing values could be reduced substantially, however, the 
reliabilities of the final scales improved only slightly and were still not sufficient. 
Nevertheless, the tasks showed consistent within-domain correlations except for the second 
auditory task (SMa2) which also exhibited the lowest reliability coefficient. 
Social Perception Tasks 
The social perception tasks utilized in Study 1 did not show consistent within-domain 
correlations. No particular psychometric weaknesses occurred. In Study 2, one task was added 
for each content domain. The aim for the task development was to assimilate the underlying 
task requirements in terms of complexity. The analysis of the psychometric properties in 
Study 2 showed sufficient reliability coefficients and no severe distribution problems were 
encountered. The newly developed tasks based on pictures and videos (i.e., SPp2 and SPf2) 
showed increased difficulty which pointed towards the desired result of complexity. The 
resulting within-domain correlations were larger than those in Study 1, which provided some 
evidence that the task modifications seemed to have succeeded. However, controlling for the 
speed baseline variance resulted in a reduction of most of the correlations so that no coherent 
ability domain was supported by data. 
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Validity Evidence 
Structure of Social Intelligence – Research Question 2A 
The internal structure of social intelligence as assessed by the SIM was examined by 
correlational and confirmatory factor analysis. Similarly as in Study 1, the analysis supported 
two correlated ability factors of social understanding and memory. However, social 
perception could not be established as a coherent ability domain and was subsequently 
omitted from analysis. The factor intercorrelation between social understanding and memory 
was small but meaningful (r = .20) and fit statistics from confirmatory factor analysis favored 
the model with two correlated over two uncorrelated factors. A χ²-differences test also 
revealed preference  of the structural model over a hierarchical model with a general social 
intelligence factor. This finding contradicted the results from Study 1 and raised doubts about 
a higher order social intelligence construct. In Study 1, the correlation between social 
understanding and memory was substantially larger with r = .35 and a hierarchical model was 
supported by data. 
Data fit statistics also supported a model establishing a faceted structure of social 
intelligence with two facets cross-classifying two operations (i.e., social understanding and 
memory) and two contents (i.e., language-based and language-free contents). However, the 
model showed some weaknesses with regard to the loading pattern on the content related 
factors which was rather heterogeneous. Thus, evidence for the validity of a content related 
ability facet was weak if at all existent. 
Convergent and Divergent Construct Validity – Research Question 2B and 2C 
The present study could not prove the convergent construct validity of the social 
intelligence tasks with the PONS as a measure of nonverbal sensitivity. However, 
correlational and confirmatory factor analysis supported the divergent construct validity from 
the construct of academic intelligence. Confirmatory factor analysis supported separable 
ability factors with. The large correlations between social memory and BIS-Reasoning and 
the BIS-Speed domain were reduced which pointed towards being on the right way for task 
modifications after Study 1. By replicating the results from Study 1, social intelligence proved 
the structural independency from academic intelligence. In this respect, the structural model 
of social intelligence with two correlated ability factors was supported when only the 
residuals of the social intelligence indicators with BIS variance partialled out were applied. 
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In extension to Study 1, the data fit supported a combined faceted model of social and 
academic intelligence. The social intelligence tasks loaded on the operative ability factors BIS 
Reasoning and Memory and on a separate “social contents” factor, complementing the 
existing differentiation of the BIS into verbal, numerical, and figural-spatial abilities. The 
content factors were positively intercorrelated. The operative factor intercorrelations were 
rather low (r = .08), which was interpreted as meaning that no common higher order general 
intelligence factor for social and academic abilities could be supported. To integrate the 
findings, a combined faceted model is presented in Figure 8.20 showing the two additional 
“social content” cells classified into the faceted BIS-Model. 
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Figure 8.20 
Combined Facetted Model of Social and Academic Intelligence with Social Intelligence as an 
Additional Content Domain 
Note. R = Reasoning, M = Memory, F = Figural, C = Creativity, S = Speed, V = Verbal 
abilities, F = Figural abilities, N = Numerical abilities 
 in boldface are cells applied in the combined facetted model of Fig. 8.13 
 
By replicating the analyses in Study 1, the present study also provides evidence for the 
divergent construct validity of the social intelligence tasks with personality traits. 
Furthermore, no substantial correlations with self-reported social and emotional skills were 
observed (research question 3A). 
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Further Findings 
Gender Differences – Research Question 3B 
The findings from Study 1 and 2 complemented and partly contradicted each other. 
Regarding the overall gender differences for the social intelligence tasks, a few effects were 
observed in both studies favoring female subjects. Contrary to Study 1, male subjects tended 
to show better performance than female subjects in the social understanding tasks, however, 
this effect was not significant. 
Regarding the interaction between the subject and the target gender in the social 
understanding tasks, the findings from Study 2 clearly contradicted the results from Study 1. 
In the first study, an analysis of variance showed a significant main effect of the targets’ 
gender with a higher mean performance in scenarios related to female targets. Furthermore, a 
significant main effect of the subjects’ gender occurred with slightly better performance from 
female subjects. 
In Study 2, an analysis of variance revealed only a main effect of the targets’ gender 
showing a higher mean performance in scenarios related to male targets. However, no main 
effect of subjects’ gender was observed. Moreover, by relying only on those targets that were 
also applied in Study 1, a different pattern of results emerged showing a comparably lower 
mean performance in scenarios related to female targets. This finding could be attributed to 
some extent to a rise in mean difficulty for the scenario Katharina (SU_KL) and to the adding 
of the two “female scenarios” (SU_CK and SU_HR) which were among the most difficult 
ones. 
Scoring Methods – Research Questions 3C 
One additional domain of exploratory research concerned the exploration of 
alternative scoring methods (i.e., group consensus scoring and correlations-based scoring). 
Study 2 showed that correlations between group consensus and target scoring were difficult to  
interpret. The correlation size depended on the item difficulty which usually represents an 
obscured effect not visible when aggregated scales are applied. Moreover, it was 
demonstrated that the bivariate distributions between target and group consensus scoring 
revealed a curvilinear relationship under certain conditions. This occurred when items were 
regarded as showing the same target answer, the same mode answer in the sample, and a 
minimum of a one-point deviation between the two. 
Study 2  Chapter 8 
 291
Correlations-based scoring was applied as an alternative scoring procedure for the 
social understanding tasks. This method is originally intended to compensate for the different 
use of rating tendencies of both judge and target. The present study revealed one predominant 
weakness of this scoring method, namely, very low reliabilities. Moreover, the method as 
presented in Snodgrass (2001) did not consider the analysis of reliability coefficients because 
only one score is conventionally calculated per subject. The validity results of the social 
understanding tasks based on this scoring method showed no consistent inter-scoring 
correlations (i.e., with the target scoring scales) and low intra-scoring correlations. One other 
substantial change in validity results was observed in the correlational analysis of the 
divergent construct validity with personality traits. Correlations which were small and 
negative in sign (e.g., with Extraversion and Agreeableness) were still small but positive 
when correlations-based scoring was applied. Whether this finding could be attributed to the 
use of rating scales could not be clarified at this point. 
Effect of Similarity on the Performance in the Social Understanding Tasks – Research 
Questions 3D 
Cronbach (1955) established the idea that the assumed and the real similarity between 
judge and target contributes to the accuracy in social understanding tasks. In the present 
study, indicators of the assumed and the real similarity were assessed. The amount of 
explained variance by these indicators was generally low except for the scenario Renate 
(SU_RF) with R²adj = .081. Surprisingly, the prediction was enhanced when the perceived 
sympathy for the target person was added. However, for some targets, the effect of sympathy 
and also of the assumed similarity was negative suggesting that performance decreased when 
the targets were more sympathetic or more similar. To provide a careful post-hoc explanation, 
this finding pointed towards a reduced accuracy in information processing because the 
assumed similarity and / or the perceived sympathy suggested the use of heuristics to 
accomplish the social understanding tasks. However, this result was only valid for some of the 
targets and above all suggests that the number of targets should be increased in order to 
balance these diverse performance determinants. 
Faceted Structure of Social Understanding – Research Question 3E 
The social understanding tasks applied in Study 2 allowed the investigation of the 
structure of the social understanding tasks as postulated in the faceted design with cross-
classifications of contents, modalities, and settings. No comparable analysis was possible in 
Study 1 since the items contained an imbalanced taxonomy. 
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Prior to the final analysis of the structure, the reliabilities of the cells of the faceted 
design were analyzed and showed comparably high reliabilities regarding the reduced number 
of items in the cells and more items with positive item-total correlations resulted (see above). 
This finding suggested that items in one cell of the design were more homogeneous than 
items within the content related scales as applied throughout most of the present study. 
Confirmatory factor analysis of the faceted structure supported the modality facet with 
a differentiation into one factor related to the judgment of emotions and cognitions, and one 
factor related to the judgment of relationships. The loadings on the factors were stable and 
both factors were consistently intercorrelated across all models. Analysis furthermore 
supported the differentiation into a factor with loadings of all language-based cells and one 
with loadings of language-free task contents (i.e., the χ²-differences test showed better fit for 
the two-factor instead of a one-factor solution). However, the loadings were heterogeneous on 
the content factors so that an interpretation of the factor was hardly possible. The faceted 
structure could be maintained when common target variance was controlled for. Finally, a 
hierarchical structure was also supported by the data suggesting the existence of a higher-
order social understanding factor. 
Examining the Process Underlying the Social Understanding Tasks – Research 
Question 3F 
Two statistical approaches were applied in the present study to examine the processes 
contributing to the accomplishment of the social understanding tasks. One approach focused 
on the level of performance during the course of the scenarios. The underlying assumption 
suggested that the accumulation of knowledge about the target person would result in an 
increase in accuracy. This assumption was not supported by data; the mean performance did 
not rise along with the course of the scenarios except for the scenario Friedrich. 
The second approach examined the correlation of performance in the social 
understanding tasks with the long term memory of information contained in the scenarios. In 
this instance, a higher long term memory of the task material would point to a more profound 
information processing of the material-related contents and thus suggest that perception 
would play a larger role (i.e., bottom-up processing; see Bless et al., 2004; Buck, 1983). A 
higher correlation with the long term memory of background information about the targets 
and the situations would point to a larger role of knowledge in the accomplishment of the 
tasks (i.e., top-down processing, see Bless et al., 2004; Buck, 1983). 
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Results showed no evidence for a relationship of long term memory of background 
information with the performance in the scenarios. Only small correlations were discovered 
for the performance with long term memory of task material. Controlling for the common 
social memory variance resulted in a reduction of the correlation size. Thus, neither pure 
bottom-up, nor top-down processing determined the performance in the social understanding 
tasks. Conforming to the underlying definition of social understanding, this finding, however, 
strengthened the role of interpretation of the social cues for task accomplishment and thus 
pointed to a match of the intended measurement construct and the task requirements. 
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9 General Discussion 
The superordinate foci of the present work were threefold. One focus was aimed at 
establishing the theoretical foundations of social intelligence as a multidimensional cognitive 
performance construct. The second focus concerned the elaboration of the methodological 
foundations relying on already existing measurement approaches and empirical studies. 
Derived from these considerations were the principles of test development for a new test 
battery of social intelligence, the SIM. The third focus regarded the investigation of the 
psychometric properties of the newly developed tasks and the construct validity of social 
intelligence as assessed by the SIM. 
The subsequent Chapters will discuss the pivotal issues with respect to the 
aforementioned foci and therefore, elaborate upon the differentiation into the theoretical 
foundations (Chapter 9.1), the methodological foundations and test construction principles 
(9.2), and the empirical findings with a main focus on the psychometric properties and 
construct validity (9.3). 
9.1 Theoretical Foundations 
The present work conceives social intelligence as a cognitive ability construct. It 
explicitly distinguishes between this cognitive abilities’ approach and approaches that rely on 
behavioral aspects. The conceptual foundation for the present work was the performance 
model of social intelligence (Weis & Süß, 2005; Weis et al, 2006) and the framework of 
socially competent behavior (Süß et al., 2005). The performance model of social intelligence 
represents an integrative attempt to subsume and classify theoretical and operational 
definitions extracted from the literature (see Chapter 4.3.1 and 4.3.2). It originally represented 
a structural model distinguishing between social understanding, social memory, social 
perception, and social creativity as the cognitive ability domains. The model was modified in 
the present work by adding a hierarchical assumption in terms of a higher-order social 
intelligence factor. The classification of the cognitive ability domains overlaps with 
established ability domains in models of academic intelligence (Carroll, 1993; Guilford, 1967; 
Jäger, 1982). Moreover, the relevance of this differentiation also finds support in 
classifications from social cognitive psychology. In their attempt to disentangle the social 
cognitive processes, Bless et al. (2004) also distinguish between perceptive functions (i.e., 
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social perception), interpretative processes (i.e., social understanding), and storage and 
retrieval functions (i.e., social memory and creativity). Both psychological disciplines, 
namely differential and social psychology, assign a special role to social knowledge. In 
definitions of social intelligence, social knowledge is still vaguely defined. It is assumed that 
any knowledge construct includes not only cognitive requirements, but is also strongly 
influenced by culture and the learning environment. Bless et al. (2004) conceive social 
knowledge as having an impact on all remaining cognitive processes by, for example, guiding 
the encoding of cues into existing categories and the top-down controlled interpretation of 
social cues. The subsequent test development focuses only on the domains of social 
understanding, memory, and perception. Some more detailed considerations will be presented 
in Chapter 10 about possible extensions of the SIM by the inclusion of tasks of social 
creativity and social knowledge. 
Complementary to the aforementioned cognitive operations, further taxonomic 
principles visible in definitions and operationalizations of social intelligence and in related 
disciplines such as the psychology of emotions or social cognitive psychology are identified. 
These taxonomic classifications are related to (a) the queried modalities (i.e., the output of 
social cognitive operations such as judgment of emotions or personality traits), (b) the 
contents or social cues (i.e., the input that the judgment relies on such as body language or 
tone of voice), (c) the settings (i.e., the context conditions or the type of setting), and (d) the 
targets (i.e., the person or situation as the object of judgment; self vs. others; familiar targets 
vs. strangers). These considerations do not claim to be exhaustive, as this would not be 
possible. Both the number and types of taxonomic facets and the number and types of 
elements within one facet cannot be overlooked. For example, classifications of emotions in 
the literature and the associated empirical studies are manifold (Ekman, 1999; Lazarus, 1991; 
Roseman, 2001; Scherer et al., 2001). Comparably numerous are the classifications of 
discriminable personality traits. Consequently, the guiding question underlying the present 
and any further taxonomy must be that of the relevance and significance of the 
differentiations for assessing social (or emotional) intelligence. To accomplish these 
requirements, the taxonomic elements must be discriminable and sufficiently broad to allow 
adequate operationalizations and identification by the subjects, and to permit a preferably 
representative assessment. Another question concerns the implementation of the taxonomic 
elements in measurement instruments. In this respect, a differentiation of taxonomic elements 
is only useful when it can be realized in the intended measurement approach. For example, 
assessing the ability to judge emotions in familiar persons (e.g., family members) is hardly 
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possible in group testing situations because every subject would have to bring a family 
member to the assessment; or the test administrator would have to accompany every subject 
to his or her home. 
The benefits of an underlying theory-based taxonomy are self-evident (see also Cattell, 
1987). It allows a more systematic and broad comprehension of the respective construct and 
consequently a more methodical assessment. It permits the classification of existing 
measurement approaches and thus a more profound interpretation of empirical findings. 
Taxonomic considerations can be applied as a methodological tool to balance method related 
variance within psychological tests. At the same time, it provides the foundation for a 
potential faceted model of the respective construct which allows the disentangling of different 
variance sources and the identification of meaningful ability domains besides operative ability 
factors. 
9.2 Methodological Foundations and Test Construction Principles 
To provide the methodological foundation for the subsequent test development, 
existing measurement approaches and the surrounding methodological problems and 
challenges were addressed with a focus on the class of cognitive ability tests. Existing 
approaches were discussed in the light of the methodological shortcomings and the resulting 
validity evidence. The resulting empirical problems, above all, concern low reliabilities and 
the lack of convergent and divergent validity evidence. In light of these considerations, the 
most striking problems are identified as the use of artificial and decontextualized item 
material, the use of only written language contents, a lack of theoretical a-priori 
considerations and, consecutively, a mismatch between the purported measurement construct 
and the actual task requirements. 
During the course of test development, several decisions were necessary which partly 
relied on the aforementioned criticisms of existing approaches and which are more or less 
debatable. These concern the test principles of all social intelligence tasks (i.e., the application 
of genuine task material, the differentiation into the different content domains, and the 
selection of response formats) (Chapter 9.2.1) and specific questions surrounding the social 
understanding tasks (i.e., the application of a scenario approach and the application of the 
target scoring procedure) (Chapter 9.2.2). 
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9.2.1 Test Principles of all Tasks 
Genuineness of Task Material 
One relevant claim for all newly developed tasks was the application of genuine task 
material. The most striking advantages of genuine compared to posed or artificially produced 
material are the ecological validity and the availability of scoring standards for the social 
understanding tasks. With respect to the ecological validity, the task material in the present 
test development represents a variety of persons and situations. Any test battery based on 
posed material does not seem to be capable to comprise a comparable variety of contents. Any 
fictitious story or script cannot reflect the diversity of real life that often provides unexpected 
events; it is the unexpected contents that occur in real life that could hardly be included in 
scripts. Although professional script writers have certainly learned to account for this 
problem, it can be assumed that posed or artificial task material tends to favor “typical” 
situations that occur in real life. With respect to the honesty in providing truthful answers to 
questionnaires and to the recorded scenes, this implies several benefits and problems that are 
addressed in a later section when the target scoring procedure is discussed. 
Other disputable issues refer to the efforts of material sampling for the target persons 
and the consequences for the test constructors. The target persons, particularly those included 
in the social understanding tasks, were accompanied for a certain period of time (i.e., between 
a few hours and two days) in both private and public situations. They were recorded by digital 
camcorder, voice recorder, and photocamera. Additionally, some were required to fill out 
questionnaires, provide answers to the recorded scenes, and hand out text material. The 
resultant questions concern the authenticity of the exhibited behavior and the honesty of the 
information provided. With respect to authenticity, the experience during the recordings 
clearly suggested that targets get used to the fact that they are being observed (e.g., video-
taped) after a certain time after the beginning of the recordings. This was confirmed by the 
colleagues who were responsible for the recordings and of whom one was always acquainted 
to the respective target. The consequences of relying on genuine compared to posed or 
artificial task material for the test constructor are distributed on different points throughout 
the test construction process. Prior to the recordings, the exertion of writing scripts represents 
a greater effort compared to “simply” selecting target persons and accompanying them over 
two days. After the recordings, the work on the sampled material represented the greater 
effort including the assessment of the target information (only in social understanding tasks), 
the selection of the most appropriate scenes out of all of the recordings, the matching of the 
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material contents with the taxonomic demands, and the editing of the scenes in order to 
achieve adequate item formats. 
One disadvantage of genuine task material lies in the quality of the task material. The 
quality was sometimes limited in the present test construction because no artificial means 
were applied to modify the situation (e.g., the setting up of floodlights). However, the quality 
of most of the material was good and subjects were instructed to ignore any restrictions in 
quality. 
Differentiation of Task Contents 
The taxonomy underlying all tasks was intended to help balance the situative input and 
the contents of the task material (see Chapter 6.2.1). The latter varied in terms of the applied 
task material (i.e., written and spoken language, pictures, and videos). Spoken language 
contents did not include pictorial information, and videos did not contain an audio stream. 
This classification originally served as a methodological tool to balance method related 
variance. The systematic variation of contents was also conceived as a variation of the social 
cues displayed in the task material. However, it must be questioned whether this classification 
represents an appropriate differentiation of social cues (occurring in real life) or whether it is 
rather artificial. Several classifications seem sensible in real life, however, they overlap to a 
certain extent and do not allow unequivocal assignment of the type of cue to the type of 
content. For example, social cues can diverge into language-based and language-free 
(nonverbal) cues while language-based cues can rely on written or spoken language. At the 
same time, spoken language also contains cues that are not intrinsically related to the 
language but to the way of using the language itself (e.g., the intonation). This fact was used 
in the auditory social perception task (SPa2) where artificial (senseless) spoken sentences 
were applied and subjects had to identify the correct emotion relying only on the “language-
free” cues such as intonation. In turn, originally language-free cues contained in pictures or 
videos without including an audio stream contain totally different cues such as postures, 
gestures, mimic, etc. which differ from the language-free cues in spoken language. 
Furthermore, the different cues related to the task material also differ in terms of the 
approximation to cues occurring in real life. Written and spoken language cues occur in 
letters, emails, and telephone conversations as typical ways of communication. Photographs 
are probably the most unusual social cues compared to the remaining task contents. Moving 
pictures (i.e., videos) without auditory information are probably seldom relevant because 
conventionally, people can listen to communication while viewing the person. However, 
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situations are possible to think of where people watch others from a certain distance so that 
they cannot listen to the conversation but still interpret the nonverbal cues they see from a 
distance. 
This fact notwithstanding, it seems that it is the combination of nonverbal cues (i.e., 
from the tone of voice to postures and gestures) and language-related information which is 
one meaningful aspect in human interactions. This combination, however, was not included in 
the design of the SIM and the consequences cannot be determined. It is certainly true that, in 
this respect, the sum of the parts does not equal the whole. It cannot be clarified whether 
performance particularly in the social understanding tasks is enhanced when combined task 
contents are applied. Contrarily, Archer and Akert (1980) claim that providing all possible 
cues may be confusing for the subjects because cues sometimes stand in contradiction to each 
other. Their results, however, showed that performance was highest when the full material 
was provided. At any rate, the results in Study 2 did not reveal a particular bias except for the 
fact that written language material was the hardest to interpret in the social understanding 
tasks. In the end, an answer to this question requires an empirical investigation. 
Response Format and Item Selection 
Some conceptual weaknesses of the present work concern the procedure of the 
selection of adequate response formats for the social understanding tasks, the applied 
response formats of all of the tasks, and the process of item selection. 
Regarding the selection of response formats for the social understanding tasks, Study 1 
was directed at empirically identifying scale properties depending on the response formats 
(i.e., ratings-based, multiple-choice, and open-ended formats) used. However, the first task 
version did not systematically vary the response formats across different contents and 
modalities. Moreover, the number of items per format was not balanced. Thus, separate scales 
related to the different formats could not be built so that the question of format selection could 
not be answered empirically only. The actual procedure compared scales based on all item 
formats to scales based on rating format only and found comparable reliability coefficients 
and larger within-domain correlations for the ratings-based scales. Additionally, the decision 
to apply only the rating format in the subsequent task modifications was also based on the 
question of economy of testing and test construction. However, together with the task 
modifications of the social memory tasks, this decision resulted in different response formats 
in all three operative ability domains. In Study 2, rating formats (social understanding), 
multiple-choice and open-ended formats (social memory), and response latency formats 
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(social perception) were applied. As MacCann (2006) demonstrated, the use of different 
response formats resulted in a drop in correlation size. It can be speculated that the lower 
correlation between social understanding and memory (on a latent level) in Study 2 was, in 
part, due to different response formats. 
With respect to the last issue, the selection of adequate items for the final scales in 
Study 1 was based on the item-total correlations (besides conceptual considerations related to 
the taxonomy). The resultant Cronbach’s alpha coefficient consequently represented an 
overestimation because the scale was optimized for the respective sample. Problematically, 
the modifications of nearly all tasks in Study 2 did not only refer to the application of the 
selected items, but frequently included further changes such as the response format, different 
distracters, and different underlying item material. Therefore, the effect of only item selection 
could not be examined in Study 2 and the item-total correlations could not be compared to 
those in Study 1. This could explain the partly large number of negative item-total 
correlations and would require one more step in test development, namely the confirmation of 
the present item selection in another sample. 
9.2.2 Test Approach of the Social Understanding Tasks 
Selection of the Test Paradigm 
Different from the test approaches for the social memory and perception tasks, the 
social understanding tasks represented an unparalleled attempt, without a specific predecessor 
in the literature, which combined a scenario approach with the so-called postdiction paradigm. 
A scenario presented a target person in his or her natural surroundings based on scenes of all 
four types of task material. The advantages of this approach lies in the opportunity to 
introduce context information in an efficient way. The introduction of context information 
would not be accomplished for a comparable number of items if each item referred to a 
different background. In the present approach, one item refers to various context information. 
These can be differentiated into the specific item background related to the respective scene, 
the overall background related to the target person, and the general social background (e.g., 
the biographical information about the targets or all other information about the life of the 
targets and the situations). 
The effect of the use of such rich context information on the performance beyond the 
influence of the information provided by the task material could not be clarified in the present 
work. An open question remains that addresses a possible anchoring effect of specific 
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information and the activation of knowledge structures about the target persons or the 
situations. Anchoring effects concern, for example, the elicitation of expectations by the 
instructions to specific scenes. It is important that these instructions are formulated as neutral 
as possible without suggesting the target responses to subsequent items. At the same time, the 
instructions are supposed to direct the subject’s attention to the relevant cues in upcoming 
scenes. It cannot be clarified whether the balance between neutrality and attention control was 
accomplished in the present work and this question must be subject to further investigation. 
It is unclear whether and how much subjects made use of existing knowledge 
structures in judging the mental states of the targets. The task definition identifies that only 
the interpretation of the task material determines performance. However, the situations in the 
scenarios or the target persons possibly elicit the memory for one’s own experiences and  
associated knowledge structures. If this happens and subjects do not explicitly exclude the 
influence of such knowledge, potential top-down processes may influence information 
processing. In this respect, stereotypes represent an extended type of top-down processing 
relying on heuristic information processing. Stereotypes may also be elicited by certain 
general person characteristics of the targets (e.g., gender or religion stereotypes, stereotypes 
of a specific profession such as a bartender, etc.). The designs of the studies in the present 
work do not allow the investigation of these effects. Some ideas about future research 
questions and designs will be provided in Chapter 10.2. 
Target Scoring Procedure 
The scoring of the tasks of social understanding or related social or emotional abilities 
is subject to controversial discussions (Cronbach, 1955; Legree et al., 1995; Mayer & Geher, 
1996; Schulze et al., 2007; Tagiuri, 1969; Wilhelm, 2005). Several scoring procedures are 
suggested (i.e., target scoring, group and expert consensus scoring, standards-based scoring). 
The problems of group consensus scoring were already discussed in detail (see Chapters 
5.2.4.2 and 8.4.4.3) and shall not be mentioned again. Standards based scores could not be 
applied in the present test approach. The chosen scoring in the present work was target 
scoring, however, this procedure is also debatable. The most crucial concerns in the literature 
and from the present work are the validity of the target information about their mental states, 
the accounting of Cronbach’s (1955) original critique of the influence of stereotype accuracy 
on the target score, and the specific algorithms to calculate the target score. 
Regarding the validity of the target information, this represents a serious problem 
encountered in the discussion about target scoring. It is frequently questioned whether target 
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persons are capable of reporting their true mental states because these may be too complex or 
too difficult to communicate or perhaps may be deemed socially undesirable (MacCann et al., 
2004; Mayer & Geher, 1996). Some researchers, however, also report that targets are more 
precise in judging their mental states compared to external observers and, at the same time, 
not as precise in judging their own behavior (Spain, Eaton, & Funder, 2000 as cited in 
O’Sullivan, 2007). In the present work, it was attempted to account for single imprecise or 
intentionally dishonest answers throughout the process of item construction and selection by 
sorting out items where answers contradicted with what was obvious in the recordings of the 
respective situation or with any other information available. However, it could not be clarified 
entirely whether, at some point, the targets were not providing the “right” answer about their 
mental states. Therefore, necessary future directions concern the application of peer and 
expert ratings to validate the target answers. Moreover, necessary test documentation needs to 
archive which are the relevant cues within the task material that support the target answer (see 
Chapter 10). 
Cronbach’s (1955) critique of the target scoring procedure referred to the influence of 
separate accuracy components that constitute the target score and that bias a simply calculated 
difference score. The most important component represents the stereotype accuracy (i.e., the 
degree to which a judge predicts the mean answer of a group of targets). According to 
Cronbach, the single components are influenced by the interaction of the assumed and the real 
similarity between judge and target. The present scoring procedure did not account for this 
alleged problem. Since the targets were judged on different items, it was not possible to 
conduct the suggested componential analysis (Cronbach, 1955) that decomposes the variance 
of the target score into the different types of accuracy (i.e., stereotype and differential 
accuracy; see Chapter 5.2.4.1 for a detailed description). Thus, it could not be clarified 
whether or to what extent the present target score was determined by the Cronbach 
components. Analysis showed that the real and assumed similarity or the perceived sympathy 
was not meaningfully correlated with performance in the scenarios. Only some specific 
effects related to specific target persons could be identified. This analysis certainly does not 
imply the focus of Cronbach who was only regarding the use of rating format and not the 
general idea of assumed or real similarity. However, without relying on empirical data, some 
arguments can be considered that seem to put Cronbach’s critique into another perspective: 
(a) subjects were instructed to show maximum performance so that they should show a 
maximum strive for accuracy, (b) subjects have maximum resources and unlimited time 
available. If they had not, this would usually limit profound information processing and 
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enhance the probability to apply mental shortcuts such as stereotypes (Bless et al., 2004; 
Tagiuri, 1969), (c) the scenarios contain unfamiliar situations and persons which should 
minimize a bias due to prior knowledge, and (d) eight targets were applied so that a potential 
influence of stereotype accuracy or any other heuristic information processing due to 
similarity, prior experience, or sympathy should be balanced in the content related scales 
across the targets. 
A final problem that must not be ignored concerns the specific mathematical 
procedure applied in the present work. The target scores were calculated by the weighted 
differences between the subject and the target answer. The weights accounted for the position 
of the target answer and the resulting maximum possible deviation (see Chapter 6.2.2.1). 
Thus, the basis for the scoring was the target answer on the 7-point rating scale (6-point in 
Study 1). This answer, however, was, in turn, calculated from the original target answer 
which took place on the 10 cm analogous scale (i.e., divided into 100 mm for an original 
answer between 0 to 100; see Chapter 6.2.2.1). Consequently, for the 7-point rating scale, an 
original target answer of 0 to 14 received a score of 1, from 15 to 29 a score of 2, etc. This 
procedure implied two major problems: (a) some original target answers lay at the border 
between one rating category and the next (e.g., an original answer of 14 received a score of 
“1”; an original answer of 15 received a score of “2”) and (b) the extreme original answers (0 
and 100) were put into the same extreme rating categories (“1” and “7”) as less extreme 
original answers (e.g., 10 or 90). With respect to the latter point, the endpoints of the final 
rating scales were formulated as to refer to the extreme cases “e.g., not at all present or 
extremely present). To provide insight into the relevance of this problem, the original answers 
of four targets (CK, CP, FB, and MM) were inspected and showed that a meaningful number 
of original target answers are affected by the assignment of original answers to rating 
categories. Out of a total of 236 original target answers, 18 lay exactly on the category 
borders. For the example from above, this would reflect an original answer of 14 or 15. 
Additionally, 20 answers were one point beyond the borders (e.g., 13 and 16). However, for 
these four targets, only three original target answers belonged to the extreme categories 
without representing the true extreme answers of 0 or 100 so that this problem seems 
negligible. 
However, it seems interesting to recalculate the scores in order to explore the impact 
of the present procedure. Particularly, it seems interesting to reassign the extreme categories 
to only the extreme original answers and to create five categories in between by dividing the 
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original answers between 2 and 99 by 5. This would also result in a smaller number of 
original answers that lie exactly on or close to the category borders. 
9.3 Studies and Empirical Findings 
Sample and Procedures 
The empirical findings in the present work are based on two main studies. Study 1 
included a sample of 126 German university students (mage = 21.35; sd = 3.06; 53.5 % 
females). In Study 2, an unselected sample of adults participated (mage = 28.69; sd = 5.57; 
58.8 % females). The subjects in Study 2 were heterogeneous in terms of age, education, and 
occupation. The total testing time, including breaks, was 10 hours for Study 1 and 12 hours 
for Study 2. Testing was conducted on two separate days, with half of the testing time 
occurring on each day. On every testing day in Study 2, the testing was organized in four 
blocks with a break in between each block. 
One concern refers to the lack of comparability of the two samples. The samples not 
only differ in terms of biographical features, but also in terms of the mean performance level 
in the BIS scales (see Appendix D). This complicates the interpretation of the mean difficulty 
levels of the newly developed tasks. At the same time, it is a notable finding that the models 
of social intelligence structure could be replicated in Study 2. 
Another concern addresses the rather long testing time per day (i.e., 5 and 6 hours, 
respectively in Study 1 and 2) and possibly related problems of compliance or exhaustion. In 
Study 2, the perceived exhaustion was assessed at four different time points during the testing 
(i.e., Day 1 Block 1, Day 1 Block 4; Day 2 Block 1, and Day 2 Block 4). The mean level of 
exhaustion rose from the first to the last block, however, it did not reach an extreme level (see 
Table 8.8 in Chapter 8.3). Moreover, the perceived exhaustion in one block did not correlate 
with the performance in the tasks of the respective block (higher exhaustion expressed by 
lower scores). In Block 1 on Day 1, the correlations ranged between -.140 and .008; in 
Block 4 on Day 1, from -.012 and .056. In Block 1 on Day 2, the correlations ranged from 
-.129 to .061 and for Block 4 on Day 2 from -.102 to.061. 
Thus, it is apparent that perceived exhaustion did not play a role for performance 
which corresponded to the experiences during the testing. Only very few subjects complained 
about the long testing time or asked for an earlier break. 
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Empirical Findings 
a) Scale reliabilities 
One big concern represents the reliability analysis of the tasks. Cronbach’s alpha was 
applied as an indicator of the reliability. This coefficient requires the homogeneity of the item 
true scores of one scale. However, the task conception is meant to be heterogeneous so that it 
is questionable whether really high reliability coefficients can be achieved at all. The analysis 
showed mostly sufficient reliability coefficients, however, all scales were optimized by 
excluding items with a negative item-total correlation. Interestingly, the number of items with 
a negative item-total correlations in the social understanding tasks was smaller when the 
entity of analysis was smaller (i.e., when only the cells of the social understanding tasks were 
analyzed). This supported the assumption that the items were rather heterogeneous when the 
overall scale level was regarded. In any event, future research should investigate the retest-
reliability in order to provide further insight into the reliability of the newly developed tasks. 
Any further issues of future task modifications based on the psychometric properties of the 
present tasks (e.g., the lower reliabilities of some social memory tasks) are described in the 
upcoming Chapter 10. 
b) Item difficulty of social understanding tasks 
Another issue requiring some sophistication represents the problem of difficulty of the 
social understanding tasks. Several analyses throughout both studies yielded varying degrees 
of difficulties, depending on the type of scales applied, furthermore partly inconsistent 
findings. The most debatable empirical findings are to be repeated hereafter: (a) the content-
related social understanding scales showed varying difficulty patterns (i.e., in Study 1, the 
pictorial scale; in Study 2, the video-based scale showed the lowest difficulty level), (b) the 
difficulty level related to the different targets showed inconsistent findings (i.e., scenario 
Katharina was among those with the lowest difficulty in Study 1 and among the most difficult 
in Study 2), and (c) the cell judgment of cognitions based on pictures showed a rather low 
difficulty although the remaining cells based on pictures were among those with the highest 
difficulty. Every single one of those findings could have been underpinned by some post-hoc 
explanation. However, after all, it appeared inevitable to develop a schema to deliberately 
estimate and adjust the item and scale difficulties. Such a schema should account for the 
determinants of difficulty regarding the different taxonomic elements of the social 
understanding tasks. First steps in this undertaking could be (a) the obtaining of expert ratings 
and (b) the documentation of the relevant cues within task material. This could be compared 
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to the item difficulties in the present sample. Both the assembling of expert ratings and further 
design-related issues to deal with this problem will be addressed in Chapter 10. 
c) Social perception tasks 
Another concern that emerged during the analysis refers to the lack of convergence of 
the social perception tasks. The intercorrelations seemed to support a coherent construct 
however, controlling for the speed baseline measures resulted in a substantial reduction of 
correlation size for most of the tasks. Confirmatory factor analysis could also not identify a 
common social understanding factor. Seidel (2007) elaborated her findings concerning the 
social perception tasks in detail and concluded that different underlying processes contributed 
to the apparent lack of convergence between the social perception tasks. She differentiated 
between processes that only require sensory perception based on physiological channels (i.e., 
auditory cues such as laughter) and those that require a larger amount of processing (e.g., 
perception of written language cues). This idea is similar to the differentiation of Bless et al. 
(2004; see also Chapter 4.3.3.1) between perception and encoding as processes that address 
any incoming information. The authors refer to perception as the pure physiological 
perception process of stimuli entrance. Contrarily, encoding functions reflect the process of 
assigning a mental representation to perceived stimuli by the use of available social categories 
(e.g., assign “smile” to a perceived movement of a person’s mouth, or “man” to a perceived 
person). Regarding this classification, the elicited perception process depends on the applied 
stimulus. It could be assumed that the concreteness of the stimulus and the sensory channel 
determine the subsequent process. However, research is needed that addresses this question 
empirically. 
d) Construct validity of social intelligence  
Regarding the internal structure of social intelligence, the analysis in Study 2 did not 
convincingly support a general social intelligence factor which contradicted the findings from 
Study 1. A hierarchical model showed good data fit, however, a comparison with the 
structural model showed better fit for the structural model. This finding clearly needs 
replication. First and foremost, it should be accounted for the possibility that this finding was 
due to the different formal characteristics of the items underlying the social understanding and 
memory domain (e.g., ratings-based scales vs. multiple-choice and open-ended response 
format, untimed vs. timed administration; respectively). However, if this finding was 
confirmed in future research, the performance model of Weis & Süß (2005) needed to account 
for tthis lack of coherence. 
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With respect to the divergent construct validity, the present analysis clearly 
demonstrated the benefits of applying a sophisticated measure of academic intelligence such 
as the BIS-Test (Jäger et al., 1997). Eventually, the divergent construct validity of social 
intelligence as assessed by the SIM was demonstrated although analysis relying on specific 
levels of the hierarchical BIS-Model first raised doubts about the construct independence (i.e., 
large latent factor intercorrelations between social memory and BIS-Memory with r = .67). 
e) Content-related ability factors in faceted designs 
One pivotal question emerging from the investigation of faceted models throughout 
Study 2, of both the SIM and the BIS and the SIM combined, concerns the content-related 
ability factors. Although the faceted structure of social intelligence, and of social 
understanding was supported by confirmatory factor analysis, results showed heterogeneous 
and partly uninterpretable loadings on most of the postulated content factors. They, in times, 
seem to allocate “residual” variance so that a meaningful differentiation within the content 
facet was hardly possible. Only one language-free factor in the faceted model of social 
understanding showed a rather coherent loading structure. At the same time, a combined 
faceted model of social and academic intelligence supported a “social content” factor with 
heterogeneous but consistently directed loadings of the social intelligence indicators. To 
attempt putting these findings in context, some more issues need attention. 
The social understanding tasks did not show the typical bias related to written 
language task material as frequently found in past empirical studies. The tasks were only 
marginally related to the verbal BIS content domain. This fact may be responsible for the lack 
of common “language” variance with social understanding tasks based on spoken language 
and thus, for the diverse loadings on the language-based factor of social understanding. 
Moreover, the spoken language contents do not only rely on language-related cues what may 
additionally imply a different impact. In contrast to the language-related contents, the pictorial 
and video-based tasks of social understanding show at least some meaningful common 
content variance allocated on a language-free content factor. 
Regarding the findings from the faceted model of social intelligence, the social 
understanding and memory tasks differ in one important aspect that may be responsible for 
the lack of common content-related variance. In the social understanding tasks, the content-
related differentiation only has an impact on the task material and thus on the provided cues. 
Since the task conceptualization required the interpretation of the task material, the task 
product is only indirectly related to the cues in the task material. In contrast, the content-
General Discussion  Chapter 9 
 309
related differentiation in the social memory tasks also influences the task product because the 
task conceptualizations required that only objectively provided information must be queried. 
Thus, tasks based on written and spoken language pose items only referring to the language 
contents (as the only objective cues). 
To summarize, while the social understanding tasks apply to a distinction of different 
queried modalities related to a basically independent differentiation of task material (i.e., a 
full cross-classification is possible of modalities and material-related contents), the social 
memory tasks only query objective cues that directly depend on the task material (what 
information is queried directly depends on the material-related contents). This could explain 
why a differentiation into task contents was not truly relevant for the social understanding 
tasks so that no meaningful common content variance could be discovered with the content-
depending social memory tasks. 
Conclusively, the question remains which social contents were allocated in the social 
content factor in the combined faceted model of social and academic intelligence. This model 
seems to support Guilford’s (1967) conceptualization of social intelligence as an autonomous 
content domain (i.e., behavioral contents) besides, for example, symbolic and semantic 
contents. However, the loadings on this factor and the factor intercorrelations with the BIS 
suggest that it is rather language variance that determines the social content factor. The 
language-based cell of social memory showed the highest loading (.78), and the factor was 
correlated with r = .52 with BIS-Verbal abilities. The remaining loadings of the social 
intelligence indicators were substantially smaller but all positive so that at least, weak 
evidence was provided that the factor was also determined by contents beyond those related to 
language. 
f) Analyses relying on the target-related social understanding scales 
The social understanding tasks were based on eight scenario, each related to one target 
person. The actual focus of the present work lay on the construction and investigation of 
social understanding scales related to the task contents to match the MTMM design of the 
SIM. In this original conception, idiosyncratic effects of different targets (e.g., similarity and 
sympathy between judge and target or different sending accuracy of targets) were all 
subsumed under the idea of item difficulty. Thus, the aforementioned replies to Cronbach’s 
(1955) critique also applies at the present point in terms of the maximum performance 
situation induced by the tasks with unlimited resources provided. 
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Some analyses in Study 2 switched the focus from the content-related scales to scales 
that aggregated items related to the target persons. Results showed no systematic influence of 
the possible biases as far as they could be accounted for. However, some effects were 
discovered related to specific scenarios. For example, performance in the scenario Renate was 
predicted to no meaningless extent by indicators of assumed and real similarity. The 
perceived sympathy for the target person could, moreover, add significantly to the prediction 
in three other scenarios (i.e., Bringfried, Christoph, and Friedrich). Performance in the 
scenario Friedrich increased substantially with the course of testing although different 
accuracy levels of contents and modalities were accounted for. It is certainly possible that 
these were rather random effects because there are no obvious reasons for these findings. 
Anyway, the most prevalent conclusions suggested that the application of as diverse 
and as many targets as possible seems important. The upcoming Chapter will again recur to 
this problem by providing design suggestions. 
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10 Future Perspectives 
This last Chapter is intended to provide suggestions about future steps in test 
development and research designs capable to complement and extend to the findings of the 
present work. 
10.1 Test Modifications 
The test version of the SIM applied in Study 2 requires concrete steps of modification 
relying on the identified psychometric weaknesses and some debatable results concerning the 
internal structure and the construct validity. The upcoming Chapter will provide suggestions 
for test modifications based on the aforementioned considerations. 
Technical Modifications 
The advantages of implementing the social intelligence tasks in the experimental 
software WMC 0.18 are self-evident and refer to the standardization of task administration, 
the sampling of data directly on the computer, and the exact assessment of reaction time 
scores. However, one concern about the technical restrictions related to the experimental 
software represents (a) the lack of possibility to present video and audio information at the 
same time and (b) the comparably low quality of the pictures due to the constraints on data 
format. Therefore, it should be attempted to find means to deal with these restrictions. 
Reliability Analysis of all Social Intelligence Tasks 
The test approach explicitly introduces heterogeneous task material for all tasks so that 
the problems related to a large number of items with negative item-total correlations and 
partly low reliability coefficients of internal consistency do not seem surprising. It is by no 
means an alternative to reduce heterogeneity in order to enhance the homogeneity of the 
items. Apart from some specific modifications of single tasks that are also necessary because 
of taxonomic considerations, the breadth and representativeness of the tasks is to be obtained. 
Therefore, it appears outmost important to investigate the stability of the test scores in a retest 
investigation and thus, conform with one of the requirements on a new intelligence construct 
of proving stability (Süß, 2001). 
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Task Modifications of Social Understanding Tasks 
The objectives for future task modifications of the social understanding tasks are listed 
as follows: (a) the reduction of the total test length in order to allow more economic testing, 
(b) the development of a schema to estimate and adjust item difficulties, (c) examining the 
validity of the target answers, and (d) considering the use of combined audio and video 
information to enhance real-life fidelity. 
a) Reduction of test length 
At present, the scenario tasks take about three hours of testing time. It is totally 
unrealistic to maintain this test length, both for research and applied settings. Several starting 
points for the reduction of test length are conceivable, for example, the exclusion of entire 
scenarios, the exclusion of entire scenes within one scenario or the exclusion of single items. 
The latter option could rely on the results of the present study by selecting items with only 
positive item-total correlations. However, this may result in the least reduction of test length 
since still the same scenes were included in the scenarios. The other options are not to be 
derived as obviously from the present results since no entire scenario and hardly any entire 
scene showed malfunction. This dilemma can hardly be solved at present and needs further 
considerations based on the following concerns of test modifications. However, any actions 
require a thorough consideration of the consequences when entire scenes or further 
background information is excluded from one scenario task. 
b) Learning about item difficulty and   c) validity of the target answers 
These two objectives are combined since they rely on comparable steps. As elaborated 
in the discussion, several analyses point to controversial results relating to the item and scale 
difficulties. It appeared valuable to develop a schema to learn about the determinants of item 
difficulty. Therefore, peer and expert ratings appear promising, such that, at the same time, 
the validity of the target answers could be examined. Expert ratings should not only assemble 
the expert answers on the items but also investigate the experts’ opinion about the underlying 
processes specific to task material. Additionally, the relevant cues within the material for the 
accomplishment of the tasks should be documented for every single item, both based on the 
expert statements and on the material assembled during scenario construction. The results of 
this documentation can be interpreted in light of the experts’ and peer ratings and the 
psychometric properties as found in the present work. 
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With respect to the validity of the target answers, an investigation of this appears as a 
necessary step to confirm the objectivity of scoring in light of the manifold criticisms related 
to the target scoring procedure. 
d) Application of task material combining audio and video information 
It appears interesting to develop a parallel task that relies on the combined audio and 
video information in order to allow a comparison of the accuracy levels. Moreover, this type 
of task material may as well represent the most genuine situations so that the relevance for 
real-life (applied) settings may be enhanced in such a task version. 
It is suggested throughout the present analyses and the preceding discussion that it 
appears promising to apply as heterogeneous and as many targets as possible in order to avoid 
idiosyncratic effects (see last section of Chapter 9). This suggestion contradicts to the 
objective to reduce the test length. A compromise accounting for both aims is certainly not 
easy to find based on the present approach. The introduction of context information and the 
maintenance of taxonomic requirements need a certain amount of task material and 
introductions to the subjects. One possible way of dealing with this problem could lie in 
abstaining from within-scenario variation of the taxonomic elements, but rather introduce 
taxonomic variations across the single scenarios. 
Task Modifications of Social Memory Tasks 
The necessary task modifications for the domain of social memory concern more 
specific aspects related to presentation and answering times and the consecutive item 
difficulties. The pictorial and video-based tasks of social memory still showed missing values 
located at the end of each sub-task indicating too short answering times. The bigger problem 
concerns the low scale reliabilities. These may also be due to the heterogeneity of task 
material and requirements. Thus, apart from some concrete item modification or selection 
based on item-total correlations and item difficulty, the social memory tasks also require a 
retest investigation to examine the stability of the scores. Similar to the social understanding 
tasks, the social memory tasks need a reduction of the test length in order to account for the 
standard of economy. 
Task Modifications of Social Perception Tasks 
The outline for possible task modifications of the social perception tasks is not as 
concrete as the preceding considerations since no particular psychometric problems occurred. 
Chapter 9 already elaborated the possible problems underlying the lack of convergence 
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between the social perception tasks. Therefore, task modifications require more elaborate 
a priori considerations that account for the effect of different cognitive functions as 
determinants of social perception (i.e., sensory processes related to physiological channels vs. 
encoding processes requiring a basic processing of the stimuli). Task modifications or new 
development should consider these different processes so that a coherent domain of social 
perception or related requirements can emerge in future research. 
10.2 Future Research Questions and Designs 
To conclude the present work, expanding research questions and design issues derived 
from the theoretical and empirical parts of the present work shall be elaborated. These 
concern (a) expanding research questions related to the social understanding ability domain 
and the present test approach (b) considerations about the performance model of social 
intelligence as established by Weis and Süß (2005) and modified in the present work. 
Expanding Research Questions Related to Social Understanding 
Expanding research questions related to the ability of social understanding as assessed 
by the scenario tasks all refer to the investigation of the underlying processes. It is frequently 
argued throughout this work that the task conceptualization of social understanding 
incorporates processes that cannot be fully estimated at present. The scenario task rely on rich 
context information so that it could be questioned whether performance relies on the actual 
task material or the background information. An open question remains about a possible 
anchoring effect of specific information within one scenario and the activation of knowledge 
structures by specific information (top-down processing). It is unclear whether and how much 
subjects make use of knowledge in judging the mental states of the targets. 
The task conceptualization underlying the scenarios clearly states that only the 
interpretation of the task material is supposed to determine performance. Results in the 
present work do not suggest any diverse process to be relevant. However, the scope of this 
analysis is restricted. Rather, these questions demand more design-oriented approaches. 
Therefore, some suggestions shall be made that concern possible ways of exploring the 
processes of the social understanding tasks: 
a) Promoting and examining bottom-up vs. top-down processing: 
The use of bottom-up vs. top-down processing is conceived as depending on the 
processing motivation and the available resources (Bless et al., 2004; see also Probst, 1982 for 
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the differentiation between intuitive and deliberate information processing). Several 
experimental conditions are thinkable that promote either top-down or bottom-up processing. 
(1) Processing motivation and thus, bottom-up processing should be promoted when subjects 
are instructed to justify their answers (see Bless et al., 2004; e.g., “Tell me the basis for your 
judgment and the inferences you have made.”). Moreover, the technique of thinking-aloud 
should elicit the same effect. Such investigations should provide helpful information about the 
general process and effects related to specific scenarios or scenes. Both conditions require 
effortful testing, and subjects can be tested only one at a time. (2) In turn, processing 
motivation is supposed to be reduced (i.e., enhancement of top-down / knowledge-driven 
processing) when resources are withdrawn (e.g., in a dual task paradigms or by the 
introduction of time limitations). Forcing people to make quick judgments enforces 
automatic, knowledge-based information processing (i.e., top-down). 
b) Manipulation of the cues and background information 
Other experimental conditions concern the manipulation of task material and 
background information. For example, one condition can exclude any of the background 
information and only provide subjects with the actual task material. Another condition can 
omit the task material and provide subjects with biographical background information about 
the targets and a situation descriptions. The latter condition (i.e., no available cues) should be 
capable to enforce the use of stereotypes since subjects would not know anything about the 
target’s behavior in the respective situations and they would not be provided with specific, 
idiosyncratic cues. 
The aforementioned experimental manipulations can be applied in a both within- and 
between-subjects designs. These should also allow a comparison with the standard testing 
condition as applied in the present study. Comparing the accuracy levels of the experimental 
groups probably yields more information about the concurrent processes during task 
accomplishment. 
Modifictaions to the Performance Model of Social Intelligence (Weis & Süß, 2005) 
and Extentions of the SIM 
Analyses in the present work carefully points to two modifications of the performance 
model of Weis and Süß (2005) that need replication in future studies. On the one hand, the 
social perception ability domain was so far not supported by data (see also Seidel, 2007) so 
that, without any further investigations, it cannot be justified to keep it in the model as a 
meaningful ability domain. On the other hand, evidence for the hierarchical assumption of a 
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higher-order social intelligence factor was weak. This could be due to many different facts 
(e.g., different response formats, different queried modalities of social understanding and 
memory, etc). Thus, further research is needed that incorporates the aforementioned principles 
of task modifications. Besides the implications of the empirical findings for the performance 
model, in turn, the model also implies some extensions of the SIM regarding the adding of 
two more ability domains, that is, social creativity and social kowledge. 
Social Creativity 
The current test battery focusses only on three cognitive ability domains from the 
performance model of Weis and Süß (2005). However, the model also includes social 
creativity as a forth domain, sometimes also labeled social flexibility. It was defined as the 
production of as many and as diverse solutions or explanations as possible for a social 
situation or problem (Weis & Süß, 2005; see also Lee et al., 2002). Social creativity was not 
realized in the present test development basically due to economic constraints. Nevertheless, 
this ability domain is sought to be as relevant as the remaining domains, although surely 
social understanding plays the most prominent role. To provide an example of the practical 
relevance of this ability domain, imagine an unfamiliar situation where equivocal cues are 
provided so that an inference from the cues is not possible. Social creativity abilities can now 
help finding possible explanations for the equivocal cue pattern. The products of socially 
creative cognition can then, for example, guide further information seeking in order to finally 
achieve an explanation for the situation. Abstractly spoken, social creativity represents 
imagination ability. This example illustrates why this ability domain is frequently referred to 
as retrieval functions (Bless et al., 2004) or the flexible application of knowledge (Lee et al., 
2002). It seems that in this conceptualization, social creativity hardly, if at all, depends on the 
available cues but rather on the ability to combine prior knowledge or experience with the 
information about the poblem and not necessarily, the equivocal cue pattern. Performance 
criterion is not the idea of a correct or incorrect solution, but rather that of quantity and 
diversity. 
The present work extended the performance model of social intelligence by the 
introduction of taxonomic classifications of contents, modalities, settings, and targets. To 
apply this differeniation to social creativity, just as social understanding, the outcome of 
socially creative cognition is not directly related to the available cues (conventionally 
provided by the task material). What is queried in the social creativity domain (i.e., the 
product), are possibly complex social facts such as solutions to problems, explanations to a 
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situations, possible future behavior, but also a possible range of emotions someone might 
possibly feel about a certain event. Thus, the classification of different queried modalities also 
counts for the social creativity domain. The taxonomic considerations related to the settings or 
the targets also apply one-to-one. 
Consecutively, the aforementioned considerations suggest that the ability domains 
purportedly related to the social intelligence construct possible need some further 
differentiation, so far not applied explicitly. This differentiation concerns the relationship of 
the task material to the outcome (product) of a task. In the social memory and perception 
domain, the task outcome is directly related to the task material (the input), no extrapolation 
from input to outcome is necessary or desired (i.e., only objectively present contents can be 
addressed as task outcome). Contrary, social understanding and creativity reach beyond the 
given information so that the queried task product does no longer directly relate to the task 
contents. 
To finalize these considerations, a potential test approach to social creativity is 
illustrated. According to the domain conceptalization, a test of social creativity requires the 
posing of an equivocal situation to the test taker such as the social understanding tasks. 
Whether a differentiation into different contet domains still makes sense, is yet left open. 
Anyway, test takers need instructions to imagine as many and as diverse explanations for the 
situation (or solutions to the problem, the range of possible emotions, etc). Answers seem 
only possible by the use of open-ended response format relying on written language. The 
scoring requires a scoring key that accounts for the quanitity and diversity of the responses. 
Therefore, an a-priori differentiation of possible answers is valuable or must be derived from 
the answers of the first sample that the test is applied to. Concluding from the results of the 
present study and the aforementioned considerations, it would be expected that social 
creativity is more largely related to social understanding than to social memory or perception. 
The effect of written open-ended response format, however, is to be accounted or controlled 
for during scale construction. 
Social Knowledge 
Social knowledge does not belong to the core performance model of cognitive social 
intelligence since it is supposed to be strongly influenced by culture and the learning 
environment. Moreover, it is supposed to be situation-specific in such sense that only allows a 
judgment as correct depending on the prevalent situation. It is seen as having an impact on all 
remaining cognitive processes by, for example, guiding the encoding of cues into existing 
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categories, and by influencing top-down controlled interpretation of social cues (Bless et al., 
2004). The pivotal role of knowledge is also stressed by Bernieri (2001) who claims that 
knowledge represents the integrative component between the cognitive ability structure and 
the final social behavior. Bernieri’s conception sees social knowledge to be the final 
determinant of social behavior when one knows what to do. In this case, the final behavior 
just can be influenced by the situation, a current intervening state or personality traits; the 
cognitive abilities no longer play a relevant role in such situation. In different instances, social 
cognitive research also claims that knowledge has an impact on the concurrent cognitive 
processes (see above). 
Conclusively, the relevance of social knowledge is undoubted. The investigation of 
social knowledge represents an admittedly interesting though challenging objective for future 
research. Just as for the domain of social creativity, a preliminary test approach to the 
assessment of social knowledge shall be provided: Prior to any other steps, the knowledge 
domain under interest needs to be defined and delimited in terms of scope, breadth, and the 
classification of possible subdomains of this content area (e.g., knowledge in the domain 
“peer relationships”). For this objective, it appears valuable to cooperate with experts in the 
respective knowledge domain. The problem of expert nomination needs to be accounted for in 
this context, but shall not be addressed any further at this point. The establishent of a sample 
of critical incidents allows the later selection of different items and distracters as the 
foundation for the final item material. 
As a next step, task material and the knowledge contents have to be sampled in 
accordance with the identifed structure of this content area. The sampling of adequate item 
material, distracters, and the identification of the “correct” solution represents the largest 
obstacle during the construction of a social knowledge test. One idea to account for these 
problems deals with the application of the Situational Judgment Test paradigm which is 
purported to assess tacit knowledge in a content domain. For test construction, critical 
incidents occurring in the kowledge domains of interest can be sampled including the true and 
other possible outcomes in the situation. As many as possible critical incidents should be 
sampled in order to account for the differentiation of the content domain. Various ways to 
identify the “correct” answers to the critical incidents exist, the most prominent probably is 
the application of an expert sample. To validate the final knowledge test, the denominated 
experts are supposed to show better performance than lay persons in this field. 
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To conclude, the final Chapters hopefully succeeded in pointing towards valuable 
future research directions and also provide necessary and fruitful steps for continuative test 
development. Although incorrect by the matter-of-fact, Goleman’s (2006) denomination of 
social intelligence as “The new science of human relationships” is hopefully directive in such 
that future reserach accounts for the relevance and opportunities related to social intelligence; 
and for the necessary requirements to establish social intelligence as a new human ability 
construct. 
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Appendix A: Test database 
Rating Test of Empathy 
(Dymond, 1949; Orlik, 1978; Walker & Foley, 1973) 
Test description 
After a short encounter, two genuine persons A and B rate each other’s personality on six 
dimensions on a 1-5-point scale (i.e., superior-inferior, friendly-unfriendly, leader-follower, 
self-confidence, selfish-unselfish, and sense of humor). The ratings are done from four 
different perspectives: the persons rate themselves (AA and BB), rate the other person (AB 
and BA), rate how the other person rates him- or herself (ABB and BAA), and rate how the 
other person rates oneself (ABA and BAB). A person’s empathy score (person A) is 
determined by the differences between the two scores “ABB – BB” and “ABA – BA”. 
No examples 
No further results 
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George Washington Social Intelligence Test (GWSIT) 
(Moss et al., 1955; see also Thorndike & Stein, 1937) 
Test descriptions 
? Judgment in Social Situations: find possible solutions for a social problem. 
? Memory for Names and Faces: recognize target photographs previously studied and 
presented later among a larger group of photographs. 
? Observation of Human Behavior: answer questions about human functioning on a true-
false basis. 
? Recognition of the Mental States Behind Words: choose the correct mental state or 
emotion, among four, reflected in a given vocal statement. 
? Sense of Humor: select the best ending of a joke. 
No examples 
No further results 
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Role Taking Test 
(Feffer, 1959, as cited in Orlik, 1978 and Walker & Foley, 1973) 
Test description 
The test is intended to assess the cognitive developmental stage in terms of the idea of 
balanced decentering of the self. Test takers are presented with pictures showing stimuli like 
those included in the Thematic Apperception Test (Murray, 1943). They have to tell stories 
around the pictures based on the different roles or perspectives shown in the stimuli. 
Responses are judged in terms of the ability to switch between different roles. 
No examples 
No further results 
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Chapin Social Insight Test (SIT) 
(Chapin, 1967; Gough, 1968) 
Test description 
Social insight is defined as the ability to evaluate others, to foretell what may occur in 
interpersonal and social situations, and the ability to rectify disturbing tensions or conflicts 
(Gough, 1968). The test consists of 25 items showing verbal description of different social 
situations. Test takers have to choose out of four alternatives the best explanation or solution 
to the social problem. The vignettes were drawn from case histories, literary descriptions, and 
published analyses of conferences and discussions as well as from prior scales for social 
attitudes and social adjustment. 
Examples 
A man bought an expensive automobile after some hesitation because it cost more than he 
could well afford to pay. Later, when a fried questioned him as to why he bought such an 
expensive car, he gave several reasons, but the one reason he did not give was: 
a. His family needed to get out into the country and he bought a big car so that they could all 
drive together. 
b. The car would save him money in the long run because it would not need the repairs that an 
older or cheaper car would. 
c. The friend had bought a car almost as expensive although his income was not much greater. 
d. He expected to receive some money from an estate by the death of a critically ill relative. 
Solution “c” is correct. 
No further results 
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Communication of Affect Receiving Ability (CARAT) 
(Buck, 1976, 1983; O’Sullivan, 1983) 
Test description 
Genuine targets are videotaped while they are watching four types of slides (i.e., unusual, 
unpleasant, sexual, and scenic). The targets additionally report how pleasant they feel on a 1-
9-point scale. Finally, test takers are presented 32 video scenes (of 25 different targets) 
without sound and are asked to judge the pleasantness on a 1-9-point scale and the type of 
slide that was shown. Thus, both target scoring and standards-based scoring is applied. 
No examples 
No further results 
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Profile of Nonverbal Sensitivity (PONS) 
(Rosenthal, Hall, DiMatteo, Rogers, & Archer, 1979) 
Test description 
The PONS consists of 220 items showing one single woman simulating nonverbal responses 
to twenty separate social situations (e.g., comforting a lost child, helping a customer, talking 
about her divorce, etc.). The situations should vary on two dimensions (i.e., dominance – 
submission and positive – negative). The nonverbal channels are varied across the items and 
distinguished into a Video PONS (i.e., face vs. body vs. both) and an Audio PONS (i.e., 
content-filtered speech vs. randomly spliced speech). Each item presents two verbally 
described response alternatives in multiple choice format. 
No examples 
No further results 
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Couples Test 
(Barnes & Sternberg, 1989) 
Test description 
Test takers are presented photographs of real and faked couples and have to decide for each of 
them, whether they are faked or real. 
Examples 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                       true couple                                                               faked couple 
No further results 
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Empathic accuracy test 
(Ickes et al., 1990; Ickes, 2001) 
Test description 
The test is based on the dyadic interaction paradigm. 38 mixed-sex dyads were put into a short 
encounter and interacted with each other in an unstructured way. The interaction was recorded 
on videotape. Afterwards, the subjects answered questions about their thoughts and feelings 
during the interaction. They assigned the respective scene on the tape to each thought and 
feeling. They reported both the content and the valence (positive, neutral or negative) of the 
thoughts and feelings. For the collection of the accuracy data, the respective interaction 
partner viewed the videotape a second time. The investigator stopped the videotape at those 
times that the other subject had indicated a thought or feeling and asked the subject to infer 
about this thought or feeling in terms of content in valence. 
The performance score for the valence accuracy was the percentage of matches of the dyad 
members' inferences about the overall emotional tone of the respective partners' entry 
(positive, neutral, or negative). The performance score for the content accuracy was the 
degree to which a dyad member's written description of the inferred content of his or her 
partner's thoughts or feelings matched the actual content that the partner had documented. 
No examples 
No further results 
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Level of Emotional Awareness Scale (LEAS) 
(Lane et al., 1990; Lane, Sechrest, Riedel, Weldon, Kaszniak, & Schwartz, 1996; Ciarochi, 
Scott, Deane, & Heaven, 2003) 
Test description 
The LEAS asks the participants to describe his or her anticipated feelings and those of another 
person in each of 20 vignettes always involving two person (i.e., myself and another person). 
The degree of differentiation and integration of emotion-denoting words are rated according 
to 0-5 possible levels of emotional awareness. 
Example (Lane et al., 1996; p. 205) 
Example vignette: 
You and your friend are in the same line of work. There is a prize given annually to the best 
performance of the year. The two of you work hard to win the prize. One night the winner is 
announced: your friend. How would you feel? How would your friend feel? 
Example responses for the different levels of awareness: 
0 – My friend would probably feel that the judges knew what they were doing. (nonemotion 
responses; “feel” describes a thought) 
1 – I’d feel sick about it. It’s hard for me to say what my friend would feel. (awareness of 
physiological cues) 
2 – I’d probably feel bad about it [...] I’m sure that my friend would be feeling really good. 
(relatively undifferentiated emotions; bad / good) 
3 – We would both feel happy. (typical differentiated emotions) 
4 – I would feel depressed. [...] I would also begrudgingly feel happy for my friend. [...] My 
friend would feel very gratified but [...]. (two or more Level-3-words) 
5 – I’d feel disappointed [...] but glad [...]. My friend would feel happy and proud but slightly 
worried [...]. (scored for Level-4-responses when feelings of oneself and others were 
differentiated) 
No further results 
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Tacit Knowledge Inventory for Managers (TKIM) 
(Wagner & Sternberg, 1991) 
Test description 
The TKIM represents a Situational Judgment Test. Test takers are presented short verbal 
descriptions of scenarios of a situation in business settings and have to judge the effectiveness 
or the quality of verbally presented actions to the solution of the problem presented in the 
scenario. The scenarios and the possible actions were derived from experts’ description of 
critical work-related situations. The TKIM covers three content-domains: knowledge about 
managing oneself, others, and tasks. 
Examples 
Your immediate superior has asked for your opinion on a new promotional campaign that she 
has developed. You think the promotional campaign is terrible, and that using it would be a 
big mistake. You have noticed previously that your superior does not take criticism well, and 
you suspect she is looking more for reassurance than for an honest opinion. 
Given the present situation, rate the quality of each of the following reactions on this 1- to 7-
point scale (from extremely bad to extremely good). 
1. Tell her that you think the campaign is great. 
2. Tell her that you like the work but have some reservations about whether it is the right 
campaign for this client. 
Further results 
Tacit Knowledge Inventories were developed for different occupational domains (i.e., 
business setting, university settings, military leaders, etc.). The authors claimed that practical 
intelligence complements and extends the criterion-related validity of traditional intelligence 
tests which are criticized to be only applied on and predictive of success in academic settings 
(Sternberg et al., 2000; Hedlund & Sternberg, 2000). The conceptual background of practical 
intelligence and tacit knowledge was frequently criticized (Gottfredson, 2003; see also 
Chapter 4.3.2). 
Practical intelligence equaling tacit knowledge was typically assessed by just one type of 
measure, the Tacit Knowledge Inventory. Wagner and Sternberg (1985) and Wagner (1987) 
investigated expert-novice differences in specific occupational fields and found better 
performance of experts compared with novices in the respective domains. Academic 
intelligence or personality was not controlled for. However, tacit knowledge has shown to be 
only marginally related to academic intelligence and personality (for an overview of empirical 
results see Gottfredson, 2003; Hedlund & Sternberg, 2000; Henry et al., 2005; Sternberg et 
al., 2000). Tacit Knowledge Inventories in different occupational domains are reported to 
correlate partly to a substantial extent (r = .58 for academic psychology and management; r = 
-.06 - .36 for management and military leadership). The authors infer an underlying general 
ability of practical intelligence that contributed to these correlations. The criterion-related 
validity ranges from .05 (company prestige) to .46 (salary) (Wagner & Sternberg, 1985; 
Wagner, 1987). The Tacit Knowledge Inventory seems capable to assess meaningful job-
related knowledge which is not equal to or explainable by academic intelligence. However, 
interpretations should be restricted to the assessment of knowledge without extrapolating to a 
generally valid intelligence construct. 
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Interpersonal Perception Task – 15 (IPT-15) 
(Costanzo & Archer, 1993) 
Test description 
The IPT-15 was constructed to measure social perception and the ability to interpret 
expressive verbal and nonverbal behavior. Test takers watch 15 brief video scenes showing 
different persons in different social situations (e.g., a single woman talking to a person on the 
phone; two men talking to each other after a basketball game, etc.). The situations cover five 
postulated content dimensions, status, kinship, intimacy, competition, and deception. After 
each scene, test takers have to answer multiple choice questions about the social facts behind 
the scenes (e.g., Who is the woman talking to on the phone?, Who of the two men won the 
game?, etc.). 
No examples 
No further results 
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Test of wisdom-related knowledge 
(Staudinger et al., 1994) 
Test description 
The test is based on the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm (Baltes & Smith, 1990) and intends to 
operationalize the 5 wisdom-related criteria (i.e., rich factual and procedural knowledge, life-
span contextualism, value relativism, and uncertainty). Test takers are presented short 
situation descriptions that cover two thematic domains, life planning and life review. They are 
asked to think aloud about the presented situation or problem. Their answers are judged by 
trained raters according to how they match the five criteria. 
Examples (Staudinger et al., 1994; p. 15) 
Situation description (Target: Older female adult in a work-family-related problem in life 
planning) 
Joyce, a 60-year-old widow, recently completed a degree in business management and opened 
her own business. She has been looking forward to this new challenge. She has just heard that 
her son has been left with two small children to care for. 
Joyce is considering the following options: She can plan to give up her business and live with 
her son, or she can plan to arrange for financial assistance for her son to cover child-care 
costs. 
What should Joyce do and consider in making her plans? What additional information is 
needed? 
Further results 
The test to assess wisdom-related knowledge was applied in a nomination study that 
investigated the validity of the Berlin Wisdom Paradigm (Baltes, Staudinger, Maercker, & 
Smith, 1995). People nominated as wise (according to laypersons’ conception of wisdom) 
were compared with age-equivalent clinical psychologists, an age-equivalent comparison 
group and a younger comparison group (both from non-human-service occupations). Results 
indicated an advantage of both, the nominated group and that of clinical psychologists. The 
authors concluded that age is not the critical factor that determines wisdom-related 
performance. Moreover, important factors appeared to be general experiences, professional 
training and practice, and motivational preferences (Kunzmann & Baltes, 2005). 
Staudinger, Lopez, and Baltes (1997) investigated the overlap of wisdom with variables of the 
domain of intelligence, personality, and the personality-intelligence interface (i.e., social 
intelligence, creativity, and cognitive styles). Social intelligence was operationalized by two 
self-report inventories. Results showed that intelligence, personality, and measures that 
straddled this interface could explain 40 % of the variance in wisdom-related performance 
whereby the interface measures (i.e., five measures of cognitive style and creativity) 
explained the largest amount of unique variance. 
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Situational Judgment Test of Social Intelligence 
(Legree, 1995) 
Test description 
The scales for dinner-related knowledge requires participants to rate the relative 
appropriateness of 20 actions. The scale for knowledge of alcohol abuse requires participants 
to rate the extent to which 20 statements suggest alcohol abuse. 
Examples (Legree, 1995; pp. 265) 
Dinner-related knowledge 
Assume that you are married and have two children. You and your family have been invited 
to attend a dinner at the home of your supervisor. In the office, you usually interact with your 
supervisor in a friendly and nonchalant manner, and you have known him for several years. 
At this dinner, you will meet his family. You want to make a good impression at the dinner 
because you are being considered for a promotion. 
Using the rating scale (extremely inappropriate (1) – neither appropriate nor inappropriate (6) 
– extremely appropriate (11)), estimate the effectiveness of the following actions with respect 
to portraying as competent and promotable. 
1. Discuss the weather 
2. Describing your dislike of a pet that is nuisance to your neighborhood. 
3. Dominating the conversation in order to appear confident and self-assured to your 
supervisor. 
4. Using your fingers to eat a piece of food. 
5. Complimenting the hosts on the quality of food. 
6. Flattering the hosts on their “superb taste in home decoration”. 
7. Discussing sports or artistic issues. 
Knowledge of indicators of alcohol abuse 
This section provides short descriptions of the habits and actions of 20 individuals. Your task 
is to rate the extent to which each of the descriptions is more or less consistent with the 
expectation that the individual may or may not abuse alcohol (extremely unlikely (1) – neither 
unlikely nor likely (6) – extremely likely (11)). 
1. Nancy is frequently late for work, and often calls in sick on Mondays. 
2. Sue is a moderately heavy smoker. 
3. At a business lunch held at Mary’s favorite lunch spot, the waitress asked Mary “Ma’am, 
will you have your usual drink today?” Mary quickly responded, “I’ll have coffee today.” 
4. Ever since his grandfather died three month ago, James has been in state of deep 
depression. 
5. One can occasionally smell alcohol on Liz’s breath after lunch and she frequently shuts her 
office door for several hours after returning from lunch. 
6. Over the past 18 month, Thomas has been involved in three automobile accidents. 
No further results 
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Emotional Accuracy Research Scale (EARS) 
(Mayer & Geher, 1996; Geher et al., 2001) 
Test description 
Participants are given three written descriptions of situations (compose one vignette) that 
contribute to the present mood of a target person. After reading, they are asked to select the 
best adjective out of pairs of adjectives that best describes the present feelings of the target. 
The test consists of eight vignettes with twelve items each. 
Examples (Mayer & Geher, 1996; p. 98) 
Written by a 20-year-old woman (one of three descriptions of one vignette) 
“My roommate has been kind of blowing off her boyfriend. She told him she did not want to 
see him until Spring Break. He is hurt because he thinks she does not like him anymore, and 
he wants to come up here to see her this weekend. I have been gone almost every weekend 
since school started, giving her plenty of opportunities to have im up here while I am gone, 
and now I’m finally getting to stay here for the weekend and he might be coming up. (Why 
can’t she go visit him instead?!?!)” 
For each of the twelve pairs below, choose the word or phrase within that pair which best 
describes the reported feelings of the person who wrote the above passage across all the 
situations she described (correct answers marked with an asterisk). 
“1. Be by myself* – Kick something; 2. Stomping feet – Alone*; 3. Pretend everything is ok* 
– Threaten a fight; 4. Angry for someone else – Help a friend*; 5. Evade feeling* – Defiant; 
6. Sharing another’s anger* – Threatened with death; 7. Hostile – Unhappy with another*; 8. 
Fearful – Apart from another*; 9. Cheated* – My teeth clenched; 10. Withdraw – Scared for 
someone else*; 11. Attacked – Isolate myself*; 12. Mad* – Delighted.” 
No further results 
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Japanese and Caucasian Brief Affect Recognition Test (JACBART) 
(Matsumoto, LeRoux, Wilson-Cohn, Raroque, Kooken, Ekman et al., 2000) 
Test description 
The test was constructed to measure emotion recognition ability. Its scope and objectives 
reach beyond the, at that time, published tests of Ekman and Friesen (Ekman & Friesen 1975, 
cited in Matsumoto et al., 2000). The test varies systematically the ethnic group and the 
gender across the seven universal emotions (i.e., anger, contempt, disgust, fear, joy, sadness, 
and surprise). The facial stimuli were scored by the use of the Facial Action Coding System in 
order to verify the same facial muscles configurations associated with the emotions. Each 
facial emotion expression is included in a one-second-video-scene with a neutral expression at 
the beginning and in the end so that no after-image of the expression is possible. Furthermore, 
the duration of the emotion expression was varied (1/15 sec., 2/15 sec., and 2/5 sec.). After 
the presentation of one item, test takers have to indicate how much each of the seven emotions 
were present in the expressions (on a 0-8-point scale from not at all to a lot). Group consensus 
scoring was applied for this type of task. In a forced-choice format, test takers have to decide 
which of the seven emotions is pictured. This task is scored according to the standard rule for 
the universal emotions. 
No examples 
No further results 
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Diagnostic analysis of nonverbal accuracy scale (DANVA) 
(Nowicki & Duke, 1994, 2001) 
Test description 
The test consists of several subscales, both for children and adults. The two most interesting 
subscales are those based on facial and vocal stimuli of emotion expressions. The stimuli were 
selected to cover a wide range of difficulty by including emotion expressions of varying 
intensity. Task material was posed by actors and includes stimuli from members of different 
racial groups. 
The test is intended to measure the receptivity of four basic emotions (i.e., happiness, sadness, 
anger, and fear). 
In both subscales, the test takers are presented each stimulus separately and they have to 
indicate which of the four above-mentioned emotions is expressed in the face or in the voice. 
Answers are scored in terms of correct vs. incorrect. 
No examples 
No further results 
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Vocal Emotion Recognition Test (Vocal-I) 
(Scherer et al., 2001) 
Test description 
Test takers have to identify emotions in meaningless sentences spoken by male and female 
actors. The emotions that have to be identified are joy, sadness, fear, anger, and neutral. Both, 
the Vocal-I and the MERT are based on the GVEESS, the Geneva Vocal Emotion Expression 
Stimulus Set. The GVEESS includes 224 vocal emotion portrayals of 14 different emotions 
(i.e., hot anger, cold anger, panic fear, anxiety, despair, sadness, elation, happiness, interest, 
boredom, shame, pride, disgust, and contempt). 
No Examples 
No Further results 
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Facially Expressed Emotion Labeling (FEEL) 
(Kessler, Bayerl, Deighton, & Traue, 2002) 
Test description 
Participants have to decide which emotion is present in facial expression of the six basic 
emotions (i.e., anger, sadness, disgust, fear, surprise, happiness) relying on multiple-choice 
response format. Answers are scored in terms of correctness. The stimuli were judged as 
unambiguous by the use of the Facial Action Coding System and stem from the database of 
Ekman, Friesen, and Hager (2002). 
No examples 
No further results 
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Verbal Social-Cognitive Flexibility (SCF-V) 
(Lee et al., 2002) 
Test description 
The test takers are presented three vignettes. Each contains a verbal descriptions of an 
ambiguous social situation which involves some novelty. Participants are given 3 minutes to 
write down all possible interpretations of each episode. Answers are scored according to a 
previously developed coding scheme in terms of fluency and flexibility. The fluency score 
represented the number of relevant interpretations across the three episodes. The flexibility 
score represented the number of hits of different categories that had been generated in 
advance (e.g., Category I: personal characteristics, states, traits, activities; Category II: 
cognition, perception, thought, etc.). The fluency and the flexibility score were summed up 
for the final score. 
Example (Lee et al., 2002, p. 918) 
“In one episode, two males who routinely play racquetball together are described. One is a 
lawyer who encourages the other (a college student) to apply for law school. When the 
college student asks for assistance in studying for the law school, however, the lawyer appears 
uninterested in helping and later stops playing racquetball with the college student.” 
No further results 
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Pictorial Social-Cognitive Flexibility (SCF-V) 
(Lee et al., 2002) 
Test description 
The test takers are presented three one-minute video clips each portraying male and female 
actors in ambiguous and novel social situations. Participants were given 3 minutes to write 
down all possible interpretations of each episode. Answers are scored according to a 
previously developed coding scheme in terms of fluency and flexibility. The fluency score 
represented the number of relevant interpretations across the three episodes. The flexibility 
score represented the number of hits of different categories that had been generated in 
advance (e.g., Category I: personal characteristics, states, traits, activities; Category II: 
cognition, perception, thought, etc.). The fluency and the flexibility score were summed up 
for the final score. 
Example (Lee et al., 2002, p. 919) 
“In one video, a man, dressed in a tuxedo, walks from his car to the front door of a house 
where he knocks on the door. A woman wearing jeans and a sweatshirt answers the door, 
walks with the man to his car, gets into the car with the man and they drive away.” 
No further results 
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Test of Emotional Intelligence (TEMINT) 
(Schmidt-Atzert & Bühner, 2002, Amelang & Steinmayr, 2006) 
Test description 
Test takers are presented 12 situation descriptions and have to rate the presence of 10 
emotions of the targets in the situations. The situations were generated by genuine persons 
reporting about meaningful life events and their feelings in that situation. The emotions rated 
were, aversion, anger, fear, unease, sadness, guilt, happiness, pride, affection, and surprise. 
The ratings were done on a 1-3-point scale from not at all present to strongly present. The test 
is scored in terms of the simple difference between judge and target answers. 
Examples 
Female student, 24 years old: “I have failed in an important exam and had to repeat it.” 
Transpose yourself into the role of  the female student. How strong were her emotions? 
Emotions rated: aversion, anger, fear, ... 
Further results 
Schmidt-Atzert and Bühner (2002, see also Amelang & Steinmayr, 2006) report only 
moderate correlations with personality and intelligence and found substantial correlations 
with school grades when controlling for intelligence (r = .24 / .42, for math and german 
language, respectively). However, Amelang and Steinmayr (2006) could not detect 
incremental validity of the TEMINT for the prediction of school grades, social status, or 
educational level over and above academic intelligence and conscientiousness. The academic 
intelligence test applied was a multidimensional measure including verbal, figural and 
numeric task material and separate operational ability domains (i.e., reasoning, speed of 
information processing, and memory). Thus, the contradictory findings could be attributed to 
this. 
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Facial Emotion Inspection Time Task 
(Austin, 2004) 
Test description 
Respective to a choice reaction time paradigm, participants have to decide whether a shortly 
presented face shows an emotionally laden expression (happy and sad for the two test 
subscales) or a neutral expression. Presentation times were systematically varied (from 17 to 
350 ms). The stimuli stem from the database of Ekman and Friesen (1976; as cited in Austin, 
2004) to assure unambiguousness. Both, male and female faces were used of two different 
targets each. 
No examples 
No further results 
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Test for the Assessment of Empathy 
(Kunzmann & Richter, 2004) 
Test description 
The test consists of 8 video scenes presenting target persons telling about positive or negative 
feelings (happiness or sadness; 4 persons for each feeling) they have had while watching an 
emotion-eliciting video. Test takers have to indicate how much one of a list of 20 emotions is 
present in one video scene. Performance is judged in terms of the correlation of the judges’ 
and the targets’ answers (target scoring) and in terms of the correlation of the targets with a 
trained observer who had also rated the presence of emotions (expert consensus scoring). The 
list of emotions contained the following elements: fearful, happy, indifferent, sad, angry, 
joyful, hostile, affected, amused, burdened, empathic, depressed, contemptuous, interested, 
saddened, worried, delighted, abject, excited, aggrieved. The targets were selected in a 
complex procedure that accounted for the concordance between their reported emotions, the 
thematic of the video they had to watch, and the judgment of the trained observer. 
Furthermore, they should show homogeneous personality profiles. 
No examples 
No further results 
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Multimodel Emotion Recognition Test (MERT) 
(Bänziger, 2005) 
Test description 
The MERT like the Vocal-I is also based on the GVEESS with a database 224 vocal emotion 
portrayals (see the description of the Vocal-I). In a facetted design, each of 10 acted emotions 
is presented by four different types of task material (i.e., audio, video, audio+video, pictures) 
and three sentences. 
No examples 
No further results 
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Test of Emotional Abilities 
(Freudenthaler & Neubauer, 2005) 
Test description 
According to Freudenthaler and Neubauer (2005), the test idea is based on a criticism on 
existing operationalization of emotional abilities in the MSCEIT. The instruction to these 
tasks (see Branch IV operationalizations of the MSCEIT) suggest to measure emotional 
knowledge about the intended constructs (i.e., knowledge about the adequate behavior for 
emotion regulation) instead of the actual effectiveness of emotion regulation abilities (i.e., the 
typical performance). 
Subjects are presented emotionally laden scenarios and have to choose out of four alternatives 
which behavior would best describe their actual behavior in the given situation (typical 
performance). Answers are scored in terms of degree of correctness. In order to determine 
correctness, the response alternatives were rated by a panel of 10 experts for adequacy or 
effectiveness on a 1-4-point-scale (most adequate to least adequate). 
Examples (Freudenthaler & Neubauer, 2004) 
Intrapersonal emotional abilities 
A close friend has told you that he doesn‘t trust and understand you. You are very sad about 
it. Response alternatives: a) I talk with him about it in order to find out the reason. b) I 
analyze the communication problem. c) I try to get his confidence back. d) I try to accept it.  
Interpersonal emotional abilities 
A good friend was recently abandoned by his/her partner. He/she severely suffers from it. 
Response alternatives: a) I suggest to go out more often together then. b) I refer to the 
negative attributes of the ex-partner and emphasize the advantages of being a single. c) I tell 
him/her that I will be available for him/her if he/she would like it. d) I assure him/her that 
he/she will find a new partner soon. 
Further results 
Freudenthaler & Neubauer (2005, 2007) could replicate results about the validity of their test. 
Applying the typical performance instruction resulted in larger correlations with personality 
traits and self-reported emotional intelligence, and lower correlations with academic 
intelligence tests. Applying the traditional maximum performance instruction to the same test, 
the reverse correlation pattern was found. 
However, the authors could not provide evidence about the underlying requirements of their 
test beyond the dispositional tendencies assessed by personality trait inventories. Furthermore, 
the test could not yet prove incremental validity in the prediction of relevant external criteria. 
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Situational Test of Emotional Understanding (STEU) 
(MacCann, 2006) 
Test description 
The test development was based on the taxonomic principles of the appraisal theory of the 
structure of emotions (Roseman, 2001). In short, the taxonomy postulates that the appraisal of 
emotions depends on the surrounding circumstances. These circumstances are classified 
according to seven dimensions (e.g., “relief is caused by appraisals of circumstance-caused, 
certainty, motive consistency, and aversive stimuli”, p. 45). Item construction was based on 
this taxonomy and thus allows standards-based scoring. 
Test contains 42 multiple-choice items. For each of 14 emotions, three structurally equivalent 
items were given: one of work context, one of private context, and one that described the 
abstract features of the situation and was thus context-less. 
Examples (MacCann, 2006, p. 93) 
“Xavier completes a difficult task on time and under budget. Xavier is most likely to feel? 
(a) surprise, (b) pride, (c) relief, (d) hope, (e) joy.” 
Further results 
(see Chapter 5.2.4 for an overview of analysis assessing the implications of different response 
formats) 
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Situational Test of Emotional Management (STEM) 
(MacCann, 2006) 
Test description 
This test is based on the Situational Judgment Test approach and followed the construction 
rational suggested by McDaniel and Nguyen (2001). Item contents were derived from semi-
structured interviews. They were selected according to content-domain of life and the type of 
emotion. Response alternatives were generated in a separate step by asking people about their 
actual and ideal responses. Finally, experts (i.e., counselors, emotional intelligence 
researchers, life coaches) were asked to respond to the items both in multiple coice format (13 
experts) and ratings-based format (6 experts). 
The final test contains two forms A and B (multiple-choice and ratings-based, respectively). 
Subjects have to identify the most effective solution / the degree of effectiveness for the 
solution of an emotional problem. 
Examples (MacCann, 2006, p. 94) 
multiple choice: 
“Clayton has been overseas for a long time and returns to visit his family. So much has 
changed that Clayton feels left out. What action would be the most effective for Clayton? 
a. Nothing, it will sort itself out soon enough 
b. Tell his family he feels left out. 
c. Spend time listening and getting involved again. 
d. Reflect that relationships can change over time.” 
 
ratings-based: 
“Clayton has been overseas for a long time and returns to visit his family. So much has 
changed that Clayton feels left out. How effective are each of the following actions for 
Clayton? [on 6-point scale from not at all effective to extremely effective). 
(a) Nothing, it will sort itself out soon enough 
(b) Tell his family he feels left out 
(c) Spend time listening and getting involved again 
(d) Reflect that relationships can change over time” 
Further results 
(see Chapter 5.2.4 for an overview of analysis assessing the implications of different response 
formats) 
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Appendix B: Letter of Information to Targets 
 
Sehr geehrte/r Frau / Herr, 
 
zunächst möchten wir uns recht herzlich bei Ihnen bedanken, dass Sie uns und der 
Wissenschaft behilflich sein möchten. Damit Sie sich endgültig dafür entscheiden können, 
uns bei der so genannten Itemerstellung zu helfen, möchten wir Sie im Folgenden umfassend 
über den geschätzten Aufwand und Ablauf und über generelle Voraussetzungen informieren. 
Dieses Informationsschreiben sollte Ihnen eine Einschätzung darüber ermöglichen, was genau 
auf Sie und gegebenenfalls auf Dritte zukommt und Sie darüber informieren, was mit dem 
von uns angefertigten Bild- und Tonmaterial geschieht. 
 
Über uns 
 
Wir sind Mitarbeiter in einem Forschungsprojekt an der Universität Magdeburg. Unser 
Projekt beschäftigt sich mit der Erfassung sozialer Intelligenzleistungen. Dafür möchten wir 
vollkommen neue bzw. neuartige Testinstrumente erstellen, die geeignet sind, sozial 
intelligente Leistungen zu erfassen. Unserer Auffassung nach besteht soziale Intelligenz zu 
einem großen Teil aus der Fähigkeit, andere Personen in unterschiedlichen Situationen gut 
einschätzen zu können, d.h. ihre Gefühle und Gedanken identifizieren, verstehen und ihr 
Verhalten interpretieren zu können. Bisherige Testinstrumente versuchen, diese Fähigkeit auf 
Basis völlig dekontextualisierter Informationen zu erfassen. Unserer Meinung nach entspricht 
dies kaum den realen Anforderungen, die an jeden sozial agierenden Menschen gestellt 
werden. Die mangelnden Forschungserfolge zur Identifizierung sozial intelligenter 
Leistungen führen wir zum Teil auf diese in unseren Augen veraltete Testidee zurück. 
Stattdessen ziehen wir eine Reihe von Kontextinformationen hinzu, um eine möglichst gute 
Einschätzung einer Person abgeben zu können. Auf Grundlage dieser Überlegungen entstand 
eine Testidee, die in der Frage des Kontextes von bisherigen Ansätzen abweicht. Um diese 
Testidee zu verwirklichen, brauchen wir Sie. 
 
Ablauf 
 
Wir, d.h. zwei Mitarbeiter der Universität Magdeburg, möchten Sie gerne über einen 
Zeitraum von einem bis drei Tagen begleiten, um in unterschiedlichen Situationen Bild-, Ton- 
und Videoaufnahmen von Ihnen und den mit Ihnen interagierenden Personen zu machen. 
Dabei sind wir sowohl an beruflichen als auch an privaten Situationen interessiert. Sie können 
jeweils im Voraus bestimmen, wann und in welchen Situationen Sie uns erlauben möchten, 
Sie zu begleiten. Eine Situationsauswahl sollte in jedem Fall vorab mit uns getroffen werden, 
da wir insbesondere an Interaktionssituationen interessiert sind und diese sowohl im privaten 
als auch im beruflichen Umfeld abbilden möchten. Denjenigen Personen, von denen Sie 
schon sicher wissen, dass Sie Ihnen in dieser Zeit begegnen werden, können im Vorab 
dieselben Informationen zugehen. Selbstverständlich müssen wir auch von diesen Personen 
eine Einverständniserklärung einholen. 
Wir werden selbstverständlich versuchen, so unsichtbar wie möglich zu sein und Sie bitten, so 
wenig wie möglich Notiz von uns zu nehmen. Uns kommt es bei den Aufnahmen nicht auf 
ein bestimmtes Verhalten an, sondern wir sind vor allem daran interessiert, ganz natürliches 
Verhalten in Bild und Ton festzuhalten. Zusätzlich zu den Bild- und Tonmaterialien sollen 
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auch von Ihnen geschriebene Informationen gesammelt werden. Dazu zählen wir vor allem 
von Ihnen verfasste E-Mails, Kurznotizen, Briefe, etc. Selbstverständlich dürfen Sie auch hier 
darüber entscheiden, welche dieser Materialien Sie uns zukommen lassen wollen. 
Während der Aufnahmen bzw. in passenden Unterbrechungen werden wir Sie über Ihre 
Gedanken- und Gefühlswelt befragen, die sich in den Bildern, in dem Gesprochenen und 
Geschriebenen widerspiegelt. Dazu werden wir Sie zu verschiedenen Zeitpunkten bitten, 
kurze Fragebögen auszufüllen. Diese Informationen, die Sie uns geben, werden später als 
Grundlage für die Testerstellung dienen. Der eigentliche Test wird später darin bestehen, dass 
die jeweiligen Testpersonen, denen die gesammelten Bild-, Ton- und Textmaterialien gezeigt 
werden, an bestimmten Stellen eine Einschätzung über die Gedanken- und Gefühlswelt der 
gesehenen Personen abgeben sollen. Diese Einschätzung wird mit den von den jeweiligen 
Personen selbst gemachten Angaben verglichen. Aus dem Grad an Übereinstimmung wird 
sich dann die Qualität der Leistung ergeben. 
Nach Abschluss der Aufzeichnungen erhalten Sie die Möglichkeit, das gesammelte Material 
zu sichten und gegebenenfalls bestimmte Szenen von der weiteren Verarbeitung 
auszuschließen. Bei dieser abschließenden Sichtung des Materials werden wir Ihnen 
gegebenenfalls zu einzelnen Szenen weitere Fragen bezüglich Ihrer Gedanken und Gefühle 
stellen, etwa an welchen Hinweisreizen in Bild und Ton Sie Ihre eigenen Gefühle und 
Gedanken in der jeweiligen Szene identifizieren würden. Zuletzt werden wir Sie darum bitten, 
einen Fragebogen auszufüllen, der Bereiche Ihrer Persönlichkeit erfasst. Wiederum wird es 
hier Aufgabe der späteren Testperson sein, Ihre Persönlichkeit in diesen Bereichen möglichst 
zutreffend einzuschätzen. 
 
Weiterverarbeitung 
 
Nachdem Sie das Material abschließend gesichtet und gegebenenfalls einzelne Szenen 
ausgeschlossen haben, werden wir das Material weiterverarbeiten. Diese Weiterverarbeitung 
wird vor allem darin bestehen, das Material zu kürzen. Für den finalen Test benötigen wir ein 
„Szenario“ von 10 bis 15 Minuten Dauer, das die relevanten und interessierenden 
Informationen möglichst komprimiert aber realistisch darstellt. Beachten Sie, dass wir beim 
Zusammenschnitt des Materials dieses möglichst authentisch lassen wollen. Auch wir sind 
nicht daran interessiert, realitätsferne Informationen darzustellen, da in der Realitätsnähe der 
Darstellung der eigentliche Sinn der Testidee liegt. 
Ziel der Nachbereitung ist es, ein Szenario zu erstellen, in dem relevante 
Hintergrundinformationen über Sie dargestellt werden und auf dessen Basis die Testpersonen 
versuchen sollen, Sie so gut wie möglich „kennen zu lernen“ und daraufhin einzuschätzen. Ob 
das Material dann tatsächlich in den Test integriert wird, entscheiden wir nach dem 
Zusammenschnitt und nach diversen Vortestungen. Bei diesen Vortestungen wird überprüft, 
ob die Aufgaben dazu geeignet sind, sozial intelligente Leistungen zu messen. Dabei kommt 
es vor allem darauf an, wie schwer es den Testpersonen fällt, die richtige Einschätzung zu 
treffen und ob es dabei besser oder schlechter geeignete Testpersonen gibt. 
Nur für den Fall, dass das Szenario die genannten Anforderungen erfüllt, wird es in der 
Hauptuntersuchung eingesetzt. In der Hauptuntersuchung wird wiederum geprüft, ob wir mit 
den Tests (dazu gehören dann auch weitere andersartige Aufgaben, die mit der hier 
beschriebenen Aufgabe nichts zu tun haben) überhaupt soziale Intelligenz erfassen konnten. 
Erst wenn alle diese Voraussetzungen erfüllt sind, wird darüber entschieden, ob der Test in 
der Endform publiziert wird. Eine Testpublikation enthielte dann alle Bild-, Ton- und 
Textmaterialien, da die letztendlichen Testkäufer in der Lage sein müssen, die Antworten 
ihrer Testpersonen auf dieser Basis auszuwerten. Verlegt würde der Test von einem 
Fachverlag für psychologische Testverfahren. Es würde sich also um die wissenschaftliche 
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Publikation eines Verfahrens handeln, dass von Fachleuten erworben und eingesetzt werden 
soll. 
Wie sie sehen, ist es zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt noch ungewiss, ob die Hürden zu einer 
erfolgreichen Testerstellung überwunden werden können. Sollte dies jedoch der Fall sein, 
werden wir den Test publizieren. 
 
Rechtliche Aspekte / Datenschutz 
 
Für jede Form der Aufzeichnung (in Bild, Ton und Schrift), die wir von Ihrer Person oder von 
Dritten sammeln und später den Testpersonen präsentieren, gilt, dass sämtliche 
personenbezogenen Informationen (Namen, Adressen, Arbeitsplatz, u. ä.) eliminiert werden. 
Damit werden keinerlei Daten über Sie, Ihre Familie oder Ihre Arbeit an Dritte 
weitergegeben, so dass der Datenschutz vollständig gewahrt wird. Wir sichern Ihnen 
außerdem zu, dass wir die Aufzeichnungen und die darin enthaltenen Informationen nicht 
verzerrt darstellen werden. 
 
Wir brauchen von Ihnen zu zwei Aspekten Ihr Einverständnis: 
1. Sie erklären sich damit einverstanden, dass wir Bild-, Video- und 
Tonaufnahmen von Ihnen anfertigen. 
2. Sie erklären sich damit einverstanden, dass wir das entstandene und von Ihnen 
gesichtete Material zu wissenschaftlichen Zwecken nutzen und weiterverarbeiten. 
 
Unter der Nutzung und Weiterverarbeitung zu wissenschaftlichen Zwecken verstehen wir: 
- Auswahl und Schnitt des Materials zur Erstellung eines 10-15 minütigen 
Szenarios, das Sie in Ihrem privaten und beruflichen Umfeld darstellt 
- Darbietung dieses Szenarios im Rahmen von wissenschaftlichen 
Untersuchungen als Grundlage für Leistungstests zur Erfassung von sozialer 
Intelligenz 
- Publikation der Materialien im Rahmen von wissenschaftlichen Arbeiten (d.h. 
Präsentationen auf Fachtagungen, in Fachzeitschriften und im Rahmen von 
Testpublikationen) 
- Nur die Testpublikation betreffend: Ihre schriftlichen Antworten in den 
Fragebögen zur Erfassung Ihrer Gefühls- und Gedankenwelt und Ihrer Persönlichkeit 
werden ausschließlich im Rahmen der Testpublikation veröffentlicht, da sie den 
Testkäufern zur eigenständigen Auswertung der Tests dienen muss. Diese 
Informationen werden den späteren Testpersonen nicht zur Verfügung gestellt. 
 
Ihre Einverständniserklärung umfasst den Verzicht auf eine Beteiligung an etwaigen Erträgen 
aus Testverkäufen.  
 
Aus urheberrechtlichen Gründen können wir Ihnen das angefertigte Bild- und Tonmaterial 
leider nicht aushändigen. 
 
Mit unserer Unterschrift unter dieses Schreiben sichern wir Ihnen zu, dass wir die 
datenschutzrechtlichen Vorgaben erfüllen und dass wir die von Ihnen aufgenommen und 
gesichteten Materialien ausschließlich im Rahmen der oben aufgeführten wissenschaftlichen 
Zwecke nutzen werden. 
 
Zusammenfassung 
 
Hier noch einmal die entscheidenden Informationen im Überblick: 
12   Appendix   
 376 
 
- Bedenken Sie den Aufwand: Je nach der Verfügbarkeit von „interessanten“ 
Szenen werden wir ein bis drei Tage lang zu bestimmten Tageszeiten Ihre Begleiter 
sein. 
- Bedenken Sie, dass nicht nur Sie, sondern auch Ihnen nahestehende Dritte 
betroffen sein können. 
- Bedenken Sie, dass Sie nach der abschließenden Sichtung des Materials keinen 
Einfluss auf die Weiterverarbeitung mehr haben. Allerdings sichern wir Ihnen zu, dass 
die Weiterverarbeitung sich auf die oben genannten Schritte beschränkt. 
- Bedenken Sie, dass wir Ihnen das Bild- und Tonmaterial aus 
urheberrechtlichen Gründen im Falle einer Testpublikation nicht aushändigen können. 
- Bedenken Sie, dass die Möglichkeit besteht, dass das Material zu einem Test 
verarbeitet wird, der u.U. als Leistungstest zu sozialer Intelligenz publiziert wird. 
 
Falls dieses Schreiben noch Fragen offen lässt, wenden Sie sich bitte an uns. Wir sind gerne 
bereit, Unklarheiten zu beseitigen. Lesen Sie bitte auch die Einverständniserklärung nochmals 
gründlich durch. Sie fasst die wesentlichen Punkte nochmals zusammen. 
 
Wir würden uns freuen, wenn Sie uns unterstützen würden. Wenn Sie sich dazu entschließen, 
unterschreiben Sie bitte die Einverständniserklärung in zweifacher Ausführung, ein Formular 
und dieses Schreiben verbleiben bei Ihnen. 
 
Unten aufgeführt finden Sie die Namen Ihrer Ansprechpartner und die Kontaktinformationen, 
unter denen Sie uns erreichen können. 
 
Wir hoffen auf eine positive Antwort Ihrerseits, auf gute Zusammenarbeit und verbleiben mit 
freundlichen Grüßen, 
 
 
(Heinz-Martin Süß)  (Kristin Seidel)  (Susanne Weis) 
 
Postadresse 
Institut f. Psychologie (IPSY) 
Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg 
Postfach 4120 
39016 Magdeburg 
 
Telefon 
 
0391/67-18468  0391/67-18486  0391/67-18486 
 
Telefon Sekretariat: 
 
0391/67-18464 
 
email: 
heinz-martin.suess@gse-w.uni-magdeburg.de
kristin.seidel@gse-w.uni-magdeburg.de
susanne.weis@gse-w.uni-magdeburg.de
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Appendix C: Course of Testing in Study 1 Including Planned Task Durations 
Study 1 – Testing day 1 
 
No. Test Planned 
Duration / min. 
1 General instructions / Biographical Questionnaire 5 
2 SRT 10 
3 SPv1 15 
4 Recognition of Repeated Tones 10 
5 SMa1 Part 1 15 
6 Sound Recognition 15 
7 Chord-Decomposition 15 
8 Break 10 
9 BIS Part 1 15 
10 SMf1+2 15 
11 Scenario 1: Matthias (SU_MM) 15 
12 Questionnaire: MF – MMPI-2 10 
13 Questionnaire: Hearing Screening Inventory 5 
14 Break 10 
15 Mouse Task 10 
16 Tonal Analogies 10 
17 SPp1 15 
18 SMa1 Part 2 15 
19 Dissected Sentences 15 
20 Break 10 
21 BIS Part 2 15 
22 Scenario 2: Katharina (SU_KL) 15 
23 Questionnaire: Social Behavior 15 
 Sum 285 
 
 
 
12   Appendix   
 378 
 
 
 
 
Study 1 – Testing day 2 
 
No. Test Planned 
Duration / min. 
1 SPa1 Part 1 15 
2 NEO-FFI 10 
3 Tonal Figures 15 
4 Rhythm Reproduction 15 
5 Recognition of Repeated Voices 10 
6 AIT-P 25 
7 Break 10 
8 SMp1 / SMp 2 15 
9 BIS Part 3 15 
10 Scenario 3: Renate (SU_RF) 15 
11 SMv 1+2 20 
12 Break 10 
13 SPf1 15 
14 Masked Words 15 
15 Questionnaire: Computer Experience 5 
16 Tonal Series 15 
17 Audiobook 10 
18 SPa1 Part 2 15 
19 Break 10 
20 Readspeed 5 
21 BIS Part 4 15 
22 BIS Part 5 15 
23 Scenario 4: Christoph (SU_CP) 15 
 Sum 305 
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BIS-Tasks (selection and order, 5 test parts) 
Part 1 cell assignment IT WT ∑ 
VS warming up 0:40 1:30 2:10 
SI SN 0.20 0.50 1:10 
FA RF 0:30 3:30 4:00 
WM MV 0:55 1:30 2:25 
RD RN 0:40 3:20 4:00 
ZZ MN 1:15 0:50 1:05 
∑    15:50 
 
Part 2 cell assignment IT WT ∑ 
SV RV 1:30 1:30 3:00 
WE MF 0:50 0:40 1:30 
WS RV 0:30 1:00 1:30 
OE SF 0:30 0:30 1:00 
TL RN 0:20 5.00 5:20 
OG MF 1:55 1:40 3:35 
∑    15:55 
 
Part 3 cell assignment IT WT ∑ 
ZN RN 0:50 3:50 4:40 
KW SV 0:15 0:30 0:45 
AN RF 1:00 1:45 2:45 
XG SN 0:50 1:00 1:50 
WA RV 1:00 1:30 2:30 
ZP MN 2:20 2:00 4:20 
∑    16:50 
 
Part 4 cell assignment IT WT ∑ 
TM RV 1:00 1:00 2:00 
BD SF 0:20 0:50 1:10 
SC RN 1:30 2:45 4:15 
TG SV 1:20 0:40 2:00 
RZ SN 0:45 0.50 1:35 
SL RV 2:30 1:40 4:10 
∑    15:10 
 
Part 5 cell assignment IT WT ∑ 
AW RF 1:10 2:15 3:25 
PS MV 1:20 1:15 2:25 
BR RN 1:00 3:30 4:30 
BG RF 1:45 2:10 3:55 
FM MF 1:35 1:30 2:05 
∑    17:30 
∑∑    81:15 
Note. IT Instruction time 
 WT Working time 
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Appendix D: Academic Intelligence Standard Scores Based on the Normative Sample 
of the BIS Study 1 and 2 (Jäger et al., 1997) and Correlations with Age Study 2 
(a) Standard scores of academic intelligence based on the normative sample of the BIS 
 
 Sample Study 1 (N = 126) Sample Study 2 (N = 182) 
 M SD Min Max M SD Min Max 
Cell SF 99.859 10.089 78.00 125.00 93.890 7.472 75.33 117.67 
Cell SV 100.895 10.727 72.00 126.00 103.861 8.003 84.67 126.67 
Cell SN 97.160 9.133 78.00 120.67 94.013 8.504 76.67 120.00 
Cell MF 101.249 8.364 80.33 120.33 97.623 8.236 76.33 116.67 
Cell MV 99.944 8.308 79.50 121.50 96.220 7.729 78.67 114.33 
Cell MN 102.488 7.973 80.00 123.50 99.729 7.241 83.00 117.33 
Cell RF 100.562 6.746 85.75 116.75 98.260 9.334 81.00 123.00 
Cell RV 103.624 7.260 86.00 119.80 101.969 8.355 85.33 124.33 
Cell RN 98.634 7.546 83.40 117.40 95.498 8.894 78.67 117.00 
BIS-Speed 99.305 6.911 83.22 119.61 97.258 6.208 81.33 119.33 
BIS-Memory 101.227 6.099 84.28 116.83 97.857 6.364 80.11 112.33 
BIS-Reasoning 100.940 5.864 87.00 114.42 98.576 7.287 83.44 118.22 
BIS-Verbal 101.488 6.558 85.23 116.10 100.683 6.057 87.89 118.89 
BIS-Figural 100.557 5.554 88.31 114.39 96.594 6.062 84.11 112.44 
BIS-Numerical 99.427 6.548 86.82 118.50 96.413 6.546 83.22 118.11 
BIS-g 100.490 4.817 89.95 113.09 97.897 5.266 87.44 115.96 
 
(b) Correlations with age prior to and after age standardization (age groups: 23-25; 26-30; 
31-35; 36-40); N = 182, *p < .05, **p<.01 
 
 Correlations with age 
 Prior to standardization After standardization 
Cell SF -.083 .188* 
Cell SV .124 .064 
Cell SN .017 .204** 
Cell MF -.153* -.002 
Cell MV -.166* .054 
Cell MN -.153* .049 
Cell RF -.316** .051 
Cell RV -.193** .055 
Cell RN -.112 .164* 
BIS-Speed .028 .197** 
BIS-Memory -.193** .041 
BIS-Reasoning -.254** .111 
BIS-Verbal -.102 .075 
BIS-Figural -.265** .109 
BIS-Numerical -.102 .178* 
BIS-g -.182* .145 
 
 Appendix E: Example Picture Sequence and Item for SMp2 Study 2 
Example 1: Sort the following persons according to their seating arrangement at the dinner table in the last picture of the sequence. Start at the left 
hand in the front (free response). 
1 2 3 4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Example 2: Which of the following extracts was NOT part of the picture sequence? 
1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix F: Course of Testing in Study 2 Including Planned Task Durations 
Study 2 – Testing day 1 
No. Test Continue 
program with 
Planned 
Duration / min. 
1 General instruction 
Biographical Questionnaire 
 10 
2 SRT Q / Q 6 
3 Word span Q / Q 10 
4 SPf1 U / A 13 
5 Recognition of Repeated Tones R / K 12 
6 Instruction to Scenarios 
Example Scenario: Birger 
 
S 
20 
7 Scenario 1: Renate (SU_RF) P / E 25 
8 Questionnaire: Exhaustion  1 
9 Break  10 
10 BIS Part 1  17 
11 SPa1 I / S 15 
12 SMp1 E / S 12 
13 SPf2 C / H 13 
14 Memory Updating – Numerical Q / Q 10 
15 Scenario 2: Bringfried (SU_BS) M / E 20 
16 Break  5 
17 BIS Part 2  15 
18 Masked Words C / K 8 
19 SMv1  14 
20 Dissected sentences T / G 12 
21 Scenario 3: Conny (SU_CK) A / N 20 
22 Questionnaire: Empathy  5 
23 Questionnaire: Depression  5 
24 Break  10 
25 Readspeed (RS) Z / W 10 
26 SPv2 U / N / D / E 8 
27 SMp2 R / B 20 
28 Scenario 4: Christoph (SU_CP) A / R 20 
29 Questionnaire: NEO-FFI  10 
30 Questionnaire: Exhaustion  1 
 Sum  367 
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Study 2 – Testing day 2 
No. Test Continue 
program with 
Planned 
Duration / min. 
1 Mouse Task (MT) Q / Q 6 
2 SPp1 U / E 8 
3 SMa2 L / L 20 
4 PONS Video Version (PONS-V) W 12 
5 Dot span Q / Q 10 
6 Scenario 5: Katharina (SU_KL) A / S 20 
7 Questionnaire: Exhaustion  1 
8 Break  5 
9 BIS Part 3  25 
10 Rhythm S 6 
11 SMv2  13 
12 SPa2 E 13 
13 Tonal series R / I 10 
14 Scenario 6: Friedrich (SU_FB) S / T 20 
15 Break  20 
16 BIS Part 4  22 
17 SMa1 G 15 
18 SPp2 E / S 12 
19 Audiobook U 9 
20 Scenario 7: Hannah (SU_HR) N / D 20 
21 Questionnaire: AES  7 
22 Break  10 
23 SPv1 U / N / D / S 14 
24 Scenario 8: Matthias (SU_MM) O 20 
25 SMf1+2 K / A 22 
26 Questionnaire: Social Behavior / 
Altruism 
 10 
27 Long Term Memory (LTM) L / T 15 
28 Questionnaire: Exhaustion  1 
 Sum  367 
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BIS-Tasks (selection and order, 4 test parts) 
Part 1 cell assignment IT WT ∑ 
VS -- 0:40 1:30 2:10 
SI SN 0:20 0:50 1:10 
WM MV  0:40 
1:30 
 
2:10 
RD RN 0:40 3:20 4:00 
ZS SF 0:30 1:00 1:30 
ZZ MN  1:00 
0:50 
 
1:50 
WS RV 0:30 1:00 1:30 
∑    14:20 
 
Part 2 cell assignment IT WT ∑ 
WE MF  0:30 
0:40 
 
1:10 
UW SV 0:20 0:50 1:10 
AN RF 1:00 1:45 2:45 
XG SN 0:50 1:00 1:50 
WA RV 1:00 1:30 2:30 
ZP MN 0:20 2:00 
2:00 
 
4:20 
BD SF 0:20 0:50 1:10 
∑    14:55 
 
Part 3 cell assignment IT WT ∑ 
ZN RN 0:50 3:40 4:30 
ST MV  1:00 
2:00 
 
3:00 
RZ SN 0:45 0:50 1:35 
TM RV 1:00 1:00 2:00 
XG_new SN – new task 0:50 1:00 1:50 
OG MF  1:30 
1:40 
 
3:10 
TG SV 1:20 0:40 2:00 
CH RF 1:00 3:00 4:00 
∑    22:05 
 
Part 4 cell assignment IT WT ∑ 
FM MF 0:45 0:50 
1:30 
 
3:05 
SC RN 1:30 2:45 4:15 
OE SF 0:30 0:30 1:00 
ZW MN  1:00 
2:00 
 
3:00 
AW RF 1:10 2:15 3:25 
SI_new SN – new tasks 0:20 0:50 1:10 
KW SV 0:15 0:30 0:45 
PS MV 0:20 1:00 
1:15 
 
2:35 
∑    19:15 
∑∑    68:35 
Note. IT Instruction time 
 WT Working time 
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Appendix G: Correlations of Social Perception Tasks and Speed Baseline Measures 
With BIS Cells and Within the Baseline Measures and the BIS Cells 
(a) Correlations of standardized residuals of social perception tasks with social understanding 
 SPv1_res SPv2_res SPa1_res 
a
SPa2_res SPp1_res SPp2_res SPf1_resb SPf2_res 
SUv .020 -.039 .037 .102 .102 -.014 .154* .096 
SUa -.003 -.027 -.112 -.013 -.016 -.040 -.060 .011 
SUp -.032 -.095 -.071 -.030 -.071 -.116 -.011 -.055 
SUf -.020 -.067 .004 .071 -.011 -.026 .141 .072 
Note. a N = 181; b N = 177; _res = standardized residual after controlling for the baseline 
variance 
(b) Intercorrelations within the BIS cells and of the BIS cells with the speed baseline 
measures and the original social perception tasks 
 BIS cells 
 RV RF RN MV MF MN SV SF SN 
RF .470**    
RN .420** .622**   
MV .330** .191** .332**   
MF .214** .374** .337** .462**   
MN .190* .205** .338** .566** .482**   
SV .364** .150* .247** .353** .261** .257**   
SF .199** .145 .092 .152* .282** .180* .433**  
SN .459** .467** .686** .265** .236** .267** .496** .257** 
SRT -.197** -.158* -.111 -.139 -.075 -.095 -.278** -.343** -.198**
MT -.189* -.323** -.211** -.117 -.132 -.048 -.087 -.126 -.115
RS -.488** -.226** -.313** -.242** -.224** -.182* -.509** -.193** -.442**
SPv1 -.430** -.206** -.194** -.261** -.228** -.210** -.394** -.175* -.261**
SPv2 -.475** -.228** -.190* -.300** -.190* -.215** -.465** -.229** -.310**
SPa1 -.089 -.093 .047 -.020 -.107 -.047 -.167* -.203** -.030
SPa2a -.227** -.187* -.079 -.135 -.157* -.008 -.204** -.220** -.043
SPp1 -.121 -.183* -.037 -.120 -.237** -.234** -.170* -.393** -.081
SPp2 -.060 -.197** -.131 -.022 -.152* -.027 -.050 -.176* -.055
SPf1b .022 -.009 .041 -.025 -.237** -.085 -.007 -.222** .084
SPf2 .051 -.032 -.065 -.119 -.096 -.070 -.108 -.077 -.007
 
(c) Intercorrelations within speed baseline tasks and with the original social perception tasks 
 SRT MT SPv1 SPv2 SPa1 a SPa2 SPp1 SPp2 SPf1b SPf2 
SRT   .303** .322** .433** .344** .421** .241** .198** .248** 
MT .313**  .148* .221** .194** .167* .491** .196** .088 .112 
RS .309** .181* .627** .792** .218** .297** .173* .175* .201** .139 
Note. a N = 181; b N = 177 
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Appendix H: Correlations Within the Personality Trait Inventories in Study 2 
 
 NEO-N NEO-E NEO-O NEO-A NEO-C Altruism EC PT 
NEO-E -.549**        
NEO-O .092 -.039       
NEO-A -.207** .324** -.108      
NEO-C -.425** .262** -.046 .191**     
Altruism .045 .212** .248** .264** .041    
EC .055 .095 .124 .336** .003 .489**   
PT -.086 .115 .229** .321** .159* .207** .130  
Depression .815** -.613** .065 -.263** -.532** -.050 .057 -.183* 
N = 182, * p < .05, ** p < .01 
 
Appendix  Chapter 12 
 387
Appendix I: Kurzfassung zur Dissertation in deutscher Sprache 
Kurzfassung zur Dissertation in deutscher Sprache 
zum Thema „Theorie und Messung Sozialer Intelligenz als Kognitives Leistungskonstrukt“, 
vorgelegt von Dipl.-Psychologin Susanne Weis 
Die Erforschung menschlicher Fähigkeiten blickt auf eine lange und erfolgreiche 
Forschungstradition zurück. Dabei steht das Fähigkeitskonstrukt der akademischen Intelligenz 
unangefochten im Zentrum der Forschung. Gleichzeitig fungiert es als Maßstab, an dem sich 
alle weiteren Kandidaten für ein neues Fähigkeitskonstrukt messen sollten. Das übergeordnete 
Ziel der vorliegenden Dissertation ist es, die Forschung zu sozialer Intelligenz als Kandidat 
für ein neues Fähigkeitskonstrukt theoretisch und methodisch aufzuarbeiten und 
weiterzuentwickeln. Dies geschieht unter Bezugnahme auf in der Literatur genannte 
konsensuale Anforderungen an ein neues Fähigkeitskonstrukt (Matthews, Zeidner & Roberts, 
2005; O’Sullivan, 1983; Schaie, 2001; Süß, 2001, 2006; Weber & Westmeyer, 2001). Dazu 
gehören eine a-priori Begriffsklärung, theoretische Einordnung in das nomologische 
Netzwerk bereits etablierter Konstrukte und die Beschränkung auf hinreichend generelle und 
kognitive Fähigkeiten. Weitere Kriterien betreffen die methodischen Voraussetzungen. Dabei 
steht die Operationalisierung anhand von objektiven Leistungsdaten sensu Cattell (1965) im 
Mittelpunkt. Außerdem soll der Nachweis konvergenter und divergenter Konstruktvalidität 
erbracht werden. Nicht zuletzt wird der Nachweis der inkrementellen Bedeutsamkeit bei der 
Vorhersage relevanter Außenkriterien verlangt (über etablierte Konstrukte hinaus). Vor 
diesem Hintergrund kann die soziale Intelligenz bislang nicht als etabliertes 
Fähigkeitskonstrukt angesehen werden 
Die spezifischeren Ziele dieser Arbeit lassen sich grob in drei Bereiche untergliedern. (1) Die 
theoretischen und methodischen Grundlagen sozialer Intelligenz als kognitives 
Fähigkeitskonstrukt sollen erarbeitet und dargelegt werden. (2) Diesen Überlegungen folgend 
soll eine Testbatterie auf Basis von Leistungstests entwickelt werden. (3) In zwei ersten 
empirischen Untersuchungen sollen die psychometrischen Eigenschaften der Skalen 
untersucht und erste Validierungsbefunde berichtet werden. 
Theoretische und methodische Grundlagen 
Die vorliegende Arbeit bezieht sich auf das Leistungsmodell sozialer Intelligenz von Weis 
und Süß (2005) (siehe auch Weis, Seidel & Süß, 2006) und auf ein integratives Modell sozial 
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kompetenten Verhaltens von Süß, Weis und Seidel (2005). Soziale Intelligenz wird als 
multidimensionales Fähigkeitskonstrukt definiert und klar von verhaltensbasierten 
Konzeptionen abgegrenzt. Jenes Leistungsmodell setzt sich zusammen aus den kognitiven 
Operationen soziales Verständnis, soziales Gedächtnis, soziale Wahrnehmung und soziale 
Kreativität. In der Literatur wird häufig soziales Wissen als weitere kognitive 
Fähigkeitskomponente angeführt (Cantor & Harlowe, 1994; Lee, Day, Meara & Maxwell, 
2002). Allerdings ist die Rolle von Wissen in Intelligenzkonstrukten umstritten, da es kultur- 
und kontextabhängig ist (Süß, 1996; Weis et al., 2006) und somit nicht allein auf kognitiven 
Anforderungen basiert. Aus diesem Grund wurde bei der nachfolgenden Testkonstruktion 
soziales Wissen nicht berücksichtigt, ebenso wie soziale Kreativität - vor allem aus 
Aufwandsgründen - nicht in die aktuelle Testkonstruktion aufgenommen wurde. 
In Erweiterung zum Kernmodell von Weis und Süß (2005) erarbeitet die vorliegende 
Dissertation weitere taxonomische Einteilungsgesichtspunkte, die aus Definitionen sozialer 
Intelligenz und verwandter Konstrukte abgeleitet sind. Der Wert einer solchen Taxonomie ist 
dreigeteilt: Zum ersten wird damit die Definition des Konstrukts auf eine heterogenere und 
repräsentativere theoretische Basis gestellt (Cattell, 1987), zum zweiten werden bislang 
unberücksichtigte Varianzquellen bei der Operationalisierung des Konstrukts systematisch 
kontrolliert, zum dritten ergeben sich aus solchen taxonomischen Überlegungen testbare 
Hypothesen über die Struktur eines Konstrukts, die möglicherweise zur Etablierung eines 
facettentheoretischen Modells beitragen. Mit den vorliegenden taxonomischen Überlegungen 
werden folgende Elemente unterschieden: (a) materialgebundene Inhalte oder damit 
verbundene soziale Stimuli (z.B. Körpersprache dargestellt in Videos, der Tonfall der Stimme 
in Tonaufzeichnungen, etc.), (b) die abgefragte Modalität (z.B. Emotionen oder Gedanken 
einer Person, über die in einer sozialen Situationen geschlussfolgert werden sollen), (c) das 
Setting (z.B. der Kontext, wie etwa beruflich oder privat) und (d) die Target- oder 
Zielpersonen, deren Emotionen oder Gedanken geschlussfolgert werden sollen. Die 
Taxonomie erhebt dabei keinen Anspruch auf Vollständigkeit und muss empirisch überprüft 
werden. 
Bei der in dieser Arbeit vorgestellten Aufarbeitung methodischer Grundlagen wird der Fokus 
allein auf Leistungstests gelegt, die der objektiven Erfassung sozialer Intelligenz und 
verwandter Konstrukte dienen. Vorherrschende methodische Fragestellungen und Probleme 
werden dargestellt und bestehend Mess- und Testansätze vor diesem Hintergrund diskutiert. 
Dabei werden sowohl formale als auch inhaltliche Probleme identifiziert wie (a) die Auswahl 
adäquater Item- und Antwortformate, (b) die Verwendung artifizieller, dekontextualisierter 
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und realitätsferner Stimuli und (c) der fehlende theoretische Bezug bei der Testkonstruktion 
und die daraus folgende mangelnde Übereinstimmung zwischen Theorie und Messkonstrukt. 
Entwicklung des Sozialen Intelligenztests Magdeburg (SIM) 
Basierend auf dem Leistungsmodell sozialer Intelligenz nach Weis und Süß (2005) und den 
bereits genannten weiterführenden taxonomischen Überlegungen wurde der Soziale 
Intelligenztest Magdeburg (SIM) entwickelt. Das Testdesign beinhaltete drei operative 
Fähigkeitsbereiche (soziales Verständnis, Gedächtnis und Wahrnehmung) und vier material-
gebundene Inhaltsbereiche (geschriebene und gesprochene Sprache, Bilder und Videos). 
Zusätzlich wurden bei allen Aufgaben sowohl das Setting der dargestellten Situationen als 
auch die Anzahl der dargestellten Personen systematisch variiert. Alle Aufgaben basieren auf 
realem Aufgabenmaterial. Im Folgenden soll der jeweilige Testansatz der einzelnen 
operativen Fähigkeitsbereiche kurz dargestellt werden: 
a) soziales Verständnis 
Soziales Verständnis wurde basierend auf einem Szenarioansatz operationalisiert. Jedes 
Szenario setzte eine Zielperson ins Zentrum der Aufgaben, deren Emotionen, Gedanken, 
Beziehungen zu Dritten und Persönlichkeitseigenschaften vom Probanden eingeschätzt 
werden sollten. Die Einschätzung erfolgte auf Basis von Aufgabenmaterialien, die den 
Inhaltsbereichen zugeordnet waren (z.B. Briefe oder Emails, Ton- oder Videoaufzeichnungen 
von Gesprächen und anderen sozialen Interaktionen). Antwortformat war eine 7-stufige 
Ratingskala, auf der die Probanden einschätzten, wie stark beispielsweise eine Emotion bei 
der Zielperson ausgeprägt war (von 1 = gar nicht bis 7 = sehr stark). Die Antworten der 
Probanden wurden anhand des sogenannten Targetscoring ausgewertet (der gewichtete Betrag 
der Differenz zwischen der Antwort der Probanden und der Antwort der Zielperson). 
b) soziales Gedächtnis 
Die Aufgaben zum sozialen Gedächtnis beinhalteten die zeitlich limitierte Darbietung von 
sozialen Stimuli mit Hilfe der bereits genannten Aufgabenmaterialien. Probanden waren 
aufgefordert sich sozial relevante Inhalte einzuprägen und später im Multiple-Choice-Format 
oder in ungebundenen Antwortformaten wiederzugeben. Die Antwortzeit war ebenfalls 
limitiert. Die Antworten wurden entsprechend des Prozentsatzes an richtigen Antworten 
ausgewertet. 
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c) soziale Wahrnehmung 
Aufgaben zur sozialen Wahrnehmung bedienten sich ebenfalls des „Targetkonzepts“. Anders 
als in den Aufgaben zum sozialen Verständnis waren Targets hier allgemein als Zielreize 
anzusehen (z.B. eine vorgegebene geschriebene oder gesprochene Aussage wie ein 
ausgesprochener Dank oder eine Zustimmung, eine bestimmte Körperbewegung oder eine 
Interaktion beispielweise in Form von Augenkontakt). Aufgabe der Probanden war es, 
vorgegebene Zielreize im Stimulusmaterial so schnell wie möglich zu erkennen und diese 
Wahrnehmung durch einen Tastendruck anzuzeigen. Das abhängige Maß war die 
Reaktionszeit richtiger Antworten. 
Die finale Testbatterie beinhaltete acht Szenarien, sechs Aufgaben im Bereich des sozialen 
Gedächtnisses und zwei Aufgaben pro Zelle aus dem Bereich der sozialen Wahrnehmung. 
Methoden und Studien 
Die der Arbeit zugrunde liegenden Fragestellungen betrafen die psychometrischen 
Eigenschaften der neu entwickelten Skalen und die Konstruktvalidität der sozialen Intelligenz 
- operationalisiert durch den SIM. Hypothesen zur Konstruktvalidierung wurden in Form von 
Strukturmodellen aufgestellt. Strukturmodelle erlauben die Überprüfung der Passung eines 
theoretischen Modells zu der empirischen Datenstruktur mit Hilfe von konfirmatorischen 
Faktorenanalysen. 
Die vorliegende Dissertation umfasste zwei empirische Studien. An Studie 1 nahmen 126 
Studenten der Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg teil, im Durchschnitt 21.35 Jahre alt 
(sd = 3.06), wobei 53.5 % der Stichprobe weiblich waren. Die Stichprobe in Studie 2 setzte 
sich aus 182 Erwachsenen zusammen, heterogen im Hinblick auf Alter, Bildung und Beruf. 
Die Probanden waren durchschnittlich 28.69 Jahre alt (sd = 5.57), 58.8 % waren weiblich. In 
beiden Studien wurde der SIM in seiner jeweils aktuellen Version eingesetzt, zudem der 
Berliner Intelligenz Strukturtest (BIS-Test; Jäger, Süß & Beauducel, 1997) und ein 
Fragebogen zur Erfassung der Big Five Persönlichkeitsfaktoren. Überdies wurde eine 
Vielzahl weiterer Instrumente eingesetzt, die nicht direkt mit den zentralen Fragestellungen in 
Zusammenhang stehen und hier nicht weiter beschrieben werden sollen. 
Ergebnisse 
Der erste Teil der Analysen befasste sich mit den psychometrischen Eigenschaften der neu 
entwickelten Skalen. Diese zeigten weitestgehend ausreichend bis gute psychometrische 
Qualität. Die Reliabilität der Skalen (Cronbach’s Alpha) zum sozialen Verständnis lag 
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zwischen .75 und .85, zum sozialen Gedächtnis bei .19 bis .84 (mit niedrigen Werten für eine 
Aufgabe auf Basis von gesprochener Sprache (.19) und zwei Aufgaben auf Basis von Bildern 
(.46 und .56)). Die sozialen Wahrnehmungsaufgaben zeigten mit .71 bis .98 die höchsten 
Reliabilitätswerte. Alle Skalen erwiesen sich als annähernd normalverteilt. 
Zur Frage der internen Struktur der sozialen Intelligenz: Konfirmatorische Faktorenanalysen 
in beiden Studien bestätigten die multidimensionale Struktur sozialer Intelligenz mit zwei 
korrelierten operativen Faktoren (soziales Verständnis und soziales Gedächtnis). Die 
Korrelation der Faktoren lag bei r = .35 in Studie 1 und r = .20 in Studie 2. Im Gegensatz zur 
ersten Studie konnte bei der zweiten Untersuchung kein übergeordneter Faktor soziale 
Intelligenz identifiziert werden. Damit stellte sich für weitere Forschung die Frage, ob nach 
Abschluss noch ausstehender Schritte der Testentwicklung soziale Intelligenz als einheitliches 
Konstrukt weiter bestehen kann. 
Zur Frage der divergenten Konstruktvalidierung: Korrelative Analysen und konfirmatorische 
Faktorenanalysen bestätigten die Unabhängigkeit der sozialen Fähigkeitsfaktoren von denen 
der akademischen Intelligenz. Zwar zeigte vor allem der Faktor soziales Gedächtnis 
substantielle Korrelationen mit dem Gedächtnisfaktor des BIS-Tests (r = .42 / .67 in 
Studie 1 / 2), allerdings konnten weiterführende Analysen zeigen, dass sowohl die Struktur 
der sozialen Intelligenz als auch die Korrelationen ihrer operativen Fähigkeitsbereiche 
erhalten blieben, wenn BIS-Varianz auspartialisiert wurde. Die sozialen Intelligenzaufgaben 
zeigten sich außerdem als weitgehend unkorreliert mit den Big Five Persönlichkeitsfaktoren. 
Diskussion 
Neben der Diskussion der eben angerissenen empirischen Ergebnisse zu psychometrischen 
Eigenschaften der Skalen und der Konstruktvalidierung bezieht sich die Diskussion vor allem 
auf den gewählten Testansatz, der mehrere diskutable Entscheidungen beinhaltet. Diese 
betreffen zunächst den Gebrauch von realistischem Aufgabenmaterial, danach die verwendete 
Scoringmethode für die Aufgaben des sozialen Verständnisses, den eigentlichen 
Konstruktionsprozess und abschließend der Lösung der sozialen Verständnisaufgaben 
zugrunde liegende Prozesse. Zukünftige Fragestellungen und Untersuchungsdesigns, die sich 
aus der vorliegenden Arbeit ergeben, werden ebenfalls aufgezeigt. 
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März 2007 Abschluss des curriculums “Sportpsychologie im Leistungssport” mit 
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Invention of an Aged and Misconceived Performance Construct’ 
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